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Abstract
This thesis aims to examine the dynamics and interplay between contextual factors and
network features and their role in SME network evolution, with a view to building a
theory of how context and features affect SME network performance outcomes. Given
the complexity of the phenomenon under investigation, a case study methodology was
employed. Specifically, four cases of Greek agrifood SME networks were selected of
which two exhibited strong performance and two relatively weak performance.
Following literature review, the influence of three categories of contextual factor
{market conditions, social cohesiveness, external institutional support), and three types
of network feature {member profile, competencies, network governance) were examined
empirically via the case studies. The research found that all six had some individual
influence on performance, but beyond this, certain patterns of interplay between factors
could be distinguished. In particular, certain positive .factors were found to counteract
the negative influence of other existing (or lacking) factors. Specifically, in terms of
network features, governance structure was found to have a countervailing effect over
negative performance outcomes produced by diverse member profile and lack of
competencies. In addition, the competencies of the constructor of the governance
structure were also important in overcoming deficiencies in other features. In terms of
network context, social cohesiveness seemed to have a countervailing effect over
contextual disincentives for network strengthening, such as unfavourable market
conditions or lack of external institutional support. Overall, the research finds that
network features are key to explaining the variability in performance displayed by SME
networks operating in a very similar context, since they moderate the impacts of external
forces on the evolution and performance outcomes of those networks. The research
concludes with a proposed framework to explain how context, features and outcomes
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The objective of this thesis is to explore the organisation and functioning of SME
networks, seeking particularly to investigate their evolution, and the implications for
performance, placing the phenomena within a socio-economic context. The purpose of
this Chapter is to set out the rationale for this study and the broad research approach
adopted. First, a conceptualisation of business networks is offered together with an
explanation of their increased popularity in both research literature and business practice
(Kanter, 1991). This section also offers an overview of the advantages of networks to
SMEs in both the private and public sectors. Next, the Chapter introduces the role of
SMEs in the Greek Agrifood Sector (GAS), and explains why a study of networks in this
sector is particularly relevant and important. The predominant position of SMEs in the
GAS is also stressed. Thereafter, the Chapter indentifies key uncertainties in the
literature, regarding SME network evolution, for which, it is argued, empirical work is
required, leading to a statement of the key research objectives of this thesis. The need for
a cross-disciplinary research approach and theoretical context is justified, which
combines sociology and marketing perspectives in the light of the dynamic and complex
phenomenon of SME network evolution. The value of the research is also described.
Finally, the Chapter presents the structure of the thesis, providing a brief description of
contents per chapter.
1.2 Business Networks and their Application to SMEs
The popularity of business networks' has increased rapidly amongst SMEs and large
firms, academics and practitioners, and private and public sectors within recent decades
due to dramatic changes in structures and conditions of international markets. Getting
involved in networks appears to be not only a 'forced' response of firms to turbulent
' Research interest in interfirm relations and networks can be traced to the very early investigation of
different 'institutional arrangements with the buying and selling of product and sendees' (Dixon, 1982;
Wilkinson, 2001, p.4). However, since the decade of 1970s network research has increased rapidly
(Borgatti and Foster, 2003) with an explosion after 1990 (Ebers, 1999).
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economic conditions inherent to globalisation, and the increased pressure from a
knowledge-driven and innovation-seeking society, but also a deliberate strategic choice
to develop new competences (Cullen, 1998; Vanhaverbeke, 2001), and especially for
SMEs to remove size-related disadvantages (Skarka, 1990; Nadvi, 1995). Indeed,
compared to large firms, the literature argues that SMEs face more severe performance-
related problems (e.g. marketing, uncertainty) due to their small scale (e.g. limited
marketing expertise, Carter and Jones-Evans, 2006). This section first offers a brief
description of the network concept, and then elaborates why business networks are an
increasing favoured approach by practitioners and academics, particularly for SMEs.
As modes of organising economic activity (Grandori, 1995), inter-firm networks have
been studied from an extensive range of theoretical disciplines including sociology,
organisational or strategic management and industrial economics. Consequently, the
conceptualisation of business networks and the empirical cases investigated vary
according to the orientation of academics in each research stream. Thus, alternative
terms such as 'coalitions' , 'partnerships', 'industrial districts' (Scott, 1988; Sabel, 1989;
Pyke et al., 1990; Pyke and Sengenberger, 1992; Baker, 1995), 'clusters' (Porter, 1990;
Van dijk and Sverrisson, 2003), French filiere (Griffon, 1989; Raikes et al., 2000),
Japanese keiretsu (Dyer, 1996), 'joint-ventures' and 'strategic alliances' (Harrigan,
1986; Anderson, 1990; Gulati, 1998) have come into regular use in the literature.
Although a tight definition of business networks would be inappropriate at this early
stage of the research, the following definition proposed by Achrol and Kotler (1999,
p. 148) outlines most of the key characteristics of a business network.
"A network organisation is an interdependent coalition of task- or skill-
specialised economic entities (independent firms or autonomous organisational
units) that operates without hierarchical control but is embedded, by dense
lateral connections, mutuality, and reciprocity, in a shared value system that
defines "membership " roles and responsibilities. "
In other words, the concept of interfirm networks generally denotes autonomous but
interdependent 'nodes' (e.g. individuals, firms, etc.) related by dense connections
('threads' or repeated exchanges) that create a unique operating environment,
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characterised by weak hierarchical control, but greater transparency, mutuality and trust
(Achrol, 1997), and shared defined values and roles. Not only novel structures, but also
the emergence of a new interfirm collaboration ethos is implied, highlighting the actors'
orientation more towards relationship-specific investments, rather than immediate gains
(e.g. price), as scholars introducing the concept of embeddedness2 of economic
exchanges in social and institutional structures have argued (Granovetter, 1985).
Consequently, some greater degree of interfirm reciprocity, incentive alignment,
information exchange, and use of 'voice before exit' (Hirschman, 1970; Powell, 1991;
Podolny and Page, 1998) are proposed as some of the defining elements of networks.
These are also used to distinguish networks from the conventional organisational forms
in economic theory (e.g. transaction cost economics), such as markets where actors'
opportunism and incentive conflicts may predominate (Baron and Hannan, 1994). In
practice, the notion of embeddedness restores the value/importance of a firm's external
linkages, which were diminished by a misleading, artificial distinction based on the legal
boundaries of a company (Richardson, 1972; Powell, 1990), between hierarchies
('inside') and markets ('outside'), and the inherent assumption that firms operate in
isolation. The firm boundaries within the network concept tend to blur (Birkinshaw and
Hagstrom, 2000; O'Reilly et al., 2003).
The popularity of the network concept is partially explained by the increased volume
and intensity of interfirm networking due to the liberalisation of former state-owned
enterprises, the availability of low cost and advanced information technology,
globalisation tendencies and the vertical 'dis-integration' of firms combined with the
outsourcing of 'non-core' activities (Blundel and Smith, 2001). Most of these changes
reflect the logic of a business transformation process, that "too big is inflexible and
inefficient", and represent opportunities for SMEs to establish strategic linkages with
large firms (Ritter and Gemunden, 2003, p. 691). However, this business transformation
is driven by conflicting market demands as Aijo (1996, p. 12) has noticed:
" Embeddedness is a metaphor denoting something that is anchored to a larger structure (Hornby, 1995).
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'Companies find themselves having simultaneously to lower their costs, improve
efficiency, raise the level ofquality and sendee, as well as speed up innovations
and the innovation cycle. Typical strategic responses to these often conflicting
demands have been flexibility, standardization and customization
Therefore, in the turbulent economic conditions inherent to globalisation, networks have
constituted an organisational response to dynamic, and sometimes contradictory
demands, including volatile, fragmented and regionally differentiated markets (e.g.
shorter product life cycles, DiMaggio, 2001), which require increased efficiency (e.g.
quality assurance and just-in-time delivery), coordination, flexibility, openness and
decentralisation (Whitford, 2005). Empirical evidence suggests that networks as a form
of organisation can use resource uncertainty productively, mitigate opportunism, and in
turn reduce transaction costs (Podolny and Page, 1998). For instance, Achrol and Kotler
(1999) point out that networks can dissipate the intensity of environmental disturbances,
permitting network members to deal with smaller and manageable parts of them. As
Milward and Provan (2006) note, most challenges faced today by organisations in both
the public and private sector, regardless of their size, exceed single organisations'
capabilities3. In fact, networks can increase the efficiency of resource usage,
competitiveness, and the capacity to plan for and address the emerging complex
problems.
In addition to the aforementioned reasons, networking is considered an important
strategic management option especially for SMEs in order to remove size-related
disadvantages e.g. resource constraints (Skarka, 1990; Nadvi, 1995; Gilmore et al.,
2000). The notion of the 'virtual organisation' in the literature conveys how small firms
through network linkages manage to pool complementary resources and attain effects of
'virtually bigger size' (Sammara and Biggero, 2001; Ritter and Gemunder, 2003).
Furthermore, a considerable body of research has provided evidence that networks foster
the emergence of entrepreneurial SMEs (Hoang and Antoncic, 2003), by providing
3
They demonstrated that decentralization, outsourcing and devolution changes within the last 25 years
resulted in a "networked government" (Kamarck, 2002), where the non-profit and private sector are
funded and provide sendees to the government.
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access to resources, advice and emotional support (Zimmer and Aldrich, 1987, Aldrich,
1995; Bruderl and Preisendorfer, 1998). Networking is also recognised as a means by
which SMEs can improve their market orientation and response to customer needs
(Blankson and Stokes, 2002). Overall, networks have been considered as appropriate
devices for both large firms and SMEs to tackle business problems (e.g. the pressure for
global expansion and flexibility, creation of superior value along the supply chain, and
R&D) that do not fit within a single firm's boundaries, but are spread along the whole
value chain (Ritter and Gemunder, 2003; Fjeldstad and Ketels, 2006; Milward and
Provan, 2006)4. Having introduced the concept of business networks and explained its
popularity and importance, the next section introduces the role of SMEs in the Greek
{ r
agrifood sector, and explains why a study of networks is particularly relevant and
important here.
1.3 SMEs and Networks in the Greek Agrifood Sector
Greek agrifood SMEs constitute the empirical focus of this research. SMEs predominate
in the Greek Agrifood Sector (GAS), since more than 90% of its production and
processing units are small-scale. The GAS makes a disproportionately high contribution
to the domestic economy relative to the European average (12.8% of GDP relative to a
European Union average of 9.6%, Eurostat, 2006). Recent years have seen the entrance
of large, multinational processing and retailing firms into the domestic market, changing
drastically the infrastructure of food markets and distribution channels
(Anastassopoulos, 2003; Salavou et al, 2004). Competition, mergers and acquisitions
have intensified (Theodorakioglou and Wright, 2000). Additionally, in the context of
CAP reform, and after the European Union's expansion, an even greater need has
emerged for agrifood SMEs to be commercially feasible and connected to each other,
4
Gummesson (2002, p. 588) states that "to learn, we must unlearn", encouraging us to relax distinctions
between tenns such as producer-consumer, primary-secondary-tertiary sectors. Both producers and
customers are active as both value users and creators and exist in networks. He explains that goods,
services, infonnation and knowledge, commonly used tenns, only constitute the means of production.
Researchers should "zoom in on the total offering". Thus, a 'new economy' can be described in tenns of
(Gummesson, 2002, p. 587): (i) the "value economy", stressing the desired output, and (ii) the "network
economy stressing the character of the input - the structure and organisation of the resources necessary
to produce value.
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reflecting the prevailing philosophy of "endogenous development" (Ray, 1999). In other
words, each territory is assumed to have some specific tangible and intangible collective
resources, offering for potential improvement in social-economic well-being (Ray,
1999). In this climate, it has become extremely difficult and undesirable for SMEs in the
GAS to operate in a fragmented, localised, commodity and production-oriented way.
In other southern European countries, agrifood SMEs have successfully developed
strong horizontal and vertical networks based on the production and marketing of high
quality, value-added end products (Bessiere, 1998; Bianchi, 2001). In many cases, this
has been achieved by building on pre-existing structures such as co-operatives or
I I
producer associations, and pre-existing relational characteristics such as strong social
cohesiveness (de Roest and Menghi, 2000). However, whilst Greece shares many of the
characteristics of other Mediterranean countries such as Italy, where strong, market-
oriented SME networks have emerged (for example, Greece has one of the largest
numbers of registered farmer co-operatives in Europe at over 6900), very few examples
of strong networks exist (van Bekkum and van Dijk, 1997). A small number of 'success
stories' such as the Zagora Apple Cooperative (ZAC), the dairy industry of Epirus
Dodoni and the union of agricultural olive oil cooperatives of Sitia3, indicates that
successful collaboration is possible. But further research is needed to elucidate the
networking behaviour of Greek agrifood SMEs, and to explore the reasons why only a
few agrifood SME networks in Greece perform satisfactorily. Such research needs to
trace the evolution of such networks over time, and compare this to the evolution of
under-performing networks, which represent the majority of SME networks in the GAS.
It is for these reasons stated above that Greek agrifood SMEs are the focus of the
empirical component of this research. In addition, although the agrifood sector is
typically comprised of a great proportion of SMEs, it is traditionally criticised for its
5
http://www.dodonidairy.com/Home/Company/Profile/Default.xm].aspx?Language=2
http://www.sitiaonline.com/aboutus.htm (13 April 2009)
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reliance on commodity production efficiencies and lack of market orientation
(Armstrong et al, 2005). Since networking is recognised as a means by which SMEs can
improve their market orientation and response to customer needs (Blankson and Stokes,
2002), this is a further reason why the GAS represents a potentially fruitful sector to
research.
1.4 The Research Problem
Having introduced the key features of business networks and the reasons for their
popularity, especially amongst SMEs, this section elucidates key issues regarding SME
networks that remain problematic and complex, particularly in relation to Greek
r f
agrifood SMEs. Empirical evidence suggests that a highly diverse range of SME
networks exist, that interact dynamically with the environments or contexts in which
they are embedded. This in turn, makes it hard to anticipate their evolution and
performance (Provan et al., 2007). In fact, despite the abundant literature on unique
capabilities of networks in creating economic opportunities for SMEs, the evolution of a
network as a whole entity is treated as a 'black box' (Bell, den Ouden, and Ziggers,
2006). If practitioners, policy makers and academics agree that networks are the
appropriate devices for stimulating the competiveness, productivity and innovation of
SMEs, then there is an urgent need for research to focus on understanding and
explaining these uncertainties regarding whole network properties, dynamic evolution
processes and their impact on network outcomes. Each of these uncertainties is
discussed in detail below, preparing the ground for the statement of the research
objectives of this thesis.
1.4.1 The Diversity of Business Networks
Whitford (2005) points out the fallacy in considering networks as identical and ignoring
variations across nations. He cites the work of Dyer (1996), Westney (2001) and Powell
(2001), who show that networks rely on long-term interpersonal commitment in Japan,
while the prominent orientation in the United States is project-specific collaborations
seeking to foster innovation. The degree of collaboration, coordination, and formality as
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well as the power distribution among network members are some of the features that
vary considerably accross empirical business networks (DiMaggio, 2001). For instance,
Powell (1990) and Harrison (1994) notice that despite the shift of capacity (i.e. vertical
integrated firms) to specialised subcontracting, the new production model has not
necessarily diminished the economic power inequality between large and small firms, by
maintaining power, finance and control at the hands of the large firm. Should these
examples be rejected as cooperative network relationships, compared to other more
genuinely perceived 'collaborative' network forms such as industrial districts? As the
reviews of Grandori (1995, 1997) and Brass (et a!., 2004), indicate, there is a vast
variety of existing network configurations, including: industrial districts, clusters,
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franchising, joint ventures, consortia, strategic alliances sub-contracting, interlocking
directories, clubs, cartels, trade associations, licensing, federations, informal
social/personal networks, filiere and other forms. With such diversity, Grandori (1997)
raises the question of whether it is meaningful to talk of business networks as a coherent
concept and whether the aforementioned empirical categorisations can be used as a basis
for comparison. She concludes that a theory-driven assessment of different properties of
networks, also linked to performance outcomes, needs to be undertaken. Types of
collaboration and networking are expected to vary over numerous dimensions (e.g.
vertical versus horizontal networks, mono-sectoral and cross-sectoral networks,
territorial versus non-territorial, "goal-directed" versus "serendipitous" networks, and
formal versus informal agreements).
To date however, this step forward in the research has hardly been made, because the
interfirm relationship and network literature is very fragmented, due to different
academic backgrounds, focus and methods used (Ritter and Gemunder, 2003). For
instance, in general, European researchers focus on understanding realities of interfirm
interactions, by collecting qualitative data, while US researchers used quantitative
methods to analyse the structure and management of relationship ties. Araujo and
Easton (1996) identify more than 10 different 'network schools'. Particularly, this
diversity signals a need for identifying a set of universal properties-dimensions for
describing a business network, (with emphasis on those networks including SMEs).
Structural properties and governance mechanisms6 borrowed from the literature could be
used for this assessment (Amit and Zott, 2001). The current research seeks to respond to
these calls, in the context of investigating Greek agrifood SMEs' networks. This would
be a valuable investigation in practical terms for both academics and practitioners (e.g.
managers, policy makers), because it will facilitate the comparison of different empirical
forms of networking governance, the observation of the evolution of these features' over
time and their association with particular performance outcomes. Overall, it would assist
in the development of more appropriate theory-driven classification of networks. The
evidence presented suggests that stakeholders have relied, thus far, upon empirical and
convenient notions of business networks, which inserts high heterogeneity in their
approach.
1.4.2 The Dynamic and Embedded Character of Business Networks
Leading on from the uncertainty stemming from the diversity of network arrangements
and interfirm collaborations, there is a problem of fully understanding the dynamic
change of networks and their embeddedness in social (cultural) and institutional
contexts7 (e.g. legal, political and economic environment-Powell, 1990). If stakeholders
agree that networks are worthy to be established, then it is necessary not only to be able
to define them using a set of universal properties, but also to predict their evolution and
how contexts can influence this. Empirical evidence has revealed that the interfirm
relationships, network structures, network actors' perceptions and behaviours are not
static (Johannisson, 1996), they influence and are influenced by the network
environment (Johannisson, 1986; Hakansson and Johanson, 2001). An interactive
process was suggested to occur at multiple levels (Galaskiewicz and Wasserman, 1994;
6 Governance refers to the mechanisms that pennit a network to exist (trust, power etc.), whilst structure
refers to the picture drawn by network strong and weak ties, as well as the position of each firm in the
network.
7
Crouch and Farrell (2004, p.8) state that "institutional systems tend to crystalise around coherent logics
of ordering, creating path dependencies and 'lock-in'", implying that network members may 're-discover"
the alternative paths when environment changes set new demands. Hall and Soskice (2001) explain how
national systems influence firms though 'hard-to-copy' and self-reinforcing institutes such as trading
systems.
23
Venkatraman and Lee, 2004) primarily referring to individual actors, the network as a
whole entity and the wider environment. But how should a meaningful conceptualisation
of network evolution and the interplay with network context be arrived at, in light of the
fact that most studies have not systematically distinguished between the three
aforementioned levels or categorized the contextual aspects researched? For instance, it
is unclear at which level the stimulus for change is generated and how this is transmitted
to the other two levels. In existing research, emphasis placed on investigating the
dynamic process and the context's influence varies considerably, raising questions as to
how intangible and complex phenomena such as 'network evolution' and 'network
context influence' can be fully comprehended, distinguished, expressed and measured in
tangible ways by both practitioners and academics. Yet, there are more uncertainties
associated with the role of the network actors, for instance to what extent do they
preserve their freedom to respond differently to a stimulus for change derived from their
environment? Is it possible to agree on a universal set of contextual factors, which
represent common key influences in all empirical network configurations? Furthermore,
what role does network governance play, referring to both formal and informal
governance mechanisms? Has it a self-reinforcing character? According to Provan et al,
(2007), a literature gap also appears to exist in discussing network governance
mechanisms explicitly, with few exceptions (Provan and Milward, 1995; Johnsen et al.,
1996; Bazzoli et al., 1998).
Finally, three fundamental steps for effective management of networks involve: (i)
sorting out what are the essential universal properties-dimensions to describe different
empirical network configurations (e.g. structural properties and governance
mechanisms), (ii) tracking and analysing the evolution of these properties and (iii)
identifying the impact of a set of universal contextual factors on this evolution. As
Achrol and Kotler, (1999), Ford et al., (2002) and Milward and Provan (2006) point out,
since networks usually are characterized by informal authority structures, a new range of
marketing and relationship management skills are required, which emphasise
negotiation, coordination and conflict management, in order to address problems and
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challenges (e.g. 'free riders', goal consensus, gaining legitimacy, ensuring commitment
etc.). As Wilkinson (2001, p.55) and Axelrod and Cohen, (1999) explain, "network
management is not simply a matter of controlling and directing the behaviour of other
network members, it is more about participating, responding and learning about the
problems and opportunities that emerge". Therefore, recognizing patterns in the way that
network properties evolve and the implications that this evolution has for managing
interfirm relationships and network configurations would be valuable in practical terms.
Additionally, it would provide a more precise answer to the question: to what extent do
actors preserve their freedom and power in altering a network's evolution towards a
favourable direction?
In summary, although the literature has demonstrated the existence and functionality of
networks in volatile market conditions, it has paid relatively little attention to the in-
depth investigation of their evolution and the impact of contextual factors. In stating this,
it is necessary to distinguish between evolution studies of interfirm relationships in a
network context and those of networks as whole entities. Few studies (Human and
Provan, 2000; Powell, 2005; Koka et al., 2006) have concentrated on how a whole
network configuration evolves, discussing particularly constraints underlying their
formation, governance and functionality (Podolny and Page, 1998). Bell et al, (2006)
and Provan et al., (2007), in their reviews, highlight the need for further research on
evolution at the level of the whole network, to understand how and if it can be predicted
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and managed. For instance, a central question here is: What hinders the shift from an
existing network configuration that becomes increasingly ineffective due to changes in
context/environment, to a different form? Overall, there is a need to understand the
interplay over time between a network's properties, including its structure and
governance, and contextual factors, and how and if this interplay can be managed and
controlled. The current research seeks to address this gap, in the context of Greek
agrifood SMEs' networks, aiming to provide more precise answers to the questions of
how a given network configuration came to be and is expected to evolve.
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1.4.3 Network Evolution Impact on Performance Outcomes
Whilst the preceding two sections have raised the uncertainties related to network
properties and evolution processes respectively, this section refers to the question of the
impact of network evolution on performance outcomes, whose answer is assumed to
provide a fruitful means of successfully translating SME neU\>orking behaviour into
tangible performance outcomes. Provan et al., (2007) notice that the literature has placed
more emphasis on efficiency rather effectiveness and on outcomes of network members
rather the whole network. Drawing from empirical evidence, mixed messages are
conveyed. Specifically, networks are seen as appropriate flexible devices to address
volatile market conditions, but "are fragile and need a good deal of. stability to operate
effectively" (Mildward and Provan, 2006, p. 12). How do these tradeoffs (i.e. flexibility
versus stability) actually occur? What network configurations actually arise from the
possible ones? Due to the limited knowledge on evolution of whole networks and the
interplay with contextual factors, the reality of networks remains complex. Their
formation, maintenance and effective performance are hard to guarantee, so networks
can certainly fail (Kogut 1988; Killing, 1982; Powell and Smith-Doerr, 1994; Inkepen,
1996; Mildward and Provan, 2006) or have negative effects (e.g. cartels, unstable
competitive advantage, Provan et al., 2007). It is indicative that models of close
interfirm collaboration such as the Japanese keiretsu or the 'flexible specialisation' of
the Italian industrial districts, have been found not "fully coherent and importable" to
countries with different social and institutional conditions, such as the United States
(Hamilton and Biggart, 1988; Dobin, 1994; Whitford, 2005, p. 15). Inclinations towards
opportunism, trust, legal contracting and self-interest are found to be affected by
distinctive institutional patterns across national borders (Cooke and Wills 1999; Keeble
et al. 1998, 1999). Consequently, there is uncertainty regarding the interplay between
contextual factors, network evolution and performance. A further problem related to this
uncertainty is that, "the outcomes are complex and may not easily or even in principle be
traced to actions of individual network members" (Wilkinson, 2001, p.49). Particularly,
the notion of equifinality suggests that organisations can utilize different orientations
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(e.g. conservative versus entrepreneurial; cooperative versus non-cooperative; market-
oriented versus non market-oriented) to reach the same objective (e.g. high performance,
competitive advantage, longevity) and achieve the same performance outcome(s),
because exogenous or endogenous, known or unknown factors have counterbalancing
effects (Seines et al., 1996). This signals a need for adopting an holistic research
approach and investigating network properties, context and outcomes together, so as to
fully understand their interplay when focusing on the whole network, from the supply
side. The current research attempts this approach. A deeper knowledge of the network
evolution phenomenon, reasons, and implications for the performance of individual
SMEs is likely to enhance actors' ability to manage and control a network's
development, assessing more accurately the extent to which a particular network is
sustainable and can create value. Studying the whole network from the supply side is
especially relevant to the interests of policy makers on collective behaviours and
outcomes, beyond the performance of individual organisations (Provan et al, 2007).
1.4.4 Methodological Issues
Over and above the practical and commercial ramifications described above, the
revealed uncertainties with respect to network evolution also have some important
methodological implications. Empirical evidence relating to network evolution has
shown that individual members of networks attach meanings to rules, goals and values
(Lipparini and Lomi, 1999; Van Raak and Paulus, 2001), resulting in dominant logics
when these meanings are held by a large group of network members and their leaders
(Bazzoli et al., 1998; Owen-Smith and Powell, 2004). Thus, that the meanings of
complex concepts and phenomena such as "network", "evolution", "effectiveness",
"context of a network", "impact of network evolution" are socially constructed, and in
turn can have multiple interpretations rather than a 'definite', 'objective' and 'concrete'
meaning in time and space (Provan, et al., 2007). Therefore, to understand multifaceted
phenomena such as network evolution in the course of a research project, it is proper to
collect the different meanings given and interpret them through the eyes of research
subjects (Henwood, 1996). A further methodological challenge in research of network
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dynamics is to include feedback effects, not just unidirectional causation (Wilkinson,
2001). Studying how identified meanings are constructed over time and how they
influence the protagonists' choices and behaviours sheds light on the network dynamics.
Hence, the current research seeks to adopt an empirical research methodology, that
allows multiple meanings to be captured, as well as a dynamic perspective.
1.5 Research Objectives
Building on the discussion of existing uncertainties and gaps in knowledge regarding
how business networks evolve and how factors interplay affects performance outcomes,
this section presents the following research objectives, which this thesis is devoted to
i
addressing:
1. To describe the key features and trace the evolution of a sample of SME
networks, as whole entities, within the Greek agrifood sector
Both a static and a dynamic description of SME network configurations are needed to
capture the dynamic character of interfirm relationships, suggested by the literature. This
objective is valid in the absence of a uniform set of theory-based terms assessing
different properties of an SME network configuration (Grandori, 1997), and of a clear
understanding of the network evolution phenomenon (Provan et al., 2007). Responding
to this literaturq gap, the current research seeks first to identify key descriptive network
features, including both structural properties and governance mechanisms, and second,
to trace their historical evolution in the context of a sample of Greek agrifood SME
networks. Network performance outcomes are also traced. This objective clearly reflects
the core interest of this research.
2. To identify the key factors influencing the evolution of these networks, both in
terms ofcontextual factors and networkfeatures
28
Given the lack of agreement amongst researchers on the identity and impact of factors
influencing network evolution (Grandori and Soda, 1995; Provan, et al., 2007), the
second objective of this research is to investigate the contextual factors influencing the
evolution of networks and to examine the interplay between the contextual factors and
network features, such as structural properties and governance mechanisms. In
particular, the research attempts to explain how network configurations shift or change
over time in response to contextual or environmental circumstances, (or indeed, how
they do not shift or change).
3. To build a theory ofhow the context andfeatures of these SME networks impact
I
on the performance outcomes of individual SME members, and the networks as
whole entities
In view of the knowledge gap relating to SME network performance, in terms of how it
can be explained, and what really influences it, the third objective of this research is to
build a theory of how the context and features of the SME networks impact over time on
the performance outcomes of individual SME members, and the networks as whole
entities. This objective is valuable academically because first the existing literature
suffers from mainly discussing network impacts on individual SMEs, rather than the
whole network. Second, although it stresses that a network can be ineffective and fail, as
evidence for Greek agrifood SME networks shows, performance has not been linked
with network evolution, which appears hard to anticipate. By considering the interplay
over time between a network's features, context and outcomes, a theory linking these
three components goes beyond the limited traditional focus of research on each
component separately. Instead, it captures the dynamic interactions of particular
endogenous (e.g. features) and exogenous (e.g. context) factors on network performance,
and in turn enables practitioners to understand the tradeoffs and management challenges
they have to face, their role and power, if any, in network evolution. The ultimate goal
of this research is to identify key critical conditions for the existence/feasibility and
effectiveness of agrifood SME networks.
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1.6 Research Approach and Theoretical Framework
As may be appreciated by the discussion and evidence presented thus far, the
investigation and explanation of business network dynamics requires a cross-disciplinary
research approach which acknowledges both the social and economic nature of interfirm
relationships. On the one hand, adopting a sociological perspective is deemed necessary
in order to capture how social relations influence the nature and evolution of network
linkages. Literature justifies this requirement through the notion of social
embeddedness8 (Granovetter, 1985), which suggests the on-going contextualisation of
economic exchange in the structure of social relations. Therefore, the current research
will trace the social history of interfirm relationships and the impact of macro-
environmental forces for the SME networks in the empirical study. On the other hand,
an economic, marketing perspective is also necessary to capture how costs of
networking and actors' strategic choices influence the nature and evolution of network
linkages. Literature justifies this requirement, by highlighting first that building and
maintenance of interfirm relationships costs (Mattsson, 1998), and second that network
linkages mainly represent the actors' deliberate (strategic) marketing decisions to fulfill
certain economic purposes (Hakansson and Turnbull, 1982). Furthermore, Ford et a!.,
(2002, p. 18) note that network outcomes affect subsequent networking choices,
revealing a "learning by doing" pattern in networking, a "controlled experimentation".
This implies a proactive role for the network actors who may impose meanings and
values on their interfirm relationships which are more consistent with the goals that they
are trying proactively to pursue rather than the true 'realities-qualities' of the
relationship. Therefore, the current research will investigate the impact of networking
costs and actors' strategic choices for the SME networks in the empirical study.
The cross-disciplinary perspective adopted is consistent with the recommendation made
by Hoang and Antoncic, (2003 p. 168) to increase 'cross-fertilisation across process- and
8 "Embeddedness theory was formulated precisely in order to provide an alternative to both 'over-
socialised' and 'under-socialised' conceptions of human actions, and examines how social ties may enable
social action as well constraining it" (Whitford, 2005, p. 17).
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outcome-oriented research' and to investigate which particular network conditions lead
to various network outcomes. Particularly, a sociological perspective facilitates the
investigation of processes (e.g. environmental stimulus for change, socially constructed
meanings), whilst an economic, marketing perspective focuses the research on the
outcomes of networking (e.g. costs, benefits) and their impact on subsequent networking
changes (e.g. what was learnt by doing). As may be appreciated thus far, the nature of
research objectives and the cross-disciplinary perspective adopted imply a need for an
exploratory and holistic character in the current research. Therefore, the empirical
component of this research adopts a qualitative case study methodology. Specifically, it
comprises case studies of four Greek agrifood SME networks, where the evolution of
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each network is traced and explained with reference to contextual factors and network
features, and where the performance outcomes are also examined, compared and
explained.
1.7 Value of the Research
The value of this research is threefold. First, in generating knowledge about the factors
that influence network evolution, and identifying network features, the research would
be valuable to both academics and practitioners (e.g. managers, policy makers) in
assisting comprehension of networks as whole entities, and allowing comparisons
between different empirical network forms. Second, the research would allow the same
stakeholders to gain insights into the interplay between the aforementioned network
features and a developed set of key contextual factors. This would allow them to (i)
explain how a given network configuration came to be and/or is expected to evolve, and
(ii) evaluate whether and how this interplay could be managed and controlled. Finally, in
explaining the association of network evolution to particular performance outcomes, the
research would help both academics and practitioners to fully understand the
performance of not only individual network members, but also whole networks. In
practice, since the great majority of Greek agrifood SMEs does not appear to be
performing optimally, findings could be extremely valuable to Greek policymakers and
agencies with development remits.
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1.8 Structure of the Thesis
This Chapter has introduced the main subject matter of this research, and has stated and
justified the key research objectives. The thesis proceeds with Chapter 2 which gives an
overview of the Greek agrifood sector and the role of SMEs within it. Next, Chapter 3
reviews the literature relating to SMEs and business networks, addressing key questions
regarding how networks evolve, the explanations for this evolution, the implications for
the performance outcomes of individual firms and of whole networks. It concludes with
a framework consisting of the theoretical propositions derived from the literature, which
is used as a starting point for the empirical study. Chapter 4 then describes the methods
employed for the empirical study: specifically four case studies of SME networks in the
GAS. The Chapter describes and justifies the actual methodological choices made and
the practical techniques employed for data collection and analysis. Thereafter, the thesis
presents four result Chapters, each one dedicated to presenting and analysing each of the
four case studies (Blauel organic olive oil, Kefalas organic olive oil, Zagora Apples and
Agia Apples respectively). Chapter 9 consists of a cross-case analysis of the four case
studies and presents the (revised) theoretical framework which constitutes the main
contribution of this thesis. Finally, Chapter 10 draws together all the main findings in
answer to each of the key research objectives outlined in this Introduction, and
concludes with limitations of this study and avenues for further research.
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Chapter 2: Agrifood SMEs in Greece
2.1 Introduction
In Chapter 1, it was highlighted that the Greek agrifood sector offers as an intriguing
case study for investigating the phenomenon of business network evolution. A key aim
of this Chapter is to introduce the aforementioned sector to the reader, in terms of its
relative contribution, structure, performance, and embeddedness in the political,
legislative, and social context. The role of SMEs, farmer cooperatives and the State's
intervention in the sector development is presented. Also, it is explained how this
discussion shapes the research objectives and methodology of this thesis. *The Chapter
now proceeds as follows. The first section describes the agricultural sector's
contribution to the Greek economy and its features, performance and problems. The next
two sections illustrate the role of SMEs and farmer cooperatives respectively in the
agricultural sector, addressing the key of questions why both of these underperform,
what challenges they face, and how State intervention has affected their development.
The last section draws together the arguments that form this thesis' research questions
and certain choices made in methodology.
2.2 The Agrifood Sector in Greece: Status and Trends
The general premise in the literature is that despite its considerable size relative to the
economy and its contribution to both main macroeconomic indicators (e.g. GDP,
employment, exports) and the maintenance of social and economic cohesion in rural and
remote areas, the Greek Agrifood Sector (GAS) is confronted with several natural,
structural and demographic factors that seriously impede its performance and
competitiveness. The agrifood sector, particularly for this research, includes agriculture
and the processing industry of agricultural products. However, reference is also made to
the wholesaler/retailer distribution channels and end-consumers, to complete the picture.
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2.2.1 Contribution to Macroeconomy
Data from the National Statistical Service of Greece (NSSG) show the GAS appears to
have a far-reaching but decreasing contribution to the main macroeconomic indicators of
the domestic economy. First, is the observation that since the early 70's, the agriculture
sector, including agriculture, forestry, fishery, and livestock, has dramatically shrunk.
Hence, it contributes less to total employment, and GDP has reduced from respectively
40.6% and 18.9% in 1972 to 16.6% (accounting for around 676,000 persons) and 6-
6.5% in 2004. Both these statistics are approximately four times higher than the EU
averages (Pezaros, 2004a). Until 1970, the GAS was the largest domestic sector, but
today its GDP contribution is the lowest among all major industries, namely: wholesale
and retail trade (26-28%), financial and real estate activities (20-22%), other service
activities (20%), manufacturing including energy (13-15%); and construction (8-10%)
The average monthly labour cost (approximately 1019 Euros) represents only 75% of
the national average. Second, the processing industry of agricultural products (i.e. food
and drinks) is vital, since it is the largest processing sub-sector, representing around 27%
of the national industrial output and more than 20% of industrial employment. It
contributes 25.1 % of GDP and employs 21.8% of national labour.
Furthermore, regarding the Greek exports-trade balance, agricultural products and foods
accounted for 22.7% of the value of exports and 11.2% of the value of imports in 2003.
Although the trade balance was in balance until the beginning of the '80s, it moved into
deficit after Greece joined the EU, and has constantly deteriorated to reach 1.7 billion
Euros in 2003. This reflects the lower competitiveness of the GAS compared to other
European countries. In fact, income subsidies combined with state corporatism have had
a stagnant effect, created a plasmatic picture for market competition without any signal
for cost efficiency, leaving farmers unprepared for the post-protection period (Pezaros,
2004a). "Greek agricultural policies were chiefly income-oriented in character, placing
emphasis on subsidising the volume of production, and not enhancing the necessary
structural adjustments" (Karanikolas and Martinos, 2007. p.40). Additionally, the
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imbalance originates from the country's low degree of self-sufficiency (54%) in meat
products, especially beef. Domestic agricultural production is predominately crop-
oriented. Particularly, the ratio between the total production values of plant and livestock
production is 70-30. Tables 2.1, 2.2 and 2.3 show the volume of different agricultural
products, the percentage of value of the total agricultural output per product category,
and the degree of self-sufficiency per product.




















Source: Damianos et a!., (2006)
2.2.2 Natural/Geo-physical Constraints
The shrinkage of the GAS could be explained by natural and geo-physical constraints, as
well as demographic and structural limitations. First, despite the generally favourable
climate, the GAS faces various natural and geo-physical restrictions (Galanopulos et a!.,
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2006), including large mountainous and less-developed areas, and scarcity of useful and
fertile agricultural land. The dry climate, especially during the irrigation periods, results
in insufficient water resources that in turn increase production costs and encumber
overall efficiency. Particularly, the climate is temperate and mild, with wet winters and
Hot summers. Such conditions are generally favourable for agriculture, especially plant
cultivations, explaining the crop-orientation of the GAS. With respect to geography,
Greece is a hilly and mountainous country, with flat land generally restricted to small
coast plains. The only exception constitutes two large plain regions: Central Macedonia
and Thessaly in northern and central Greece respectively. In numbers, 80% of land is
steep, of which 36% has very steep slopes (>30%). This results in the utilised
agricultural area covering only 29.54 % (i.e. 3.9/13.2 million hectares) of the country's
surface, of which 27% is given to plantations of trees in 1998 (Galanopulos et al., 2006).
There is underemployment of farmers due to seasonality of crop-cultivation". This
geography of mountains and a vast number of 2000 islands, does not favour the
9 In 2000, 67.5% of fanners spend less than 50% of their time to agriculture, due to seasonality of the crop
cultivation practices compared to livestock (similar effect to Italy, Spain), causing underemployment.
However, only 1/3 of them have an alternative activity and source of income (Damianos et al., 2006)
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development of efficient physical distribution systems (Pezaros, 2004). Regarding water
resources, more than 40% of agricultural land in 2002 was irrigated lands, with a sharp
increase. There are few rivers mainly in northern Greece, of which most dry up in
summer. In the last 50 years, the precipitation in certain country parts has fallen 30%,
but the country does not apply desalination or reusing of treated wastewater, therefore it
may limit the expansion of irrigation.
The scarcity of useful agricultural land is worsened by the lack of a national cadastre10
and regulatory framework of land use, which has led to a sharp increase in land value,
independent of its productivity (Louloudis and Beopoulos, 2001). So, both the increased
costs and non-farm usage of land are counterincentives for farm expansion (Galanopulos
et al., 2006).
2.2.3 Demographic Constraints
There are also demographic constraints to the GAS' development, referring to ageing
and low education level of farmers. In 2002, 52.6% of farmers were between 45 and 64
years old, 9.4% older than 65, and more than 86% of employees and farmers had a very
limited (elementary) education (Galanopulos et al., 2006). These characteristics explain
farmers' limited interest for investing in agriculture, searching for innovation and why
they use mainly empirical cultivation techniques (Papageorgiou et al., 2005). These
results in increased production costs, inefficiency, and low product quality. Also, there is
a limited ability to transfer farmer labour to other sectors. The structural constraints of
the GAS are explained in detail in section 2.3. So far, it has been implied that the GAS
has been increasingly influenced by changes happening at the European and global level.
These changes and some of the challenges created are described below.
10 It is the national register of property showing the extent, value, and ownership of land for taxation.























2.2.4 Policy Context and Challenges
The first policy 'moment', which constituted a challenge for the GAS was the accession
of Greece to EEC/EU in 1981. According to Pezaros (2004), the GAS become fully
regulated by the CAP (e.g. support in farmer prices, guaranteed minimum prices, direct
export subsidies, import tariffs), under the almost exclusive competence of the European
Commission, in which the Greek ministry of agriculture has participated and co-decided.
Consequently, experience was needed in lobbying at the European level and also the
establishment of a channel was needed for systematic interaction between the ministry
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and the GAS's stakeholders (e.g. the farmers and their civil organisations, regional and
local authorities and other supply chain actors of agricultural products). The trade
balance went into deficit, first because of the diversion of the GAS's export market away
from third countries towards the EU countries, and second because of the country's
failure to adjust its production capacities to the changes in domestic consumption
patterns. Particularly, imports were needed to cover increased domestic demand for
dairy products and red meat products exceeded the increased exports in plant products
(Hellenic Ministry of Rural Development and Food1').
The second crucial policy 'moment' relates to the two major CAP reforms in 1992, and
4 <
2004 respectively. The former gradually eliminated farmers' price support system and
introduced quantity quotas, shifting the production orientation from quantity to quality.
This trend was accelerated by the CAP reform in 2004, forcing a movement of farmers'
support from production-related aids to direct income support, and its association with
requirements for compliance with environment-friendly production practices (i.e.
decoupled payments- the "Green Box"). However, as Pezaros (2005, p.7) states, "it is
Utopia, to believe that farmers in the Southern European areas, such as Greece,
everywhere can switch rapidly and fully from livestock breeding or crop cultivation to '
gardening, eco-tourism or handicraft production".
Third, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) in 1994 was another force
encouraging globalisation, trade liberalisation and cutting import tariffs and other
obstacles to international agricultural trade. This increased pressure on the European
agriculture sector, including the GAS, to increase its competitiveness.
Next, a decisive factor in the GAS' development was the country's full integration into
the European common market in 1992, which sharply increased domestic competition
from imported goods, while the introduction of the Euro and price liberalization led to a
profound increase in production costs and consumer prices. This caused inflation
"
www.minagric.gr/en. 1.2.7.2.html, (27 December 2008)
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(Pezaros, 2004), permitted the fast penetration of global brands and consolidation of
their position in the domestic market. Consequently, traditional Greek agricultural
products began to decline, while an intense trend for concentration among distribution
actors occurred. The average consumer price level in Greece moved upwards about
twice as fast as that in the rest of the EU, particularly the price index changed from 83 in
1981 to 522 in 1992 (1982= 100, NSSG).
Finally, the recent EU enlargement to neighbouring Balkan and East European countries
(2004) is expected to have both positive and negative impacts on the GAS'
development. These countries mainly are not direct competitors, giving a potential for
l 4
increase in Greek exports, however, they pose a threat of reducing the EU-structural
funds that Greece receives. It is evident, especially since 1992, that the GAS has faced
two sharply increased demands, one for competitiveness and one for full market
liberalisation, related to dramatic elimination of national and European protectionism.
Very few studies have been conducted on how its economic actors perceive and respond
to these challenges, specifically on how their networking activity is influenced, and what
incentives or obstacles for networking have emerged (Blavoukos, 2003). Before turning
the focus on the GAS' economic actofs, it would useful to have an insight on domestic
consumers' trends, which also formulate the supply chain's challenges.
2.2.5 Domestic Consumer Trends
The dominant trend amongst Greek consumers is that having been familiar with foreign
products, they are becoming more sophisticated, starting to appreciate branding,
packaging, advertising, and quality. This has forced domestic producers to be market-
orientated, advance their product/service quality and marketing practices.
To elaborate, after 1981, Greek consumers moved closer to the European average, in
terms of consumption patterns, lifestyles, social attitudes and demographics. They
adapted to other Europeans' choices of products or brands and buying behaviour
patterns according to the new lifestyles. Particularly, convenience, quality and prestige
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have been the basic axis of consumer behaviour, with an increase in the importance of
diet and health foods (Kouremenos and Avlonitis, 1995; Krystallis et al., 2008). Greece
has the highest per capita consumption of fruits and vegetables and olive oil in the EU
(twice the EU average in 1992). Products which traditionally have been sold
unpackaged, such as bread, olive oil, wine, cheese, meat, fruits and vegetables,
constantly change over to packed and branded forms (Kouremenos and Avlonitis, 1995;
Euromonitor, 2004). In 1992, the advertisement deregulation and permission given to
private television and radio channels to operate resulted in an increase in advertisement
time and consumer exposure (Kollintzas and Bitros, 1992). Consequently, the attention
paid to food product labels, quality, origin specifications and marketing promotions has
< t
increased. For example, in relation to wine purchasing, Fotopoulos et al. (2003) find that
over the last decade, domestic consumers are seeking labels with a clear geographical
identity and high quality level. Despite the increased brand competition and heavy TV
advertisement, however similar trends are not observed in the consumption of olive oil,
because Greeks strongly prefer and trust raw rather than standardised and packed olive
oil (Kouremenos and Avlonitis, 1995). So far, reference has been made to the GAS'
underperformance, and the next section describes further its structure and performance.
For convenience, the analysis addresses food'production, processing and distribution
units separately. Moreover, examples of particular sub-sectors (i.e. olive oil; fruits and
vegetables) are given.
2.3 Structure and Performance of the Greek Agrifood Sector
The general premise in the literature is that the Greek food producing, processing and
distributing sector underperforms, is fragmented, and dominated by SMEs. However,
their number is declining through mergers, acquisitions and vertical integration due to
intensified competition in the domestic market after 1992, because of the increased
presence of multinational manufactures and retailers, as well as imports. At the same
time, there are oligopolies of large processing units in most product categories. Overall,
the high potential for development in both domestic and international markets of most
41
Greek agrifood products is under-exploited due to low added value and lack of both
efficient supply chains and marketing strategies.
2.3.1 Structure of food production, processing and distribution units
related to the agricultural sector
In terms of structure, the agricultural sector is dominated by family-type agricultural
holdings: 77% of the 817,059 holdings are less than 5 Ha, and no more than 3% are
more than 20ha. The average area is 4.5 Ha per holding, about four times less than the
EU-15 average, usually subdivided into 6-7 parcels (Pezaros, 2004). Recently, the
observed trend is that the number of large farms is increasing at the expense of smaller
ones (Galanopoulos et al., 2006). Overall, the sector is strongly fragmented and
characterised by quite small and medium-sized farms, family-based.
Galanopoulos (2004) showed that the agrifood processing industry is also characterised
by a high number of small units (992 in the year 2000), 90% of which have less than 10
employees (Psaltopoulos, 2001). However, there are also large companies, which build
plantations in other countries, mainly in the Balkans. In 2001 11 out of the 50 largest
« Greek companies ranked according to their profit, were operating in the food-processing
sector (12 out of 50 if ranked according to the sales, 13 out of 50 if ranked according to
the employees' number). The large companies dominate particular sectors: dairy
(4firms); tomato (5-6); confectionery (2); bread products (2), pasta (6-7), brewery (2)
♦ <
beverage (2) (Baltas, 2001). Table 2.4 shows that more sub-sectors are characterised by
large numbers of operating firms. As an overall trend, the number of SMEs declines, and
oligopolies exist in some sub-sectors.
With respect to the wholesalers and retailers in the marketing channels of fruit and
vegetables, in 2001, there were 2085 active wholesalers, and 3277 retailer firms, of
which 92% are SMEs (Galanopoulos et al., 2006). Four types of distribution channels
for fruit and vegetables were identified (ICAP, 2004):
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Fruit & vegetables 1,414 1,245 1,067 463
Vegetable & animal
oils & fats
581 540 324 146
Dairy products 1.143 1,084 1.726 475
Flour and products 2,306 1.942 630 303
Animal feeding stuff 1.602 1,356 401 198
Other foodstuffs 1,284 1,192 1,332 706
Drinks & beverages 2,595 2,635 929 521
TOTAL 10151 6828 3 089
Source: Damianos et al., (2006)
(i) Central Fruit and Vegetables Markets (CFVMs) with a market share of around
20-25%, one located in Athens and another in Thessalonica. The former includes
550 wholesalers and distributes around 550,000 tonnes of fruit and vegetables, while
the latter includes 280 wholesalers, distributing nearly 280,000 tonnes.
, (ii) Wholesalers outside the CFVMs with a market share 25-40%. They purchase
directly from local producers and have standardising facilities or import from third
countries and sell to specialised retailer outlets and supermarkets.
(iii) Multiple retailers/ Supermarket chains with an estimated market share of
around 20%. They purchase either standardised quantities from wholesalers, or
import. Recently, they also purchase directly fresh produce from growers and
standardise at their own facilities.
(iv) Direct sales in street-markets, with an estimated market share of around 10-
15% and a long tradition in Greece.
As an overall trend, the share of supermarkets is constantly increasing at the expense of
wholesalers, the neighbour grocery shops and street markets, while packaging is a
constantly increasing practice, since the early '90s (Tzimas and Bennison, 2003;
Bourlakis, 2001).
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2.3.2 Performance of food production, processing and distribution
units related to the agricultural sector
The performance of food production units is characterised by structural difficulties,
resulting in low quality and increased costs. Due to significant increases in the prices of
agricultural inputs12, without a corresponding increase in output prices (e.g. the price of
olive oil has in fact decreased), Agricultural incomes in Greece per AWU (i.e. Annual
Work Unit) are lower than in most EU countries, at approximately 74-77% of the EU-15
average. Similarly, the performance of small-scale food processing units is typical of
low production capacity and usage of a local distribution network. Overall, it has two
dominant characteristics: a high tension of inputs, as input costs represent almost half of
total costs, and also a low-tension of capital (Galanopoulos et al., 2006).
However, recently the number of small-scale processing units has been declining. A
number of reasons are identified. First, the increased competition from imported goods
following the market opening in 1992 (Salavou et al., 2004), is combined with the fact
that domestically, small-scale units have struggled to compete with large firms,
promoting their brands nationally and gaining consumer loyalty via product
♦ *
diversification strategies (Oustapassidis, 1998). The decline is further fuelled by the
increasing presence of multinational firms in Greece (Anastassopoulos, 2003;
Euromonitor, 2004; Salavou et al., 2004), which has intensified competition and
increased merger and acquisition activity (Theodorakioglou and Wright, 2000). In
contrast to small-scale processing units, large firms - both domestic and foreign - have
national distribution networks, and they tend to differentiate and integrate rather than
specialise on a single product. Vertical integration is attempted both downstream and
upstream. Whilst these developments are on-going, most Greek agrifood processing and
distribution channels remain in the hands of SMEs and are characterised by
fragmentation and lack of co-ordination (Galanopoulos, 2004).
The oligopolistic structure of the agricultural inputs market and that the bulk of agricultural inputs is
imported explain why higher prices paid for most inputs in Greece, for instance during the period 1995-
2002, input prices were increased from 16%-30.6% compared to l%-5.9% in the EU average.
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The marketing activity of food processing units is also weak. Although Greek agrifood
products generally have a good quality reputation, it is not necessarily the result of
branding initiatives, rather it is the Greek origin that appeals, in contrast to other EU
countries (Papadopoulos, 1995; Hughes et al., 1998; Tzouvelekas et al., 2002).
Consequently, many Greek agricultural products are exported in bulk to other countries,
where they are processed, branded and re-exported at higher premiums. Some examples
are durum wheat, olive oil and tobacco (Psaltopoulos, 2001; Tzouvelekas et al., 2002).
Greek exports are priced at a higher price than the world average units. However,
"Greek brands are not well-recognised abroad and a better-organised promotional
campaign in major importing countries (northern European countries and the USA) is
necessary" (Galanopoulos et al., 2006, p. 29). The domestic industry and market used to
be more protected and less competitive than the European ones, so foreign products
which relied on superior marketing know-how, penetrated the Greek market easily after
1992. To support this argument, Avlonitis et al., (1992) provided evidence that a major
differentiation factor between profitable and unprofitable Greek companies relates to the
executives' attitudes towards marketing and to the corresponding degree of marketing
implementations. SalaVou et al. (2003) offer evidence that some Greek agrifood SMEs
do have market-oriented tendencies, and in turn innovation precedence compared to
product-oriented SMEs. However, many Greek agrifood SMEs have limited market and
regulatory intelligence, for example relating to changing trends in consumer
requirements and EU agrifood production legislation (Damianos and Giannakopoulos,
2002; Agricultural Corporatism, 2005). Consequently, they often face difficulties in
meeting the quality and safety requirements of European consumers (Dimara, et al.,
2004).
Regarding the perfonuance of food distribution units, around 50% of wholesalers are
located in the two CFVMs in Athens and Thessalonica, the rest are typically very small
family enterprises, located throughout the country, and often acting also as retailers. Yet,
the two CFVMs are neither sufficient nor properly equipped (e.g. they lack new and
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advanced machinery and storing facilities). Consequently, each year large quantities are
distributed outside the CFVMs, whereas in the previous decades the bulk of the produce
was distributed through them. The trade outside the CFVMs had an adverse effect on
regulating and monitoring the market and it is suspected that a considerable portion of
the produce is distributed via unregistered channels.
2.3.3, Examples of Performance of Fruit & Vegetables and Olive Oil
Sectors
Fruit and vegetables accounted for roughly 20% of Greek fresh and processed food
exports (i.e. fruits 15.6% and vegetables 3.9%), and 4% of total exports in-2003. Greece
is a prominent actor in the global olive oil market, since its share is more than 10%,
compared to 0.1-1.9% for particular categories of fruits and vegetables and 5.7% for
oranges in 2003 (Galanopoulos et al., 2006). Fruit and vegetables are traditional
Mediterranean products cultivated in Greece for centuries, along with olive oil. Both
constitute traditional exporting sectors and are major contributors to the domestic
agricultural economy, in terms of employment, production areas, volumes and values.
For instance, olives are the crop that could thrive in less fertile and stony grounds,
thanks to their modest water demands. Therefore, olive cultivation is the only income
source in less favoured areas.
The prospects seem quite favourable for olive oil produce (Galanopoulos et al., 2006),
since domestically, increased brand-competition and heavy TV advertisements are
evident, to address the main constraint for the market development that Greeks prefer to
buy raw olive oil. Abroad, although labelled Greek olive oil is gradually gaining shares
in world markets, the bulk of domestically produced oil (nearly 90%) is still exported
raw mainly to Italy. Italians mix their produce with the higher quality Greek olive oil,
then standardise, package and re-export the Greek produce (Tzouvelekas et al., 2002;
Psaltopoulos, 2001).
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Regarding fruits and vegetables, although generalisations for such a broad category are
not safe, the prospects may not be favourable. Research shows that Greece has a clear
advantage in producing fruits rather vegetables (Galanopoulos, et al., 2006). Despite the
favourable soil and climatic conditions, the sector's competitiveness is hindered on the
production side by the lack of early or late ripening varieties and usage of certified seed,
low yields and quality, along with increased production costs and prices. In the
standardisation and distribution side, low standardised marketed quantities, large number
of small-sized units, ill-equipped in standardisation, storage and packaging facilities are
noticed. Additionally, the absence of a national exporting strategy (i.e. lack of
advertising and promotion campaigns, market research, brands, contracts with major
foreign retailer chains) figures most prominently as an inhibiting factor. Consequently,
Greece is specialising in the production of 'saturated' products, not highly-demanded
products (Galanopoulos, et al. 2006), explaining the decreasing shares in major markets
(i.e. Germany, Italy, Netherlands etc.) and the shift towards lower income markets from
Eastern Europe (i.e. Poland, Burgaria, Russia, Romania etc.). Even in the domestic
market, imported products from Spain, Italy or Turkey are gradually gaining market
shares at the expense of domestic produce. Multiple retail chains in particular tend to
import fruits and vegetables, but given the tendency of Greek consumers to shift from
neighbourhood groceries and farmers street markets to super- and hypermarkets, the
sector faces notable future threats.
That the GAS was for long time fragmented, ill-equipped and less market-oriented
explains why it underperforms domestically and abroad. After the domestic market's
opening in 1992, the presence of multinational players, manufacturers and retailers
intensified competition and revealed the weaknesses of the domestic market and supply
chains, forcing the domestic actors to adapt. Since then, the GAS is under transition.
Essentially, how the domestic agrifood SMEs have responded to the imperative need to
become competitive requires to be further investigated. Most SMEs used to be
unfamiliar with practices of brand building, quality certification and traceability, along
with market orientation. Particular issues are raised relating to how network linkages
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help domestic SMEs to understand the sources of their uncompetitiveness and ways to
escape their disappearance. This topic is of particular interest for this thesis. The
following section explicitly discusses how the domestic agrifood SMEs have typically
been organised in Greece. What kind of civil organisations have formed?
2.4 Organisation and Government Support ofAgrifood SMEs in
Greece
In this section, the main argument is that cooperation amongst Greek agrifood SMEs is
very weak, especially for the food processing and distributing units, and established
through 'bottom-up' procedures.'For the food producers, i.e. farmers, there is a paradox,
on one hand the number of farmer cooperatives is one of the highest in Europe, on the
other hand, their vast majority struggles to undertake efficient processing and marketing
activities to add value to their produce, and is limited in a credit-intermediary role
between the farmers and the funding bodies (i.e. banks, the State or EU). This is
primarily the result of the long intervention of the State in farmer cooperatives'
organisation and operation with detrimental effects in their political autonomy,
economic viability and social credibility. The State's protectionism and patronisation of
farmer cooperatives have triggered a sequence of negative implications also for the rest
of the GAS (e.g. market imbalance).
2.4.1 Cooperation amongst Greek agrifood SMEs
In other EU countries, agrifood SMEs have addressed some of the supply chain and
marketing problems by developing networks and alliances with each other - i.e. by
engaging in collective action. In Greece, by far the most popular form of collective
action is the agricultural co-operative. There are over 6,900 such co-operatives with
782,000 members, totals which are amongst the highest in Europe (Table 2.5). These co¬
operatives span activities such as farm input supplies, product processing and marketing,
and imports/exports. Most of the Greek PDO/PGI products are held by formally
constituted co-operatives or co-operative unions (EUROPA, 2005).
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Farmer cooperatives have a long history in Greece, starting in 1778 when under the
Turkish occupation, the residents of the Ambelakia village and 22 neighbouring villages
(around 6,000 people) in the Larissa prefecture, created a model of co-operation,
solidarity and civic provision, which became famous as one of the first cooperatives in
the world, called "Common Company of Ambelakia"13. It produced, processed, dyed
and traded red threads (1780-1811).
There are other forms of civil organisations, which have been insufficiently studied to
date (Pezaros, 2005). First, "Producer groups"14 of fruit and vegetables, as defined by
the EU Regulation 952/1997. Their exact number in Greece is unknown, but rapidly
increasing, usually operating within the farmer cooperatives. Second, there are eight
"Inter-professional organisations" created on a product basis13, usually formed under the
State's demand. These organisations aim to plan and apply developmental strategies,
promote agreements among their members, form inter-professional regulations of
operation and strengthen food safety and market-orientation. Third, there are "wine
routes" and regional collective brands certifying high quality local products and services
(Papadaki-Klavdianou et al., 1999), for example the 'Wine Roads of Macedonia'
(Karafolas, 2005) 16. As data for the other types of collective action among agrifood
processing or distributing units are not available, therefore, and given the number and
dominance of farmers' cooperatives, the focus of the next sections is on describing and
explaining the latter movement as a form of networking activity amongst Greek agrifood
SMEs.
www.ambelakia.org/history_eng.php (27 December 2008)
14 "Producer group are spontaneous collective actions of producers, wanting to 'escape' cooperatives or
work in a more flexible formula within existing fanner cooperatives, to provide an effective common
solution to shared problems. Usually, these are fonned by the most active members within existing
cooperatives'" (Vakoufaris et al., 2007, p. 778).
13 Olive oil and Olives; Vines and Wines; Fruit-bearing trees and Horticultural plants; Honey and Beehive
Products; Tobacco; Aviculture; Organic products; Vines and Wines of Crete
16
www.greekembassy-press.fi/files/Greekwine.pdf, (27 December 2008)
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2.4.2 Structure of the Cooperative Movement
The farmer's cooperative movement is represented by around 6,919 cooperatives, 118
Unions and 25 centralised State-cooperative organisations operating on the basis of
product sectors (Patronis, 2002)17. The "Panhellenic Confederation of Unions of
Agricultural Cooperatives (PASEGES) coordinates and represents all the Greek farmer
cooperatives. It is apparent that Greece has the largest number of cooperatives in the EU,
with the smallest average number of members (under 100), where the organisational
compartmentalisation and the fragmentation of actions prevail. The syndicalism
movement of farmers compromises 6,500 agricultural associations, 80 leagues and 2
Configurations, GESASE and SYDASE representing the 'trade unisons' of farmers of
the left and right wing respectively (Pezaros, 2005). Both of these configurations rushed
out of the cycles of PASEGES.
Table 2.5: General Statistics on EU Agriculture and Cooperatives





Belgium 1991 1,6 2.5 Not
avail.
Not avail. Not avail.
Denmark
e
1996 2.5 214 113000
, 12,1
Germany 1996 0,8 J 3950 3280000 39,3
Greece 1996
~ < 20,8 6919 782000 0,85
Spain 1996 "> ~r 9,8 4350 950000 6,3
France 1993 4,8 3618 720000 52,6
Ireland 1995 £ A .12 128 186000 9,56
Italy 1995 2,6 7,9 SS50 1124900 16,45
Luxembourg 1995 0,9 2,8 25 100% 0,12
Netherlands 1996 3.2 T 251 O O 22 4
Austria 1996 y 13,3 1757 2182000 Not avail.
Portugal 1996 -y 11,6 909 800000 1,27
Finland 1995 us 8,3 403 1228500 7,59
Sweden 1995 1 3,4 50 300000 8,24
IX 1995 0,9 2,2 506 271000 7,66
Source: van Bekkum and van Dijk (1997)
* Including double counting
1
www.eurofound.europa.eu/emire/GREECE/ COOPERATIVE-GR.htm (27 December 2008)
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2.4.3 Performance of Farmer Cooperatives
According to Galanopoulos el al., (2006), the performance of the Greek farmer
cooperatives has been hindered by poor management, financial scandals, and large
debts, so their market share has dropped. The inability to undertake significant
productive activities confines them to a credit-intermediary role (60%). Despite their
significant infrastructures and large quantities of produce aggregated, only 4.3% are
devoted to processing and/or marketing, building successful brands (Patronis, 2002), for
instance the Zagora apple cooperative, the Dodoni dairy cooperative and the union of
agricultural cooperatives of Sitia province in Crete. As van Bekkum and van Dijk (1997)
stated, a limited number of Greek farmer co-operatives are engaged in downstream,
value-adding activities: less than 30% of agricultural production is selected, marketed or
processed through them. There is much evidence that existing co-operatives are weak in
terms of differentiation, branding and other aspects of development of long-term
marketing strategies (Oustapassidis et al., 1993; Agricultural Corporatism, 2005). In the
literature, the key reason given for the farmer cooperatives' underperformance is the
State's intervention, which is explained below in historical phases. Given the prominent
« t
position of farmers' cooperatives in the GAS' supply chain, it is necessary to get in-
depth insights into their different developmental phases, marked by either the State's
intervention or certain historical events.
2.4.4 Role of the State Intervention in the Development of the
Cooperative Movement
Having investigated the State's intervention in the cooperative movement, Patronis
(2002) identified six periods:
First during the 1915-1920 period, the first cooperative Law 602/1915 was introduced in
1915 and a number of supportive organisations created, leading to the expansion of
fanner cooperatives. Second, through the interwar period (1921-1939) and the
international recession, the state introduced a top-down institutional model by
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establishing centralised State Organisations for collecting and managing domestic
agricultural produce and inputs (e.g. fertilisers, seeds) at the national level. Additionally,
it reduced fanner cooperatives to a credit-intermediate role between the banks (i.e. the
National Bank of Greece -ETE, till the creation of the Agricultural Bank of Greece-
ATE) and the farmers. In fact, the joint liability of farmers in the cooperative was
abolished, while the banks' primacy over the elected representatives of the cooperatives
was safeguarded, regarding the financial issues (Patronis, 1997). This paralysed the
cooperatives' autonomous operation. Later, the triple occupation of Germans, Italians
and Bulgarians during the second WW and the civil war (1946-1949) damaged the
cooperatives hugely, since they were drained of capital and a dramatic decrease in social
cohesiveness was observed, due to polarisation between leftists (especially communists)
and rightists. Third, in the post warperiod (1950-1973), the cooperatives were treated as
appendages of the state administration, aiming to compress the agricultural sector for the
benefit of the country's rapid industrialisation. The existing top-down model in the
State-cooperatives-ATE relationships was kept. As a result, there was an exodus of 1.5
million rural people to cities and abroad. The reconstruction effort of farmer
cooperatives was interrupted by the dictatorship (1967-1973) when the elected
cooperative boards were remoVed and the cooperatives received direct orders. However, '
adjustments of cooperatives' debts were made partially in 1964, and later for the whole
debt in 1967 by the dictatorship. The post-dictatorship period of 1974-1980 was
recognised as a new reconstruction period for the farmer cooperatives, with increases in
prices and production volumes, and a gradual decline of rural population exodus
(Kioukias, 1994). In fact, Greek farmers demanded a cessation of their status as 'non-
privileged Greeks' or 'poor relatives' (Karabelias, 1989), forming a 'force for social
change', which was compressed till then and found an expression under the political
program of a new political party, PASOK (i.e. Panhellenic Socialist Party). Once again,
the fanner cooperatives become politicized, contributing to the PASOK's election
victory in 1981. For first time in the post-war period, the rural masses were pulled away
from the dominant influence of the right political wing (Patronis, 2002).
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The next period of 1981-1990, was characterised by dramatic changes. Particularly,
Greece joined the EU. A number of consecutive institutional-legislative interventionsls
were introduced. Consequently, an explosion in the farmer cooperatives' number and
size occurred, benefited by a 230% increase in public subsidy during the period of 1982-
1987, compared to the last five years (Patronis, 2002). Their role has expanded into the
subsidies distribution to farmers, and implication of the EU agricultural policy measures
(Louloudis, 1995). This thriving development was fuelled by the State, but it proved
later to be less 'disinterested' than expected. In fact, its 'hidden' aims were first to
replace the old rules of the electoral game within the cooperatives, replacing the old
oligarchic model of personality authorities with a competition among political-party
blocks. Second, it also aimed to restructure the cooperative movement, shifting from the
existing 'top-down' model towards participatory procedures ('bottom-up'). In this way,
PASEGES and farmers' unions were strengthening, and particularly predominant
syndicalists appeared, who assumed their power thanks to massive mobilisation of the
members of political blocks within the cooperatives. Third, the State intervention in the
1981-1990 period aimed to create homogenous cooperative structures across the
country. Consequently, extensive party factionalism was observed, along with the
overdependence of cooperatives upon'the state. In fact, the farmer cooperatives were
transmuted into 'decentralised state bureaus' and centres of clientelist relations between
the farmers and political-party elites (Louloudis, et al., 1995, p. 140). Moreover, the
farmer cooperatives undertook activities1 Q on behalf of the State, irrelevant to their
nature, and were funded through procedures of disputed transparency20 and verbal
guarantees (Louloudis and Maraveyas, 1997). All these were launched (covered) as a
kind of 'social policy', while the cooperatives' structural and operational deficiencies21
remained untouched and the co-operative members' education and training about co¬
operation principles remained poor (Papageorgiou, 2002). The emphasis was placed on
ls See the comment for the footnote 18 from Chapter 2 in the Appendix I
19 See the comment for the footnote 19 from Chapter 2 in the Appendix I
20 See the comment for the footnote 20 from Chapter 2 in the Appendix I
For instance, dependence upon the state, obscurity between its economic and social role, limited
productive activities
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the syndicalism and party penetration, leaving the farmers with the impression of endless
support from the State, As a result, cooperatives were encumbered with huge debts, and
this kind of 'social policy' increased the GAS' imbalances, and decreased its integrity
and commercial credibility. Moreover, unequal competition conditions were set between
the private firms and cooperatives, or between the few market-oriented cooperatives and
the rest. The missed market opportunities, along with the huge debts, made the farmers
distrust cooperatives and collective action in general.
Since 1989, a public criticism and social/political debate started on the sources of
cooperatives' indebtedness and the ways that farmer cooperatives could gain back their
political independence, economic viability and social credibility. Finally, in the post-
1990 period, farmer cooperatives faced dramatic economic challenges after the market
opening in 1992. At the same time, the right political party (i.e. Nea Democratia-ND)
came to power during 1990-1993, and introduced a new cooperative Law 1982/90,
which forced the disengagement of the ATE bank from cooperatives. Some partial
adjustments of cooperatives' debts were made in 1990, 1994 and 1997. The
social/political debate resulted in the first law (Law, 2810/2000)22 that has contributed
significantly to the cooperatives' 'purification'! Particularly, it reflects the change in
position of the State from a 'pro-fanner' to a consciously 'neural' attitude. In practice, it
forced cooperatives to abandon their passive administrative-intermediary activities, and
become autonomous. For the first time, farmer cooperatives were required to face alone
their old (i.e. structural, institutional) and new (i.e. market competitiveness) challenges
at once, without a transition period from the protected to the free market conditions.
Two camps were formulated among the farmers, the 'modernists' and those demanding
the continuation of the State protectionism. Despite the less interventionist stance of
government, crucial barriers in the farmer cooperatives' development exist, including
"The Cooperative Law (2810/2000) introduced principles followed by European cooperatives: (i) a
common ballot, resulting in the abolition of the party lists; (ii) Separation of the elected officials from the
administrative staff/management; (iii) Strengthening of the financial transparency of the cooperatives
through external audits, and (iv) motives for wider amalgamations of cooperatives (Ministry of
Agriculture, 1999)
54
the little guidance and training for cooperatives and agrifood SMEs on how to apply new
organisational solutions, resolve common market problems and fill their gap in skills and
competencies.
Overall, there is a long history of strong State intervention within cooperatives. It is
partially explained by historical causes (e.g. periods of international recessions), but
mainly reflects the will of each government to align the interests of a significant part of
the population with its politics23. That the Greek cooperative laws are the shortest-lived
laws among the member states of the EU indicates the exceptionally high interest of
each government on agricultural cooperatives, compared to any other form of legal
f
economic organisation in Greece. Farmer cooperatives were forced to undertake "a
'supplementary-assisting' role against the needs of the state and of the private sector"
(Lappas, 1990; Papadopoulos and Patronis, 1997; Patronis, 2002, p.11). This kind of
intervention considerably hindered the development of Greek agricultural cooperatives,
in terms of limiting their flexibility, innovation and autonomy, with detrimental
implications for the whole GAS, given their central role in the agrifood supply chains.
So far, despite their geographical and socioeconomic coverage, along with the highest
* public subsidies, farmer cooperatives appeared unable to contribute to the necessary
restructuring and modernization of the GAS. It was revealed that the adjustment of
cooperatives' debts was used as a tool of agricultural policy to facilitate the farmers'
social integration into the wider socioeconomic system (Vergopoulos, 1975), mentioned
as "the social character of adjustments of cooperatives' debts"''4. However, the long¬
standing ambivalence between their economic and social role and its implications has
been discussed openly since the late 1980's. The prevailing argument alluded to by
Patronis, (2002, p.24) is that farmer cooperatives' failure is caused by "the manipulation
of social policy needs for gaining electoral, political and socioeconomic benefits".
Given the strong tendency of the State to patemalise the farmer cooperatives, those few
cooperatives that have a successful marketing activity, constitute subjects for further
See the comment for the footnote 23 from Chapter 2 in the Appendix I
24 See the comment for the footnote 24 from Chapter 2 in the Appendix I
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investigation. How and why have these managed to (i) 'escape' the detrimental effects
of the State's intervention, and (ii) respond successfully to the dramatic changes in the
domestic market, proving their competitiveness? Alternatively, this notion of 'distrusting
the failed farmer cooperatives' raises intriguing and complex possibilities regarding the
general propensity of agrifood SMEs for collective action and networking. Thus, it may
be possible to find agrifood actors who changed their networking behaviour due to past
negative experiences from farmer cooperatives or others seeking alternative collective
schemes, for instance cooperative enterprises or contract agricultural agreements.
2.5 Implications for the Current Study
This Chapter has drawn from broad literature to review the current status of the GAS
and the role of SMEs within it. Prevalent forms of collective action and networking
activity have been also described, in particular farmer cooperatives. Overall, the
selection of the GAS as a valuable choice for investigating SMEs' networking activities
has been confirmed. Particularly, SMEs prevail in the GAS, and its context plays an
evident role in the development of farmer cooperatives as the predominant example of
networking and collective action of Greek agrifood SMEs. The review has formulated
questions for further research, demonstrating that the levels and potential of collective
action and networking behaviour in Greece, beyond the farmer cooperatives, are under-
researched. These key questions are summarised below and constitute further refinement
of the thesis' research objectives. As stated in the opening Chapter, the research
objectives are: (i) to describe the key features and trace the evolution ofSME networks;
(ii) to identify the key factors influencing this evolution and (iii) to explain how the
context and features of these SME networks impact on the performance outcomes of
individual SME members, and the networks as whole entities. Within these, it will be
intriguing to also investigate the following inquiries:
• Given the problematic Greek agrifood context, why is it that some SMEs and
collective schemes are successful? How have they reacted differently to the
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context challenges (e.g. intensified competition, illicit trade, the State's
intervention creating market imbalance etc.)?
• What structure and governance have these agrifood SMEs' network/collective
schemes (including the farmer cooperatives) formed? To what extent do SMEs'
survival and success depend on the aforementioned structure and governance?
For instance, do the networks/collective schemes play a role in how SMEs
identify the challenges and the proper ways to respond to them?
• Apart from cooperatives, what other forms of networking have Greek agrifood
SMEs tried? Do these represent a bottom-up process? Are there problems in
establishing these alternative forms of collective action?
• What impact do past experiences of failed cooperative movements have on
SMEs' perceptions of cooperation and networking?
• How do Greek agrifood processing and distribution units network? What is their
reaction to the pressure of unequal market conditions due to the State's
protectionism of farmer cooperatives?
In addition to these subject-related questions, in this Chapter methodologically, the
literature reviewed makes particular suggestions for the research design. For example, it
suggests that a fieldwork project seeking to investigate networking activity amongst
Greek Agrifood SMEs should focus particularly on:
• Fruit/vegetable produce sector rather than livestock, because the ratio of
respective total production values for the GAS' is 70-30.
• Cooperatives and non-cooperatives, e.g. private firms and cooperative
enterprises, because cooperatives constitute the prominent, but not the only form
of networks that Greek SMEs establish.
• Successful cases versus less-successful ones, to understand why most members
of Greek SME networks are not deriving the efficiency benefits normally
associated with collective action
• Qualitative methods, since the phenomenon of SME network evolution is
complex and little knowledge exists, especially in the GAS' context,
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• Not only fanners, processing and distributing units, but also non-supply actors
e.g. links to the State and public agencies, because it is evident that the
Government's intervention has considerably influenced the development of
Greek agrifood SMEs' networks
Finally, the literature reviewed in this Chapter also indicates that in an empirical study of
networking activity amongst Greek agrifood SMEs, it is necessary to do the following:
• To include the network context in the research, with particular reference to
market structures and forces, the State, legislation, existence or not of supportive
agencies and mechanisms to agrifood SMEs, due to the prominent influence of
the Greek State's intervention on the development of the cooperative movement
• To check possible behavioural factors for explaining why some SMEs or actors
of collective schemes behave differently, e.g. leadership, cooperative spirit and
degree of market-orientation, because evidence is mixed over these behavioural
conditions in the GAS.
Having reviewed the literature relating to agrifood SMEs in Greece, the thesis now goes
on to consider how, in theory, SME networks evolve, and what factors influence their
perfonnance. This is the subject of Chapter 3.
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Chapter 3. SME Networks: Evolution and Performance
3.1, Introduction
This thesis compromises an investigation of SME networks, how and why these evolve,
and the implications for the performance of individual firms and networks as a whole.
The purpose of this Chapter is to capture and synthesise the essence of theoretical
contributions that inform us about SME networks, their evolution and performance. It
points out under-researched areas, which drove the research objectives of this study.
The Chapter proceeds as follows. First, a section describes SMEs' characteristics and
o 4
performance issues. The second section discusses in detail the characteristics of
networks, and presents the theoretical underpinnings, operational issues, evolution and
their effect on SME performance. The third section reviews contextual factors
influencing network evolution and concludes with a summary of theoretical
propositions. Next, an overview of network features influencing performance is given,
together with a summary of theoretical propositions. Finally, a novel framework
designed to classify contextual factors, network features and performance is proposed.
3.2. SMEs: Characteristics and Performance Issues
3.2.1 What is an SME?
SMEs may be defined according to the EU recommendation number 2003/361/EC23
which takes account of the number of employees, annual turnover, annual balance sheet
and independence (Figure 3.1). An enterprise is classified as small and medium-sized
when it has fewer than 250 employees and its annual turnover and /or its annual balance
sheet total does not exceed 50 million Euros and 43 million Euros respectively.
25
http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/enteiprise_policy/sme_definitiori/index_en.htm, 27 December 2008
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Figure 3.1: Definition of SME
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3.2.2 Performance Issues of SMEs
In the literature, it is argued that compared to large firms, SMEs face certain
performance-related problems which result from inherent features of their small size.
First, the lack of scale (Baum, 1996) combined with certain resource constraints,
especially time, finance (Hudson et al., 2001; Lu and Beamish 2001) and human
resources, create constraints such as limited marketing activity (Carter and Jones-Evans,
2006), ability to employ expertise (Weinrauch et al., 1991; Barrow, 1993) and impact of
marketing efforts (Carson, 1985). For example, SMEs are observed to have limited
product portfolio (Cosh and Hughes, 2000) and customer base (Storey 1982; Hall,
26
http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/enterprise_policy/sme_definition/sme_user_guide.pdf (13 April 2005)
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1989), usually spread in a restricted geographical area (Curran and Blackburn, 1990).
Consequently, SMEs' fortune seems tied to the cycles of local economies (Carter and
Jones-Evans, 2006).
Second, SME managers appear to follow a personalised style, where they know all
employees personally, and make alone all key management decisions (Scholhammer and
Kuriloff, 1979). The dominant influence of the owner-manager in SME results in a lack
of strategic formalised planning (Carter and Jones-Evans, 2006), prevalence of an
operational orientation (Cromie, 1990), and prevalence of intuitive and reactive
marketing that prioritises short-term considerations (Fuller, 1994), as well as a 'survival'
mentality (Elankinson et al, 1997). The personalised management style exposes SMEs to
greater uncertainty, and higher fixed management costs as the owners-managers may
lack the necessary 'skill-set' (Carter and Jones-Evans, 2006).
Furthermore, the lack of good market information or marketing expertise (Rocks et al,
2005) makes SMEs dependent on their owner-manager's marketing competencies
(Carson et al. 1995), explaining why SMEs' performance varies widely. Empirical
evidence suggests that SMEs tend to have a relatively small market share, be price
'takers' rather than 'makers' (Bolton, 1971), and face difficulties to defend and fully
capitalise on their market niches' (Cannon, 1992).
Networks have been recognised by both SME managers and policy makers as a way of
enhancing performance and overcoming some of these problems. According to Donckels
and Lambrecht (1997, p.13), 'the fragility which accompanies small size can be offset
by the supportive environment provided by resilient networks'. Through networks,
SMEs manage better competitive uncertainty and resource interdependence (Pfeffer and
Nowak, 1976; Perrow, 1993; Madhavan et al, 1998). Networks "balance the flexibility
of markets with the predictability of traditional hierarchies" (Borgatti and Foster, 2003,
p. 995). Clearly, value-adding partnerships constitute a competitive strategy for SMEs
(Feame, 1996; 1998; Wierenga, 1996; Fearne and Hughes, 1998; 1999; 2000; Fjeldstad
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and Ketels, 2006) and influence their performance. This thesis further investigates the
impact of networks, because it seems to have not only commercial and policy-relevant
implications but also theoretical ramifications. The next section gives the definition and
characteristics of SME networks. It also draws together the main findings of studies on
clusters, industrial districts and entrepreneurship regarding the impact of networks on
SMEs' performance.
3.3 SME Networks: Characteristics and Performance Issues
3.3.1 What is an SME Network?
Despite the broad range of definitions, the general premise in the literature is that a
network constitutes a coalition between autonomous but interdependent actors who
pursue repeated exchange relations, based simultaneously on coordination and
cooperation (Assens 2003). Networks are regarded as modes of regulating inter-firm
interdependency, distinguished from markets or hierarchical forms, because of their
reliance on stronger trust, rich information exchange, and joint problem-solving
arrangements (Whitford, 2005).
Interfirm relationships and networks in the form of non-market relationships between
firms have always existed. Marshall (1898; 1919) first noticed their impact in certain
regions and called them 'industrial districts'. The term network started to be commonly
understood and used since the 1980's, and social and business networks constitute a
developing field of study that has spanned many disciplines including economics,
sociology, geography, psychology, computer science and communications. Empirical
examples of network governance include industrial districts, consortia, clusters, joint
ventures, strategic alliances, franchising, partnerships, and wine routes (Grandori and
Soda, 1995; Brass et al., 2004). For instance, according to Grandori (1997), industrial
districts constitute SME networks characterised by geographical and cultural proximity,
inter-firm cooperation and competition, as well as flexible sectoral specialisation. These
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features originated from the dominance of small firms, and the existence of intra and
inter-firm trust. Inter-firm trust works as a coordination mechanism, and permits
horizontal imitation, personnel mobility and constant technological/organisational
innovation. Also, local government and institutions are found to be active in industrial
districts.
3.3.2 Theoretical Foundation of Business Networks
Given the great number and diversity of business networks that exist, what are the
theoretical explanations for their existence? Broadly, the literature focuses on one of two
themes: costs or resources. Regarding costs, the economic theory of Transaction Costs
(TCA)~7 argues that networks reduce governance and transaction costs more than
bureaucratic mechanisms (hierarchies) or price mechanisms (markets). Regarding
resources, networks are argued to address problems not only of resource dependency
(Resource Dependency theory28), but also of heterogeneity, imperfect imitability and
substitution of resources. The Resource-based theory of the Finn20 supports the
argument that the aforementioned problems create the potential for firms to specialise
their distinctive resources, and therefore generate a competitive advantage (Ostgaard and
Birley, 1994; Sandberg and Logan, 1997). Furthermore, empirical evidence reveals the
unique capabilities of SME networks to (i) create economic opportunities such as
" The variables used in TCA theory (Williamson, 1979; 1991; 1996) explaining key dimensions of
transaction were the following: asset specificity, uncertainty, transaction frequency; human behaviour
assumptions; bounded rationality, opportunism, and risk neutrality. The problems that firms face are
safeguarding, adaptation and performance evaluation. Bureaucratic mechanisms (i.e. hierarchies) are
proposed as a substitution of price mechanism (i.e. markets) on the basis of transaction efficiency, in other
words minimum Transaction Costs (TC). If TC are high, then firms (i.e. hierarchies) become more cost-
effective.
28 Resource Dependency theory (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978): Firms are not self-sufficient regarding
critical resources. It introduces uncertainty since other firms control/power these resources, which is
reduced only through long-term relationships.
29 The basic unit of analysis is resources and capabilities. Wernerfelf s article "A Resource-Based View
of the Finn" (1984), originates from Penrose's (1959) argument that a firm is a bundle of distinctive
resources that can provide competitive advantage (Teece, 1982; Collis, 1994). The resource heterogeneity
assumption (Grant, 1991; Wright et al., 1994) states that key features of resources generating a sustainable
competitive advantage are: value, rareness, inimitability and substitutability (Barney, 1991). These criteria
are individually necessary, but not sufficient conditions. In practice, the chain is as strong as its weakest
link is.
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increased bargaining power and external organisation legitimacy (Sharfman et al., 1991;
Baum and Oliver, 1991; 1992; Podolny and Page, 1998; Provan and Kenis, 2008); (ii)
create "virtual" scale economies (Boudreau et al., 1998); and (iii) encourage novel
synthesis of ideas30 and information by facilitating exchange of tacit knowledge (Powell
and Brantley, 1992; Inkpen 1996; O'Reilly, 2003; Hakansson, 2005). Such capabilities
"are difficult to replicate via markets, contracts or vertical integration" (Uzzi, 1997,
p.37).
Grandori (1995) summarises the core variables that explain the efficiency of networks
over markets and hierarchies, including the reduction of production costs (e.g.
» 4
economies of specialisation and experience; economies of scope or scale), the reduction
of governance costs, transaction cost-efficiency, pareto-efficiency and the fairness of
devised arrangements sources.
In terms of types of approach to the analysis of networks, two main streams of literature
can be identified (Beije and Groenewegen, 1992). First, the structural approach, also
called Social Network Analysis (SNA) which originated in America. Second, the
interaction approach, Associated with the works of the Industrial Marketing 'and
Purchasing ('IMP') Research Group, and which originates in Europe.
SNA uses the network structure as the unit of analysis, assumed to be a more powerful
explanatory tool than individuals' attributes. A network structure is composed of 'nodes'
(e.g. organisations or individuals) which are related by connections ('threads') of
different natures and each node has a specific position which may evolve and which
denotes the specific role of the entity vis-a-vis the other network members (Thorelli,
1986). Individuals are presumed to act accordingly to their position in the network
structure, rather than through personal choice. The position affects both individuals'
action and opportunities. Moreover, action itself is seen as purposive, almost denying
spontaneity. SNA has a quantitative orientation, producing a range of structural,
30 These are the outcome of the collective investment of resources (O'Reilly, 2003).
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quantitative measurements such as density, centrality, multiplexity and clique analysis
(see review of Provan et al., 2007). SNA contributes to our understanding of dynamics
in social networks, introducing concepts such as strong and weak ties, structural holes
and social embeddedness. In particualr, smaller, tighter networks are argued to be less
useful to innovation-seeking actors than networks with lots of loose connections to
individuals outside the main network ("weak ties"), who are more likely to introduce
new ideas and opportunities (Granovetter, 1973). Weak ties are presumed to stimulate
change while strong ties e.g. close workmates, friends and relatives, stabilise
relationships. Besides, individuals can exercise influence or act as brokers within their
social networks by bridging two networks that are not directly linked. This is called
« *
"filling" the structural holes (Burt, 1992). Granovetter (1985) also introduces the
concept of social embeddedness, recognising the on-going contextualisation of
economic exchange in the structure of social relations. As Uzzi (1997, p.37) explains
'actors shift their focus from the narrow economically rational goal of winning
immediate gain (maximum price) and exploiting dependency to cultivating long-term
cooperative ties'. Thanks to reciprocity, actors gradually obtain a mutual orientation, and
are willing to make relationship-specific investments, which it is expected the other
party will not take advantage of.
The interaction approach, followed by the IMP group, views the relationship established
by the repeated exchanges of industrial buyers-sellers as the unit of analysis. Previous
experiences and interactions of both active parties and expectations for future business
are assumed to affect this relationship. The active engagement of firms in repetitive
interactions is found to require exchange and adaptation, commitment and time before
any profit is achieved (Ford et al. 2002). The underlying assumption is that resources are
heterogeneous and their value is not given but created within the buyer-seller interaction.
The interaction approach favours qualitative methods. Its contribution starts with the A-
R-A model (Hakansson and Johanson, 1985; Hakansson, 1987), which introduces three
overlapping parallel network structures (i.e. inter-connected network layers) of Actors,
Resources and Activities, and explains the multiplexity of links between these three
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structures (Hakansson and Snehota, 1995). Specifically, actors perform activities and
control resources. Activities31 transform resources and are used by actors to achieve
goals. Finally, resources give actors power and enable activities. Furthermore, existing
interdependences (Lazzarini et al., 2001) are expressed through bonds between actors,
links between activities and ties between resources, but they may vary in time, intensity
and direction (Hakansson and Snehota, 1995; Sutton-Brady, 2008). The A-R-A model
was later incorporated into the model for managing networks proposed by Ford et al.,
(2002), which analyses the complex interconnections between three broader elements
that are examined along the three A-R-A dimensions: (i) networking32, (ii) network
pictures34 and (iii) network outcomes34 In conclusion, networks are argued to be broad
i »
and complex, therefore attribution of causality seems meaningless. Overall, the
interaction approach reflects the reality of repetitive (connected) long-standing business
transactions, in which each industrial market is embedded, and also the simultaneously
stable and dynamic character of these transactions (Hakansson and Snehota, 1995).
Overall, the structural approach examines how the existing structure of network linkages
forms the participants' choices in relationships. The network structure appears to create
both constraints and opportunities. Despite reference to the dynamic character of
networks however, the structural approach obscures the complexity and dynamics of
network processes (Todeva, 2006). It reduces relationships to a link rather than a
dynamic process, and except for mentioning symmetry and strength of ties, it ignores
31
Activity is defined as the participation in events and performing business functions within the supply
chain, and differs from individual behaviour as the network actors establish a framework for collective
participation and cumulative outcomes
"
Networking is discussed in terms of the three paradoxes proposed by Hakansson and Ford (2002); Ford
et al., (2002; 2003); Ford and Redwood (2005) (Section 3.3.3)
"Network pictures are defined as views of the network held by each participant. These views constitute
the basis for its perceptions of what is happening around, forms its actions/reactions, and depend on its
own earlier experience, relationships and position in the network. These views are affected by its
problems, uncertainties and abilities and by the limits to its knowledge and understanding. Also network
pictures provide the frame within which performance is assessed.
34
Regarding Actors, network outcomes were examined for a single actor, for a single relationship, and for
the whole network. Regarding Resources, network outcomes are referred to the utilisation of resources and
development of unique ones. Regarding Activities, outcomes are referred to changes in the network
structure, including: Aggregation, Dis-aggregation, Intermediation, Dis-intermediation (Ford et al., 2002;
2003).
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variety in relationships and actors' heterogeneity. Sociologists belonging to the
structural approach, via the social embeddedness concept, highlight that structures
themselves need to be seen as outcomes of past and existing social relationships. In a
way, social embeddeness argues for a shift of emphasis from the structure of ties to the
behavioural orientation of actors, underlining that actors want to satisfy not only their
economic goals but also social goals/expectations. It signposts that more research is
needed at the level of relationships (e.g. dynamic, interdependent, embedded),
investigating how these relationships form the existing or future structure and content of
network ties. This research gap is addressed by the interaction approach, which not only
analyses the relationships in three inter-connected layers (the A-R-A model,) but also
i
gives a multiple perspective, including perception (i.e. network picture), action (i.e.
networking) and outcome, when it explains the dynamic character of relationships. The
main criticism of the ARA model is that it is voluntaristic rather than deterministic,
which makes it difficult for hypothesis testing and mathematical modelling (Todeva,
2006). However, more systematic research is needed at the levels of network and actors
in parallel. Both the structural and interaction approaches note that networks evolve, but
they do not address the following specific issues: (i) the influence of the context (e.g.
market, legislation, policy measures etc.) in which' a network is embedded; (ii) the
evolution of the network governance mechanisms along with the evolving structure; and
(iii) the assessment of performance outcomes not only at the level of the individual
actors, but also the entire network, from the supply side. Investigation of these issues is
the aim of the current study, which takes a more holistic approach of analysing
simultaneously the context, the network structure, governance and performance, seeking
to understand the interplay between these four elements. So 3.3.2 introduced the
theoretical foundations of business networks, reviewed literature that explains what
business networks are, why they exist and how can be researched/analysed effectively.
May get impression that business networks are fundamentally positive phenomena, and
their operation is unproblematic. In fact, there are several issues with business network
operation that do pose problems and complexities. These are introduced in the next
section.
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3.3.3. Issues and Problems of Business Network Operation
This section aims to give an overview of the observations of business network nature as
provided by researchers from both the aforementioned theoretical foundations. It reveals
that business networks are complex and that their operation can be potentially
problematic. The section also refers to a debate in the literature on how distinct business
networks are, and concludes with a series of tensions/paradoxes for both network
managers and members, that were detected in business operation.
Observations of business network operation revealed that networks consist of
autonomous but interdependent actors who actively engage in repetitive exchanges, and
interaction, seeking solutions to their problems. This kind of interaction involves
simultaneous elements of cooperation, conflict (Beije and Groenewegen, 1992),
integration and separation. Interdependence among actors, activities and resources is a
fundamental element of networks (Lazzarini et al., 2001), since the myth of self-
sufficiency is challenged. These interactions and exchanges as short-term episodes
contribute through routinisation, institutionalization, and adaptation to the development
of a long-term orientation in the relationship. Relationships are not self-runners (Walter,
1998), do not come free of costs (Ritter and Gemunder, 2003). Firms have to invest
money, resources and time to make them work. Therefore, relationships are purposive,
mainly created to fulfil an economic function. However, because relationships are
socially embedded, in order to flourish, first they need to satisfy social expectations of
reciprocity and mutual trust. A relationship has an atmosphere described in terms of the
power-dependence balance, the state of conflict or cooperation, overall closeness or
distance and mutual expectations. Inter-firm relationships and network configurations
are dynamic (Gadde and Mattsson, 1987; Easton and Lundgren, 1992; Andersen et al.,
1994; Hakansson and Snehota, 1995) "living, ever-changing relationships", where the
actors' strategic choices are path/history dependent. What flows through a relationship
i.e. explicit or tacit knowledge and social energies enhancing goal achievement (e.g.
trust, courage, determination, commitment etc.), matters (Ambler and Styles, 2000),
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because it influences the evolution of network linkages. Thus, the evolution cannot be
fully-planned and predicted. Besides, networks do not necessarily need a 'leader' or
'captain', since they can work as self-organizing systems (Ritter and Gemunden, 2003).
When such leaders exist, they are called 'strategic networks' (Jarrilo, 1998). So
networks can exhibit features such as flat hierarchy, voluntary participation, self-
governing teams, heavy use of temporal structures (e.g. project teams), and lateral
communication (Birkinshaw and Hagstrom, 2000; Hales, 2002; Borgatti and Foster,
2003). The diversity that characterises networks in terms of their structure, governance,
and outcomes is evident. Networks are of a different type if seen from a different
perspective, but no absolute or objective network types3" and no single network exist
(Ford and Rewood, 2005).
The boundaries of a network are effectively artificial, since their definition depends on
both purpose and starting point of analysis (Ford et al., 2002). It is difficult to provide a
complete description of a network, due to the fact that no company owns or manages it,
although some try to do so, or have the illusion of control. Networks do not have a
centre, despite the belief of some companies that they have a central role. Ford et al.,
(2002, p.23), stated that "each company has limited knowledge and operates on the basis
of an evolving, but subjective 'network picture'". Such inadequate knowledge means
that a crucial aspect of networks is the principle of 'learning by doing' (Balakrishana
and Koza, 1993; Mody 1993; Gulati etal., 1994; Gulati, 1995; Powell et al., 1996).
The freedom of all companies to act in the network is restricted, because they need to
take account of others' expectations, reactions, goals, capabilities. Seeing things, also
from the perspective of others is a necessity, not an option (Hakansson and Ford, 2002).
The aforementioned observations of the business network operation triggered a long
lasting debate in the literature about how distinct business networks are. One stream of
researchers urge that networks are an 'intermediate' or 'hybrid' organisational form
between the two pillars, markets and hierarchies/firms (Thorelli, 1986; Williamson
33 Ford et al., (2002, p.3) note that "any view of a network centred on a single company, or defined by the
company itself is inevitably restricted and biased and gives an incomplete view of the world surrounding
that company."
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1991). This thesis is rejected by researchers claiming that business networks constitute a
'third-type" organisational agreement, with its own distinctive properties36, worthy of
study in its own right (Bradach and Eccles, 1989; Powell, 1990, p.79). For example,
networks possess unique structural features, as well as modes of conflict resolution,
bases of legitimacy etc. (Jones et al. 1997; Blundel and Smith, 2001; Provan and Kenis,
2008). Finally, the second argument predominated.
Research from scholars agreeing with the unique nature of networks reveals a series of
tensions (which could also be considered as 'trade-offs') for both the network managers
and members, sometimes described as paradoxes. Overall, an understanding of the
i
balance between collaboration and competition, between 'exploring' and 'exploiting' is
essential to any explanation of actors' networking choices. Particularly, some scholars
from the IMP group (Hakansson and Johanson, 1992; Hakansson and Ford, 2000; Ford
et al., 2002; Ford and Redwood, 2005) present three paradoxes faced by individual
organisations (i.e. members) when participating in a network. The first one relates to the
choices firms make within existing relationships, specifically where a firm's
relationships not only form the basis of its existing activity and subsequent development,
but also play a role in'actually limiting development. The freedom to act is restricted by
the need to consider the potential reactions of others (Ford et al., 2002). So, firms face
the dilemma of confronting or conforming to the existing ways of operating when they
are part of a network (Ford et al., 2002). The second paradox pertains to firms' choices
about network position and suggests that a firm both defines and is defined by its
relationships. A firm faces the dilemma of either consolidating its existing network
position by stabilising its existing relationships and improving their efficiency and
effectiveness or creating a new position by combining the relationships differently or
building new relationships (Ford et al., 2002). This choice can be problematic, when
firms underestimate their dependency on others' resources, capabilities and
commitment, as well as any cost and difficulty of changes initiated. The third paradox
36 In Appendix I, Table 3.1 presents the distinctive characteristics of markets, hierarchies and networks as
summarised by Powell (1990).
70
refers to a firm's choice of control of network linkages. The intense ambition of a firm to
control its inter-firm relationships, in order to reach its own targets could be destructive.
So, the dilemma of coercing partners or conceding to the plans of others, exists (Ford et
al., 2002). Put simply, the less a single firm forces its thinking onto the network, the
more freedom is given to other firms to take initiatives and be creative (Tunissini, 1997).
Thus, a balance between controlling and being controlled is needed, since the change of
a network to a kind of hierarchy makes the leading firm the only true source of
innovation, and results in any limitations of the leading firm affecting the whole
network.
Overall, the conclusion derived from the three aforementioned paradoxes is that change
in networks is an interactive process, therefore only by analysing other's resources,
limitations, motives and expectations, one company could introduce others to the picture
of intended change in direction, and motivate them to act and accept incurred costs and
effects (Ford et al., 2002). Moreover, Hakansson and Ford, (2002) note that a firm can
only achieve change through its network, while the development of a relationship is
driven by the more committed party and is forced to move slowly by the less committed
party.
Provan and Kenis (2008) offer additional tensions or conflicts that exist in the operation
of business networks by shifting the emphasis on three network-level tensions for
network managers (Milward and Provan, 2006). The first conflict identified by them is
flexibility versus stability. The former ensures rapid network responses in ways that meet
changing stakeholder needs and demands, while the latter secures consistency and
efficiency in responses (Provan and Kenis, 2008). Governance structures of business
networks that satisfy equally both flexibility and stability requirements are difficult to
develop. The second tension refers to efficiency versus inclusiveness. Administrative
efficiency (e.g. consistency, productivity) in network governance is equally important
with a satisfactory level of democracy in its structures and processes. However,
increasing the number of involving participants makes the network decision-making
more difficult, due to the increased level of time and resources needed. Third, it is the
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issue of internal versus external network legitimacy. Internally, if network members do
not legitimate interactions and coordinated efforts as economically and socially
beneficial, the network risks existing in name only, with little real commitment by
participants to network-level goals and outcomes. Externally, a business network needs
to build its credibility and "public image". It needs to be recognised by outside groups
such as customers, funders, future partners and the government, so it can be seen as an
active and productive entity in its own right, rather than simply a group of firms that
occasionally gathers and shares concerns. Tension arises when the internal legitimacy
needs of network members conflict with the external demands. For example, network
managers may prioritise collective network goals, but not necessarily the individualistic
* *
legitimacy concerns of members. Thus, participants may feel excluded or that their
credibility is being undermined (Provan and Kenis, 2008).
Importantly, literature pertaining to the tensions and paradoxes of business networks
serves to highlight the importance of understanding the distinctiveness of network nature
compared to markets and hierarchies in explaining the inherent complexity in business
network operation, the diversity in forms and relationships, and the unique challenges
that both network managers and meriibers face. Practically, it facilitates empirical
research in identifying networks' features in the field. Having introduced some of the
problems and complexities in business network operation, it becomes apparent that
networks are not static phenomena, but change over time. Moreover, these tensions and
paradoxes demonstrate that change in networks is socially constructed, and takes time to
be extensively communicated and implemented. So, there is a need to relate the change
emerging at the dyadic relationship level with that observed at the network level. The
next section both addresses this issue and explains how network evolution is linked with
a parallel evolution in actors' network perceptions, previously defined as "network
pictures" by Hankansson and Ford (2002) in their model for managing networks.
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3.3.4 How do Business Networks Evolve?
Given the complexities and problems in business network operation, this section
presents the key insights from the literature regarding how networks evolve, in particular
how network processes and the actors' perceptions of them change over time.
Investigating actual change processes in network linkages, Batonda and Perry (2003,
p.1458) reject the determinist approach taken by some 'life cycle' (Utterback and
Abernathy, 1975; Porter, 1980; Quinn and Cameron, 1983; Easton et ah, 1993) or
'growth stage' models (Ford, 1980; Dwyer et ah, 1987; Larson, 1992; Kanter, 1994),
arguing that network evolution "occurs in an unstructured and unpredictable manner at <
any point at time". To address the question of how business networks evolve, this thesis
adopts the perspective of Halinen et al., (1999). According to them, change always
emerges at the level of dyadic relationships, which function not only as generators, but
also as receptors and transmitters of change to other connected relationships causing a
'domino effect' (Hertz, 1999; 2001). This relates the change emerging at the dyadic
relationship level with that observed at the network level. They borrow the punctuated-
equilibrium paradigm of change (Gersick, 1991), referring to persistent underlying
structures (deep structures), i.e. all the existing 'choices' of network actors' bonds,
activity links and resource ties. Long periods ofstability (equilibrium), where these deep
structures persist and only incremental changes and adjustments happen, are punctuated
by brief revolutionary periods. In the latter, sudden and frame-braking changes trigger
reconfiguration of the deep structure, i.e. breaking of actor bonds, activity links and
resource ties. Such destruction is experienced by actors as a period of disarray,
uncertainty, and discomfort (Salmi, 1995), related to high switching costs (Turnbull et
al, 1996), until the "choices" for the new deep structure are made. This explains why
both organisations and individuals tend to stick to their previous "choices", seeking
stability and creating rigidity in networks (Hakansson, 1982; Easton, 1992). Halinen et
al. (1999) expand the punctuated-equilibrium paradigm by introducing two more
concepts: inertia and critical events (e.g. entrepreneurial and strategic actions, economic
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recession, merges, bankruptcies, partner-switching, technology breakthrough). Their
argument is that business-network evolution is dominated by two conflicting circles of
change: the incremental change circle, stemmed from inertia, the tendency to preserve
the deep structures, and the radical change circle, prompted by critical events. These
change circles start always within a single dyadic relationship, and are either confined
there or spread to other connected relationships, becoming a network-level change,
either incremental or radical. A transfer from the one circle to the other occurs, however
'Whether a revolutionary period is started or not depends ultimately on the
actions and intentions of the companies in the network. It is not the mere event
itself that is critical but the way the parties ofa focal and other dyads react to it.
A critical event is the impulse that allows tensions to be released and the network
to reconfigurate. It may be the 'last straw' in a series of developments that
finally leads to major company actions. ...the seeds of the change may have been
sown some time ago and the pressure for radical change evolved during a long
but seemingly stable period ofincremental change. (Halinen et al. 1999 p.786)'
Overall, for considering an event critical, the connected actors' perceptions,
interpretations and intentional behaviour do appear to be decisive, while radical changes
may have their origins in incremental adjustments during periods of stability.
Furthermore, it may be asserted that industrial reality is 'continuously and socially'
constructed (Berger and Luckmann, 1967).
What shall become apparent in this discussion is that the network evolution is
accompanied by a parallel evolution in the actors' perceptions (Halinen et al., 1999),
particularly how they view- the business network, its context and their interdependencies,
in terms of the potential array of options37 and the necessary resources to exercise these
options38, to achieve their goals in this context. For example, empirical evidence
suggests that environmental forces are always interpreted as (materialised into) a stream
of particular critical events influencing their dyadic inter-firm relationships, rather a
general external force, and as such they are transmitted within the channel (Hakansson
and Johanson, 1993; Noliria, 1992). However, scholars agree that surprisingly little
Defined as Uncertainty (Koka et al., 2006)
's Defined as Munificence (Koka et al., 2006), an index of environment's capacity to support the firm and
its strategies
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knowledge exists about both evolution processes of network and actors' perceptions of
it, also how and if network evolution is managed (Milward and Provan, 2006). Clearly,
there is a need to increase 'cross-fertilisation across process- and outcome-oriented
research' (Hoang and Antoncic, 2003 p. 168) and investigate which certain network
conditions lead to various network outcomes39. It is clear from this section that the way
the network actors perceive an event and react to it dramatically affects, and is affected
by network evolution. Therefore, the evolution processes of a network and actors'
perceptions of it are dynamic, and need to be investigated together in order to understand
better the complexities and problems in business network operation. Building on the
exploration of the two key constructs, conditions and outcomes, the following section
*
gives an overview of network impact on SMEs' performance (outcomes), capturing both
positive and negative effects.
Figure 3.2: A Framework of Change in Networks and Dyads
39 Called differently "network functioning' (Provan and Kenis , 2008)
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3.3.5 Effect of Networks on SMEs' Performance
The aim of this section is to present what the existing literature indicates about the
influence of networks on SME performance, in particular whether network involvement
enhances or restricts the performance of firms.
Positive effects of networks for SMEs proposed in the literature include the
enhancement of survival and financial performance (Bruderl and Priesendorf, 1998).
Except for the capital (Zimmer and Aldrich, 1987), entrepreneurship scholars investigate
the role of networks to access intangible resources, highlighting diverse market
i information, advice and know-how (Singh et al., 1999), as well as the emotional support
for risk taking (Bruderl and Priesendorf, 1998; Eloang and Antoncic, 2003) that
increases persistence to remain in business (Gimeno et al., 1997). According to Uzzi,
(1996), over time firms become a growing "repository of information", as they join
different sets of market players through networks, and are exposed to a wide range of
opportunities and constraints (Gulati and Gargulio, 1999). Deeds et al. (1997) showed
how entrepreneurs gain legitimacy when collaborating with well-regarded firms of the
sector, and so become attractive to potential investors, employees and customers, as a
more secure choice. Strong ties at the earlier stages are "valuable as ready, low-cost
links to critical resources" (Hoang and Antoncic, 2003 p. 174) and give the market
'entrance ticket'. Inter-firm relationships seems to have not only reputational, but also
signalling content (Calabrese et al., 2000) by indicating new areas of market
opportunities, and attracting other entrepreneurs. "Virtual" economies of scale through
subcontracting production parts to competitors (Boudreau et al. 1998), and novel
synthesis of ideas by facilitating systematic meetings and exchange of tacit knowledge
among trustful partners (O'Reilly 2003), constitute two more positive network effects.
A concise categorisation of network effects is the typology of network performance
outcomes offered by Human and Provan (1997). They identify two types of positive
outcomes resulting from SMEs' engagement in business networks: economic, called
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transactional and non-economic, called transformational. First, transactional outcomes
are defined as enhanced resource acquisition and gains in performance of SMEs
participating in a network. In particular, the empirical evidence supports the existence of
three sub-categories of transactional outcomes: organisational credibility; access to
resources; and financial performance. Second, Human and Provan (1997) define
transformational outcomes as changes in network members' collaborative attitudes and
behaviours. In other words, how network participation changed the actor's approach to
work with others. In fact, the network provides a group of known firms with which
members could engage frequently and safely in joint business, exchange of information
and competency, and friendships. The argument is that a transaction makes recourses
t i
available at different network places, while a transformation creates "novel" resource
from the combination of the existing ones (Beije and Groenewegen, 1992).
Both these outcomes could be considered, and in turn need to be assessed not only at the
level of individual SMEs evolving in a network (i.e. micro level), but also at the level of
the network as a whole entity. The latter refers to meso level of analysis, while the
network environment/context constitutes the macro level (Beije and Groenewegen,
1992). For example, either the networks' unique capability to create collectively novel'
resources, or the fact that cooperatives or consortia could have superior external
legitimacy (e.g. credibility, bargain power, and authority) than that of their individual
members, demonstrate the importance of examining outcomes at both levels. In the
literature, there is a lack of studies that simultaneously address the micro, meso and
macro level (Foss 1999; Venkatraman and Lee, 2004). Therefore the novelty of this
research is that it focuses equally on the three levels, for the following reasons. First,
many outcomes i.e. learning, appear at the network level, but the actual learning process
often starts at a level slightly below (e.g. dyads, cliques). This strong interplay between
the meso and micro levels respectively stresses the need to analyse performance
outcomes at both levels. Second, the current research examines changes in the network
structure and governance as a whole over time, which clearly constitute network-level
outcomes. For instance, it addresses questions of how the overall sustainability of a
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network can be enhanced, particularly by examining the effectiveness40 of its existing
governance, or what happens when a network fails. The network structure and
governance are assessed within the particular network contextual conditions at any point
of time that entails considering both meso and macro levels. Third, negative externalities
generated by networks often are first discovered at the network level, which necessitates
a focus on network-level outcomes as well as outcomes for individual firms. Finally,
Provan et al., (2007) point out that researchers emphasise efficiency, rather than
effectiveness, and organisational rather network-level outcomes. In conclusion,
exploiting rather than minimising the richness of the network phenomenon requires
assessing together the three aforementioned levels: micro, meso and macro.
4
Thus far, when considering the impacts of networks on SME performance, the main
thrust of the literature has been to assume that impacts are primarily positive. Several
industrial economic scholars however, have focused on the 'dark side' of business
networks. As Grandori and Soda (1995, p.193) note, negative outcomes tend to be
observed when business networks are considered "at the more general level of economic
policy and law i.e. at the level of the competitiveness, effectiveness and fairness of
national or international economic systems". Thus, a number of concerns and criticisms
have been raised regarding the negative externalities that networks may generate for the
whole economy, including cartels and unstable competitive advantage between firms
(Soda and Usai, 1999) or regions (Grabher, 1993). Furthermore, networks might become
a hindrance to the further development of their members, because of institutional
isomorphism (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983) and a shift from complementary to similar
resources (Blundel and Smith, 2001), which impedes innovation (Loasby 1999) and
increases conflict likelihood and tie termination. Particularly in industrial districts, "the
strong and long-established institutional framework, cultural homogeneity and reliance
on shared tacit knowledge ...may create organisational inertia, insularity and
40 Network effectiveness is defined as the "positive network-level outcomes that could not normally be
achieved by individual organisational participants acting independently" (Provan and Kenis, 2008 p. 230).
Because if we argue that networks can be a "good thing", we need to know under what circumstances they
are likely to appear and strengthen.
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complacency" (Blundel and Smith, 2001 p, 16). In extreme situations, whole supply
chains can become 'locked-in' to old technologies. Consequently, they suffer from a
lack of flexibility to adapt and over-dependence on a limited number of customers or
suppliers, exacerbating the decline of a whole regional cluster (Bozdogan et al., 1998).
For example, Bozdogan et al., (1998) and Neal (1999) showed how under certain
circumstances, leading suppliers in a chain gradually squeeze out the smaller ones,
which can be viewed as detrimental for these smaller firms.
Section 3.3.has reviewed the literature relatively business networks, explaining what
they are, why they exist, problems of operation and impacts on SME performance. In
4
particular, the literature on the positive and negative impacts of business networks
demonstrates that although networks can offer the potential to enhance firm
performance, such outcomes do not always emerge as anticipated. This draws attention
to network evolution and the question of how this evolution can be predicted and
managed so as to maximise the chance of the outcomes. Clearly, it is vital for those
involved in SME networks to know what is likely to shape or influence the evolution of
such networks, and to identify any mitigating actions they could take. Hence, this
chapter now goes on to consider the factors that can influence the evolution of business
networks, to build a picture of how performance outcomes may be determined.
3.4 Factors Influencing the Evolution of SME Networks
The section aims to present the key insights from the literature regarding factors
influencing the evolution of SME networks. An extensive literature review revealed
numerous factors influencing when and how business networks form, strengthen or
dissolve, but failed to identify a pre-existing categorisation of the main contextual
factors which may be influential in SME network evolution. Hence, the following
sections offer an original categorisation of key contextual factors that emerged from the
literature review, under the headings of market conditions, social cohesiveness and
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external institutional support41. The nature of each contextual factor is described in
detail, together with a discussion of the implications for SME network evolution.
3.4.1 Market Conditions
Market conditions are the first contextual (macro) factor influencing SME network
evolution considered here. According to Dacin et al., (1999), firms, and the networks
which they form, are both embedded in specific markets that are defined in terms of
products, services, clientele, competitors, suppliers, functions performed, time and
territory (Halinen and Tornroos, 1998). They are also embedded in certain infrastructural
technologies at the country level (e.g. transportation and information systems), product
<
technologies, technological processes, and relationships with particular research
laboratories and universities (Hakansson, 1989; Hagedoorn, 1993). These technologies
compel certain economic expenses from firms.
Numerous studies suggest that successful the strength and direction of SME networks
are supported by or dependent on market conditions. These are discussed under five
different aspects. First, the extent to which a significant volume/segment of end-users
exists in a market, who are capable of differentiating between products in the category
(in terms of product labels, quality, origin specifications marketing promotions, and
intrinsic cues of value). Research evidence finds that, as long as a high and stable profit
margin is generated (Bianchi, 2001), strong network linkages tend to ensue from the
existence of discriminating consumers as they provide the network with impetus, to
develop quality product and brands (de Roest and Menghi, 2000). Second, the extent to
which the pressure of well-differentiated substitutes or imitations exists in a market,
which are offered by competitors outside a specific region and may misuse the name of
41
In fact, the discussion about market conditions, social cohesiveness and external institutional support
reflects and explains the embeddedness of business networks in respective on-going larger structures of
market/technology, social-cultural/cognitive context and political/institutional one (Dacin et ah, 1999).
The term of embeddedness was first introduced by Polanyi (1944). The argument is that embeddedness in
context affects (reduces) the actors' economic rational activity. Neglecting the temporal and dyadic
perspective of transaction cost analysis (TCA), embededdness is used to explain the continuous and
interactive process of change in inter-firm relationships, which needs to consider the contextual setting,
time and space (Granovetter, 1973, 1985; Pettigrew, 1990; Grabher, 1993; Halinen and Tornroos, 1998).
provenance or product under investigation. The stronger the pressure of well-
differentiated substitutes or imitations, the more reinforcing it is for the existing network
linkages among SMEs inside the specific region, by making network members realise
"the strength of unity" (Barjolle and Sylvander, 1999; Sylvander et al., 2000). Third, the
existence of very concentrated downstream channels influences SME network evolution.
In particular, a fragmenting effect takes place on the network (Koka et al., 2006),
because the dominant firms are more attractive partners, and in turn better capitalise on
opportunities, thanks to resource control and exclusive information. However, when the
fragmented suppliers are in a disadvantageous position due to unfair treatment, this has
the opposite effect. It stimulates the establishment of power 'countervailing' networks
(Galbraith, 1980; Grandori and Soda, 1995; Masurel and Janszen, 1998), providing that
sufficient social lateral interactions exist. Less-market oriented downstream actors are
likely to treat the upstream actors unfairly. Next, is the observation that the physical and
technological constraints increase production and marketing costs, and threfore affect
differently the relationships of processors (e.g. food processors) with their suppliers and
distributors. Such constraints exacerbate variability in quality/quantity standards, and
include seasonality, perishability, heterogeneity in quality and quantity, scant resistant to
transportation and handling, lack of effective quality assessment' techniques etc. From
the suppliers' side, empirical evidence suggests that quality brand-oriented processors
are likely to adopt a vertical integrated form, "virtual" (e.g. contract agriculture) or real
(i.e. cooperatives), rather than spot markets to tackle the issue of quality uncertainty and
information asymmetry (Papandreou 1994; Schmitz, 1999). In contrast, from the
distributors' side, these processors usually establish long-term bilateral relationships.
Thus far, when considering the impact of the physical and technological constraints on
SME network evolution, the literature suggests that it is primarily positive. However, the
aforementioned physical and technological constraints are expected to weaken either
real or "virtual" vertical integrated forms, if mechanisms to obstruct repeated
opportunistic behaviour of some members are absent or inefficient in the collective
scheme (De Roest, 1999; Chappuis and Sans, 1999; Barjolle and Chappuis, 2000). The
final, but noteworthy, market condition considers the case when the participation in a
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quality certification system, i.e. a less loose code of production practice, is set as a
precondition for market entry. This is likely to have a positive effect on SME network
evolution, by encouraging fragmented SME suppliers to adopt again a vertical integrated
form, either "virtual" or real (Spiller and Zellner, 1997; Maze et al., 2001; Borch and
Roaldsen, 2007). Overall, market conditions have a complex impact on evolution of
inter-firm relationships.
3.4.2 Social Cohesiveness
The social, cultural, and cognitive embeddedness of firms have often been proposed as
key factors to explain the evolution of business networks. It is argued that "collective
i i
understandings shape organisational strategies and goals, ideologies that prescribe
conceptions of the means and ends of individual action, and rules systems that categorise
organisational actors and systems of organisational control" (Dacin et al., 1999. p. 328-
329). Cognition here infers not the individual, but the collective large-scale social
processes of classification and categorisation of elements (Walsh, 1995). More precisely,
empirical research presents models explaining how authority (Kurowski, 1998),
organisational identity (Dutton and Dukerish, 1991), expertise, hierarchy and control
(Guillen, 1994) are culturally embedded. It seems that concepts of control (Fligstein,
1991) and competition (Lant and Baum, 1995) are embodied in industry cultures, which
dramatically determine what individual managers define as strategic issues or best
operating practices. Threfore, social factors influence SME network evolution.
Another concept frequently cited in the literature to express the social, cultural and
cognitive embeddedeness of individuals (e.g. firms, persons etc.) is social cohesiveness.
It refers to the nature and extent to which network actors share common ties, interests
and perceptions. Empirically, it refers to contexts where local people know each other
well, work together, and have family ties or common social lives. The presence of such
strong pre-existing socio-cultural bonds helps to develop (Scott, 1988; Baker, 1995), and
sustain (Huggins, 2000) successful collective action providing that a capable leader
exists (Barjolle and Sylvander, 1999; Bhaskaran 2004; Mattiacci and Zampi, 2004; Ryan
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et al., 2004). In practice, personal ties are strengthened by shared values, beliefs and
reciprocity by the pursuit of common goals, interests, and mutual benefits (Hu and
Korneliussen, 1997). Larson (1992) stated that trust and inter-personal and social
relationships consist the pre-requisite condition for building up inter-organisational ties
(Gundolf and Jaouen 2008). This argument is valid since "machine-like relationships do
not exist" (Hakansson and Snehota 1995, p. 10). Moreover, Macauley (1963, p.63) notes
that 'non-contractual' inter-firm relationships rely on "a man's word and common
honesty and decency". It is generally found that high levels of pre-existing social
cohesiveness amongst network members encourage stable network relations (Sammarra
and Biggiero, 2001). Overall, pre-existing social cohesiveness and communality in
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interests and perceptions appear to have a catalyst role in SME network formation.
3.4.3 External Institutional Support
A final, but noteworthy, factor influencing SME network evolution is the political and
institutional context in which networks are embedded. "Economic activity is organised
through institutions, ... (which) themselves anchored in wider political arrangements
and cultural systems of meaning'" (Dacin et ah, 1999, p. 322). In practice, economic
transactions are ruled by governance regimes, whose property rights politicians enforce
through the authorisation of institutional and legal frameworks (Campbell and Lindberg,
1990). Empirical evidence (Hamilton and Biggart, 1988; Dobbin, 1994) suggests that
markets, industries and business networks in Europe, Asia and USA follow distinctive
institutional patterns embodied by these respective policies, relating for example to
property rights, rules governing competition, cooperation and access to capital (Dowd
and Dobbin, 1997) and institutional change mechanisms. Inclinations towards
opportunism, trust, legal contracting and self-interest are affected by these distinctive
institutional patterns (Cooke and Wills 1999; Keeble et al. 1998, 1999). For example,
Japanese and German systems tend to rely less on legal contracts than UK and US ones
(Janne 2002; Nooteboom 2000). Authorisation, prevalence (Jepperson and Meyer, 1991)
and potential for competitive advantage of firms (Porter, 1985) are anchored in wider
political and legislative arrangements, which seem to shape the boundaries and the
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'paths' of strategic action (Biggart and Orru, 1997). For instance, the competitive
advantage of firms stems from the exploitation of weaknesses in industry structures.
Differences in (political) power and political embeddedness create additional
transactional costs, typically invisible in the traditional supplier-buyer relationship, due
to the impact ofpolitical intervention (Melin, 1989; Jacobson et al., 1993).
For the current research, the impact of political and institutional context on network
evolution is empirically assessed through the concept of external institutional support,
or 'institutional thickness' (Amin and Thrift, 1995). This refers to the nature and extent
to which regional or national governments' 'public support' (Grandori and Soda, 1995;
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Barjolle et al. 1999; Street and Cameron, 2007) is offered to SME networks. It refers to
the legal and policy context of the network, and includes the legal framework, funding
opportunities and, supply quotas prescribed as well as the public agencies facilitating
SMEs and acting as intermediaries in cluster formation (Davenport et al., 1999).
The influence of external institutional support on SME networks could be positive, for
example by encouraging intra- and inter- sectoral collaboration on a regional basis with
adequate funding (e.g. LEADER programs; Ryan et al., 2004) and access to information
and services (Asfaw, et al., 2007). However, it can also be negative. Economic support can
harm more than benefit both SMEs and their collective schemes by setting them in a
defensive or passive position (Oustapassidis et al., 1993). For example, funding for
cooperatives' infrastructure, when it has not previously secured the collection of a
sufficient quantity of raw materials by the cooperative members or set artificially low
interest rates for credit capital assets for cooperatives (Oustapassidis, et al., 1993), can
harm both the network (e.g. reaching a prohibit production cost, conflicts among the
cooperative members) and those SMEs not belonging to the network (e.g. creation of
unfair market conditions for those do not enjoy such favourable conditions). Overall, the
strength of SME network linkages are expected to increase only where external
institutional support respects the network's autonomy and self-management, and
furthermore enhance its flexibility and efficiency.
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The benefits of the embeddedness research are summarised by Dancin et ai, (1999, p.
320-321).
"...tends to strike a balance between behavioural rationality and economic
efficiency (Smelser and Swedberg, 1994). Embededdness arguments take the
economic activity seriously, but look beyond the rhetoric of intentionality and
efficiency, and make a strong commitment towards understanding relational aspects
oforganisations (Marsden, 1981). "
This section has presented the key insights from the literature regarding how market
conditions, social cohesiveness and external institutional support influence the evolution
of SME networks, in particular whether these factors seem to strengthen or weaken
intra-network linkages. From the literature, a series of tentative proposals has been
generated, which can be used as part of preliminary stages of data collection and
analysis in empirical study. Table 3.2 presents a complete summary of the proposals. As
well as investigating the actual influence of each one individually through empirical
study, this research also aims to expose their relative significance and investigate
whether one contextual factor can counterbalance or reinforce/strengthen another one.
3.4.4 The Role of Network Actors in Network Evolution
As revealed in the preceding section, contextual factors can change the conditions within
which networks function, altering the demands on member firms and management. At
this point, network actors "can either struggle with the current governance form, which
is likely to become increasingly ineffective, or shift to a different form that is consistent"
with the new demands (Provan and Kenis, 2008, p.). Therefore, evolution of networks is
more than a simple natural process, entirely determined by external forces.
If conditions would trigger fundamental network reconfiguration seems to depend on
actors' interpretations and intentional behaviours (Halinen et al., 1999) for example,
whether actors considered the market conditions to be critical and necessitating prompt
action. Friedland and Alford (1991, p. 252) claim that despite the exchange facilitation,
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Table 3.2: Summary of Contextual Factors Influencing SME Network Evolution
and Research Proposals
!) marketconditions
* If a significant segment of end-users recognises and differentia** tire product this may enhance
tighter cooperation to develop quality products and brands. So, this factor has a positive effect on
SME network evolution.
* The pressure of well-differentiated substitutes and imitations is assumed to reinforce an existing
collective action, by .-.taking its members to realise "the strength of unity*'. So. this factor has a
positive effect on SME network evolution.
"The existence of very concentrated downstream channels or monopolies is assumed to inhibit the
collective action of fragmented suppliers. This factor can have a negative effect on SME network
evolution.
* Hv**yer, when the fragmented suppliers arc in a disadvantageous position, due to unfair
treatment from the concentrated downstream actors, this » expected to have the opposite effect,
because fragmented suppliers join to a "countervailing power" network. It can also have a positive
effect on SME network evolution.
* It is assumed that the physical and technological constraints increase production and marketing
costs, and by this way affect irtterftrm relationships, due to both information asymmetry and quality
uncertainty, from the suppliers' *'de- quality brand-oriented processors arc likely » adopt a vertical
integrated form. "Virtual" (e.g. contract agriculture) or real (e.g. cooperatives.), rather than spot
markets. From the distributors' side, these processors usually establish long-term bilateral
relationships. This factor can have a positive effect on SME network evolution.
*tl<(>wwr< these physical and technological constraints are expected to weaken either real or
"virtual" vertical integrated forms, if mechanisms to obstruct repeated opportunistic behaviour of
some members are absent or inefficient m the collective schemes. It can also have a negative effect
on SME network evolution.
The participation in a quality certification system, as a precondition for market entry, is likely to
encourage fragmented SME suppliers to adopt a vertical integrated form, either "virtual" (e.g..
contract agriculture) or real (e.g. cooperatives). So, this factor has a positive effect on SME network
evolution.
2} PKEXISrtSG SQCtAL-COUESfPESESS & COMMUMAUTYIN tNTERESIPPERSEPTlOSS •
These two factors enhance fee emergence and sustainability of SME collective initiatives,
providing thai a capable leader exists. So. this factor ha* a positive effect on SME network
evolution.
3) EXTERNAL INSTITUTSONAL SUPPORT
* The external institutional support is likely to enhance the emergence and sustainabiiity of SME
collective initiatives, providing that it respects SME network's autonomy and self-management and




"social networks per se do not have content, and as such do not entail interests, values,
motives, beliefs", but the network actors do. Consequently, any study of the evolution
and performance of networks also needs to investigate the role played by network actors,
particularly their collaborative capabilities to recognise opportunities and costs in
embedded relations (Uzzi, 1996). One can argue that actors can and make their choices
for reasons like mimicry (DiMaggio and Powel, 1983), past experiences and personal
preferences, but the demand of efficiency and effectiveness of the network configuration
under a particular set of contextual conditions cannot be totally ignored (Provan and
Kenis, 2008). The implication for the current research, therefore, is to include in the
analysis, in addition to the contextual factors influencing network evolution, the features
of networks themselves which have agency in the evolution process. An extensive
review of the literature on SME networks failed to identify any pre-existing
categorisation of the features of SME networks which may be influential to
performance. Hence, the next section offers an original categorisation of these features,
under the headings of network member profiles and competencies, as well as governance
structure.
3.5 Networks Features Influencing SME Network Performance
The aim of this section is to present what existing literature says about the influence of
SME network features on network performance. As highlighted above, the features are
categorised under three main headings: network member profiles and competencies, as
well as governance structure. In the following sections, the nature of each feature is
described in detail, together with discussion of the implications for the SME network
performance. To assess performance, the categorisation of transactional and
transformational outcomes proposed by Human and Provan (1997) is employed.
Transactional outcomes refer to impacts such as financial performance, access to
resources and organisational credibility. Transformational outcomes refer to impacts
such as changes in network members' collaborative attitudes and behaviours.
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3.5.1 Member Profile
The first feature of an SME network that influences performance is the profile of the
members. In particular, low diversity and incompatibility in network members' profile
may reinforce network performance, but constitute weak stimuli for innovation,
(Milliken and Martins, 1996).
In terms of member diversity, Milliken and Martins, (1996) note that diversity among
network members can be manifest in 'observed' attributes (i.e. physical profile) such as
gender, age, location, land size or having a second job, and also 'less visible or
underlying' attributes (i.e. attitudinal profile) such as members' behaviours, perspectives
and goals. On one hand, low diversity in network members' profile may prevent
conflicts (Pelled et al., 1999) and facilitate tacit knowledge transmission (Cross et al,
2001), coordination (O'Reilly et al., 1989) and goal consensus (Provan and Kenis,
2008). One the other hand, it may promote a mindset of 'us versus them' (Krackhardt
and Stern, 1988). In contrast, high diversity may be a stimulant for innovation (Provan
and Kenis, 2008) and affect positively some cognitive outcomes such as higher number
of alternatives considered, quality of ideas and cooperation level in complex tasks
(Milliken and Martins, 1996).
In terms of seeking an explanation for the. aforementioned paradox and 'why actors are
attracted to certain others', literature used the concept of similarity or homophily,
defined by Borgatti and Foster (2003, p.999) as "the tendency for people to interact
more with their own kind - whether by preference or induced by opportunity constraints
(McPherson and Smith-Lovin, 1987)". Homophily is related to clique analysis (Scott,
1991) and maintenance of power/statues inequality within organisations (Brass, 1985;
Ibarra, 1992). Provan and Kenis, (2008) argued that network literature concentrated
more on similarity/homophily, rather than goal consensus per se. Based on their research
on 'domain similarity', Van de Ven (1976) demonstrated that in the absence of
hierarchy, general consensus on the content and process of broad network-level goals
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might suffice to build network-level commitment of participants. Examples of such
goals could be addressing network-level needs e.g. funding, legitimacy, setting
minimum standards for the sector's services. Considering that absolute similarity of
purpose may make working together problematic, due to competitive pressures (Park,
1996), Provan and Kenis, (2008) clarified that networks need only moderate levels of
goal consensus to be effective and the critical point becomes the governance of network
relationships. Overall, low diversity in network members' profile is expected to generate
a moderate level of goal consensus, which in turn reinforces network performance in
terms of both transactional and transformational outcomes.
3.5.2 Member Competences »
The second network feature impacting on network performance is the participants'
competencies. Literature suggests that if network members have a sufficient range of
competencies, according to their responsibilities, then network performance is enhanced.
Particularly, production related capabilities, marketing and entrepreneurial skills
together with collective-management capabilities seem necessary for good network
performance.
With respect to production related capabilities, Sutton-Brary (2008)_ showed the impact
of product and service quality in relationship development and stability. Regarding
marketing and entrepreneurial skill, Matsuno et al. (2003) stressed the need of firms to
be market-oriented within their network, which means be aware of and compatible with
other members' expectations, restrictions and induced norms. The accuracy of
managers' perceptions of external interactions (called network horizon or picture)
appeared crucial, not only for obtaining adequate information, but also for taking
subsequent marketing decisions and actions. However, empirical evidence indicated that
managers often have inaccurate perceptions of the world (the network and its
environment/context) in which they are embedded and operate (Starbuck and Mezias,
1996; Sutcliffe, 1994; Holmen and Pederson, 2001), while this accuracy is affected by
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their personality, hierarchical position and centrality in the network. Moreover,
Hollingshead (1998) introduced the transactive memory concept, which considers that
"knowledge is distributed in different minds" (Borgatti and Foster 2003, p. 998), and in
order to exploit the knowledge effectively, network actors need to be aware of 'who
knows what' (Andersson et a!., 2007). For example, the skill to identify gatekeepers is a
crucial one (Pittaway et al., 2004). Entrepreneurial use of interfirm relationships depends
on the firms' capabilities to utilise relationships and absorb the knowledge/ideas
generated by these relationships (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990; DeSanctis et al. 2002).
However, not all firms possess these capabilities and maximize the advantage derived
from their inter-firm relationships (Hanna and Walsh 2002; Pammolli and Riccaboni
2002).
Finally, collective-management capabilities turn attention from dyadic interfirm
relationships towards a discussion of how firms can deliberately design their whole
network to meet their collective needs. The importance of collective-management
capabilities is stressed by Bolton et al., (1994), Gemser et al., (1996), Coles et al.,
(2003), Ferrary, (2003) and Ritter and Gemunden (2003). Successful clusters were found
to be "led by people who value learning, are committed to their community, and are
willing to work hard towards a collective vision for their industry,...take responsibility
for collective competitiveness" (Rosenfeld, 2002). Leadership appears a critical
competence (Bhaskaran, 2004; Mattiacci and Zampi, 2004). Milward and Provan (2006)
identified five essential network management tasks42, including accountability, (internal
and external) legitimacy, conflict, design of governance structure, and commitment.
Pittaway et al. (2004) recognised as core network management skills the following:
taking decision when a legal contract is needed, balancing formal and informal
agreements and identifying the necessary millstones or interventions (Shaw, 1998).
Managing inter-firm relationships and/or the whole network constitute difficult tasks
(Biemans, 1991), because in practice it means creating the ideal conditions for both
In Appendix I, Table 3.4 presents the responsibilities/management Tasks stemming from these five
tasks for both network managers (column 2) and members/participants (column 3).
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explicit and tacit knowledge, as well as energies for enhancing goal achievement (e.g.
trust, courage, determination, commitment etc.) to flow through relationships (Ambler
and Styles 2000).
Furthermore, Provan and Kenis (2008) noticed that different governance forms43
demand varying degrees of competencies from participants to achieve their network-
level goals. Individual network members may not possess the skills demanded, and this
inconsistency was suggested to lead "either to overall network ineffectiveness,
dissolution or change in governance form" (Provan and Kenis, 2008, p.241). The
collective-management task becomes even more challenging because of the dynamic
4
character of networks and reflects an additional, apart from that of "learning within
networks" (e.g. product innovation), dimension of learning, which is "learning about
networking" (Powell and Brantley, 1992; Mody, 1993; Gulati et al., 1994; Gulati, 1995).
Knowledge of how to collaborate accumulates over time through experience, reflection
and interpretation (Lorenzoni and Lipparini, 1999). Indeed, empirical evidence provided
by O'Reilly (2003) supported that key competences (learning) and governance
(coordination) co-evolve, serving to strengthen network relationships. Overall, the
theoretical proposition states that if network members have a sufficient range of
competencies, according to their responsibilities, the network performance is enhanced,
in terms of both transactional and transformational outcomes.
3.5.3 Network Governance
Third, literature suggested the network governance structure44 as a strategic variable
affecting dramatically its performance outcomes. Grandori and Soda's (1995) review
43 Provan and Kenis, (2008) defined three different network governance forms: (Self) Participant-
governed networks, Lead Organisation-governed networks and Network Administrative Organisation
(Table 3.5 in Appendix I).
44
Provan and Kenis, (2008, p. 331) explains governance as follows: "a focus on governance involves the
use of institutions and structures of authority and collaboration to allocate resources and to coordinate and
control joint action across the network as a whole. These interactions are distinct from operational links,
which are often dyad based including referrals, sharing of information, and joint programs".
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gives an indication of the variety of coordination mechanisms discussed in network
literature. A distinction can be made between formal and informal governance
mechanisms. Regarding informal ones, it is referred the social or peer control based on
power and influence (Brass 1984; Thorelli, 1986) and on moral obligations such as
norms of fairness, honesty, reciprocity (Pruitt, 1981), fear of ostracism and loss of
reputation (Portes and Sensenbrenner, 1993; Jones et al, 1997). Trust is often cited as a
critcal informal governance mechanism (Powell, 1998; Uzzi, 1997; Lipparini and
Sobrero 1994), which facilitates the transmission of new ideas (Hausler et al. 1994;
Hoang and Antoncic 2003; Sherer 2003; Fritz and Fischer 2007). The goodwill trust
sorts out inherent problems like information asymmetry (Weitzel et al. 2003) by working
as a "safeguard mechanism", against risks of opportunism (Bradach and Eccles 1991,
Dyer and Singh 1998). Moreover, as Andersson et al. (2007, p. 36) pointed out "the
more tacit the knowledge (is), the greater the need for extensive interaction and a high
degree of relational embeddedness (are) in order for the firm to have good opportunities
to absorb the knowledge". However, Grandori and Soda, (1995) asserted that trust is an
intermediate variable, better explained as an outcome rather as mechanism. This position
is adopted by this thesis, classifying trust as a transformational outcome.
Apart from informal coordination mechanisms, the design and sufficiency of the formal
network governance matter. Empirical evidence supports that network performance and
sustainability decreases when its governance structure is under- or over- formalised
(Nooteboom 2000). Therefore, it seems important to assess the sufficiency of
governance mechanisms regulating at least five main aspects of collective action: (i)
power distribution (Grandori and Soda, 1995; Johnsen et al, 2008), (ii) accountability
and formality (Milward and Provan, 2006; Provan and Kenis, 2008), (iii) diffusion of
information and knowledge (Grandori and Soda, 1995) (iv) resolution of conflict and
trust building (Grandori and Soda, 1995; Coles et al. 2003) and (v) monitoring,
evaluation andplanning (Grandori and Soda, 1995; Provan and Kenis, 2008).
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Empirical evidence suggests that high number of SMEs makes a collective strategy,
difficult to be identified and developed (Canali, 1997). Some of the better-proposed
ways to arrange these issues are described below. First, a proper communication system
needs to be established along the whole supply chain in order consumers' messages to
reach all producers (Canali, 1997) and individual goals to be adjusted to a collective one
(Chappuis and Sans, 1999; De Roest and Dufour, 1999). Indeed, Ritter and Gemiinden
(2002) highlighted such an integrated internal communication structure as an important
part for the development of network competences. In terms of accountability and
formality, network members need to reach a collective agreement on how to allocate
resources and rights based on measured contributions, such as agreeing on the various
qualities, setting a payment scheme according to the pre-determined quality categories,
and sometimes on proposing a model of contracts. As a result, network members "are
held accountable for their actions, at least relative to network-level goals (in order) to
protect against the 'free riders'... members who perform little or no work but reap the
network's benefits" (Milward and Provan, 2006, p.18). The development of the internal
mechanisms for resolution of conflicts is deemed necessary (Chappuis and Sans, 1999;
Barjolle and Chappuis, 2000). Similarly, mechanisms for process monitoring,
evaluating and planning are required to be established in clusters (Dawson and Paris,
2003). All the aforementioned mechanisms are expected to enable the network to
operate efficiently and effectively, increasing its probability to survive (Barjolle and
Bertill, 1999; Frayssignes, 2003), by being flexible and adaptive. Overall, the theoretical
proposition states that SME networks characterised by high power distribution and
sufficient accountability/formality, as well as the existence of efficient inter-firm
mechanisms for transferring valid information, resolving conflicts and
monitoring/evaluating, are more likely to perform well, in terms of both transactional
and transformational outcomes.
Further research is needed to examine all these theoretical propositions of network
features together. The current research aims to reveal the barriers to SMEs' learning on
how to collaborate (e.g. build trust, enhance goals consensus), and to re-design the
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characteristics of network configurations (e.g. governance) in order to meet individual or
collective needs. It responds to the urgent need, pointed out by Pittaway et al. (2004) to
examine which are the critical features of network governance and management (Bolton
et al., 1994) that enhance SMEs' sustainability and innovation capacity. Furthermore,
the current research seeks to investigate the interplay between the different network
features. For instance, it aims to explore if and how the governance structure of a
network can counterbalance any negative implications of network members' profile and
competences.
Overall, this Chapter has revealed insights, and developed proposals, on how SME
>
networks evolve, the factors influencing that evolution, and the implications for
performance. The combined examination of these three dimensions gives the
opportunity to describe a network, its evolution and performance outcomes in much
more depth than can be found in existing literature. The next section highlights this
novel contribution of the current research, and explains the details of the framework
proposed as a starting-point for empirical investigation of SME network evolution and
performance.
Table 3.3: Description of Network Features Influencing SME Network Performance and
their Hypotheses
1) DIVERSITYINMEMBERS' PROFILE
Low diversity and incompatibility in network members' profile, both physical and
attitudinal, is expected to be a weak stimulus for innovation, but to reinforce network
performance. (-)
2) SUFFICIENCYINMEMBERS' COMPETENCIES
Production related capabilities, marketing and entrepreneurial skills together with
collective-management capabilities affect network performance. If network members
have a sufficient range of these competencies, according to their responsibilities, the
network performance is enhanced. (+)
3) NETWORK GOVERNANCE STRUCTURE
A SME network is expected to perform well, if sufficient governance mechanisms exist
to regulate the following five mam aspects of collective action: (i) power distribution
(li) accountability and formality, (iii) diffusion of information and knowledge, (iv)
resolution of conflict and trust building and (v) monitoring, evaluation and planning. (+)
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3.6 SME Network Evolution and Performance: Theoretical
Framework and Summary of Research Propositions
Having considered the essential elements of network evolution and performance, and
having proposed multiple theoretical arguments relating to these (Tables 3.2 and 3.3),
this section draws the elements and arguments together into a consolidated framework.
The intention of the framework is to facilitate empirical analysis of network evolution
and performance (Figure 3.2), and focus on the interplay between contextual factors and
network features.
Th6 novelty of the framework is that it analyses simultaneously key contextual factors,
network features and performance outcomes salient to SME networks. Additionally, it
acknowledges the interplay of these three dimensions. Under each dimension,
meaningful theoretical propositions are offered regarding contextual factors influencing
network evolution and network features influencing network performance, respectively.
All propositions are derived from careful scrutiny of the literature.
It is important to emphasise that although the proposed framework is intended to
facilitate empirical study, it should be viewed as a starting-point for analysis, rather than
a model for deductive testing under a deterministic approach. Given the nature of the
research phenomena, it is important that an abductive research approach is maintained,
leaving open the possibility for other theoretical propositions or categorisations and
definitions to occur, if empirical evidence reveals that actors follow a different way of
seeing and analysing things than that theoretically proposed. Diversity and uniqueness of
each network is taken under consideration. Having reviewed the literature on SME
network evolution, the thesis now moves on to the empirical research phase. The next
Chapter presents the methods employed.
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Figure 3.3: Linkages between SME Network Context and Features and
Implications for Performance: A Framework and Theoretical Propositions
SME NETWORK
CONTEXT FEATURES













(FOR DETAILS SEE TABLE. 3.3)
(FOR DETAILS SEE TABLE 3.2)
zPERFORMANCE OUTCOMES
1) TRANSCACTIONAL OUTCOMES
Economic outcomes, resulting from SMEs' engagement in business networks are: (i)
financial performance, (ii) access to resources, and (iii) organisational credibility. A
transaction makes recourses available at different network places.
2) TRANSFORMATIONAL OUTCOME
Non- outcomes, resulting from SMEs' engagement in business networks constitute the
changes in the way SME managers think and act, thanks to network participation. A




In sharp contrast to the abundant network research at the level of individual
organisations and dyadic relationships, as shown in preceding literature Chapters, many
important questions regarding network evolution and performance, especially at the
whole network level, are left unanswered. Therefore, an empirical study was conducted
to provide more precise answers. This Chapter aims to give (i) a brief description of the
broad methodological approach and all the specific sub-decisions of research design
undertaken for the empirical work, (ii) a justification for these choices in terms of their
« <
appropriateness for the task with strong reference to research objectives (RO), and (iii) a
description of examples of how methods were applied in practice for the current
research.
This Chapter proceeds as follows. First, it outlines the emerging questions/issues from
the literature review, then it analyses their nature and methodological implications for
the research design. The design comprises an abductive research strategy, qualitative
case study methodology, and the collection of primary data through participant
observation, in-depth interviews and secondary data. Purposeful sampling and methods
of triangulation are also discussed, together with the data analysis methods which
followed the principles of grounded theory. For each aforementioned choice, a section
gives the relative theory, "best practices" and justification with reference to the relevant
RO, followed by a section describing the specific procedures and reflections executed in
the current research. The Chapter concludes with a discussion regarding the
generalisability, reliability and validity of the findings.
4.2 Restatement of the Research Objectives
In response to the gaps of knowledge described in Chapters 2 and 3, this thesis takes the
following research objectives forward in the empirical study:
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(i) To describe the key features and trace the evolution of a sample of SME
networks, as whole entities, within the Greek agrifood sector
(ii) to identify the key factors influencing the evolution of these networks, both in
terms ofcontextualfactors and network features
(iii) to build a theory of how the context and features of these SME networks
impact on the performance outcomes of individual SME members, and the
networks as whole entities
With respect to objective (i), Chapter 2 and 3 indicate that SME network evolution is a
dynamic, complex and socially-embedded phenomenon, and little knowledge exists in
the GAS' context. Consequently, empirical research is required to describe the features,
I
evolution and performance of a sample of Greek agrifood SME networks, with emphasis
on the symbolic meanings attributed by the protagonists. Regarding objective (ii), the
two aforementioned Chapters also suggest that context and features of SME networks
may constitute factors influential in network evolution, for instance the influence of the
Greek State's intervention in the development of the cooperative movement is evident.
However, further empirical research is needed to understand why some Greek agrifood
SME networks are successful given the problematic GAS' context. Do these networks
perceive and respond to the context differently? Empirical research is required to fully
understand the patterns of behaviours and the underlying perceptions of the successful
actors. With regard to objective (iii), Chapter 2 and 3 illustrate that the performance of
SME networks needs to be linked to their evolution, with particular reference to the
interplay over time between a network's features, context and outcomes. This approach
could be useful in exploring the reasons why only a few Greek agrifood SME networks
perform satisfactorily, by tracing the evolution of both successful and under-performing
networks.
4.3 The Nature of the Research Objectives - Implications for
Research Design
The substance of the research objectives contemplated above implies a need for a
methodological approach sensitive and compatible with a number of issues. Particularly,
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the dynamic character of the phenomena requires attention to processes, while issues
emerging regarding context-specificity (e.g. embeddedness) and path/history
dependency indicate a need to analyse the context of networks and avoid generalisations
across time or space, respectively. Requirements for flexibility, sensitivity to multi¬
directional causality and focus of analysis at multi-levels (e.g. SMEs and the whole
network) call for a research design open to adaptations. Since network realities are
"socially constructed", complexity-sensitive methods are necessary to study the real-
world of protagonists as they unfold naturally, and avoid setting predetermined
constraints on research outcomes. Besides, the assumption that each network case is
unique suggests the adoption of a holistic perspective, where the phenomenon of
t
network evolution would be studied as a whole, revealing interdependencies, rather than
be reduced to a few discrete variables explained by a linear, cause-effect relationship.
Consequently, an abductive analysis is preferable, with open questions that permit
immersion in data details/specifics to discover underlying categories, dimension, and
interrelationships.
With respect to the type of objectives (distinguished by Blaikie, 2000), the current study
aims to explore network evolution phenomenon, and particularly describe network
features, explain factors and mechanisms for network evolution, and understand and
predict network performance outcomes. Based on the desirable features of the
methodological approach described above, the following choices were deemed
appropriate for the current research design: an adbuctive research strategy, qualitative
methodology, case study for data collection and organising, grounded theory for data
analysis, in-depth interviews and participant observation for collecting primary data,
collection of secondary data, purposeful sampling methods, and triangulation
techniques. A brief introduction, best practices and a justification for each choice are
given below.
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4.4 Presentation and Justification of Choices in Research
Resign
4.4.1 Research Strategy
The starting point for any methodological choices a researcher makes is the research
strategy (RS) and approach to be followed. In Blaikie's (1993; 2000) classification, four
research strategies in social science are distinguished based on their unique
combinations of ontological and epistemological assumptions43, although they overlap to
some extent: inductive, deductive, reproductive and abductive. Their typical
characteristics are summarised in Table 4.1.
A dominant school of thought about knowledge claims in marketing, inspired from the
natural sciences (Woolgar, 1996), is that of positivism46. Its ontological assumptions
state that social reality consists only of observable events, independent of both the
observer and social actors. The order of events can be described by universal causal
relationships. Its epistemological assumptions suggest that this order can be discovered
using 'objective' procedures such as experiments, statistically valid measures and
representative samples (Silverman, 1993; Henwood, 1996) that produce 'objective' data
('observations'). Thus, if the current study adopted the logic of positivism, SME
networks would be believed to operate under universal and fixed laws (Brown, 1993).
On the contrary, the interpretivist approach to social inquiry replaces the 'realist'
ontological assumptions of positivism, with 'relativism'. The abductive research
strategy, which the current study follows, belongs to interpretivism. To elaborate,
imperative social science accepts that multiple and changing social realities exist, which
4 4 The ontological assumptions referred to the "claims about what exists", while the epistemological
assumptions concerns the "claims about what can be known and what criteria such knowledge must satisfy
in order to be called knowledge rather beliefs" (Blaikie, 2000, p.8).
46 Inductive research strategy (the logic of Positivism) shares the ontological assumption with deductive
RS, but the latter rejects the epistemological assumptions of inductive.
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are the product of social actors' negotiations about the meanings of actions and
situations. As a consequence, there is "no independent or neutral way of establishing the
'truth'... each social reality may be 'real' to its inhabitants" (Blaikie, p. 116). According
to the same author, the epistemological assumptions of interpretivism distinguish it
sharply from positivism. Intrepretivism accepts that the social world is pre-interpreted
from 'inside' by its members, before the researcher even starts to interpret these
everyday accounts. So, the researcher's task is to 'immerse' themselves in the
protagonists' lay language, which is full of ongoing socially constructed and subjective
meanings. To understand the protagonists' actions, motives and intentions, the
researcher needs to elicit their tacit and mutual knowledge, in other words, the
*
unarticulated, everyday, typical beliefs and practices, that are produced and constantly
modified by the ongoing interaction of social actors. This knowledge has no independent
existence apart from the actors' social activities and relationships which both facilitate
and structure it (Blaikie, 2000). Having discovered the 'inside' view, the researcher re-
describes it in scientific language, resisting imposing any preconceived views from
'outside' on it. However, theories derived from these re-descriptions can "include
conditions of which social actors may be unaware" (Blaikie, 2000, p.116). Overall, in
research approaches inspired by the interpretivist position, it is believed that statistical
patterns and correlations are not fully understandable without knowing the motives and
symbolic meanings that people attribute to actions, forming these patterns of behaviour.
The active role of people is acknowledged (Silverman, 1993, Banister et a!., 1995).
Why is an abductive RS appropriate for the current study? The starting point in
answering this question is to explain how this RS offers the best procedures for
addressing the thesis' research objectives. First, the abductive RS has ontological and
epistemological assumptions that distinguish it shaiply from the Inductive and Deductive
RS, and it fits better with the realities at SME networks. Practically, this means that
realities about networks, their features, evolution and performance are assumed to be
socially constructed by the network members in their ongoing interactions and to reside
in their lay language. Only by 'immersing' in it, can the researcher capture the members'
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tacit, mutual knowledge and symbolic meanings, which influence their networking
actions. Second, in an abductive RS the researcher can decide on the distance gap
between themselves and the social realities under investigation, therefore they can
minimise the problem of "creating 'sociological' realities that may not represent the
'social' realities they claim to be studying" (Blaikie, 2000, p.121), caused by the
researcher's 'coloured lenses' due to their expectations, scientific language, and past
professional experience. The underlying argument is that since social reality cannot exist
independently from the actors' knowledge about it, the researcher can learn and be
equally close to this reality as any 'native' actor. Third, an abductive RS is an attractive
choice since it can address well all three kinds of questions included in the current ROs:
«»
'what', 'why', and 'how'. Finally, it permits the researcher to adopt the role of a
reflective partner or dialogic facilitator (Section 4.8.1).
4.4.2 Qualitative versus Quantitative Methods
An abductive research strategy inspires a qualitative research approach, which entails
similar ontological and epistemological assumptions to interpretivism, in contrast with a
quantitative appraoch, resided in the logic of positivism. To elaborate, distinctive
preoccupations (Bryman, 1988) and focus of quantitative and qualitative researchers
have been encountered, although the two approaches do not exclude each other
(Denscomble, 1998). On one hand, quantitative social research focuses on the properties
of phenomena and their relationships, therefore it employs mathematical models,
measures pre-determined variables and tests hypotheses using structured questionnaires
and representative samples of the population (Denzin and Lincoln, 1994). According to
Bryman (1988) and Blaikie (2000), quantitative researchers are concerned with
measuring the concepts through reliable and valid procedures, establishing causality and
generalising with little tolerance for time and space limitations. Additionally, they are
content to replicate their findings in similar contexts, and focus on individuals, but on
their demographic rather than social reality. On the other hand, qualitative approaches
seek the in-depth investigation of human behaviours, placing as central the viewpoint of
research subjects, as these are inspired by Intrepretivism's assumptions for the existence
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of socially constructed reality. To understand complex phenomena truly, social actors
are asked open-ended questions, especially focusing on why and how aspects (Denzin
and Lincoln, 1994). Having a less-structured nature compared to quantitative methods
(Blaikie, 2000), qualitative research offers certain advantages, including data richness, a
holistic perspective (Marshall and Rossman, 1999), and tolerance of ambiguity and
contradictions, uncertainty and lack of control. Besides, it gives the ability to generate
theories that are "grounded in reality" (Denscomble, 1998, p. 312). Therefore,
qualitative researchers are preoccupied more with developing theory and concepts,
rather than measuring them. They are committed to viewing and presenting reality from
the research subjects' viewpoint (Henwood, 1996)47, giving context-rich, multi-layered
* k
. .
("thick") descriptions of it (Geertz, 1973; Denzin, 1989). Additionally, their focus on
social processes leads to the adoption of flexible, open and iterative approaches
(Bryman, 1988; Blaikie, 2000).
Similarly, the starting point to answer why a qualitative approach is the most appropriate
choice for the current research is to explain how it achieves the best procedure for
addressing the research objectives. First, as may be appreciated thus far, qualitative
research copes well with situations where parameters and dynamics of a social setting
remain "undiscovered". In these cases, qualitative researchers are sceptical of using
tightly defined concepts and pre-determined associations, because of the risk to
oversimplify the explanation of complex and dynamic phenomena, such as network
evolution (Shaw, 1998). Crucially, they prefer studying the social processes as they
naturally occur, ideally in their natural settings (Miles and Huberman, 1994), aiming to
capture the latent, underlying issues of social dynamics. In practice, this emerging
understanding is facilitated by an iterative process (Denscomble, 1998), of moving back
and forth between stages of data gathering and analysis. This implies that by comparing
4'
As Blumer (1969, p. 56) explained, the researcher enters the world of social actors to "see the situation
as it is seen by the actor, observing what the actor takes into account, observing how he interprets what is
taken into account". Social actors are regarded as purposive agents, since " the actor selects, checks,
suspends, regroups, and transforms the meanings in light of the situation in which he is placed and the
diresction of his action...meaning are used and revised as instruments for the guidance and formation of
action (p.5)" (Theorist of Symbolic Interactionism)
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the empirical data with the research design principles, the codes and concepts already
generated, qualitative researchers go into sufficient detail to unravel the complexity of
network evolution dynamics, and safeguard that their analysis remains 'grounded'.
Furthermore, qualitative analysis accepts the multiple meanings held for concepts such
as "network", "evolution", "change", "context of a network", "impact of network
evolution", as implied by network literature, and seeks to elicit how research subjects
themselves interpret these concepts. Notably, it recognises human actors' active role, so
it could be used for investigating how network members receive and transmit changes to
other connected relationships (Halinen et al., 1999). It becomes clear that network
members' behaviour cannot be assumed to be fully predictable according prescribed
laws, thus the positivism logic is inappropriate. On the contrary, research subjects are
encouraged to express their own intentions behind behaviour by qualitative researchers.
Finally, given the paradoxes and tensions faced by network managers and members, a
qualitative approach appears an attractive choice, thanks to its tolerance of ambiguities
and contradictions.
Researchers following a qualitative approach ought to respect certain research ethics
(Bulmer, 1982; Punch, 1994), including respect of the rights and dignity of participants,
and the avoidance of any harm (e.g. physical or psychological harm, confidentiality).
Besides, they must operate with honesty and integrity, avoiding deception or
misrepresentation, and only after receiving the participants informed consent.
4.4.3 Case Study Methodology
The next decision to be made is the choice of a mode of organising and selecting data.
For the current research, the case study methodology was chosen. This choice represents
a strategic decision relating to the research scale and scope and the case study approach
is recognised as appropriate for both 'theory-testing' and 'theory-building'
(Denscomble, 1998). As Blaikie (2000) notes, case studies can address a real social unit
such as a group of individuals or an event, and treats it as a whole. Goode and Hatt
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(1952, p.333) similarly note that a case study 'keeps together, as a unit, those
characteristics relevant to problem investigated7. Cases can be qualitative or quantitative
or both. Notably, the same methodological issues apply to case studies as to experiments
and surveys, but their way of dealing with them varies.
The rationale for choosing the case study method was fivefold. First, the case study
methodology offered an appropriate means of dealing with the subtleties and intricacies
of real life situations, unravelling the complexities of relationships and processes
(Denscomble, 1998). Second, it focused on depth rather breadth (i.e. on just one or a
few special instances of the phenomena under investigation rather a wide spectrum), and
I <
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on particular rather general, (i.e. extrapolating the general from the particular - Herriott
and Firestone, 1983; Denzin, 1989). To understand clearly, it seemed essential to
address the depth of the network evolution phenomenon before addressing its breadth.
Third, by adopting an holistic rather than isolated factors perspective and focusing on
relationships and processes rather than only on outcomes, case studies allowed
explanation of why certain network outcomes occur, by looking at the network evolution
process and the network configuration as a whole (Yin, 1994). Moreover, the study of
the multiple network actors in their own terms and contexts, allowed the investigation of
the interactions and processes flowing between actors as well as the actors themselves
(Stake, 1995; Shaw, 1999). This was vital to capture both the relational and structural
characteristics of the networks investigated. Fourth, case studies formed the basis of
investigating natural settings rather artificial situations, since cases such as SME
networks already exist and continue after the end of research, as 'naturally occurring'
phenomena (Yin, 1994). This saved the researcher from replicating social phenomena
under artificial settings, which is difficult due to lack of control on and knowledge of the
crucial conditions and constituent aspects of network evolution and performance.
Another reason for selecting this methodology was that case studies permitted the use of
multiple sources and methods and concentrated on the 'interaction in a time dimension'
(Goode and Hatt, 1952, p.339; Creswell, 1994). Therefore, it gave the opportunity to
compare the findings and increase their validity. Finally, case studies were ideal to
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investigate 'a contemporary phenomenon within its real life context, when the
boundaries between the phenomenon and context are not clearly evident, and in which
multiple sources of evidence are used' (Yin, 1994 p. 13). From the literature, SME
networks are found to have a highly complex, dynamic and social embedded character
(Johannisson, 1986), therefore a case study methodology is suggested (Shaw, 1998).
Moreover, research which investigates phenomena at different levels within a network
(e.g. changes in structure, governance, culture, and performance observed at the level of
individual firms and the network), while simultaneously treating the network as a single-
case study implies the need for a case study methodology. Blaikie (2000) called this
multilevel focus embedded case studies.
4.5 Case Study Selection
In the case study methodology, first the researcher has to select which cases are included
in the investigation. This section explains the theory of selection and how cases were
selected in the current research.
4.5.1 Theory of Case Study Selection
Two major categories of sampling for social science research are listed in literature:
probability and non-probability. The former assumes the replication of findings in the
larger population, is based on principles of probability and randomisation and accords
with the spirit of positivism. In contrast, the latter does not rely on statistically
representative samples of the population as the former does (Bryman, 2001). The
rationale underpinning the choice of non-probability sampling for this research is
presented below. In general, small-scale and qualitative studies tend to use non-
probability sampling strategies like 'purposive' or 'theoretical' sampling or
'snowballing'4S. First, in non-probability sampling rather than trying to achieve
48
Purposive sampling constitutes the strategic choice of information-rich cases, based on a purpose and
available resources (Patton, 1990). Theoretical sampling refers to the selection of instances, following a
route of discovery, with the ultimate goal to develop theory, which is 'grounded' in evidence (Glaser and
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sameness, representativeness, randomness or generability, the researcher is trying to
maximise variation, even contradiction (Denscomble, 1998). As Corbin and Strauss
(2008, p. 156) note, "variation is especially important in theory building, because it
increases the broadness of concepts and scope of the theory". Therefore, non-probability
sampling is driven by the logic of 'discovery' (Glaser and Strauss, 1967). It follows an
'emergent and sequential' decision making process (Lincoln and Guba, 1985) which
relies on outcomes from earlier research stages, and emphasises discovering the special
rather than normal instances. SME network evolution is a dynamic phenomenon which
can be fully explored only though such a 'building-up' analytical process. Second, the
researcher adopting non-probability sampling benefits from 'outliers', by using them to
test the generalisability of the mainstream findings, protecting against self-selecting bias
and building better explanations (Miles and Huberman, 1994; Seale et al, 1999;
Silverman, 2006). Given the high difficulty of pre-determining what is typical in
network evolution, the inclusion of 'outliers' in research offers more opportunities than
threats. Third, non-probability sampling techniques constitute a reasonable option when
the population size and composition are unknown or all different attributes of a
population cannot be included in the small sample (Denscomble, 1998). For instance, in-
depth interviews, as labour intensive research, tend to be a practice applied mainly in
small sample sizes. Indeed, little information is available about the number,
categories/forms and size of Greek agrifood networks, also even for well-known cases
the network boundaries are not easily indentified and anticipated. Having set out the
reasons for selecting a non-probability sampling approach, consideration now needs to
be made given to the specific selection of case studies. Literature in both case study
methodology and grounded theory offer recommendation on this.
Following the principles of the 'collective instrumental' case study technique, described
by Yin (1998), the researcher needs to chose individual or 'instrumental' cases,
possessing rival features important to the phenomenon under investigation (Bickman
Strauss, 1967). Snowballing is the sampling technique where the sample emerges via a process of
reference (i.e. nominated participants) from one person to the next one (Burgess, 1993).
108
and Rog, 1998). This then permits cross-case comparison. The starting point of case
selection therefore, is the identification of certain critical attributes/dimensions on which
the phenomenon varies, which constitute the basis for comparing the different cases and
making deliberate choices. If a chosen case is similar in the critical attributes to those
not selected, it constitutes a typical case. Typical cases foster generalisation of findings.
In contrast, cases that differ considerably from the norm, are called extreme cases and
reveal the impact of certain factors (Yin, 1994). Also, a case could be used to test a
theory, i.e. whether the outcomes agree with the theoretical expectations. Finally, the
credibility of a theory can be increased, when it is supported by cases representing the
least likely instances. Another fundamental aspect in case-study selection regards the
identification of the case boundaries. According to Denscomble (1998, p.44), a case
"needs to be fairly self-contained entity...and have fairly distinct boundaries", in order
to provide a clear understanding of what is contained or excluded from the case, and to
avoid studying other phenomena (Yin, 1994).
According to the grounded theory recommendations for case-study selection, the
researcher is advised to replace the logic of case replication (e.g. enumerating
frequencies) with that of theoretical sampling that allows sampling 'and comparisons
based on concepts (e.g. theoretical propositions) rather than cases or populations (Yin,
1994). Blaikie (2000, p. 254) explains why replication is incompatible with the
'reflexive' character of qualitative research: "researchers inevitably inject something of
themselves49 into the research process and, hence, into the outcomes. In addition, social
situations are never sufficiently similar, across space and time, to make replications
possible". Grounded theory sets only one criterion for the selection of the initial site for
fieldwork, that of the 'relevance', in contrast to the case-study methodology that requires
a more detailed justification of cases as 'typical' or 'extreme' (Denscomble, 1998).
49 Pike (1967) and Herre (1980) distinguish between the values of the researcher ("etic") and those of the
subject of the research ("emic").
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The notion of the theoretical sampling technique cannot be fully captured without
referring to its key features and the guidelines for application offered by the literature.
Particularly, grounded theory argues that a sample cannot be anticipated and firmly
specified in terms of its size and included sites. Instead, it emerges, 'incrementally
specified' (Walker, 1985) during the course of fieldwork. The researcher selects sites
according to their (theoretical) 'relevance' to emerging categories and concepts, aiming
to the further refinement and development of existing concepts and codes (maximise the
"opportunity to learn" Stake, 1994, p. 243). In fact, the theoretical sampling approach
takes a distinct position in its choice of being "responsive to the data rather than
established before the research begins" (Corbin and Strauss, 2008, p. 144). Moreover,
Strauss and Corbin (1990) highlight the cumulative character of theoretical sampling,
since it builds up on evidence from previous sampled sites, influencing the path of
generating theory. The researcher is advised to reflect on any new evidence and revise
the existing codes, categories and sampling criteria in the light of new understanding
gained (Mason, 1996; Marshall and Rossman, 1999). What is observed in practice is an
increasing depth offocus (Denscomble, 1998), since initially the sample is aimed to be
as open and wide as possible for generating plenty of categories and codes. Gradually,
the researcher recognises a few codes among the initial ones that are more crucial for the
analysis, and the sampling of the remaining cases is driven by the more precise questions
emerging during the analysis of previous observations. This rationale of theoretical
sampling necessitates both consistency and flexibility (Denscomble, 1998). In other
words, clear criteria for sampling, consistent with the single requirement to promote
further the refinement and development of existing codes and concepts, are needed.
Each procedural judgement and decision (e.g. the chosen criteria) has to be justified and
their implications on the outcome of the sampling process need to be explained (Walker,
1985). Additionally, flexibility implies that the researchers need to be free to use the
most fruitful data sources to respond to emerging questions during the analysis, and also
"take advantage of fortuitous incidents that occur", when it is deemed 'relevant' and
necessary (Corbin and Strauss, 2008, p. 149). All these emerging opportunities, and
avenues of investigation are hard to anticipate. A final concern for researchers in
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theoretical sampling is to avoid the pitfall of selecting 'reinforcing' cases, which a priori
affirm the theory that needs to further develop (Mason, 1996). By deliberately including
'contrasting' cases to the cases already sampled, this problem can be solved (Pidgeon,
1996). Overall, the essence of theoretical sampling is summarised in the notion of being
concept-driven. This is a point stressed by Corbin and Strauss (2008, p. 144): "the
researcher is not sampling persons, but concepts. The researcher is purposely looking for
indicators ... (of) how concepts vary under different conditions". This variation allows
the dimensions, properties and relationships of concepts to be revealed.
To address the above considerations, the literature advises the researcher to follow a
k (
circular process, that starts with data collection, followed by data analysis producing
concepts and generating questions. The emerging questions drive the next round of data
collection, and the iterative process continues until saturation of concepts and categories
is reached (Glaser and Strauss, 1967). This means that all concepts are well defined and
explained, since their properties, dimensions, variations and relationships are
investigated in depth, so new findings consistently replicate earlier ones. However,
complete saturation could never be achieved, thus in practice, theoretical sampling is
deemed sufficient when the' major categories related to the phenomenona under
investigation have been explored in depth and new data just confirms the concepts'
properties, dimensions and relationships already identified. Then, the researcher accepts
this level of 'theoretical saturation' and presents uncovered areas as limitations.
4.5.2 Selection of Cases for the Current Research
Having described the considerations and procedures involved in case-study selection
according to the qualitative case study and grounded theory literature, this section sets
out how a combination of the aforementioned guidelines for theoretical or purposive
sampling was applied to the current empirical research. Overall, the research aims to
describe the features of Greek agrifood SME networks and their evolution, explain the
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implications for performance, both for individual members as well as the whole
network. As may be apparent, not all business networks were of interest to this research.
The key balance to be struck when drawing the case boundaries, is one between using
over restrictive and over loose definitions, because the former leads to selection of 'self-
reinforcing' cases, while the latter could result in cases indistinguishable from other
kinds of networks (Mason, 1996). So for current research, the first dimension for case
selection was 'evidence ofbottom-up networking initiativeIf the case was the result of
top-down involvement, for instance a quality assurance scheme established by local
public developmental agencies, it was beyond the bounds. This did not mean however,
* *
that cases created by bottom-up procedures and included in the research could not
participate in other top-down network initiatives, as part of their networking activity. A
second baseline dimension for inclusion of a case in this research was the 'evidence of
small and medium sized agrifood enterprises and a sufficient number of them involved in
the network initiative under investigation'. In practice, the demonstration of features
such as small numbers of employees, and relatively low levels of turnover were
necessary for justifying a company as an SME. If a case demonstrated a network leader,
but the network had been initiated and governed by a large company, rather than SMEs,
then it was felt inappropriate to choose it given the aims of the research. Additionally, it
was important that a profound number of SMEs participated in the case network.
Isolated SMEs, or the network of a large agrifood enterprise, were beyond the interest of
this research. To refine further the definition of network boundaries, the approach of
Carson et al. (2004) was followed, whereby 'marketing' was identified as the thematic
anchor. Therefore, the case boundaries were drawn around SME networking initiatives
that had some goal to transform a raw product for sale to end consumers commercially.
Having identified baseline dimensions of eligibility of SME network for this research,
the next task was to identify the specific cases to be included in the study. For this,
principles of the 'collective instrumental' case study technique were followed. Two
attributes important to the phenomena under investigation were selected as the key
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criteria for case selection. These were: (i) apparent market performance of the
network and (ii) level of product processing undertaken by the network. Apparent
market performance refers to the network's apparent commercial performance in the
marketplace. A fundamental thrust of the literature on business networks, as highlighted
in Chapter 3, is that such networks can improve the performance of member firms,
including SMEs. However, as highlighted in Chapter 2, most SME networks in the GAS
fail to perform well, and very few 'success stories' exist. Hence, for case study selection
it was very important to choose cases on the basis of their performance, particularly, to
include both strong and weak performance cases, so that their respective evolutions and
features could be analysed and compared. The specification of 'performance' was
complicated, in view of the abundance of different definitions and constructs that exist
in the literature. Level of product processing concerns the occurrence of physical
transformation from raw materials into finished products purchased by end consumers,
distinguishing between processed and fresh products. 'Fresh' products are those
involving no physical transformation. Previous studies have found that governance
structures along supply chams vary heavily because of quality uncertainty in both raw
materials and final products (Chappuis and Sans, 1999). This implies that agrifood
networks can develop, evolve and influence individual firms' performance differently
because of factors associated directly with the nature of the product. By capturing cases
of both fresh and processed agrifood products, the level evolution, features and
performance of the case networks could be analysed and compared, taking account of
the moderating role of the physical nature of the product.
Further considerations in case study selection for this empirical research constituted the
choice of specific agricultural sectors of the cases, and which part of the network should
be the "focal point" of the case. In practice, the formal standardising/packaging stage of
the case supply chains was chosen as the focal point, and the product sectors selected
were apples and olives. The first decision reflected the need for a formally established
trademark/brand of agricultural produce, in order to assess its market performance. Such
a trademark is more likely to be held by standardising and packaging companies.
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Additionally, the emphasis on the end products as focal points, rather than raw materials,
was deemed appropriate for reasons of consistency and comparability across the case
studies, offering also the ability to assess the value added to the products and the quality
of inter-firm relationships within the supply chain. The second decision referred to the
choice of olive oil and apples as suitable examples of processed and fresh products,
respectively. As shown in Chapter 2, Greek agriculture production is predominately
crop-oriented, with a ratio of 70-30 between the total production values of plant and
livestock production respectively. Since cheeses, olive oil, wine and fruit juices
represent the most common processed products, the choice of organic olive oil as an
example of a processed product, instead of a meat product, was meaningful.
Following these specifications, a review of secondary data, including statistical reports
of the national statistical agency, reports of the agricultural ministry and trade literature
provided a list potential agrifood SME network cases. The great majority exhibited
apparently weak market performance, unsurprisingly. Consequently, in line with case
study methodology recomendations, cases of apparently strong market performance
were classified as extreme instances (e.g. outliers), and expected to reveal crucial factors
making this difference. Following the principles of'theoretical sampling', sampling took
place in phases; it was deemed good practice to select initially the cases of apparently
strong market performance, and collect data. Their preliminary analysis produced
emerging concepts and categories that were used as additional characteristics desired
amongst sample cases, leading to the refinement of the choice of the next set of cases
(Burgess, 1993), those of apparently weak performance. The ultimate goal was for the
final sample to display a satisfactory variation of conditions under which concepts vary,
and in turn to indentify the crucial conditions for network evolution. To increase the
validity of the selection of the final two "strong performance" cases, an expert informant
based in the Agricultural University of Athens reviewed the list of proposed cases
studies. Particularly, Blauel organic olive oil and Zagorin apples are well-known high
value products with strong brands, and are recognised as SME marketing 'success
stories' in the Greek agrifood sector. Fotopoulous and Krystallis (2003) for example,
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confirm the good customer reputation of the latter. From the data collection and
preliminary analysis of the strong cases, a list of potential weak cases was generated.
The gatekeepers in both strong cases also helped to identify the cases of apparently weak
market performance in their sector. The 'bottom-up' networking initiative of SMEs in
the same sector, and their apparently weak market performance, remained as key
criteria.
So the final two weak cases selected were Kefalas organic olive oil and Agia apples,
which indeed represent less well known products, lacking in brand reputation, market
price and position. For Kefalas, the development trajectory of this case was linked to
that of Blauel, therefore it served as an interesting and quite immediate comparison case.
Key players of the Agia case appeared to play a role in the evolution of the network in
the Zagorin Apple case, and strong interaction of the two products in the market place
was also reported. Overall therefore, the chosen cases studies in each sector were
interlinked, a fact revealed during the preliminary analysis of the two strong cases.
Thus, the selection of the two weak cases deliberately allows investigation of why
the relative cases still have so different evolutionary trajectories and performances.
All fouf cases were located in regions with high production of the specific product. The
region of Agia, in particular, has the highest production of apples in Greece. For all the
cases, except for Agia, the product chosen was exclusively standardised by one local
firm, which provided the focal point for the case analysis. Agia apples were standardised
by more than 10 private firms and a cooperative located in the Agia region. So, the
cooperative and the three largest private enterprises were selected as the focal point for
the investigation of the Agia apple network. Table 4.2 summarises the four case studies
included in this research according to the two main selection criteria and Figures 4.1 and
4.2 presents their geographical location.
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Table 4.2: Case Studies Selected for this Research
Apparent Market Performance
Strong Weak
Level of Processed CASE 1: CASE 2:
Processing Product 'BLAUEL •KEFALAS
(olive oil) ORGANIC ORGANIC
OLIVE OIL' OLIVE OIL'




Figure 4.1: Escalation Map: Cultivation of Apple Trees
MB 0% of agricultural land
from 0% to 5%
from 5% to 15%




Area for apple trees 13,400 ha
Production 275,000 tn
Percentage of agricultural area 0.4%
Number of trees in compact plantations 5,785,355
Number of trees (total) 6,406,419
SOURCE: N.S.S.G. (2004)
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Figure 4.2: Escalation Map: Cultivation of Olive Trees for Olive Oil
— 0% of agricultural land
from 0% to 5%
from 5% to 15%
■■ from 15% to 50%
■■ over 50%
Total agricultural area 3,803,700 ha
Area of olive trees for olive oil 667,500 ha
Production 1,947,000 tn
Percentage of agricultural area 17.5%
SOURCE: N.S.S.G. (2004)
118
4.6 Choice of Data Collection Techniques
In this section, the theoretical principles and 'best practices' of data collection are
presented, followed by an account of the specific procedures executed for this empirical
research, with justifications. Particularly, primary data were collected through semi-
structured interviews and participant observations. Also, secondary data were used.
4.6.1 Theory of In-depth Interviewing
Literature describes in-depth interviews as 'conversations with, a purpose' (Bingham and
Moore, 1959), which assist the researcher in getting familiar with the interviewees',
perspectives, and understanding the subjective meanings that research subjects attribute
to the events and phenomena. For the current research, the technique of in-depth
interview was deemed desirable for exploring complex and subtle phenomena, such as
SME network evolution, because interviewing unfolds its full potential when it is used
for such phenomena (Pope and Mays, 1995). This is achieved by first shedding light on
people's opinions, feelings, emotions, experiences and priorities. So, their networking
behaviour can be explained, by identifying what factors the interviewees regarded as
crucial and why for network evolution. Second, interviews address sensitive issues such
as why people reject collaboration with a specific actor, how they resolve conflicts or
assess the sufficiency of capabilities, provided that the interviewee is encouraged to
discuss these issues in an open and honest way. The possibility of the research to raise
many 'sensitive' questions (e.g. 'why do you reject starting inter-firm relationships with
the particular actor?') or issues related to power arrangements in relationships, was
considered high. So, this indicated that in-depth interviewing was an appropriate
research approach. Third, through interviews privileged and deep information from key
players could be gained (e.g. gatekeepers, opinion leaders). This offered a 'value for
money' benefit, because these key informants were deliberately selected as highly
experienced specialists, whose testimony was expected to have high credibility. The
current study sought to learn as much as possible from the 'wisdom' of leaders, network
119
initiators and managers. Additionally, the following advantages of in-depth interviewing
were deemed as important reasons for selecting this technique: flexibility to make
adjustments to the line of inquiry, high response rate and validity since though the direct
contact the data accuracy and relevance could be checked as collected. Finally,
interviewing was suggested by Berent (1966) to be rewarding, even therapeutic for the
interviewees, because they had the chance to share and reflect on experiences, to a non-
critical listener.
The classification of different types of interviewing distinguishes between structured,
semi-structured and unstructured interview guides. This distinction was helpful in
i
deciding on the extent to which the format of questions (e.g. wording and sequence)
needed to be pre-determined (Patton, 1990). Semi-structured interviews were employed
for this empirical research, which means that a 'checklist' of crucial issues provided the
direction of the discussion (Patton, 1990). These crucial issues/themes stemmed from the
research objectives. McCracken (1988) compared this 'checklist' (or interview
discussion guide) to a 'route map', which determines the boundaries of the areas to be
covered, without specifying the exact itinerary. However, the use of open questions
minimises the rigidity of the questioning framework (fe.g. fixed topics and terms) and
gives flexibility to the researcher to explore emerging topics, which were not foreseen or
anticipated as relevant before fieldwork (Strauss and Corbin, 1990). This reflects the
'discovering' rather than 'checking' character of semi-structured interviews
(Denscombe, 1998). Open questions also facilitate the description of the phenomenon
under investigation from the perspective of the interviewees, who are encouraged to
express their own experiences, thoughts and decision making processes in their own
words (Jones et al., 1985; McCracken, 1988). The rationale here is to capture both the
interviewees' perceptions or subjective meanings, and how these are constructed over
time. Overall, semi-structured interviews were deemed most appropriate for data
collection with respect of network evolution, on the basis of offering both some
consistency and flexibility in the areas/topics covered across the different interviews
thanks to the initial 'checklist' of crucial issues devised, whilst offering some freedom in
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adding new emerging perspectives. Moreover, networking behaviour and choices were
expected to not always be fully conscious, so the interviewees were likely to make their
'own discoveries' about the way they behaved, through the interview process stimulated
by the researcher's questions. Overall, the balance between structure and ambiguity in
the interview construction needs to be kept. This means that the discussion guide is
subject to ongoing modifications resulted from the advances in the researcher's
understanding of the phenomenon as interviewing proceeds (Mason, 1996).
In terms of best practices in interviewing, the literature highlights the need for the
interviewer to be carefully prepared and capable of adjusting plans as things progress,
i
given the fact that interviews are 'live human' experiences, without the possibility of
exact replication. First, the researcher is advised to establish a degree of trust and
rapport, so the interviewee does not feel suspicious or threatened. So, guarantees of
confidentiality and respect of the interviewee's desire to stop telling more are necessary.
According to Denscombe (1998, p.184), since some attributes of the researcher's
personal identity including age, sex, ethnicity, accent and occupational status, cannot be
altered, this identity is argued to affect "the amount of information that people are
willing to divulge and their honesty". He explains that this impact depends on who is
interviewed and the nature of the topic being discussed. For instance, the interviewees
may experience negative feelings (e.g. embarrassment, discomfort, defensiveness), and
modify their responses according to what they believe the researcher wants to hear. To
minimise this effect, the interviewer ought to expose a range of social skills, as being
passive, polite, receptive and neutral. In this way, the interviewers try not to antagonise
or upset the interviewee, so they dress "similar to the interviewees (Fontana, 1977) and
show respect. This requires researchers to remain neutral, listen, learn and not preach.
Crucially, having a non-judgemental attitude means the interviewer should not reveal
emotions such as aversion, surprise, or approval. This ensures that the interviewee
speaks sincerely without holding back information. Ideally, the interviewer keeps an
unobtrusive profile, minimising interruptions only to the necessary ones e.g. to return to
a topic or change subject (Berent, 1996).
In terms of the in-depth interview itself, best practise is process as follows. Initially, the
research aims and the researcher's interests are introduced, the interviewee's permission
is sought to record the conversation, and the researcher provides assurance about
confidentiality. Simultaneously, the preparation of recording equipment and convenient
sitting arrangements are made. Then, the interview commences with questions collecting
background information and creating a relaxed atmosphere (Patton, 1990), as the
interviewees present themselves, and their role. Gradually, the interviewer leads the
discussion to the key subjects under investigation, by raising broad and open questions
without imposing any assumptions or the researcher's preconceptions about the subjects,
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but encouraging the interviewees to elaborate their 'own' experiences and perceptions.
McCracken (1988) called these 'grand tour' questions, followed by prompts, probes and
checks until sufficient information is gathered for all the crucial issues listed in the
guide. During this core phase of interviewing, the researcher needs to be very attentive
in monitoring the progress, keeping eye contact, and observing non-verbal
communication clues. Particular tasks are to cover the key issues/themes within the
allotted time, identify and confirm the interviewee's key points and their properties, and
'read between the lines', in other words deciphering what is the essdnce of each
argument made, or equally important, what is not mentioned (Denscombe, 1998).
Additionally, the researcher's 'detective' role includes the use of probes for discovering
what the inconsistencies in opinions and feelings might reveal, and checking for
'boasting' or 'fob-off answers, aiming just to please the interviewer (Denscombe,
1998). Furthermore, the researcher needs to clarify whether the views expressed are
'fixed', long-existing, or if they reflect events immediately prior to or after the
interview. In the final phase, the interviewees are invited to raise any relevant points that
they want to discuss further, and are thanked for their contribution in the research.
Drawing from literature, the researcher needs to be aware of certain challenges
encountered in in-depth interviewing. For instance, if the interviewee is a public figure,
with or without intention, they may project their 'solid public face' to reinforce their
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power or status and drive the interview discussion to where they want to go (Tregear,
2000). Then, the interviewer needs to recognise these 'faces' and go underneath the
surface. They may have to address behaviours such as bullying, being mistrustful,
sceptical, or agreeable, especially with 'elite' persons, whose power is widely
recognised within their community, and skills in manipulating the interpersonal
dynamics are high (Dexter, 1970). Otherwise, the researchers risk attaching greater
weight to data from 'elite', articulate interviewees over others lacking these features
(Miles and Huberman, 1994). For this, the way in which the researchers present
themselves (e.g. as 'academic', 'native', or 'learner') and the interview (Fontana and
Frey, 1994) is crucial. The right balance has to be kept between formality and
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informality in the interviewer-interviewee relationship, so sensitive topics can be
discussed but without causing tension or anxiety to the interviewees. A helpful practice
constitutes use of fieldwork notes, including information relating location, atmosphere,
clues about intentions behind the statements, comments on non-verbal communication,
circumstances surrounding the interview and events that might have influenced the
interview.
4.6.2 Procedures for In-depth Interviewing in the Current Research
On average, 29 depth interviews were conducted per case, giving a total of 118
interviews across all four cases, of which the great majority were face-to-face interviews
(in Greek), each lasting around two hours. Two phone interviews were conducted (in
English) only for the Blauel case study because its customer base was located abroad.
All interviews were tape recorded, with 48 recordings (40%) being transcribed for full
textual analysis. Actors from all levels in the case study supply chain were interviewed,
from fanners and processors at the upstream end of the chain, to wholesalers,
distributors and retailers at the downstream end. For all four cases, the value chain was
found to exceed the supply chain, including networking linkages built to pennit
exchange of information, expertise, and other kinds of institutional support. Thus,
interviews were also conducted with non-supply chain actors that key informants
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indicated as influential to network evolution, such as representatives from local public
agencies, trade-associations or inter-professional bodies. Inevitably, the majority of
interviews were conducted with informants at the farmer levels because these were the
most numerous actors in the chain. Data collection for the case studies was conducted in
two main phases, each phase lasting approximately three months and involving
residency in or near the geographic regions in which the networks were located. Table
4.3 summarises the number and activity profile of the interviewees per case for this
empirical study.
The selection of interviewees was based on the principles of theoretical sampling, as
* ♦
described in Section 4.5.1. Thus, the initial interviewees per case study were chosen with
the help of a gatekeeper, according to the different attributes raised in the gatekeeper's
interview as crucial for the network evolution. This sampling frame was "guided by the
research objectives and conceptual framework" (Miles and Huberman, 1994, p29). For
instance, for farmer interviewees, these attributes related to their key role within the
network initiative, farm size, cooperative spirit, and commitment to common
agreements. For the distributor interviewees, the selection criteria included their
commercial significance to the focal point enterprise and the quality of their
relationships. The key concern was to select the most helpful attributes in identifying
crucial differences in the behaviour of the participants within the network and to assess
the impact of these differences on network evolution. For this reason, it was explicitly
explained to the gatekeepers how crucial it was for the quality of the research to avoid
suggesting only 'reinforcing' interviewees. Instead, interviewees with both positive and
negative attitudes towards the network were required, for instance actors who tried the
network and rejected it or those who refuse to participate. Such actors could give
valuable insights into network evolution. Persons identified as opinion leaders were also
preferred. Having conducted these interviews, a preliminary analysis was conducted,
which helped to refine the precise sample profile by identifying gaps in knowledge (e.g.
poorly developed categories), emerging contradictions or areas that were not clear.
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Table 4.3: Summary and Profile of case Study Interviewees (n=118)
fnterviewees activity
profile
BLAUEL KEFALAS ZAGORIN AGIA t ota!
Farmer, member of the 11 4 7 3 25
collective scheme
Farmer, non-member of 3 2 1 8 14
the collective scheme
President of the 1 2 1 4
cooperatives' board of
directors (farmer)
Members of the 2 3 2 7
cooperatives' hoard of
directors (farmer)
Leader of the collective 1 1 1 3
action
Owner of the 1 3 4
standa rdi sat ion '
packaging unit
The general manager 1 1 1 1 4
The marketing manager < 1 1
Employee responsible 2 2
for the relationships with
farmers
Olive oil processor 1 1 2
Import agent 1 1 2
Wholesaler 1 1 5 4 11
Multiple retailer 1 4 3 8
Small neighbourhood 4 4 8
fresh food retailer
Open market merchant 3 3 6
Representative of local 1 1 1 1 4
municipality
Representative of local 1 1 1 1 4
public agricultural
agency
Representative of 1(foi the 2 apple cases) 1
Thessaly periphery
agency
Representative of 1 (for the 2 olive oil cast2*S) 1
Peloponnesus periphery
agency
Representative of 'top- 1 1(for the 2 apple cases) 2
down' network initiative*
Facilitator of 'bottom-up' 1 (for the 2 olive oil cases) 1(foi the 2 apple cases) 2
netwo rk i niti ative**
Editor of the sector 1 (for the 2 olive oil cases) 1(for the 2 apple cases) 2
magazine**'
Expert informant of the
Agricultural University of 1 (for the foi i cases) 1
Athens
Total 26 21 36 35 118
* 'Top-down' network initiatives: Kefalas Ltd participated in 'Local Quality Agreement for Parnonas
Area's Product and Services. The Management Agency of the Thessalia Periphery failed to promote
horizontal cooperation between the Zagora Apple cooperative (ZAC) and the Agia Apple Cooperative
(AAC). .
** 'Bottom-up' network initiatives: Blauel Ltd and Kefalas Ltd belong to 'The Association for Greek
Agrifood Products of Certified Quality". The ZAC and Poulis Ltd (Agia case) belong to 'The Association
of Greek Packers of Fresh Fruits and Vegetables'.
*** -olive and Olive oil' and 'Fruit News" magazines respectively
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Thereafter, theoretical sampling was practiced to gather data to 'saturate' concepts and
their categories. For this purpose, the researcher returned to old sites. For example, in
the Blauel case, it was necessary to return to investigate the differences in perceptions
between farmers from Saidona and Neochori villages, and between farmers located in
the Messenia and Laconia prefectures. Also, the researcher returned to assess how the
failed effort for training Saidona farmers affected Blauel's attitude towards helping
farmers. A second interview was conducted with all the gatekeepers after interviews
were finished per case, to answer all the questions emerging. Furthermore, the
interviewees were invited to play an active role in defining the network boundaries, by
specifying all those actors that had a crucial contribution in 'adding value to their
product'. This includes nominating actors outside the supply chain, if the interviewees
felt that it was necessary.
Followed the principles of conducting interviews presented above, the researcher first
established a relationship with the interviewee, inspiring trust and rapport. The
information provided to the interviewees regarding the research nature, in the initial
personalised letter and phone calls or discussions, was balanced and avoided the
provision of excessive detail. The research interests were explained only broadly,
referring to the inter-firm relationships with other SMEs, how and why these evolve,
avoiding mention of technical terms such as 'network', 'context', 'structure',
'governance', 'external institutional support'. Confidentiality guarantees were given and
permission for recording the interview was always asked for in advance. Regarding the
researcher's identity, she presented herself as a PhD student of Edinburgh University,
Business School, with a dress code 'fitting to' the surroundings (e.g. office, farm, or
wholesaler markets). When 'elite' persons e.g. managers, or those with a recognised role
in the local community were interviewed, a professional impression was given.
The initial interview guide used for this empirical research (Appendix II) included five
topic headings, reflecting the focus of research objectives: background/personal
information of the interviewee; description of network features; description of network
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evolution; its explanation, its impact of evolution on the performance of the SME and
the whole network. For each topic, the interview guide had many sub-questions written
in common everyday language, with some of them including also examples of answers.
This theme 'checklist' was not to be followed closely, but as an 'aide-memoire' during
the interview. The ultimate aim was that the researcher would be prepared with a lot of
probes and prompts, which avoided academic terminology, to enable a variety of areas
to be covered, even if the interviewee did not raise those issues. This was to ensure
consistency between the interviews. However, the researcher tried to avoid over-
directing or influencing the nature of the interviewees' testimonies. Instead, an effort to
understand the interviewee's own perceptions and terminology was made, by presenting
4
herself as a 'keen learner' rather than as an 'expert', who would judge them. After the
first interviews with actors from each stage of the supply chain in a case, key themes
became easier to spot and comparisons were made, therefore the later interviews became
more focused, explanatory, and less exploratory.
Reflecting on conducting semi-structured interviews, the experience was challenging
and rewarding for both the interviewees and the researcher. Indicatively, despite the one-
hour'anticipated length of the interview, all participants showed great generosity in both
time and details given, enjoying the opportunity to express their thoughts, emotions, and
concerns on the topic. Non-verbal communication constituted a good indication of their
intentions, motives, and how deeply they believe in ideas explained. The richness and
variety of perceptions explored boosted confidence in applying the research findings and
providing policy-relevant recommendations. The major challenges faced by the
interviewer were first to make the interviewees feel that they were not antagonised or
did not need to defend. Second, when tensions arise during the interview, the researcher
tried to deal with them in a productive way. In practice, the interviewees were invited to
look at the things in more abstract and long terms, become detached from everyday
emotions, make links with issues raised previously in the interview, and identify or re¬
define boundaries and limitations of the concepts discussed. An atmosphere of discovery
of human behaviour and perception formation processes was created. The researcher's
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role was to keep the interviewees focused, asking simple questions, sometimes
pretending that the argument and its underlying assumptions were not fully understood,
in order to motivate them to reveal the whole range of their thoughts/feelings and the
perception formation process. The same technique was used when the researcher had
evidence that the interviewees tried to hide some aspects. In practice, through questions,
these interviewees were led to reveal 'by their own' contradictions and inconsistencies
in their conclusions, and afterwards, be asked their opinion about the revealed
contradictions. The researcher also used tactical changing of the subject, when it was
deemed necessary, returning later when the interviewees were more relaxed or confident
to elaborate on the topic. At the same time, attention was given to not interrupting and
f
over-directing the discussion, or creating certain research expectations that the
interviewees felt pressure to fulfil. Overall, the challenge for the researcher was to
balance encouragement of the interviewees to express themselves freely and in depth,
with keeping them on track and capable of facing emerging tensions in a productive
way.
Especially in the Zagorin apple case, where the cooperative has a long history and has
experienced some trust shocks, when some ex-presidents of the cooperative board were
interviewed, the researcher needed to demonstrate all the social, intellectual interview
skills mentioned above. Their tendency and ability to construct 'solid public faces' and
legitimate their previous actions and decisions made it challenging to 'get underneath'
this surface. Most of them had interpreted the current research, as a journalist's interest
in the ZAC's 'success story', therefore they wanted to excessively emphasise their
contribution to it. In practice, evidence derived from the secondary data (e.g. historical
and statistical data) or other interviews were used to reveal any contradictions between
their claims and reality, or efforts to 'hide' something, They were asked questions away
from the typical story of 'their own considerable contribution in the ZAC's success', but
relevant to the research topics.
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4.6.3 Theory of Participant Observation
The second form of data collection chosen for the case study research was participant
observation, where "the observer participates in the daily life of people under study"
(Becker and Geer, 1957, p.28). According to Denscombe's (1998, p.218) classification,
three types are identified: total participation when the researcher's role is kept secret,
participation in normal settings when its role is known only to the 'gatekeepers', and
participation as obsei-ver where the researcher's identity is openly recognised. In the
latter role, the researcher is "'shadowing' a group through normal life, witnessing first
hand and in intimate detail the culture/events of interest". In each case, the first and
urgent task after observation is for the researcher to produce field notes in the format of
written or tape-recorded memos. Selecting the appropriate type of participant
observation leads to the following dilemma: keeping the researcher's identity secret or
not. Since "those involved may deliberately hide or disguise certain 'truths' on occasions
when they are 'under the microscope'" (Denscombe, 1998, p.217), it is reasonable for
researchers to control their identity. However, then the researcher cannot ask questions,
and ethical problems arise such as the absence of consent of those observed, and issues
of deception by the researcher.
As may be appreciated thus far, participant observation is a method offering the
researcher the opportunity to get insights into a particular culture, situation or event, that
are privileges granted only to those who experience'it 'from inside' (Denscombe, 1998).
For instance, social subjects are not always aware or capable of articulating all the
crucial elements of social interactions under investigation (Corbin and Strauss, 2008).
The opportunity of gaining "inside' experience is vital for understanding the network
evolution phenomenon and its dynamics. It is accompanied with other advantages of
participant observation over other qualitative research methods. First, non-interference
refers to the fact that the natural setting is better preserved, since the research subjects
are not aware of being observed. Disruption is kept to a minimum, permitting the
researcher to see things as they normally occur. When the participant observation is
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followed by interviews, the research has the opportunity to confirm whether the
interviewees' claims about their behaviour match the observations of actual behaviour
made earlier (Corbin and Strauss, 2008). For the current research, participant
observation was very helpful in investigating the role playing and power relationships
within a group, and in identifying the opinion leaders within a network. Second,
ecological validity refers to the increased validity of data collected, since the method
applies well to context-sensitive phenomena, such as network evolution. Finally,
participant observation also offers other desirable features linked to qualitative research
approaches: emphasis on depth rather breadth of data, a holistic perspective, a focus on
social processes and the protagonists' viewpoint, and tolerance to complexity. Overall,
i t
studying interaction between groups within a network over time was expected to have
aspects hidden for an 'outsider', which the researcher needs to experience herself to
fully capture them. Hence, participant observation was viewed as a highly desirable
form of data collection for the current research, as a support to in-depth interviewing.
4.6.4 Procedures for Participant Observation in the Current Research
Table 4.4 summarises the events per case study for which participant observation took
place in the current research, for example negotiation processes with customers and
associations' and co-operatives' meetings. Where it was possible, the identity of the
researcher was kept secret from the participants, for example, in negotiations between
network members and multiple-retailers, general cooperative, meetings for apple cases
and the training of fanners with the Blauel case state why the secretiveness was
desirable. However, this was impossible in cases where the interviews had been done
first, so the participants knew the researcher's role, for example when the researcher
accompanied farmers in the Zagorin case on a trip to the Bolzano area. The researcher
produced field notes as early as possible after each observation. These included the
summary of key concerns/issues mentioned by the participants, their power relationships
and games, their negotiation skills, what they put emphasis on and what they tried to
'hide'. Non-verbal communications, the atmosphere of the discussions and observations
on how new information was diffused, accepted or not were also written down. Finally,
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the researcher paid attention to observing the general meeting procedures and practical
problems faced and the participants' reactions (e.g. to innovation proposals or offensive
speeches). Also, the extent to which the actors communicated and justified their
problems/ viewpoints to other network members was observed. The selection of sites
and events for participant observation followed the grounded theory principles regarding
theoretical sampling, as described in Section 4.5.1, subject to availability and
convenience. Primarily, there were chosen events characterised by an intense interaction
of a large number of network members, such as a meeting of cooperatives or a training
event. Especially, in the Zagorin apple case, the researcher took advantage of a
"fortuitous incident", the educational trip of the Zagorin fanners to the Bolzano area of
Italy. This opportunity was instrumental in critically evaluating the Zagorin, noticing the
differences in structure, governance and culture compared with the Italian apple
cooperatives, and understanding the Zagorin's weaknesses. Furthermore, the researcher
experienced first-hand the variety of Zagorin fanners' reactions and attitudes towards
innovation, how they processed and diffused new infonnation, and the power games
within the ZAC. Issues related to network management capabilities and the insufficient
external support in the Zagrin apple case became easily identifiable.
4.6.5 Theory of Collecting Secondary Data
The third form of data collection used in the current research was secondary data
collection, which comprises primary data, both qualitative and qualitative, collected by
other researchers or institutions (Bryman, 2001) for answering different research
questions, or similar questions at different time periods. Typical examples of secondary
data are (national) surveys, censuses, official statistics, data archives, industrial studies,
scientific or traditional books and articles or journals. These raw data can be used by
secondary users (Blaikie, 2000) offering them numerous advantages, summarised by
Dale et al. (1988). First, the researchers save costs and time, avoiding the step of data
collection (Stewart and Kamis, 1984). Second, some official statistics offer national-
wide samples, geographical spread and the opportunity to make longitudinal or cross-
cultural analysis.
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Third, alternative interpretations may emerge from the analysis of secondary data.
However, the researcher needs to be aware of limitations summarised by Blaikie (2000).
First, the researcher woidd need some extra time to get familiar with the data structure,
whose complexity may be high, since other people have collected and analysed them. A
second fundamental drawback is that the data quality may vary and should not be taken
for granted, especially when the research objectives and aims vary considerably, "a great
deal has to be taken on faith" (Blaikie, 2000, p.185) Finally, key variables of interest to
the current research may be absent in the available secondary data. Issues of reliability
and validity of data also arise, when it is taken under consideration the changes in key
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definitions, policies, and settings related to the phenomena under investigation over
time. Such changes can dramatically affect which variables are included and how these
were measured or interlinked (Bryman, 2001). Besides, there is a time lag between the
time the data is collected and archived. Generally, the more distant researchers are from
the data collection, the less control they have over data quality and the less certainty they
have on data appropriateness for the current project (Blaikie, 2000). Furthermore, when
the analysis and explanations given for these primary data by other researchers are also
taken under consideration, these are called tertiary data. The researcher needs to be
even more "cautious, as Blaikie (2000, p.185) explained, "analysts can adopt an
orientation towards the original data, and they can be selective in what they report. In
addition, there is always the possibility of academic fraud."
4.6.6 Procedures for Collecting Secondary Data in the Current
Research
Table 4.5 summarises the sources of secondary data used per case study for the current
research. The depth interviews were supplemented by scrutiny of documents such as
proceedings of cooperatives' general meetings; local industry statistics and history;
relative scientific papers and contracts. Responding to the aforementioned
considerations with respect to limitations of secondary analysis, the researcher treated
these sources with caution. She tried to identify the aims of each document, the
qualifications of its writer, how the data variables were defined, methods of data
collected and analysis used. Attention was paid to assessing the originality of the data,
whether a certain orientation towards them was adopted, omitting 'outliers' or
contradictory and negative evidence. Some of the secondary data (e.g. proceedings of
cooperatives' general meetings, contracts, a cooperative's memorandum) were
documentation of the operation of the institutions under investigations, i.e. private firms
or cooperatives, and these provided historical insights into the way these organisations
performed and evolved over time. This background information offered the opportunity
to the researcher not only to check the accuracy of the retrospective accounts of events
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given by the interviewees, but also to capture the changes in the actual 'words' and
'symbolic meanings' attached to them over time. 4.7. Execution of Data Collection and
Analysis
The next set of methodological decisions centres on the actual execution of data
collection and analysis. For this study, the principles of grounded theory were followed.
4.7.1 Principles of Grounded Theory
Grounded theory methodology is designed to guide researchers in generating theories,
rather than testing them or providing descriptive accounts. The term 'grounded' conveys
that the theory is always traced back to the data from which it is derived (Strauss and
Corbin, 1994). It is dedicated to replacing 'armchair theorizing', where abstracts of ideas
are first developed by the researcher and afterwards checked with empirical data, with a
systematic interactive process between data collection and analysis which has a good
'fit' with the 'real' world. "Grounded theory is (about) what it is, not what should, could
or ought to be" (Glaser 1999, p.840). The interactive character of grounded theory stems
from the constant comparisons (Glaser, 1965; 1967) made between the existing findings
(e.g. emerging codes, categories, concepts) and new data "to see if they fit, how they
might fit, and how they might not fit" seeking alternative explanations (Strauss and
Corbin, 1994, p. 279). By identifying similarities and differences, distinguished
categories with their properties and dimensions are revealed (Corbin and Strauss, 2008).
Grounded theory has its roots in pragmatism50 (Corbin and Strauss, 2008), which evinces
a profound respect for 'practical' rather than 'abstract' knowledge and truth
(Denscombe, 1998), criticising the distance between knowledge and everyday action. It
is argued that a theory is valuable only if it addresses real practical needs (Dewey, 1929;
50
Pragmatism has its roots to Symbolic Interactionism (Mead, 1956; Corbin and Strauss, 2008), which
also belong to the Interpretivism approach (Schawarndt, 1994). According to Corbin and Strauss (2008)
and Schawarndt (1994), the theorists of pragmatism were Dewey (1922; 1925; 1938) and Mead (1934;
1938), while the theorists of symbolic interactionism were also Mead, followed by Blumer (1969).
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Table 4.5: Summary of Secondary Data Collected per Case Study
SECONDARY DATA
GENERAL
BLAUEL KEFALAS ZAGORIN AGIA FOR THE
STUDY
CAP
EU legislation for food safety
and quality
Studies on problems caused
by liberalisation of CAP and
of 10 new EU members'
unification
Technical information of
specific agi ifood production
V






and labour market factors
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Media coverage V
Local industry statistics v V V
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Corbin and Strauss, 2008), and is meaningful to the protagonists concerned (Locke,
2001). Grounded theory was originally conceived by Glaser and Strauss (1967) against
the deductive methods of science. However, later the two authors followed different
intellectual paths, with Glaser (1978; 1995; 1999) moving in the inductive (positivism)
direction and Strauss (1987; Straus and Corbin, 1990; 1998) adopting the abductive
(interpretivism) approach. The latter was followed for the current research in line with
the reasons justifying the choice of abductive research strategy (Section 4.4.1).
Grounded theory accepts that knowledge (i.e. meanings) is a product of humans'
ongoing action/interaction (Dewey, 1929; Mead, 1938). As Blumer's (1962) stated
"human beings interpret or 'define' each other's actions instead of merely
reacting to ach other's actions. Their 'response' is not made directly to the
actions ofone another but instead is based on the meaning which they attach to
such actions, (p. 19)". ..."The actor selects, checks, suspends, regroups, and
transforms the meanings in light of the situation in which he is placed and the
direction of his action...meaning are used and revised as instruments for the
guidance and formation ofaction (p.5) ".
This implies that humans interpret and give meaning to environmental stimuli, before
responding to them, and in this way their purposeful actions also shape the conditions
(e.g. institutions) that affect changes in behaviour. Particularly, their actions generate
new meanings (Mead, 1934) and as a consequence, may render the used routines of
behaviour no longer efficient (Corbin and Strauss, 2008), fuelling further
actions/interactions. Additionally, variatiofi in actions/interactions to similar conditions
is argued to stem from different meanings given to them by humans (Corbin and Strauss,
2008). Therefore, researchers inspired by grounded theory are much concerned with
discovering "reciprocal changes in patterns of action/interaction and in relationship with
changes of conditions either internal or external to the process itself' (Strauss and
Corbin, 1994, p. 278). This focus on human interaction and particular settings and
conditions that surround events/situations/problems, to which humans respond through
their action/interaction (process), was suitable for exploratory research on SME network
evolution. Moreover, Strauss and Corbin (1990) launched a 'paradigm' of conditions-
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inter/actions-consequences to assist researchers in identifying contextual factors (i.e.
structure) and relating to process51 (Corbin and Strauss, 2008). They further elaborate
this paradigm via a conditional/consequential matrix. In this matrix, action/interaction is
centrally located and surrounded of circles, one inside the other, that represent the
various conditions affecting it, starting from micro conditions that are closer to
individuals in the inner rings and gradually moving to the outer rings that represent
macro conditions of the national and international environment. Both these tools
focusing on context and process could be instrumental in uncovering the complexities of
SME network evolution, a phenomenon embedded in its context. Furthermore, grounded
theory is regarded as well suited to small-scale projects, especially those using
qualitative data, open-ended questions and non-structured interviews (Denscombe,
1998). It permits the use of various data and methods for their collection and analysis
(e.g. types of software). Qualitative data analysis becomes further systematised using N-
Vivo software (Gibbs, 2002). Finally, key advantages of grounded theory for the current
research were its flexibility in selection of sample (theoretical sampling) and its iterative
process between data analysis and gathering. Drawing from the literature, the constant
comparisons of the theory shaped from the existing data with the emerging explanations
from the new data collected, until the theoretical saturation of concepts (see Section
4.5.1), leads to a "conceptually dense" final theory (Strauss and Corbin, 1994, p.278)
that confidently 'fits' with the reality it describes. Crucially, to avoid 'nasty surprises',
grounded theory researchers pay much attention to not forcing the data selection to 'fit'
the theory, as may happen sometimes in the process of testing a theory when 'outliers'
are excluded (Denscombe, 1998).
Under investigational approaches based on grounded theory, the key concern is to
generate theory that is shaped by the data. However, it would be Utopia to consider that
researchers enter the field without any preconceptions and expectations, usually based
51 "Process demonstrates an individual's, organisation's, and group's ability to give meaning to and
respond to problems and/or shape the situations that they find themselves to be in through sequences of
action/interaction, taking into account their readings of the situations and emotional responses to them."
(Corbin and Strauss, 2008)
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on their professional background and familiarity with the relative literature. It is neither
feasible nor desirable to ignore the theoretical literature. On the contrary, it can facilitate
theoretical sampling and comparison making, by indicating some crucial but salient
properties and dimensions on which data can be compared. However the literature
should not be used as data per se (Corbin and Strauss, 2008). Knowledge of literature
strengthens 'theoretical sensitivity' by raising questions such as 'are the emerging
concepts truly derived from data or is the researcher imposing them on data?'; 'how
does an emerging concept differ from those existing in the literature?'; "why is what I
observe different? Are conditions different?'. Furthermore; the literature may be used by
the researcher to generate questions for initial interviews and observations, which later
can be modified during the interactive process of data gathering and analysis. Finally,
Corbin and Strauss (2008, p.37) argue that research based on grounded theory can
provide both findings that "confirm" and "contrast". Contrasting findings illuminate
"where the literature is incorrect, simplistic, or partially explains a phenomenon".
Crucially, researchers have to treat literature or personal experience not as a set of rigid
concepts and directives, but as a starting point to their investigation, providing tentative
ideas and guidelines, which are not fixed or necessarily correct (Malinowski, 1984). On
the contrary, the need for qualitative research exists as long as there are new concepts to
be discovered, and thus it is neither feasible nor desirable to fully anticipate the
problems and concepts derived from data (Corbin and Strauss, 2008).
Through theoretical sampling and constant comparisons, a large body of textual data is
collected. To systematically analyse them, Corbin and Strauss (2008, p. 198) advise the
researcher to follow three particular analytical steps, whose distinction is artificial but
facilitates the explanation of the analytical process. First, there is the phase of open
coding, where descriptive tags are attached to the data, linking them to an idea. In fact,
researchers search for recurring 'coherent' themes or patterns that encapsulate
potentially relevant and crucial features of the phenomenon under investigation. The aim
is to "discover, name ... and develop categories in terms of properties and dimensions"
(Strauss and Corbin, 1990, p. 181). The next phase comprises axial coding, where the
researcher scrutinises the existing codes to reveal their interrelationships, integrate them
under broader and inclusive headings, representing more abstract codes and developing
a hierarchy among categories. Selective coding is the final phase, where core open and
axial codes are selected as vital for illuminating complex phenomena, and concepts are
developed. Concepts constitute the building blocks that encapsulate the essence of
crucial aspects of phenomena (e.g. the relationship between different categories), and
serve to illustrate the analyst's understanding of what was conveyed by the data. As
Corbin and Strauss (2008) note, in order to build a theory, a list of concepts is not
enough. On the contrary, the researcher needs to interrelate them into a unified
explanatory scheme that gives a coherent story about the phenomena studied. Close
attention is required, so all concepts and the emerging theory remain firmly rooted in the
data ('grounded'). To address these considerations, analysts are advised to write memos,
where their analytical thinking process, or "internal dialogue" is explicitly recorded,
providing a tangible documentation of what, how and why decisions were taken,
entailing what actions and feelings (Strauss, 1987, p. 10). Memos not only enable
analysts to track how a theory was constructed out of the data, and boost their creativity
and imagination, but they also force them to reflect on the coherence of their logic
(Corbin and Strauss, 2008).
4.7.2 Execution of Data Collection and Analysis in the Current
Research
Following the principles and guidelines of grounded theory derived from literature, the
execution of data collection and analysis for the current research was as follows. All
interviews were tape recorded, with 40% of them being fully transcribed and the rest
subject to careful note-taking. N-vivo software was used to support the analytical
process of coding, categorisation and constant comparison. Specifically, the N-vivo
software was used to store, code, and retrieve the data, speeding up the process by
avoiding manual 'copying and pasting' of text chunks under codes. Crucially, all the
analytical processes of ground theory generation (e.g identifying themes and
relationships, attaching codes, drawing mental maps and matrices, making conceptual
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decisions, constructing explanations) were done by the researcher to avoid 'over-relying'
on software packages (Tesch, 1993; Richardson and Richardson, 1994). As Denscombe
(1998) warns, computer software can excessively focus on the literal content of text,
ignoring the context and sequence of data or producing too complex codes and
interrelationships. This would be counterproductive, as the researcher then becomes
even more detached from the data or overwhelmed by the amount of data attached to
each code.
For the current research, first, the researcher applied open coding, by carefully reading
the interview transcripts or notes taken, and attaching systematically code tabs to text
chunks related to the same coherent notion. Some codes, meaning the names given to
concepts, were inspired by the thesis' research objectives, while others borrowed the
interviewees' actual words, called 'in-vivo' codes (Corbin and Strauss, 2008), rather
than being named by the researcher. For instance, in the following piece of text, drawn
from the interview transcript of an administrator of the Agia Apple Cooperative (AAC),
ideas related to necessary conditions for the establishment of a successful collective
scheme were evident:
"Ideally, a collective scheme needs to start from us, the farmers, not the State.
}Vhen you find yourself in a strong need then it is too late. Therefore it needs to
start from persons who have some knowledge and future prospects. The rest of
the farmers have to follow and support those persons without a sly attitude, for
example delivering only inferior quality apples. They have to believe in the
collective scheme. Regarding the commanders and employees ofthe new scheme,
the old practices must stop. They elected persons in the AAC based on political
identities rather on qualifications and knowledge. A high school degree is not
enough to govern a cooperative, or the bonds of relatives are not the reason to
employ someone without the needed qualifications. Meritocracy is crucial. The
local farmers have objectively insufficient skills to manage a cooperative.
Therefore, we need to hire persons with the proper expertise, and give them
incentives to work for the new collective scheme, to search for new markets.
Some of them will be responsible for marketing, others for agricultural support
to the farmers ...These need to be done by people who want to work hard... Most
important is that the cooperative or farmer group does not operate as farmer
cooperatives operate today, but show the professionalism of a private firm. I
mean we cannot be a charitable foundation. The market rules are strict and
hard. We ought to be first in quality, competitive in all aspects, ... and
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determined on the battles we have to give within the collective scheme, for
instance with the farmers supplying inferior quality, with the employees who do
notfulfil their duties, and with the commanders and managers who seem inactive
to explain why...Otherwise with the tolerance and lack ofdiscipline of the ACC,
we cannot have any progress. " [Agia Apple Cooperative Administrator]
As clearly relevant to the research objectives, the code tabs 'bottom-up', 'leadership',
'initial critical mass', 'change in governance', 'type of market', 'political intervention'
and 'sufficiency of qualifications' were attached to this piece of data. Additionally, the
labels 'discipline', 'professionalism of a private firm', 'meritocracy' constituted 'in-
vivo' codes, because the interviewees' actual words were used to denote those
unanticipated concepts emerging from the data reading. This process of data coding
continued for all interviews notes and secondary data. At this stage, it was not certain
which codes were of 'higher' or 'lower' order amongst all those developed. Next, the
research proceeded with axial coding, where all open codes were scrutinised, with a
view to identifying more abstract codes, summarising the ideas conveyed by a number
of integrated open codes. The description and properties of core individual open codes
and axial codes are presented in Appendix II. "This conceptual ordering is classifying
events and objects along various explicitly stated dimensions, without necessarily
relating the classifications to each other or developing an overarching exploratory
scheme" (Corbin and Strauss, 2008, p.64). In practice, this hierarchy of codes was
carefully crafted through an analytical thinking process facilitated by drawing and
revising mental maps (Jones, 1985) and matrices (Schatzman, 1991). Effort was made to
ensure each of the 'higher order' abstract concepts "rested on a solid foundation of
lower-level concepts, which in turn go directly back to the data, bringing with them the
detail and the power of description" (Corbin and Strauss, 2008, p.52). Key maps/
matrices included the interviewees' statements about the SME network under
investigation with respect to its (i) context, (ii) features, (iii) performance and (iii)
evolution. In Appendix II, examples of the most developed versions of a mental map for
the Zagorin Apple case and a matrix for the Kefalas case study are given. Finally, the
analytical process involved selective coding, where the researcher perused and reflected
upon all the developed open and axial codes, categories with their properties,
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dimensions and interrelationships, both within and across the four case studies. The aim
was first to construct a meaningful and complete (as possible) 'picture' of SME network
features and their evolution, out of the interviewees' testimonies. This entailed the
systematic exploration of all possible explanations for network evolution implied from
data, and of some contradictions emerging across the four case studies. This forced
recognition ' of the researcher's own assumptions, deliberately searching for
contradictory explanations to fully explore the concepts in terms of their dimensions and
properties. The ultimate goal was to tie together the concepts pertaining to network
evolution, into a coherent 'overarching' story that fully explained what was happening
and why, and represented "something larger than the sum of all its individual parts"
(Corbin and Strauss, 2008, p. 104). For instance, to highlight the diversity of contextual
factors, network features and performance across the four cases studies, a matrix of
constituent aspects of Greek agrifood SME networks was developed across the four case
studies (see Appendix II). Following the aforementioned guidelines of grounded theory
literature, the researcher repeatably went through the interviewees' testimonies and
placed them against the outputs of document scrutiny and participant observations, in
order to critically evaluate whether they tried to create certain impressions about
themselves to lead the research in a particular direction. Additionally, their testimonies
were analysed in terms of contextual conditions, inter/action, and consequences, as
Strauss and Corbin's (1990) paradigm suggests. In practice, SME network features and
context were classified as 'contextual conditions' or 'structure' leading to certain
situations/problems/events, to which humans individually or collectively act, react or
emotionally respond (process) with consequences that, may affect the 'contextual
conditions'. Regarding these conditions, the micro social and economic environments of
research subjects (e.g. direct relationships with suppliers and customers, 'cliques', local
community) were recognised as micro conditions while the SME networks' political,
economic and legislative environments at the national and international level were
explained as macro conditions. The influence of these conditions on the actors'
behaviour was hypothesised and traced as precisely as possible, considering the impact
of time and space. At the end of the open and axial coding processes across the four case
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studies, the researcher had developed a large number of intriguing concepts, which
required further scrutinising to reveal their underlying structure. To facilitate this deeper
thinking, the researcher returned to the relevant literature to see whether the concepts
derived from the data analysis were present there and how these might differ. Were the
conditions different? What was missing from the concepts derived from the literature?
This exercise was instrumental in expanding the basis for comparisons of emerged
concepts in terms of their properties and dimensions, by providing a list of theoretical
propositions that facilitated the selective coding phase as a template for consistently
analysing and presenting the data of the four case studies (it was this list of theoretical
propositions that was presented in Chapter 3). Particularly, for each case study, the
whole network structure and relations, as these historically evolved, were described in
different phases, exploring the nature and dynamics of the vertical and horizontal
connections between actors. A unified list of contextual factors and network features
was developed, exploring salient factors influencing network evolution and performance
respectively. The cross-case comparative analysis focused on revealing similarities and
differences between the network configurations studied, and linking them to specific
performance outcomes.
4.8 Verification ofAnalysis and Triangulation of Data
4.8.1 Principles of Verification of Analysis and Triangulation of Data
The final set of considerations in social science research concerns the issues of analysis
verification and data triangulation, responding to the vital need to demonstrate the
credibility of research, regardless of whether it is qualitative or quantitative (Silverman
(2000, 2006). Quantitative researchers judge the research quality on the basis of validity,
reliability, generabilisability, and objectivity, but these criteria are not well suited to
assessing qualitative research (Denscombe, 1998). Qualitative researchers cannot fully
replicate social settings, as happens for instance in experiments, while time and the
researcher dramatically affect data collection and analysis, making it impossible to
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produce identical data and findings (Bryman and Burgess, 1994; Miles and Huberman,
1994). Therefore, qualitative researchers replace the four aforementioned criteria52 with
credibility, dependability, transferability and confirmability (Denscombe, 1998).
Credibility involved evaluating the accuracy and appropriateness of the selected
measures in drawing "an authentic portrait" of the realities under investigation (Miles
and Huberman, 1994, p.278; Yin, 1994). To certify credibility, researchers apply
triangulation53, by introducing different, independent perspectives such as theoretical
positions or disciplines, involved researchers, methods, and sources of data e.g. different
informants, time and space/context (Becker, 1958; Denzin 1978). Multiple perspectives
are expected to offer complementary strengths, "by reducing systematic distortions
inherent in the use of only one method" (Bickman and Rog, 1998, 93). Additionally,
researchers can present the findings to the participants to judge their validity after the
completion of analysis (Denzin, 1978) or during data collection with new or key
informants (Becker et al., 1961). Although a problem with this is that the participants
may fail to fully understand (recognise) the explanation provided. Finally, 'grounded'
data, long stay on-site, detailed data scrutinising to identify uncertainties, rival
explanations and negative evidence can increase confidence on research credibility
(Miles and Huberman, 1994). Dependability refers to the extent to which the followed
procedures are reputable and the decisions taken are reasonable (Lincoln and Guba,
1985), implying that if fully reflexive accounts of procedures/decisions exist, then other
researchers can predict to what extent comparable findings can be produced (Seale et al.,
1999). Writing memos (Corbin and Strauss, 2008) or recording an 'audit trail'
(Schwandt and Halpem, 1988) offer this opportunity. Transferability involves assessing
whether the conclusions can be fully transferred to other instances (e.g. social settings,
case studies etc.), apart from the population studied (Lincoln and Cuba, 1985). To
facilitate it, researchers provide rich information to enable others "to infer the relevance
52 Alternative terminology of these criteria has been used (see Miles and Huberman, 1994, p.277)
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However, triangulation has disadvantages such as requiring time, money and multi-skills, and might
squeeze the remaining time for data analysis. The analysis becomes more complex, demanding all
findings to be compared, contrasted and integrated. Finally, the implicit assumption that different
perspectives produce data which support each other does not always come true. The occurrence of
contradictory results entails a need for further investigation (Denscombe, 1998)
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and applicability of the findings" through comparison (Denscombe, 1998, p.299). For
instance, 'thick' descriptions of the phenomenon, reference to limitations of the study,
precise description of the original sample's features, and corroboration of findings from
other studies constitute useful information to assess generabilizability of findings (Miles
and Huberman, 1994). Confirmability involves evaluating the degree that the
researcher's identity, values and beliefs influence the data interpretation, since his/her
'self is intertwined with the research process (Denscombe, 1998) introducing inevitable
biases. However, researchers proceed, based on the assumption that they can sufficiently
become detached from their normal personal judgements, ideologies, preconceptions and
attitudes, and operate in a neutral way. To justify their objectivity, researchers (i) take a
reflexive54 account of'self recording all the emerging personal assumptions, prejudices,
feelings, and biases during the research, (ii) consider seriously the possibility of making
false judgements (Denscombe, 1998) and (iii) avoid omitting negative evidence, rival
explanations and outliers (Miles and Huberman, 1994).
Inevitably, researchers could stand differently towards the research process and subjects.
Blaikie (1993, 2000) has distinguished different roles, ranging from detached to
committed engagement. For the current research, the roles of a reflective partner and
dialogic facilitator were deemed appropriate. In the former, researchers are in line with
the interpretivism logic accepting reality as socially constructed, and understand this
reality through a dialogue where participants are invited to "communicate their
experiences within a shared framework of cultural meanings" (Blaikie, 2000, p.53).
Moreover, through this dialogue the participants are expected to recognise by
themselves oppressive forces and contradictions in their realities, and take action against
them ('emancipation', Habermas, 1970; 1972; Mies, 1983). In the latter, researchers
continue playing the role of reflective partner but try to minimise their own "authorial
influence" on what is expressed "by letting the natives speak for themselves... to
produce a 'polyphony' of voices" (Fontana, 1994, p. 214).
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Reflexivity refers to self-awareness (Giddens, 1984), in other words, the recognitions of all responses
and decisions taken by the researcher (Mason, 1996)
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With respect to research quality, qualitative researchers, using the methodologies
applied also to the current study, have to confront the following particular criticisms
raised usually from quantitative scholars. First, quantitative researchers are sceptical
whether case studies can always produce reliable, valid findings, useful for
generalisation (Yin, 1989; Blaikie, 2000). Qualitative researchers' defence could be that
despite its uniqueness each case study remains "a single example of a broader class of
things", whose similarity to other cases in the class, and good 'fit' in the overall picture
can be assessed, by comparing all the known cases across a list of crucial
attributes/dimensions for the phenomenon under investigation e.g. location, history,
social and institutional types (Denscombe, 1998, p.42). Furthermore, Yin (1994)
highlighted that case studies focus on the analytical rather statistical generalisation of
findings; so these are selected to cover broad theoretical themes, rather being
'representative sampling units'. However, defining boundaries of case studies "in an
absolute and clear-cut fashion" could be .difficult (Denscombe, 1998, p.46). Second,
regarding participant observation, concerns have been expressed over reliability,
objectivity and generalisability again (Alder and Alder, 1994). These are originated from
(i) the observers' effect (Kidder, 1981), (ii) the fact that the research instrument is the
researcher's 'self, so the quality of field notes depends on the researcher's memory
recalling ability, and (iii) that events/situations observed are usually not representative,
but subject to availability and convenience (Denscombe, 1998). Third, to legitimise
interview findings, the researcher ought to make credibility checks against the content of
other interviews or documents and observations, and justify the interviewees' ability to
"comment authoritatively on the topic" (Denscombe, 1998). Criticism levelled against
the interviewer's effect also implies that data may be less reliable since these appear
specific to the interviewer and context to some extent (Miles and Huberman, 1994). For
instance, recorder devices create artificial conditions, affecting some of the interviewees.
Also, interview data represent only what the interviewees say they do, rather than their
actual behaviour. Finally, the main concerns related to grounded theory address issues of
dependability, since many existing versions of this theory could produce inconsistency
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in the application of the method, and confirmability, for instance, to what extent can the
researcher's own culture, personal experiences and literature be put aside? Does the
researcher 'reinvent the wheel' by not incorporating findings derived from literature?
4.8.2 Verification of Analysis in the Current Research
To address the above considerations, this section sets out the specific verification
procedures executed for the current research. To foster credibility, the researcher applied
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triangulation by using different methods of primary data collection e.g. interviews and
participant observation, combined with secondary data collection. Furthermore, different
data sources were used, including multiple interviewees, and geographically spread visit
sites (e.g. locations of farmers, villages and prefectures), and sites for participant
observation. Field visits were also conducted at different times. The research analysis
also benefited from inclusion of complementary disciplines and theoretical approaches
derived from network literature (e.g. sociology and economic, marketing theories).
Particularly,.to enrich analysis during the selective coding phase, the researcher returned
to the literature to check whether the emerged concepts from the earlier open and axial
coding phases were present or not in the literature. The researcher checked whether
informants had knowledge of the subject, by making some background research on them
(e.g. position, degree of involvement, qualifications and recommendations from others).
The interviews were scrutinised to assess to what extent ideas were shared by many
interviewees. In addition to triangulation, to increase credibility of analysis, the
researcher not only spent a long time in the field, but also some time away ("temporal
withdrawal" Whyte, 1943) to avoid "going native" (Miles and Huberman, 1994), in
other words, excessive immersion in the informants' perceptions and explanations.
Flowever, the researcher focused on keeping the analysis 'grounded' to the data. Finally,
to further increase the research credibility, a report of findings was sent to the
gatekeepers for their comment on how close it described and explained their reality. To
justify dependability written memos included the description, justification and
reflections on application of all decisions made. The participant observations helped to
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assess whether what the interviewees actually did coincided with what ihey said they
did. To enhance transferability, in the presentation of case study results, there is a
considerable amount of information covering the historical evolution and context in
order to allow readers to judge the relevance of findings to other instances. The
researcher gave 'thick' descriptions of the phenomenon (i) at the level of individual
network members, including actors from different supply chain stages, from outside the
supply chain, and applying the paradigmatic model (e.g. conditions-inter/actions-
consequences). The researcher also focused (ii) at the whole network level, by taking
under consideration its context, structure, governance and performance. To ensure
conformability, the researcher prepared a reflexive account of her expectations and
prejudices, before entering the field, in order to deliberately search for rival evidence.
After completing each interview, the researcher included in the relative memo a similar
reflection section to increase the awareness of any bias, control her attitude and operate
in a detached way during data collection and analysis. The researcher considered
seriously the possibility of 'having got it wrong', so regular checks were made by
summarising the interviewees' thoughts and asking them whether these were correctly
understood. Findings were also checked against other interviewees' input, secondary
data, and participant observations, seeking alternative or rival explanations. 'Outliers'
identified in the preliminary results signified the need to re-examine initial assumptions,
and widen the sample by including unanticipated exceptional cases (e.g. interviewees,
events, social settings). Both credibility and transferability of findings of the current
study were strengthened by the use of theoretical sampling and the 'collective
instrumental' case study technique.
4.9 Summary
This Chapter has presented in depth the specific methodological choices that constituted
the empirical research design of the current study. Given the research's exploratory
character, an abductive research strategy and qualitative case study methodology were
deemed appropriate. Primary data were collected though participant observation and in-
depth interviews, combined with secondary data collection. Techniques of purposeful
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sampling and triangulation were applied. The data analysis followed the principles of
grounded theory, and was facilitated by N-vivo software. Finally, attention was paid to
the verification of the findings. For all the aforementioned methodological choices, this
Chapter has presented the relevant theory, 'best practice' and justified the choices with
reference to the research objectives. The specific procedures executed in the current
research have also been explained together with reflection on them.
The Thesis now moves on to presenting and detailing the results of the case study
research. Results are presented case by case in four separate chapters (Chapter 5 to 8).
Chapter 9 then gives a cross-case analysis of the results. The first set of results relates to
the Blauel organic olive oil case, which is the subject of the next chapter.
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Chapter 5: Blauel Organic Olive Oil - Case Description
and Analysis
5.11ntroduction
Following the methodology Chapter, the results of the first case study are now presented
and analysed. The focal point of this analysis is the private enterprise Blauel Ltd, that
standardises and markets organic olive oil under the well-known premium brand 'Mani'.
The enterprise is located in the remote mountainous Mani area, in the part belonging to
the Messinia prefecture. Map in Figure 5.1 depicts the geographical location of the
Blauel case, with key villages highlighted.
The selection of the Blauel case was based on two methodological criteria: (i) the case
represents a processed product and (ii) the network exhibts apparently good market
performance. As a result, following the theoretical propositions set out in Chapter 3, it
was tentatively expected that relatively strong network would be found, and also
possibly quite benign contextual conditions.
The Chapter begins with the historical evolution of the case described in three phases.
The analysis of contextual factors influencing evolution and the description of the
present day network structure follows. Then, some observations regarding the Blauel
network's current performance are presented. The Chapter closes with the analysis of
how network features impact on performance, and a chapter summary.
5.2 Historical Evolution of the Blauel Network
5.2.1 'Establishing Exporting Marketing Channels for Conventional
Olive Oil' (early 80's to late 80's)
In 1980, Fritz Blauel, an Austrian entrepreneur, came up with the idea to export
conventional olive oil to Austria. He was supported and supplied by a few farmers at
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Neochori village.These farmers constituted the first critical mass of farmers supporting
Blauel. Neochori village is located in the coastal edge of Mani, which is the least
mountainous area of the region. The olive oil was bottled by hand, and exported as a
standardised product, rather than in bulk, which was the common practice in Greece.
Blauel avoided following other wholesalers and trade brokers' usual approach to
exploiting farmers.
In 1988, Fritz Blauel and his wife tried to introduce organic farming, which was
unknown in Greece. Being discouraged by an error in the application of organic pest
control, the farmers of Neochori village abandoned the organic initiative. Since then, the
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majority have either sold their land as a building plot, as the area is a popular resort, or
remained in conventional olive production. So, Blauel was forced to turn to the farmers
of the mountainous villages of Mani for support.
5.2.2 'Establishing Exporting Marketing Channels for Organic Olive
Oil' (early 90's-1995)
Based on the pre-existing social cohesiveness of the fanners of the mountainous village
of Saidona, Fritz Blauel introduced organic fanning under a supportive agricultural
contract, the Blauel "bio-program". This contract required the farmers to deliver their
organic production exclusively to Blauel Ltd for at least five years in return for a 20%
premium on the average local price offered for the conventional olive oil. In return,
Blauel Ltd provided close agricultural guidance, cheap agricultural inputs, secure
payment, and coverage of the certification costs. The Blauel enterprise cooperated with
DIO Ltd, the first certifying body for organic production in Greece. Facing tough
challenges as new entrepreneurs, the Blauel couple sought training for themselves in
Switzerland. Dramatic improvement in governance structure resulted from this training.
Almost 100% of Saidona fanners became organic, thanks to Blauel's intensive support,
which considerably contrasted with the behaviour of other wholesalers, who usually sold
abroad in bulk, and exploited fanners by offering low prices or not paying off at all.
However, an effort by Blauel to train Saidona fanners to divide collective labour in
order to improve efficiency failed, because the farmers were close to retirement, so they
were reluctant to adopt innovation. This discouraged Blauel from offering such training
again.
In 1992, the EU regulation and subsidies for organic farming encouraged more farmers
to join the Blauel bio-program. Blauel established a bottling unit and started exports of
organic olive oil to Austria. He entrenched the 'MANI' brand. Since then, his exports
were gradually expanded to Germany, and Switzerland, resulting in the expansion of the
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production base, first to farmers in the whole area of Messinian Mani, and second to the
rest of Mani region belonging to the adjacent Laconia prefecture.
A smaller umber of farmers, outside Saidona village but within the Messinian part of
Mani area, joined the Blauel bio-program. However, this part of Mani has some
unfavourable features such as small farm size and difficult cultivation, due to the
mountainous land. As a result, production costs were so high that Blauel could not offer
Mani fanners a price leaving a satisfactory profit, which ip turn made fanners complain
and be less motivated than those in low-lying areas.
5.2.3 'Expanding the Market- Dramatic Changes in Farmers'
Network' (1995-2006)
Thanks to the high reliability of product quality and customer relationships, Blauel Ltd.
gradually expanded exports to of America, Scandinavia and Japan, usually via trade
intermediates. This resulted in the need for further expansion of the olive oil production
base via an additional two groups of fanners: a) those fanners residing outside Mani
area, but who joined he Blauel bio-program, and b) 'independent' farmers, who did not
participate in the Blauel bio-program. Blauel Ltd continued to buy occasionally from
theses "independents". He offers them single-transaction contracts, and does not cover
their certification costs.
Regarding the first group of farmers who joined the bio-program, it was amongst those
in Kefalas village, where like Saidona village, farmers showed a strong will for
collective action and innovation. However, in 1999, two groups of young farmers in
Laconia, one at Kefalas village and another one at Valinisti village abandoned the Blauel
bio-program. They established their own collective enterprises: Kefalas Ltd and
Organon Ltd respectively. Generally, Laconia has different characteristics from Mani
area: big farm sizes; low-lying terrain; lower production costs; and farmers who have a
more professional attitude and are more self-motivated to learn novelties in production
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methods. So, Blauel Ltd could offer a price leaving a satisfactory profit to the Laconia
farmers, who are also proved more cooperative with Blauel.
Blauel could not persuade more farmers in Messinian Mani to collaborate with him, so
he had to seek alternative options to expand the production base. Since 1999, the
Neochori55 farmer cooperative established its own standardising unit based on public
funding. The Neochori cooperative commanders developed an antagonistic attitude
towards Blauel Ltd, but their hope that they could imitate Blauel's success proved in
vain. Local farmers were discouraged from collaborating with the Blauel enterprise and
converting to organic farming. As a result, some Neochori farmers collaborating with
Blauel Ltd, abandoned either organic farming or Blauel Ltd. Today, very few Neochori
farmers participate in the Blauel bio-program.
In 2000, Blauel replaced the general manager. A slight alienation of Blauel Ltd from the
fanners has been observed, since then. In 2002, due to disagreement in the quality of
service provided, Blauel Ltd decided to replace DIO Ltd with a new certifying company
for organic production in Greece, called Bioellas Ltd. This change constituted a trust test
in the relationship between Blauel and the farmers, since they could have refused the
change of certification body. However, this did not happen. Since 2004, Blauel has
gained many awards from the International Olive Oil Council and other bodies for the
organic quality of his oil. This added considerable recognition to Blauel's brand. Since
2003, Blauel Ltd has expanded its range to conventional olive oil, olives and other
products, focusing on high quality.
5.3 Analysis of Factors Influencing Historical Evolution
5.3.1 Introduction
This section considers the key factors influencing the evolution of Blauel network over
3:1 Both Neochori and Saidona villages are located at the Messinian part of Mani. Laconian Mani is the
other part of Mani region that belongs to Laconia prefecture, located next to the Messinia prefecture (see
Figure 5.1).
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time, drawing from the factors identified from literature in.Chapter 3. Briefly, three main
categories of factors were identified: market conditions, social cohesiveness, and
external institutional support. For Blauel analysis indicates, all three factors played a
role, however some of the sub-categories were deemed as less decisive for Blauel,
compared to the other cases. Figure 5.2 summarises the impact of all factors on Blauel's
evolution diagrammatically56; most important impacts are depicted with black bars, less
important with white bars. The length of the bars reflects the impact of the respective
factor to network evolution. As Figure -5.2 shows, the three factors identified as
particular critical to the Blauel network evolution were: (i) recognition and
differentiation of product by end customers, (ii) quality certification scheme as a pre¬
requisite to market entry and (iii) pre-existent social cohesiveness and communality in
interests/perceptions. The next sections explain the impact of these factors.
5.3.2 Recognition and Differentiation of Product by the Customers
Following the theoretical proposition from the literature, if a significant segment of end-
users recognises and pays a premium for differentiated products, this may enhance
tighter network linkages as firms are encouraged to develop quality product and brands
(de Roest and Menghi, 2000). The domestic organic olive oil and standardised market is
still in its infancy, since Greeks trust the quality of conventional olive oil bought in bulk
from their relatives. So, this factor does not play a strong role in the domestic
environment. However, Blauel foresaw the existence of market niches for organic oil in
other European countries, which he focused on since the beginning, and in turn
successfully capitalised on. Blauel's testimony illustrates this 'with our surf, we were on
two waves: one of olive oil and one of organic products in Europe'. Then, Blauel
understood that in order to establish the production base with the required scale and
efficiency, he needed a contract relationship with his suppliers offering strong support,
56 For an analysis of the less important contextual factors for the Blauel case study, see the comment for
the footnote 56 from Chapter 5 in the Appendix 1
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but also imposing stringent application of regulations. He then had to identify and
"eliminate" deficiencies of local fanners e.g. lack of orientation to quality and
customers' needs.
5.3.3 Quality Certification Scheme as a Pre-Requisite to Market Entry
Following the proposition from literature, if the participation in a quality certification
scheme becomes a pre-requisite to market entry, it motivates strong inter-firm relations
within SME networks (Spiller and Zellner, 1997; Maze et al., 2001).
Since Blauel decided to export olive oil under an organic quality certification label, he
had to reach certain standards of scale and efficiency of the production base for
exporting and differentiating his product on a quality basis. However, the local farmers
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more or less lacked the needed professionalism and orientation towards quality and
consumers' needs, due to the long-existing production system in Greece of conventional
olive oil sold in bulk and never certified for its quality.
In order to achieve an attitude change, Blauel Ltd had first to understand the mentality of
local farmers and second 'eliminate' their deficiencies in competencies. The Blauel bio-
program has provided strong support (e.g. information, guidance, and patience) and
secured stringency in the application of regulations. Consequently, a sufficient number
of local fanners were persuaded to convert to organic farming. Now, the fanners are
concerned about how to control and guarantee quality. In other words, Blauel has
gradually introduced local farmers to a whole new way of thinking and behaviour, and
his bio-program constitutes a 'virtual' vertical integration form with the local farmers.
5.3.4 Pre- Existing Social Cohesiveness and Communality in
Interests/Perceptions
The theoretical proposition from the literature in Chapter 3 was that if social-cultural
bonds pre-exist amongst actors in a network and are expressed through communality in
interests/perceptions, this enhances the likelihood of strong, durable ties existing across
the network (Scott, 1998; Baker, 1995). In the Blauel case, strong socio-cultural bonds
pre-existed only amongst the farmers of Saidona, Kefalas and Valinisti villages. Thanks
to strong communist political beliefs, the highest communality in interests and
perceptions was observed amongst Saidona farmers. In contrast, for the rest of the
farmers in both Mani and Laconia areas, very low pre-existing socio-cultural bonds are
typical, especially among habitants of different villages. Such farmers are characterised
by low communality in interests and perceptions, demonstrated by prioritising individual
benefits over collective ones, by holding conflicting perspectives such as between
farming and tourism or other jobs; between short and long-term perspective; between
profits and improving quality.
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The impacts of the nature of social cohesiveness on the expansion and maintenance of
the Blauel network are twofold. First, the existence of social cohesiveness accelerated
the network expansion by facilitating (i) the diffusion and application of innovative
ideas; and (ii) Blauel's hunt for a solid and duteous critical mass to introduce organic
farming. Thus, Blauel reached scale economies and success more easily. However,
social cohesiveness was also found to work the opposite way. Despite Blauel's
substantial investment in Saidona fanners' training, their acceptance of innovation was
unavoidably limited by their lack of funding and short-term interest in farming due to
their advanced age. They collectively decided that adapting further to innovation did not
conform to their personal interests and capabilities. Their desire to conform with each
other limited the network expansion therefore.
The second impact on social cohesiveness relates to the existence of strong cohesiveness
in Saidona, Valinisli and Kefalas villages. There, the farmers eventually tended to want
to become independent from Blauel's collaboration57. In fact, the Blauel bio-program, a
"virtual" vertical integration form, increased their confidence/interest to establish their
own collective scheme, a real vertical integration form. This wish was not materialised
by Saidona farmers, who admitted being too old for such a demanding initiative. In
contrast in Valinisti and Kefalas villages, the young age and the existence of a person
with leadership qualities led to the setting up of a new enterprise. In essence, the Blauel
bio-program transferred "tacit" knowledge to those fanners on how a sustainable
collective scheme is built, and registered in their collective memory that they are capable
of building it. In contrast, fragmented fanners, i.e. those lacking social cohesiveness, lost
their initial interest in establishing a "countervailing power" network and tend to remain
loyal, when they start collaboration with a downstream actor who offers a fair,
supportive and secure contract, such as Blaiiel Ltd.
37Blauel Ltd is a special case of interest regarding the impact of social cohesiveness on network
maintenance. Because it is a private enterprise, the farmers see Blauel as nothing more than an
exceptionally supportive and fair downstream actor. As long as their vision coincides with Blauel's
objectives, the network remains united.
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That Valinisti and Kefalas farmers eventually abandoned the Blauel bio-program, and
that Saidona farmers refused further training, convinced Blauel that such intensive
support to fanners constitutes a loss of assets invested and a danger of breeding future
competitors, rather than a beneficial effort. Consequently, Blauel adopted the principle
that 'education/help should he offered only to those who have comprehend, by
themselves, the need for it, so they express strong will to he educated and helped,
communicate effectively their needs, bring their own ideas to resolve specific problems
This finding highlights the special impact that social cohesiveness, a contextual factor,
can have on the evolution of network actors' perceptions regarding how they should
interact with other actors.
After discussing the impact of contextual factors on the historical evolution of the Blauel
network, the analysis of the present day network follows. This begins with the
description of the network structure and performance. Next, certain network features,
drawn from theory presented in Chapter 3, and which have particular relevance to the
Blauel case, are discussed. Finally, the impact of these features' on performance is
assessed.
5.4 Structure of the Current Blauel Network
The Blauel network consists of a six-stage chain, where Blauel Ltd is the focal point of
interest. Figure 5.3 depicts the network diagrammatically.
As Figure 5.3 shows, the first stage of the Blauel chain refers to input suppliers to
farmers i.e. suppliers of organic fertilisers and pest control equipment) or
standardisation/processing units (i.e. suppliers of standardising machinery or packaging
materials). The second stage consists of 350 organic olive farmers, of which 250
participate in the Blauel bio-program and 100 supply Blauel Ltd as 'independent'
farmers. In 2005, the total annual production of Blauel was around 800 tonnes of olive
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oil, 55% of which is certified as organic either by the domestic private inspection
agency, Bioellas Ltd or foreign ones (i.e. Natura; Bio Swish). The rest is conventional
oil. The third stage of the chain includes 18 olive processors, of which 11 are
cooperatives. With the exception of a private processor, which is 100% organic, the rest
accept both organic and conventional olive oil. In the next stage, the olive oil is
standardised at Blauel's single bottling and labelling plant. This is the focal point of the
network. The product is labelled either with 'Mani' brand (83%) or the downstream
actors' label (17%). The final stage consists of distribution of the oil to retail outlets.
74% of organic output is distributed by seven foreign region-specific wholesalers, and
two import agents to hundreds of small local retailers or delicatessen shops abroad (in
Europe, America, Asia). 26% of output is distributed directly to two foreign multiple
retailers in Germany and Austria. Very little quantity of organic olive oil is sold through
domestic local delicatessen shops or directly to final consumers via internet or phone.
Additionally, in the Blauel network there is a set of actors external to the supply chain,
with whom Blauel Ltd has established frequent and fruitful relationships (see Figure
5.4). The Blauel enterprise is present in the whole organic scene of Germany, Austria
and Greece. This scene consists of "lots ofsub-organisations, inspectors, organisations
accrediting something, or you need to belong to them to get information" [The
Entrepreneur-Leader], Particularly, Fritz Blauel acknowledged the following as
particularly influential external actors: those who assess the quality of olive oil (i.e.
taste-panels and competitions); the network of olive oil chemists; the network of
suppliers of standardisation machinery and raw material; the association of Greek
standardisation units of olive oil called SEVITEL; the Greek 'Olive and Olive Oil'
magazine; the association of Greek standardisation units of quality products; domestic
private/public agricultural/developmental agencies, and the coaches from his business
training in Switzerland.
Blauel delegates meet these external actors in meetings of associations; international
competitions and fairs such as the BIOFACH, the largest European organic fair annually
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organised in Munich. There, they exchange information, knowledge and ideas; collect
product/service feedback and listen closely to those shaping opinions and trends, such as
quality gurus, or associations representatives. The information flow continues through
internet contact and newsletters. In this way, Blauel watches the circumstances and
tendencies in the global organic olive oil scene; anticipates future challenges and
interactively elaborates sophisticated ways to respond.
Overall, the Blauel network is a remarkable case, because of the strong linkages between
actors both within and outwith the supply chain, and its strong reliance on European
information/knowledge exchange networks.
5.5 Performance of the Blauel Network
5.5.1 Introduction
Following the case selection criteria, the Blauel network was chosen for being a
"processed product" and having apparently strong market performance. This section
examines how strong Blauel's performance actually is in practice.
As introduced in Chapter 3, Human and Provan (1997) identified two types of network
performance outcomes: transactional and transformational. Transactional outcomes refer
to improvement in financial performance, organisation credibility and access to
resources, while transformational outcomes refer to an attitude/ behaviour change of
members as a result of network participation. For the Blauel network, both types of
outcomes were expected to be found, since this case was chosen as a classic "successful
performance story". Figure 5.5 depicts the performance outcomes found in practice, and
the following sections give the details.
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Figure 5.3: The Current Blauel Network: Internal Actors of the Supply Chain
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5.5.2 Transactional Outcomes of the Blauel Enterprise
The farmers supplying Blauel Ltd enjoy a secure premium payment and receive reliable
information/knowledge. Especially, those participating in the Blauel bio-program benefit
hugely from a long-term contract, regular training and agriculturist's advice, as well as
free certification services. The Blauel enterprise has achieved stable scale economies.
Despite the decision not to sell at a discount, as customers demand, Blauel Ltd preserves
its high attractiveness as a partner. This stems from its good reputation for being
reliable, free of scandals and having awarded product quality. Consequently, the
enterprise's viability and credibility towards large suppliers, customers and public
agencies such as universities, agricultural and administrative agencies have considerably
increased. Blauel's success has reinforced local prosperity. Botli 'Mani' and downstream
actors' brands are differentiated and recognised by end consumers and sold at premium
prices. However, none of these brands is the market leader, which means that a margin
for improvement exists. Overall, almost optimum transactional outcomes, reflecting
good economic performance are observed, as expected.
5.5.3 Transformational Outcomes of the Blauel Network
Through the Blauel bio-program, the fanners became familiar with an environmentally
friendly production system, and understood the need for higher professionalism,
discipline, coordination, quality certification, respect for the consumers' needs, and
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mutual long-term relationships with the standardisation unit. Overall, Blauel's effort for
optimum transformational outcomes have been almost successful, limited only by the
farmers' personal reasons, which were beyond Blauel's capability of addressing them.
Particularly, there were cases where fanners abandoned Blauel's collaboration before
any transformation in attitude/perceptions occurred. This happened at Neochori village,
where most farmers refused to convert to organic fanning, because they had farming as a
second job or preferred to sell their land to developers of sea resorts. Even in cases with
strong transformational outcomes thanks to the pre-existing social cohesiveness, such as
Saidona, Valinisti and Kefalas villages, the fanners compromised those outcomes. For
Saidona farmers, the reasons were their pensionable age and inability to cover the
organic production expenses; consequently their interest in farming had gradually
declined. For Valinisti and Kefalas village farmers, personal ambitions to establish their
own cooperative enterprise led them to become independent from Blauel Ltd.
In conclusion, since Blauel Ltd was selected as a classic 'successful performance story'
both transactional and transformational outcomes were supposed to be optimal. Both
expectations were almost met. It was suiprising that farmers' personal reasons and free
will can limit transformational outcomes, leaving Blauel without any power to change
this result. .Having confirmed the performance status of the Blauel network, next
sections offer an account of the key factors of the network and then explain to what
extent certain features were conducive to Blauel's favourable performance outcomes.
5.6 Features of the Blauel Network
5.6.1 Introduction
In Chapter 3 it was proposed that the specific features of SME networks, including the
profile of members, their competencies and the network governance, can have a strong
bearing on network performance. This section considers the impact of key features of
the Blauel network performance. Figure 5.6 summarises the findings, indicating that
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member profile had an ambiguous effect, whereas member competencies and network
governance had more clearly positive effects.
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5.6.2 Blauel Network Member Profile
The first feature of the network that impacts on performance is the profile of the network
members. Milliken and Martins (1996) identified two profile types: physical and
attitudinal. The former relates to the 'observed' attributes of the network members,
while the latter considers their 'less visible or underlying' features such as perspective,
goals and reluctance to change. The theoretical proposition states that diversity in either
physical or attitudinal profile impedes performance outcomes (Milliken and Martins,
1996). Given the good market performance of the Blauel network, homogeneity in the
profile of farmers collaborating with Blauel Ltd was expected.
Surprisingly, diversity was discovered in the physical profile regarding age, land size
and morphology, having a second job or not and economic prosperity. This was so for
the farmers from Mani and Laconia areas who currently participate in the Blauel bio-
program. Also, a small diversity in the attitudinal profile concerning professionalism,
commitment and discipline was observed which may explain why the farmers from
Mani show less discipline to follow agricultural instructions than those in Laconia.
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However, when comparing the Blauel farmers with the local fanners not collaborating
with Blauel or even themselves before joining the Blauel bio-program, on attitudinal
features such as professionalism, cooperation attitude, interest in organic farming,
reliability, not being deceitful, the Blauel farmers now exhibit a notable overall
homogeneity. They all believe that the Blauel bio-program as an entity is beneficial and
show willingness to remain members obeying to the contract rules. This homogeneity in
attitude results not only from the strict and deliberate selection of participants in the
Blauel bio-program, but also from effective mechanisms for transferring knowledge,
which have changed favourably the participants' attitude over time. Consequently,
Blauel Ltd not only reached scale economies, high quality and satisfactory intra-firm
coordination (i.e. satisfactory transactional outcomes), but also successfully integrated
individual farmers into their enterprise mission.
Compared to those participating in the Blauel bio-program, surprisingly the
'independent' farmers have higher homogeneity in both physical and attitudinal profile.
This is explained by the fact that the single-transaction contract facilitates the selection
only of fanners with features matching to Blauel's high standards, particularly big land
size, professionalism, high quality and market orientation. Despite the initial difficulty to
discover and confidently assess the compatibility of the 'independent' farmers with
Blauel's standards, the Blauel enterprise hugely benefited from the fact that these
farmers take the whole responsibility for self-training and certifying high quality of
organic product. So, Blauel Ltd secures extra supplies when needed with the minimum
input.
The attitudinal homogeneity among Blauel Ltd employees is noticeable, resulted from
dramatic changes in the enterprise's governance structure after Blauel's business
training in Switzerland. The employees were trained to self-learn, become independent
and communicate effectively their needs and expertise. Consequently, intra-firm
coordination and efficiency were considerably increased, since the employees
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comprehended the principles for maximum productivity, felt more confident with team
working, and were motivated to bring in most of their capabilities. The principle of
hiring only people with the 'right' mentality evidently promotes efficiency.
Overall, the Blauel network members' profile was considered as a case of high
homogeneity gradually achieved by Blauel's deliberate choices in governance structure
and members' selection. Given the apparently good market performance, the expectation
for a homogenous members' profile is confirmed.
5.6.3 Blauel Network Competencies
The second network feature that impacts on performance is the network members'
competencies. If the members are qualified according to their responsibility with
sufficient skills in production, marketing/entrepreneurship and collective-management,
then good market network performance is hypothesised (Provan and Kenis, 2008).
Given the good performance of Blauel, such skills were expected to exist.
First, regarding production skills, the Blauel network exhibited satisfactory knowledge
of organic farming of the farmers and. agriculturists. Also, good standardisation
competencies of Blauel Ltd were discovered.
Second, regarding marketing/entrepreneurial skills, the Blauel couple and the current
general manager have displayed considerable competencies. Their focus on European
information/knowledge networks and wide network horizon were noticeable. Blauel's
entrepreneurial response to the hostile circumstances of the domestic business
environment, owing to the lack of external institutional support, was to seek alternative
sources abroad. Lie used these 'weak ties' to derive inspiration and knowledge from
experts met at international fairs/competitions. By picking up the cutting edge
production and marketing techniques and understanding the tendencies and future
challenges, Blauel Ltd could design its strategy with less risk. Fritz Blauel's marketing
philosophy is illustrated by the following quotations:
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"We aim for our business partners to be so convinced of our competences, so
when they think of something innovative they will choose Blauel Ltd to
materialise it." [The Entrepreneur-Leader]
"(Care and authenticity)... then as a company we have the same quality to the
outside, and this why the customers find us I think. We are ready for this thing, I
mean we are 'good to work with 'plus we are 'safe to work with', andfor even
big companies who work in a totally different way, very rational, mechanistic
'square'. No, we do not face difficulties, because the point you meet this colossus
is a person, and this person has feelings, hopes and fears. So if this person feels
good with us, this is helpful. At the same time, we have to be 100% professional,
no question, but it helps enormously if the vibes are O.K. So we mix private and
professional, which is fine, because we are human beings who want to be happy
and want to have a good time. " [The Entrepreneur-Leader]
"Again, there is a feeling of trust that people have in us, that they (competitors)
gave us work, and we do the same with others who have special machinery that
we do not have " [The Entrepreneur-Leader]
Third, regarding managerial skills, Blauel, the current general manager and the two
employees responsible for relationships with the farmers, have displayed substantial
competencies. For instance, they deal efficiently with conflicts; convey the principles for
maximising efficiency; show empathy for farmers, employees and customers' needs;
inspire mutual trust; and apply easily the model of tlat hierarchy. Thanks to the personal
philosophy of Fritz Blauel, the governance structure was deliberately built to serve the
interests of all stakeholders in the supply chain i.e. farmers, Blauel, and customers. The
prime goal was to permit relationships to flourish, by being open and caring for others.
In essence, by inspiring farmers, employees and customers with interest, commitment,
trust and belief on their own competencies, Blauel has optimised both the contribution of
each stakeholder in goals commonly set and the distribution of benefits. By virtue of
Blauel's personal charisma, mutual long-term relationships were built.
In addition to the collective-management skills and marketing/entrepreneurial
capabilities, Blauel's high awareness, as the constructor of the network governance,
played a pivotal role in the network evolution. Awareness here is referred to the actors'
capability of assessing correctly their own competencies, and the weaknesses and
170
strengths of the whole network governance structure, against the market challenges. The
significance of this parameter has been inductively derived from the data, and therefore
is novel and not predefined in the literature. Particularly, the Blauel couple proved their
capability of (i) realising the network's problematic areas, including their personal
deficiencies; (ii) discovering the right training in constructing a sustainable network
structure; and (iii) applying the principles for maximising efficiency. To illustrate, when
the Blauel couple initially introduced organic fanning in Greece as "missionaries", they
lacked any relevant knowledge i.e. organic farming, standardisation, marketing and
organising a business. By applying their existing marketing/entrepreneurial skills, they
collected most of the information needed. However, they could not avoid typical
mistakes made by small entrepreneurs (owner/managers), such as job rotation; very
concentrated responsibility, and low internal information flow. Facing the negative
implications of an inefficient network governance structure, they realised and admitted
deficiencies in their own collective-management skills, thanks to their high awareness.
The Blauel couple sought formal training in Switzerland (i.e. external institutional
support). Consequently, the pioneering current governance structure was designed and
applied. It has enabled flat hierarchy, flexibility, adaptability, through coordination and
internal flow of information/knowledge. The principle of "collective learning" where
each subunit is strongly motivated not only to be self-reliant, but also to
communicate/collaborate effectively, was explained to the employees by formal training.
This resulted in advancing both the employees' profile homogeneity and skills. The
above analysis clearly demonstrates that the awareness of the network governance
constructor (in this case, Fritz Blauel) is a decisive contributor to satisfactory
performance. However, it is fundamental for constructors to find a source of external
institutional support (i.e. training in Switzerland) to compensate for the deficiencies of
which they become aware. Furthermore, it is important to distinguish between formal
qualifications and competencies based only on experience. The Blauel couple had both
suboptimal transactional and transformational outcomes before seeking formal training
in managing their enterprise.
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Overall, the Blauel network exhibits sufficient competencies to achieve both satisfactory
transactional and transformational outcomes. Given the apparently good market
performance, the expectations for sufficient competencies displayed by the Blauel
network members were confirmed.
5.6.4 Blauel Network Governance
The third network feature that impacts on performance is the governance structure. It is
compromised of five different aspects: (i) power distribution; (ii)
accountability/formality; (iii) mechanisms for information/knowledge diffusion; (iv)
mechanisms for conflict-resolution/trust-building; and (v) mechanisms for
monitoring/evaluating/planning (Grandori and Soda, 1995; Provan and Kenis, 2008).
The theoretical proposition states that if these five aspects are apparent at a sufficient
level, then good network performance is anticipated. Again, considering the almost
optimum transactional and transformational performance outcomes of the Blauel
network governance were anticipated for this network.
The analysis identified certain findings that accorded with theoretical propositions,
which are discussed now under the five sub-features. Regarding power distribution, a
fiat hierarchy was introduced to Blauel network as a result of the training in Switzerland.
The philosophy behind this hierarchy is illustrated by Fritz Blauel's following quotation:
"Flat hierarchy in its essence means care and knowledge of the person in the top
ofpower for all subordinates. All strategic decisions were made by respecting
the preferences and needs of those applying them and based on information/
knowledge ofall relative departments. Although I take the decisions, I have first
absorbed all ideas, requests and difficulties of the farmers and employees, and
incorporate them in my decision ". [The Entrepreneur-Leader]
"Ideally, Blauel Ltd is a self-learning organisation...I told all the subgroups (in
the company) ...that they have to find out new solutions, they have to become
self-learning and self-improving in their area, and then communicate to the rest
of the company, their needs, their progress, what they have learned and what
they want, what is bothering them. So each department is learning and updating
itself. So this is the idea because we think it is too big for me and my wife to
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improve every little bit, as we did 15-20 years ago. We changed our style for
organisation,... of leadership, of how we handle risk, how we handle
information. 1 mean that the leaders also are a group which has to learn within
the organisation. " [The Entrepreneur-Leader]
The impartiality in the indiscipline penalty for fanners offending against the obligations
of the Blauel bio-program revealed that power was equally distributed among farmers.
This was found to be crucial to build up relationships of mutual trust.
Concerning accountability/formality, Blauel Ltd established a quality-reward system for
farmers to stimulate quality improvement. The Blauel bio-program contract also
determines the support offered by Blauel Ltd to the farmer (i.e. administrative support
with organic subsidy documentation; training; free agriculturist's advice and covering
certification costs; 20% price premium for conventional olive oil) and has a mission
statement. It sets the obligation of five-year membership and delivering the whole
quantity, that secures scale economies. However, Blauel's refusal to use his right for
legal action against those farmers abandonning the Blauel bio-program is indicative of
Blauel's respect for the farmers' free will. Finally, Blauel Ltd has its own clerical staff
and offices.
"The contract (the Blauel bio-program) has a symbolic meaning for us. There
have been farmers who abandoned it and left, but we took no action against
them. But it is a nice symbol, because it describes explicitly to farmers what
organic farming means, what the cooperation with Blauel means, what we
promised to offer them, all the benefits they gain by signing it." [The
Entrepreneur-Leader]
As regards the mechanisms for information diffusion, Blauel Ltd regularly organises
informative meetings; employs four people as brokers for transferring knowledge and
objective, accurate and confidential information to the farmers; and publishes a
newsletter called 'Biotopos'.
"We have the department oforganic farming, whose purpose is the promotion of
organic farming and support, technical and administrative, of the farmers. We
are very close to our farmers. We are those who advice which fertiliser is
permitted to use, participate in fairs and learn the last developments and transfer
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them this information. We have a newsletter called 'Biotopos' per two months. "
[The Entrepreneur-Leader]
In regard to conflict resolution, two employees are responsible for the relationship with
fanners, apart from transferring knowledge. They deal with all issues the farmers raise,
resolve conflicts and clear misunderstanding, collect complaints and feedback on
Blauel's proposed ideas; and work as 'representatives' of the fanners to Blauel. In this
way, Blauel incorporates the fanners' response and perspectives in the early stages of
the strategy design.
Finally, the mechanisms for monitoring/ evaluating/ planning of Blauel Ltd are
discussed. After the training in Switzerland, Blauel Ltd established a systematic
recording procedure of most internal processes in a similar way to all standardisation
processes/ outcomes (hat have later been monitored under the ISO and HACCP
specifications. The aim was to monitor, evaluate and improve efficiency. To sort out
problems with customers, Blauel Ltd proved to have an exemplary procedure. As a
result, the creativity, flexibility, efficiency and immediacy in the response of the Blauel
enterprise is well recognised by its customers. Practically, the analysis and evaluation of
each problem constitutes a collective task, for which a team of the managers of all
relevant departments is created on the spot. Another priority constitutes the regular
assessment of both the governance efficiency and the sufficiency of
members/employees' competencies. For example, the employees responsible for the
relationships with farmers identify early and record changes in farmers' interests and
perceptions. By motivating the employees to self-learn and be confident in
communicating their needs and expertise, the Blauel network hugely benefited from
learning from everyone's experience, and highlighting the best practices. Overall, the
Blauel network enjoys an advanced adaptation mechanism. In the Blauel case, there
were no inconsistent findings concerning the proposal that an SME network is expected
to perform well, if sufficient governance mechanisms.
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In conclusion, the current governance structure of the Blauel network is a product of the
personal charisma of Fritz Blauel himself, enhanced by the training for small
entrepreneurs he had in Switzerland. This governance system is sufficient to compensate
for the negative implications of the initially existing diversity in members profile and
shortage in members/employees' competencies. Particularly, the governance ensures
that the enteiprise enjoys: scale economies; secure, high quality; noticeable flexibility in
dealing with customers' complaints; coordination; good How of information among
departments and between enteiprise and farmers; employees strongly motivated to
contribute, to self-learn, self-improve in their field and communicate effectively their
experience. Furthermore, Blauel Ltd builds trustful long-term relationships with both
farmers and customers; achieves noticeable coordination in the supply chain; identifies
early incompatibilities between network's values/strategies/actions/competencies and
environment challenges; and maintains its functions even under hostile/unexpected
circumstances. So, overall the Blauel network provides strong evidence that all five
governance aspects described in the theoretical hypothesis are crucial for a satisfactory
network performance.
5.7 Summary
This Chapter has presented an overview of findings concerning the historical evolution
of the Blauel network, the contextual factors influencing it, and the present day network
structure and performance. It has also assessed the impact of certain network features,
derived from the literature, on performance.
To summarise, the case represents a high performing network established by Fritz
Blauel, who early recognised the potential of organic olive oil exports. To persuade
farmers to convert to organic fanning and control/guarantee higher quality, Blauel
offered a very supportive five-year contract. Social cohesiveness of some farmer groups
increased the rate of diffusion of innovation. The considerable marketing and
entrepreneurial skills of Blauel led him to seek information in European networks, since
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he noticed a highly defensive attitude amongst actors involved in the Greek olive oil
scene and amongst domestic public agencies. Having faced the typical difficulties of
SME owners/managers, the Blauel couple had training, which led to significant changes
in governance structure improving efficiency. Consequently, the Blauel network
presents almost optimal outcomes in financial performance, organisation credibility,
access to resources and positive change in attitude/ behaviour of both farmers and
employees.
The next Chapter goes on to consider the case of Kefalas organic olive oil. Like Blauel,
this case is of a processed product, but unlike Blauel, the network exhibits apparently
weak market performance.
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Chapter 6: Kefalas Organic Olive Oil - Case Description
and Analysis
6.1 Introduction
Following the presentation of the Blauel case study, the results from the analysis of the
second olive oil case, the Kefalas network, are described and discussed here. Kefalas Ltd
produces, standardises and markets organic olive oil, Kalamata olives and olive paste of
certified organic and P.G.I, quality. These products primarily are distributed abroad (i.e.
UK, Germany, USA). Its own product label is 'Therapni'. Kefalas Ltd is located at
Kefalas village in the Laconia prefecture.
The Kefalas case was selected based on two criteria: it represents a processed product
and apparently weak market performance. According to the theoretical propositions, it
was tentatively expected to find relatively weak network relations, and possibly hostile
contextual conditions. The development trajectory of this case is shorter than Blauel and
linked to it. Therefore it serves as an immediate comparison case. The geographic
location of the case is the same as that of Blauel, depicted in Figure 5.1.
The Chapter begins by laying out the historical evolution of the Kefalas network in four
phases, before examining how contextual factors have impacted on network evolution.
The next section describes the present day Kefalas network structure, making some
observations about its current performance. Finally, the Chapter assesses key network
features and their impact on performance, and summarises the conclusions regarding this
case study.
6.2 Historical Evolution
6.2.1 'Organic Farming is introduced to olive farmers of Kefalas
village'
Until 1995, Kefalas fanners suffered frgm unfair treatment by trade brokers and
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wholesalers buying conventional olive oil in bulk, without a contract to secure constancy
and fairness. Although Kefalas fanners had fumed over this treatment, they avoided
starting a countervailing collective initiative, because of their past negative experiences
of failed fanner cooperatives. In 1995, the Kefalas village president contacted Blauel
Ltd and was persuaded of the benefits of organic fanning and the Blauel bio-program.
Thanks to pre-existing social cohesiveness, trust for in the village president's initiatives
and the intensive support of the Blauel 'bio-program', almost the whole village
gradually converted to organic farming. This participation in the Blauel bio-program
was enhanced further by the EU regulation and subsidy for organic fanning in 1996.
6.2.2 'A fake market opportunity pushed a few farmers to establish
Kefalas Ltd'
In 1999, a trade broker placed an attractive offer for collaboration with Kefalas farmers
under the precondition that they would establish an aggregate corporation. The
foundation of Kefalas Ltd had already been accomplished when the shareholders
discovered that the offer was fake. The village president selected 23 young organic
fanners based on ethos, age and inclination for novelty and cooperation to compose the
critical mass of the Kefalas shareholders. Using his personal network, he collected all
the information to establish the most sustainable form of collective action. He decided to
create a collective enterprise, because this form constitutes a limited enterprise with the
social sensitivity of a cooperative, but without compromising its discipline and
efficiency, as previously happened in fanner cooperatives.
Within a few months, Kefalas Ltd was established. Having abandoned the Blauel bio-
program, and later discovering that the trade broker was a deceiver, the Kefalas
shareholders were left without any option other than selling again under unfavourable
terms to domestic wholesalers in bulk. Consequently, the shareholders were
discouraged, since they held a weak market position, and they had lost the support and
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security of flie Blauel bio-program. Kefalas Ltd became fragile. Simultaneously, like
most Kefalas fanners, the shareholders needed to borrow money to cover their share
required by the EU funding for improving farm infrastructure. Since Kefalas Ltd had a
low return, its 23 shareholders faced problematic cash flow. Their high expectations
from Kefalas Ltd were not met, so they were angry.
6.2.3 'Kefalas Ltd faces hard times - the disillusion'
The collection of information on good practices in organic cultivation, standardisation
processes and marketing was a big effort for the Kefalas shareholders, because local
agriculturists lacked knowledge and competitors refused to share it. From 1999 to 2001,
Kefalas Ltd lacked its own facilities. At that phase, storage facilities were crucial, since
the enterprise had limited control of the 23 fanner-shareholders' produce, stored at their
homes. The trade brokers responded offensively to the foundation of Kefalas Ltd, and
tried to convince the Kefalas shareholders to sell directly to them, rather than via Kefalas
Ltd. Their ultimate goal was to dissolve the collective enterprise, by inducing some of
the farmer-shareholders to dishonour their word for exclusive delivery to Kefalas Ltd, by
offering attractive prices to them individually. This challenged the Kefalas enterprise's
cohesion. The enticed shareholders were isolated and punished by the Kefalas
commanders. Although, they were permitted to keep their shares of the Kefalas
enterprise, they were prohibited to sell again their annual production to Kefalas Ltd, so
they were forced to seek alternative buyers. In this way, the management overcame the
challenge and effectively intra-communicated discipline. Thereafter, three categories of
farmers from Kefalas village related to Kefalas Ltd were formed: (i) a pool offarmers
supplying occasionally Kefalas Ltd when needed; (ii) 18 fanner-shareholders enjoying
full range of benefits of being shareholders e.g. the assured buy of their whole
production at a premium price, better than category one; and (iii) five offender farmer-
shareholders, who lost most benefits except for their shares and right to participate in
the annual general meeting.
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The spectacular increase of the Athens Stock Exchange monopolised the investment
interest of both the customers and shareholders of Kefalas Ltd. As a result, the collective
enterprise struggled to find buyers (e.g. domestic standardising and exporting units) for
its annual production. Simultaneously, its shareholders required cash for investing in
listed companies' shares. The manager of Kefalas Ltd reached a dead-end. He admitted
the difficulties in the general meeting, shocking the shareholders, who stopped
complaining about the inability of Kefalas Ltd to meet their demands on cash and
immediate paying off.
Overall, this was a period of hard but necessary disillusion, since the shareholders
realised that they had excessive enthusiasm and expectations, due to their lack of
knowledge about real market challenges and limited marketing competencies.
Obviously, imitating the Blauel bio-program was not enough for market success. They
had oversimplified the challenges.
6.2.4 'Kefalas Ltd using EU funding builds its own facilities'
Kefalas shareholders preferred to tolerate delays in paying off rather than raising a bank
loan. In this way, the shareholders capitalised the Kefalas venture, which constitutes
evidence for their strong commitment to Kefalas Ltd. In order to break the barrier of
lacking information, particularly on the standardisation process, the management of
Kefalas Ltd asked other experienced enteqmises (packers) to standardise their product
and were physically present to observe carefully the whole process. However, those
packers refused to share this information through discussion, so Kefalas management
learned only by observing. Through foreign exhibitions, Kefalas Ltd expanded its
clientele for"the standardised product under wholesalers' own labels, e.g. Gaia Ltd or an
Israeli importer.
In 2002, using EU funding, Kefalas Ltd built its own storage room and standardisation
unit, and recently an olive oil press unit is near completion. All facilities satisfy high
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organic certification standards. The shareholders' behaviour became regulated by
written rules, as opposed to the verbal agreement existing in the previous two phases.
The village president resigned as Kefalas general manager on a plea of family reasons.
He was replaced by his assistant, who had worked alongside him since the first phase of
the collaboration with Blauel Ltd. The current general manager has an intensive
inclination for networking. For example, he is a member of the foundation team of (i)
the association of SMEs producing agrifood products of certified quality; and (ii) the
public enterprise of 'Local quality agreement for Parnonas area's product and services',
a network facilitated by the Peloponnesus Periphery management agency.
Currently, Kefalas Ltd enjoys strong intra-cooperation and stable trustful relationships
with a supplying pool of Kefalas organic farmers (100) in addition to its shareholders.
As a result, Kefalas Ltd is one of the rare cases of organic olive producers in Greece that
can secure each year both a large quantity (150tn) and high quality of product. Recently,
it also provides high quality services to the downstream actors such as standardisation,
and acts as a local trade broker. This attractive triplet of attributes (secure quantity-
quality-services) has been gradually appreciated by some quality-oriented domestic
downstream actors such as Gaia Ltd. In essence, the latter sees the Kefalas enterprise as
a reliable upstream collaborator ("the tail of key players"), recognising the
aforementioned Kefalas' competitive advantage over private trade brokers. Furthermore,
Gaia Ltd benefited hugely from Kefalas' high innovation diffusion rate, coordination
and proved internal discipline as well as the reduction of transaction costs.
The change in the way some downstream actors perceive the role of Kefalas Ltd, was
followed by a slight change in their behaviour. The recognition of Kefalas' beneficial
role as a reliable supplier justified more openness in sharing information/knowledge (i.e.
about improving quality and minimising costs), enhancing only this role rather than that
of a future competitor. Concerning marketing, Kefalas Ltd exhibits few own marketing
channels established. 90% of its olive oil output is sold in bulk, instead of a standardised
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product (10%) under its own brand ('Therapni') or customer's label. However, its olive
oil reaches markets of USA, Germany, UK and Greece.
Domestically, some well-established brands have monopolised the market thanks to
heavy advertising campaigns, and have made impossible for SMEs to access domestic
multiple retailers. Kefalas Ltd is forced to follow only the marketing channel of
domestic delicatessen shops and faces sharp competition from other domestic SMEs.
Even some examples of illicit competition have occurred.
6.3 Analysis of Factors Influencing Historical Evolution
6.3.1 Introduction
The main issue addressed in this particular section is which contextual factors, derived
from Chapter 3, have influenced the historical evolution of Kefalas network. An overall
observation is that Kefalas farmers entered the organic olive oil market thanks to the
'chance' association with Blauel Ltd, not by discovering it alone. Therefore the Blauel
impact is included in the analysis of many contextual factors. From the literature, three
main categories of contextual factors were proposed to have an effect on network
evolution: market conditions; social cohesiveness and external institutional support. For
Kefalas, many of these seem to play a role. Figure 6.1 summarises the impact of all
factors diagrammatically, most important impacts are depicted with black bars, less
important with white bars58. As can be seen from Figure 6.1, three factors were
identified as particularly important to the Kefalas network evolution: (i) the unfair
treatment of farmers by the downstream actors; (ii) pre-existing social cohesiveness and
communality in interests/perceptions; and (iii) external institutional support. The nature
of these factors and their impacts are detailed in the next sections.
58 For an analysis of the less important contextual factors for the Kefalas case study, see the comment for
the footnote 58 from Chapter 6 in the Appendix 1
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Figure 6.1: Contextual factors Reinforcing and Encumbering the Collective Action or
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6.3.2 Unfair Treatment of Farmers by Downstream Actors
The theoretical proposal from the literature is that the unfair treatment of fragmented
suppliers by concentrated downstream actors may stimulate the former to join resources
into a 'countervailing power' network (Galbraith, 1980). The results of Kefalas study
revealed that this is not always a straightforward process.
In the Kefalas case the lack of a contract securing stability and fairness in transactions
permitted unfair treatment of fanners by the trade brokers and wholesalers of
conventional olive oil. Having fumed over this treatment, Kefalas farmers indeed
considered the option of collectively increasing their bargain power. However, this
thought remained a 'wish', due to their past negative experience of failed farmer
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cooperatives. They did not believe it as a feasible solution, until they experienced the
Blauel bio-program.
Despite the fair treatment, this program, in fact, constituted an intermediated step in the
networking process: the 'school', the model of sustainable collective action. The
involvement in such a well-organised collective scheme slowly changed Kefalas' young
farmers' perception of their capabilities of establishing a similar one. Thereafter, thanks
to the new positive experience in collective initiatives, the existence of a strong leader
and critical mass and strong pre-existing social cohesiveness, the aforementioned 'wish'
was materialised. In conclusion, it is noticeable that the fair treatment on behalf the
downstream actors does not necessarily lead to the termination of networking activity of
fragmented suppliers. In this case, the need for countervailing the power no longer
exists, but other motives such as personal entrepreneurial ambitions can emerge.
Nevertheless, the question of when and how the thought of establishing an 'own
networking initiative' is materialised seems to constantly interplay with the downstream
actors' response. In the Kefalas case, first, a fake market opportunity was decisive, as a
pull factor, in bringing into effect the idea of establishing the Kefalas collective
enterprise. Second, because of personal philosophy to respect farmers' free will, Blauel
did not used his legal right59 to block Kefalas farmers' independence of the Blauel bio-
program. This permitted the unobstructed foundation of Kefalas Ltd and in addition to
Kefalas shareholders, all the rest of the Kefalas fanners gradually abandoned Blauel's
collaboration to supply Kefalas Ltd. Third, the offensive reaction of some trade brokers
and wholesalers, offering enticing prices to violate Kefalas shareholders' verbal
agreement on exclusive supply set a serious internal challenge in the early stages of
Kefalas Ltd. The ultimate goal was to dissolve the Kefalas partnership by proving weak
intra-cohesion. Kefalas shareholders had two options either give in or resist. The Kefalas
management isolated and paradigmatically punished the few offenders, so managed to
39 The Blauel bio-program contract stipulated the five-year exclusive supply to Blauel Ltd.
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effectively communicate discipline and strengthen the shareholders' cohesiveness and
belief of "being capable of making this collective scheme work".
Overall, the downstream actors' unfair treatment indeed stimulated a strong social
discussion for establishing "countervailing power" networks. However, whether
fragmented suppliers will progress in action or not, seems to be a matter of confidence,
dramatically influenced by positive past experience of collective init iatives, existence of
a leader and critical mass, and the degree of pre-existing social cohesiveness. In contrast,
the downstream actors' fair treatment cannot guarantee the termination of networking
activity of fragmented suppliers. Moreover, a model of a sustainable collective scheme
such as the Blauel bio-program can increase the suppliers' confidence and interest in
establishing their own network initiative. Finally, the downstream actors' response to the
suppliers' collective initiatives tends to be offensive, testing the confidence and
commitment of critical mass in the early stages of the collective scheme. This challenge
can either dissolve or credit the suppliers' partnership.
6.3.3 Pre-existing Social Cohesiveness and Communality in
Interests/Perceptions
In Chapter 3 the theoretical proposition stated that the existence of pre-existing social
cohesiveness of network members and communality in interests/perceptions enhances
the emergence and sustainability of SME netoworks, providing that a capable leader
exists (Scott, 1988; Baker, 1995). The Kefalas case provides findings consistent with
this proposal, highlighting social cohesiveness as a decisive factor for the emergence and
sustainability of Kefalas collective action.
Strong social cohesiveness among Kefalas farmers is reflected by the spirit of emulation;
happiness derived from the prosperity of their fellow-villagers; and willingness to
support a collective effort. These strong social bonds played a pivotal role in the Kefalas
network (i) creation, (ii) expansion and (iii) maintenance.
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Regarding network creation, the leader (i.e. the village president) relied on communality
in interests/perceptions, derived from social cohesiveness to select a solid and duteous
critical mass (i.e. the 23 shareholders), resistant to crises. In practice, he secured
communality in interests, by prior evaluation of how compatible the personality and
behaviour of each person was with the philosophy of the particular networking initiative.
He avoided people who focused on individual and short-term benefits; sought effortless
gain; showed indiscipline, suspicion, and lack of disposition. It was the leader's
responsibility to ensure communality in interests, because social cohesivenfess was found
to be more a precondition rather a guarantee for communality in interests; however a
sustainable critical mass seems to need both. Concerning network expansion, both as
participants of the Blauel bio-program and as Kefalas shareholders, the farmers'
acceptance of innovative ideas was accelerated thanks to social cohesiveness, ensuring
economies of scale. Regarding network maintenance, when the Kefalas shareholders
abandoned the Blauel bio-program, they lacked an alternative source of agricultural
guidance for organic farming. Based on strong social bonds, they collectively found and
applied solutions.
Overall, in addition to the leader and the model for sustainable collective action, social
cohesiveness was the connecting ingredient that boosted the confidence of Kefalas
farmers to act collectively.
"At Kefalas village, the spirit ofemulation is strong. Seeing the progress ofour
fellow-villager e.g. farm innovative investments, we try harder to catch him and
become even better. No, we are not trying to drag him down, just to improve
ourselves more. " [Kefalas Shareholder]
"First, because we were young lookingfor a better future...we could take risks.
As personalities, we were more or less a big common group, 90% of us are
friends before we collaborate. Second, we had approximately the same age. At
the village, this means common experiences, the same school class,...I mean the
connection pre-existed. There were not 23 people who met suddenly to
cooperate. Some ofus are also relatives. " [Kefalas Shareholder]
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"An initiative similar to Kefalas Ltd can start when first a vision for the future
exists. Second, some people willing to show trust, blind trust, to those who will
manage their produce. Third, a common vision, I mean people with common
minds, perceptions...also these people need to have a pre-existing inclination
towards cooperation. I mean you need to have already learnt how to coexist and
cooperate, otherwise it is very dijficidt, because ok, simply we all have a
common vision, I mean we all want to see the product sell well and have a profit.
Yes, the common vision to some extent is given. Furthermore, you need to have
learnt how to cooperate, because the path to reach the goal is not the same for
all, for others is a line, for others a zig-zag or a curve. Ifyou cannot have some
compliance, to say "yes, I believe this is the right, but do it in the other way, no
objections", nothing can progress. " [Kefalas Shareholder]
6.3.4 External Institutional Support
According to the literature and theoretical propositions, the external institutional support
is supposed to reinforce the emergence and sustainability of SME netoworks, providing
that it respects SME networks' autonomy and self-management, as well as promotes
their flexibility and efficiency (Ryan et al., 2004). In the Kefalas case, two situations
were observed regarding the factor 'external situation support': (a) complete lack of
support, and (b) existent and beneficial one.
First, the complete lack of support was found to make Kefalas Ltd vulnerable especially
at its early stages. Having abandoned the administrative support offered in the Blauel
bio-program, Kefalas shareholders faced difficulties in completing the bureaucratic
procedures needed for the organic olive oil subsidy application, by themselves.
"At the beginning we had a big shortage of information and knowledge. We
lacked much information on how the custom office operates, about the money
transaction with the banks...It was hard times" [Kefalas Shareholder]
"After a very hard effort, through huge bureaucratic procedure, we managed to
have some European funding for our standardisation equipment. Apart from
that, there is no motivation from the State, None exchange with the public
agencies is clear, flexible to help you to start and have some progress as a
farmer group or individual organic farmer. There is a chaos ofbureaucracy. The
given directions are conflicting. Sometimes, it happens to meet people from
private agencies with some expertise and give you some shortcuts within this
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labyrinth. When you ask information to the public agencies, they give you vague
answers, or send from one to another agency. New regulation are introduced,
but not clearly explained to us. Public agencies need to be more effective and
flexible. " [Kefalas Shareholder]
"From the State, we ask for information guidance, not money. There are lost
European funding opportunities because little is explained. At Kefalas village,
there was some progress only because there were a few capable people, who put
a considerable effort to discover all opportunities by themselves, and on those
we, the rest, have relied on. Regarding the market, we had lack of knowledge,
how the whole system works... that's why we, as farmers, were suffered and
continue to suffer from the unfair treatment by the trade actors. Here, we are in a
privilege position thanks to Kefalas Ltd, which proves the lost opportunities in
other villages. " [Independent Fanner]
Due to lack of training, the employees of public agricultural agencies initially straggled
to apply the EU legal framework causing loss of subsidies for farmers. The village
president, as the manager of Kefalas Ltd, used his personal network to avoid such unfair
treatment. Besides, Kefalas Ltd suffered hugely from the lack of any public source
offering valid information/knowledge of best practices on standardisation, organic
farming' and marketing. As a result, the domestic downstream actors (i.e. standardisation
units, wholesalers, retailers) appeared to "hold back or give out wrong information"
which functioned effectively as a market entry barrier. This highly defensive attitude of
domestic agrifood business actors slowed down the development of Kefalas Ltd,
increasing its vulnerability at the first stages. Since Kefalas shareholders could not find
alternative sources of valid information/knowledge such as European exchange
networks, the lack of external institutional support hugely impacted on them. For
instance, instead of having access to training for standardisation, they wasted time and
resources by simply observing the procedure performed by the experienced
standardising actors. Kefalas Ltd and other agrifood SMEs, including Gaia Ltd
responded to the lack of external institutional support by establishing 'the Association
for Greek Agrifood Products of Certified Quality', in 2004. The aims of this bottom-up
networking initiative are to exert pressure on the government's policy; to communicate
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effectively their problems; and offer external institutional support adjusted to their real
needs (e.g. accurate and prompt information on legislation and funding opportunities).
Second, regarding the existing and beneficial 'external institutional support', the Kefalas
case revealed the considerable benefits of two well-organised and coordinated
initiatives, one top-down (i.e. Parnonas Quality Agreement) and one bottom-up (i.e. the
Blauel bio-program). Regarding the former, the Peloponnesus Management Agency and
a private developmental firm have coordinated as network facilitators, the establishment
of the SME cluster of Parnonas Quality Agreement. In essence, they accelerated the
maturation of the conditions for SMEs' horizontal networking. By being engaged in
guided 'soft actions' i.e. participating in international fairs, organising local conferences
and a campaign for the cluster, Kefalas Ltd was educated on the culture of solidarity,
inter-dependence, and reciprocal help. Despite the lack of direct public funding, the
current Kefalas manager recognised these 'soft actions' as the most efficient way so far
to obtain 'tacit' knowledge in entrepreneurial networking and marketing. Moreover, he
admitted that he successfully applied this 'tacit' knowledge in the bottom-up networking
initiative, described above. Kefalas Ltd is the best supporter among participants, and in
return gains the most expertise in marketing; in promoting the distinctive characteristics
of local territory, and in best practices of inter-firm collaboration. This is why, Kefalas
Ltd is now invited to bear testimony of the benefits to SMEs in other top-down
networking initiatives, organised by the Peloponnesus Management Agency.
By being engaged in the Blauel bio-program, the Kefalas shareholders understood that
since the 'organic' certification postulates by definition the ability of actors to monitor
and certify the quality, they had to maintain higher levels of professionalism, economies
of scale and effective internal communication. Therefore, they closely imitated the
structure of Blauel Ltd (i.e. a limited enterprise, with strong local social sensitivity) and
the character of the Blauel bio-program (i.e. discipline: shareholders' obligation for
exclusive supply, payment according to the quality delivered, supportiveness,
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establishing long term, reciprocal relationships with the pool of 100 collaborating
farmers and the olive processors).
Overall, the lack of external institutional support was found to dramatically increase the
vulnerability of the Kefalas network and to encourage a defensive attitude. It set a
challenge for Kefalas actors to find alternative sources of.valid information/ knowledge
and stimulated the communication between suffering firms to collectively address the
problem. In contrast, external institutional support aiming to both accelerate the
maturation of the conditions for SMEs' horizontal networking, and advance SMEs'
entrepreneurial networking and marketing competencies, was found to benefit hugely
Kefalas' networking and survival capacity. The Kefalas results reveal that external
support via valid information and knowledge of "how to do" both tangible (e.g.
standardisation) and intangible (e.g. build sustainable networks; force quality
improvement; add value; marketing) tasks, appeared to be an essential asset and more
crucial to adding product value than public funding.
6.4. Structure of the Current Kefalas Network
Having presented the impact of contextual factors on the historical evolution of Kefalas,
the Chapter continues by analysing the network's present day structure and performance.
The Kefalas network structure is presented in Figures 6.2, 6.3 and 6.4.
Figure 6.2 illustrates the six-stage supply chain, where the Kefalas enterprise is the focal
point. As it shows, the first stage of the chain comprises of input suppliers to farmers or
standardisation/packaging units. The second stage consists of 123 Kefalas fanners of
organic olive oil, of which 23 are shareholders of the Kefalas enterprise. 100% of output
is certified as PGI and organic by the certification body, DIO Ltd. Flowever, since 2001
five offender shareholders of the 23, keep only their share and right to participate in the
general meeting, losing the right to supply Kefalas Ltd.The third stage includes two
private olive processing units, with which Kefalas Ltd has a close collaboration. At the
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next stage, there is the storage and standardisation of olive oil at facilities of Kefalas Ltd
or of other private enterprises e.g. Gaia Ltd. 90% of Kefalas output is sold in bulk to
other standardisation/wholesaling units, with the most important: Gaia Ltd, absorbing
30% in 2004. Only 10% is bottled at Kefalas' facilities under its own label ('Therapni')
or customers' label. The final stage refers to the distribution of olive oil to retail outlets.
95% of output is distributed by domestic standardisation/wholesaling units or foreign
wholesalers and import agents/brokers to small local retailers or multiple retailers,
abroad or domestically. Kefalas output reaches foreign markets of USA, Germany, UK,
Scandinavia. 5% of output distributed directly to domestic small delicatessen shops.
Figure 6.3 and 6.4 present the network actors external to the supply chain, with which
Kefalas Ltd is highly involved and exchanges knowledge/information. They are,
respectively, the domestic private/public agricultural/developmental agencies; the 'Olive
and olive oil' magazine; the 'Association of Greek Agrifood Products of Certified
Quality'(Figure 6.3); and, the Parnonas SME cluster called the 'Local Quality
Agreement for Parnonas Area's Product and Services' (Figure 6.4). It is noticeable that
all aforementioned external actors are domestic ones.
Overall, the Kefalas network is characterised by a small number of shareholders, and
contrary to expectations, fairly right linkages between farmers. However, it lacks links
with European knowledge/information exchange networks external to the supply chain,
although it has surprising strong links with both the association and Parnonas cluster,
which constitute domestic knowledge/information exchange networks.
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Figure 6.2: Internal Actors of the Supply Chain: The current Kefalas Network
STAGE 1: RAW MATERIAL INPUT
Suppliers to formers Suppliers to processing and bottling units
t STAGE 2: OLIVES PRODUCTION
23 Farmers establishing Kefalas Ltd About 100 formers cooperating with
Kefolas Ltd from Kefalas village
and neighbour villages
STAGE 3: OLIVES PROCESSING
STAGE 4: OLIVE OIL STARDISATION AND PACKAGING
KEFALAS Ltd, for the rest
quantity that it does not sell in







STAGE 5: TRADE INTERMEDLATES' INVOLVEMENT
Wholesalers in abroad (buying
bottles of organic oil and sell it
to local retailers)
Import agents/ Brokers
STAGE 6: RETAILERS' INVOLVEMENT
Small Retailers (e.g. speciality/
delicatessen shops) abroad via
intermediates; while domestically
directly to Kefolas Ltd
Multiple Retailer Chains,
abroad and domestically; Direct
contact with Gaia Ltd
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Figure 6.3: The Present Day Structure of 'Bottom-up' Network Initiatives of
Kefalas Ltd
The Association for Greek Agrifood Products of Certified Quality
TACTICAL MEMBERS (whose 75% ofproduct output is ofcertified quality)
SMEs producing organic
food products e.g





Experts such as scientists -
specialists on agrifood
products of certified quality, the
editor of the magazine 'Olive
and Olive oil'
X
SMEs producing food products, hut
certified as organic/integrated or/and
PDO/PG1 in a smaller percentage
tlian 75% of the total output,
compatible philosophy with the
association's goals ✓
Figure 6.4: The Present Day Structure of 'Top-down' Network Initiatives of
Kefalas Ltd
'Local Quality Agreement far Parnonas Area's Product and Services'
(The Parnonas SALE cluster)
10 Local private processing arid
standardising units of olives and
olive oil and 12 cooperative ones
7 Local municipality
agencies













operating as a network
broker
12 Local lodgings
'Peloponnesus-the Centre for Strategic Planning and
Development' - the local central dispenser of £U/natronal funds
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6.5 Performance of the Kefalas Network
6.5.1 Introduction
The Kefalas case was chosen on the basis of apparently weak performance, based only
on an external judgment. So, the purpose of this section is to undertake a more detailed
internal assessment, seeking to validate whether or not the initial judgement was true.
According to Human and Porvan (1997) two types of network performance outcomes
exist: transformational and transactional. Transactional outcomes refer to the
improvement in financial performance, organisation credibility, and access to resources,
while transformational ones relate to a change towards a more cooperative attitude/
behaviour. In the Kefalas case, less than optimum outcomes were expected, as it was
selected for its apparently weak performance. Surprisingly, this case had the closest to
optimal transformational outcomes, compared to other three cases, but transactional
outcomes were found to be less satisfactory (Figure 6.5).
Figure 6.5: Transactional and Transformational Performance Outcomes of the
Kefalas (K) Case Study
Problematic Semi-satisfactory Optimum
-*■
Transactional Outcomes K ♦
Transformational K ♦
Outcomes
6.5.2 Transactional Outcomes of the Kefalas Enterprise
As Figure 6.5 suggests, the analysis revealed that botli the Kefalas shareholders and the
farmers supplying Kefalas Ltd experienced some positive performance outcomes.
However, since 90% of Kefalas output is sold in bulk, the overall transactional outcomes
are deemed less than satisfactory.
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More specifically, 18 of the Kefalas shareholders enjoyed a range of transactional
benefits: the assured buy of their whole production at a premium price, better than other
fanners supplying Kefalas Ltd; reliable information and administration support on
demand; secure storage; capacity to add value through own standardisation facilities;
and scale economies. Also their credibility to suppliers, customers and public agencies
as Kefalas shareholders, rather than fragmented suppliers, has been increased. For the
remaining five shareholders (the offenders) the benefits are restricted to only retaining
their shares and the right to participate in the annual general meeting.
Finally, the pool of Kefalas farmers supplying Kefalas Ltd enjoys fair payment and a
single transaction contract. Although the Kefalas enterprise buys only the quantity
needed, without an obligation to buy the whole quantity every year, it offers reliable
information and administration support on demand, and economical support (i.e. a
deposit), in_ case of farmers' emergent personal need, as happened for the 18
shareholders. The prosperity of Kefalas village has been increased, thanks to the
existence of Kefalas Ltd.
Nevertheless, despite the Kefalas' own standardisation facilities, 90% of output is sold
in bulk. Kefalas Ltd also struggles to establish its own market channels for its
standardised product, causing loss of profits from adding value. Most agreements with
the downstream actors are verbal, adding a risk of exploitation. Even with Gaia Ltd,
Kefalas has a quite unilateral relationship, facing problems in reciprocity and
communication. Overall, less than satisfactory transactional outcomes reflect weak
market performance, as was expected.
6.5.3 Transformational Outcomes of the Kefalas Enterprise
Contrary to expectations, there was evidence that Kefalas shareholders experienced
considerable transformational outcomes because they belonged to the network. First,
thanks to the existence of Kefalas Ltd, its shareholders jointly bid for large projects, e.g.
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large orders from Gaia Ltd or foreign importers and successful applications for EU
funding for infrastructure. Second, key interviewees emphasised the radical change in
attitude, which the shareholders were forced to make, during the "disillusion" period
(i.e. third phase). Their biggest challenge, intensified by external unfavourable
conditions (e.g. offensive reaction of trade brokers; market difficulties due to the
increase of the Athens Stock Exchange) was to adapt to the requirements of being the
shareholders of a collective enterprise. In other words, the Kefalas farmers were required
to play the role of the wholesaler and owner of a collective standardisation unit as
shareholders. For instance, they had to accept discipline, meritocracy and lack of special
treatment, and focus on long-term collective interests instead of short-term personal
ones. This change in attitude/behaviour was found necessary for the collective action to
be sustainable and effective.
"It has been difficult for us to move from the mentality ofthe farmer towards that
of the Kefalas shareholder, e.g. the trading actor who takes risks, invests, and
has delays in being paid off... We now follow the average market price, trying to
be competitive and secure our sales for the next years, rather than simply selling
the product to the trade broker or olive oil processor and forgetting it after that,
as we used to do. Now, we are in the middle of an effort, a long-term
commitment, ifyou look for only immediate gains and think one-sided, you get
lost. Our goal is to store our product with less cost than that as individuals did,
sell larger product quantities of certified quality to achieve better prices, and
guarantee the availability. My personal goal as the manager is to find at least
two stable marketing channels to' absorb all our produce packaged. " [The
Kefalas General Manager]
"Each year, we become more 'grounded', disillusioned and more professionally
conscious, responsible towards Kefalas Ltd. You see the farmers supplying
Kefalas Ltd become more concerned with the quality of their product, through
the information provided by Kefalas Ltd, for example collect more carefully their
olives, use proper containers for carrying the produce... " [The Kefalas General
Manager]
"We used to arrange eveiything individually and sometimes gain a special
treatment, but now as Kefalas Ltd, we are a group, and those individual
privileges are past. Now all the benefits, as happens with responsibilities and
costs, are shared. I mean all the negotiations are made by the Kefalas
commanders, and the privileges are enjoyed collectively, not individually. Ifyou
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do want to accept this, the collective scheme cannot work. Because the surplus
value has been created collectively, it is a shared, common asset. ...This was
hard to understand at the beginning, but some first results considerably helped.
Here, our word of honour is important, we keep it. Now we see a part of our
dreams to have become true. This encourage us with stronger patience and
tolerance to potential future failures, we have become more open-minded and
involved in more innovative actions. As a group, we also reach a compromise
more easily " [Kefalas Shareholder]
The transformational changes were mainly channelled through the general manager,
with whom the 18 shareholders often meet informally. It is the general manager who
communicates the problems, the need to stay united, and be more market oriented. In
this way, the shareholders improve their tacit knowledge, in decision-making and their
market-orientation attitude is enhanced. Regarding the pool of 100 farmers supplying
Kefalas Ltd, the transformational outcome was that they have comprehended the
importance of producing olive oil of high quality and establishing a trustful bilateral
relationship with Kefalas Ltd. This has been achieved through their personal discussions
with the Kefalas shareholders/manager and the fair treatment by Kefalas Ltd.
Overall therefore, the analysis showed less than satisfactory transactional but almost
optimal transformational outcomes for the Kefalas network. Given the apparently weak
market performance of Kefalas Ltd, the transformational results were not consistent with
expectations. The following sections analyse the features of the Kefalas network seeking
to explain these outcomes.
6.6 Features of the Kefalas Network
6.6.1 Introduction
This section of the Chapter examines the impact of key network features on
performance, guided by the theoretical propositions offered in Chapter 3. All the three
features suggested by the literature are discussed, namely: network members' profile,
their competences, and network governance structure. Figure 6.6 summarises the
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findings, indicating that member profile and network governance structure had generally
positive effects on performance, but members' competences could help to explain
weaker transactional outcomes.
Figure 6.6: Effects of K-ey Network Features on Performance Outcomes
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6.6.2 The Kefalas Network: Member Profile
The first feature of a network that impacts on performance is the members' profile.
According to Milliken and Martins (1996) two profile types are discerned, physical and
attitudinal. The theoretical proposition is that profile diversity impedes performance
outcomes. In fact, the analysis of the network revealed high homogeneity in members'
profile, especially among the shareholders. Particularly, low diversity in both physical
profile (e.g. young age; not having a second job; and large land size) and attitudinal
profile (e.g. professionalism; willingness for investing more; seek innovation and
believe in collective action) was observed. The only evidence for heterogeneity in the
attitudinal profile was the decision of five stakeholders-offenders to dishonour their
word for exclusive supply at the early stages of Kefalas Ltd. However, the
management's resolute response prevented the rest of the shareholders from showing
indiscipline.
These findings were somewhat unexpected and suggest first, that homogeneity in profile
cannot alone guarantee strong performance on transactional outcomes. Low diversity
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only appears to create a potential for optimum transactional and transformational
outcomes. Second, paradigmatically punishing indiscipline within the critical mass may
militate any increase in profile diversity, especially the attipidinal one.
6.6.3 The Kefalas Network: Competences
The second network feature influencing performance is the members' competences,
including skills regarding production, marketing/entrepreneurship and collective
management. If network members are sufficiently qualified according to their
responsibility, then the network is expected to exhibit good performance (Provan and
Kenis, 2008). Given the poor results on transactional performance, the Kefalas network
members were tentatively expected to display some weaknesses in (he aforementioned
competences.
With regards to production skills, the Kefalas farmers have now good knowledge of
organic farming and standardisation competencies, despite their initial serious
difficulties to detect and gain access to sources of expertise. Since they were keen on
investing and adopting innovation, they became pioneers of eco-friendly cultivating
practices; farm infrastructure and compliant to agriculturist's instructions. So, their
overall good production competences secured quality improvement and early application
of innovation.
However, in terms of marketing/entrepreneurial skills the picture was found to be more
complex. Thanks to his considerable entrepreneurial skills and the long involvement in
local public administration as the village president, the Kefalas leader had a strong
personal network, including public agencies and ministries. He used it to collect vital
administrative information and deal with bureaucratic problems regarding (i) organic
subsidy; (ii) establishment of a collective enterprise; and (iii) applying for the EU
funding for infrastructure. For instance, his personal network filled him in on pros and
cons of alternative forms of collective schemes in terms of discipline, sustainability, and
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market efficiency. Therefore, he was able a priori to recognise the benefits of collective
enterprises over cooperatives, and the flexibility advantage offered by a small number of
shareholders. However, the leader's personal network did not provided vital information
regarding market, standardisation, production and marketing, due to lack of links with
domestic and foreign agrifood processing and trade actors. His little reliance on
European networks is also noticeable. Moreover, the leader's marketing competences
were proved almost insufficient to face the market challenges. Consequently, Kefalas
Ltd delayed to collect the aforementioned information; and still struggles to build
bilateral relationships and establish market channels for its own standardised product.
This shortage in marketing/entrepreneurial capabilities has slightly been reduced since
the next general manager, i.e. the current one, has recently being expanding his "tacit"
knowledge gained as the leader's best assistant. This small improvement resulted from
his participation in marketing and networking activities of the Parnonas cluster, referred
to as the "soft actions". Having a substantial contribution in this top-down networking
initiative of the Peloponnesus Periphery Agency, which is the main body for public
funding in Peloponnesus, Kefalas Ltd has managed to gain priority in funding and future
developmental initiatives. The improvement in the Kefalas shareholders' entrepreneurial
mentality is reflected by being receptive in pioneering, more sophisticated marketing
ideas, for instance by capturing the intangible benefits of the 'Local Quality Agreement
for Parnonas Area's Product and Services' (The Parnonas SME cluster). Evidence for
improvement in the Kefalas manager's networking competences was given by his active
involvement in the foundation of 'the Association for Greek Agrifood Products of
Certified Quality'. Through this bottom-up network initiative inspired by the editor of
the "Olive and Olive Oil" magazine, Kefalas Ltd increased dramatically its negotiation
power over the governance's policy for product of certified quality.
Overall, the slight improvement in the Kefalas network members'
marketing/entrepreneurial competences has so far been inadequate for reversing the
weak transactional performance. This happens for a series of reasons. First, there is still
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a shortage in the current manager's marketing skills, revealed through a discussion about
market-orientation and professionalism. He referred to the commitment to the quality
improvement in terms only of the core product, not of the augmented product or of the
relationship with the downstream actors. This might explain some of his difficulty to
build bilateral relationships with the downstream actors. Second, since the current
general manager is the only broker of knowledge/information to the remaining
shareholders, his communication abilities and level of market orientation dramatically
influences the outcome of transformational process in perceptions/behaviours of
shareholders. Third, the downstream actors, even Gaia Ltd, seem reluctant to share their
marketing intelligence with Kefalas Ltd, a potential future competitor. This narrows the
channel of marketing information/knowledge flow. Finally, despite the apparently
satisfactory diffusion of knowledge among the shareholders by the general manager, the
existing marketing/entrepreneurial skills seem to be concentrated within one individual,
simply because the rest of the shareholders do not practice these skills through daily
involvement in decisions/actions. So, it is questionable whether the rest of the
shareholders are prepared enough to undertake management responsibilities, when
elected, in other words have they enough "tacit" knowledge?
Regarding collective-managerial skills, the Kefalas leader exhibited considerable
capabilities, such as evaluating the different collective forms and assessing the
compatibility between the personality of potential members of critical mass and the
philosophy of the particular network initiative. The dissolution of Kefalas Ltd was
avoided during the hard 'disillusion' period, mainly because he proved decisive and
enduring through crises. Most of these skills have been passed to the current manager
(e.g. how to deal with difficult shareholders), but not to the rest of the shareholders. The
current manager gained the 'tacit' knowledge by being the secretive and compliant
assistant of the leader ever since Kefalas fanners joined the Blauel bio-program. The
leader deliberately involved the cunnnt manager from this early stage, and explained
every action, intending to train him to replace the leader, but ensuring that the
philosophy and way of operation of Kefalas Ltd would be preserved. This reflects the
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long-term perspective of the leader and his care for the collective scheme's
sustainability. However, the effort to transfer 'tacit' knowledge to other shareholders
seems not to be continued so deliberately by the current general manager. This
jeopardises the future prosperity of a collective scheme, more than a private firm, since
the management of the collective scheme is periodically elected.
Overall, the Kefalas network exhibits surprisingly considerable collective-management
skills and production competences, which secure quality improvement, early adoption of
innovation, intra-coordination and discipline. In other words, these create a good
potential for satisfactory transactional outcomes. However, key deficiencies in
marketing/entrepreneurial competences (e.g. shortage in marketing intelligence, and lack
of reliance on European networks), and the fact that both marketing/entrepreneurial and
collective-management skills are concentrated amongst few network members, explain
the weak market performance. The negative implications of the shortage in the
marketing/entrepreneurial competences were intensified by the domestic downstream
actors' defensive attitude, limiting the potential for optimum transactional and
transformational outcomes.
6.6.4. The Kefalas Network: Governance
The third network feature influencing performance is network governance. Particularly,
the theoretical proposition is that high power distribution and accountability/formality
may boost good network performance (Johnsen et al, 2008; Milward and Provan, 2006)
Additionally, the existence of sufficient mechanisms for (a) information/knowledge
diffusion; (b) conflict-resolution/trust-building; and (c) monitoring/evaluating/planning,
is likely to enhance the network's satisfactory performance (Grandori and Soda, 1995;
Provan and Kenis, 2008). Given the weak transactional outcomes, some of these
governance features were expected to be lacking.
202
The findings are now presented according to the above sub-factors. Regarding power
distribution, all shareholders have equal votes and opportunities to gain expertise,
regardless the size of the land they own. Besides, the Kefalas network is strengthened by
the impartiality in indiscipline penalty for both the shareholders and collaborating
farmers supplying Kefalas Ltd, even if the latter have no decision power. One
unanticipated finding was that because Kefalas Ltd is a cooperative enterprise, and not a
cooperative, the shareholders seem more disposed to obey the majority's decisions, even
when they belong to those disagreeing. In fact, after the "disillusion" phase they seem to
have learnt to show obedience and acquiescence in the management's power and the
introduction of stricter obligations, justified by market challenges. However, despite the
small number of Kefalas shareholders and their high profile homogeneity, the existence
of cliques and their 'games' of influence also constituted a surprising finding. These
seeds for conflict made both the current manager and president more diplomatic, taking
into consideration the group dynamics and protecting themselves against accusation for
prodigal administration.
Overall, the power distribution in the Kefalas network was found to be balanced,
promoting flexibility in decision-making and discipline, without generating a feeling of
non-democratic leadership. The few examples of opinion sub-groups (cliques) can be
attributed to individualism, a typical characteristic of the Greek mentality. However, the
Kefalas commanders have so far successfully suppressed these behaviours through
diplomacy, incorporating them into a constructive decision-making process.
With regards to accountability, in the Kefalas network it is clear what happens, and is
achieved by whom. This stems from a quality-rewarding system for farmers and
shareholders, and the fair recognition of contribution. It based on the clear distinction
between behaviours that reinforce or encumber optimum transactional and
transformational outcomes, according with which, the network members are rewarded or
punished, morally or materially.
"Ifa farmer brings in olive oil of inferior quality, this is stored separately and
paid with a lower price. The issue is arranged as follows. The Kefalas board of
directors is informed, it informs the farmer and the discussion stops there. On
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these issues, we operate quite autocratically. I mean you need to he autocratic on
some; issues, because ifyou are too open to discussion, you see the tree and lose
the forest. Some issues are not negotiable. There is mot any compromise
regarding the quality. " [Kefalas Administrator]
Consequently, the existing accountability in the Kefalas network secures high quality
and cooperative attitude. In terms of formality, Kefalas Ltd increased its perceived
legitimacy through its established offices, a memorandum of the collective enterprise,
and a contract with strict obligations for the shareholders to exclusively deliver and
produce the best possible quality. Such "tangible proofs" of legitimacy for both internal
and external actors of Kefalas Ltd were indicated by both the managers of Peloponnesus
Agency and Kefalas Ltd, as indispensable for the sustainability of Kefalas network at the
early stage of evolution.
Regarding mechanisms for information diffusion and knowledge transfer, accurate
information was circulated in the Kefalas network through general meetings and
personal discussions with the commanders or other shareholders. The shareholders'
small number and trust explain the effectiveness of these mechanisms. The collaborating
fanners -not shareholders- are informed via personal discussions with the commanders,
but only about production and quality improvement issues, since they do not participate
in the decision-making process. Overall, the conduit of informational flow was found
open both 'within' the Kefalas enterprise and the 'outside' part from the upstream
actors' side, i.e. the collaborating farmers. However, the same seems not to happen from
the 'outside' part from the downstream actors' side, which in practice matters more in
the acquisition of sophisticated market knowledge than the upstream 'outside' conduit
part. Since (i) the domestic downstream actors are not fully open to exchange
information with the commanders of Kefalas Ltd, and (ii) the latter do not rely on the
more open European information/knowledge exchange networks, the potential of
information diffusion 'within' and 'upstream' the Kefalas enterprise remains
unexploited. Practically, the limited information/knowledge that the leaders managed to
collect, was effectively transferred to the rest of the shareholders.
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Regarding knowledge transfer, the effectiveness of general meetings and personal
discussions can be questioned. It is unclear whether the Kefalas shareholders elected in
the future, have obtained the "tacit" knowledge regarding entrepreneurial/marketing and
managerial skills, needed to generate optimum transactional and transformational
outcomes.
Regarding mechanisms for resolving conflicts and trust building, relationships among
the shareholders are informally maintained,-through the peer/clique control and its group
norms. Moreover, the current manager claimed that keeping the balance required the
board of directors to include members of each opinion sub-group of shareholders, and
better the leader of each one. Formally, disagreements are settled at general meetings
where paradigmatic resolution of conflicts usually occurs. Both these mechanisms
proved effective because of the shareholders' small number and the commanders'
collective management skills.
As a result, all shareholders are forced to fully justify their arguments, avoiding vague
blaming, which could cause trust shocks. There is no disinformation of the Kefalas
shareholders, although those assessed (i.e. the president or general manager) coincide
with those providing information needed for assessment. This positive result comes also
from the effective accountability and mechanism for information diffusion 'within'
Kefalas Ltd, described above. Overall, the satisfactory explanation of what decisions
taken, under what speculation and criteria by whom; and of what was the particular
context (e.g. market situation; regulations and trends) appeared to boost the Kefalas
shareholders' gradual transformation from 'simple fanners' to shareholders of a
collective enterprise. It also proved to enhance the appreciation of discipline, and
avoidance of conflict/trust shocks, giving Kefalas Ltd the ability to maintain its
functions even under hostile/unexpected circumstance. Besides, the shareholders' small
number permits the commanders to identify easily changes in shareholders'
interests/perceptions and discuss these openly.
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Finally, regarding mechanisms for monitoring/evaluating/planning, the Kefalas
shareholders leam informally from everyone's experience, and highlight the best
practices. Kefalas Ltd does not follow an ISO or HACCP protocol. However, the
existing mechanism proved inadequate for discovering the shortage in the shareholder's
marketing competences.
To conclude, given the less than (almost) optimal transformational and weak
transactional outcomes, it was surprising to find quite effective mechanisms in Kefalas
network governance, regarding (i) power distribution; (ii) accountability/formality; (iii)
information diffusion; and (iv) conflict resolution. The existing governance of Kefalas
network appeared to reduce gradually the diversity in members' profile and shortage in
competences. Indeed, it proved sufficient to distribute the benefits derived from the
transformation in altitude and behaviour to the great majority of the Kefalas
shareholders. This success may be explained partially by the fact that the Kefalas
governance had followed the principles of the Blauel bio-program such as: existence of a
contract; setting high quality standards; openness and strong support to farmers,
shareholders or not; and communicating the need for market orientation and
professionalism.
However, it is crucial to mention that the Kefalas network governance is effective,
conditional on the shareholders' small number. Indeed, the interviewees admitted no
plans or willingness for future increase in this number, revealing their fears that the
existing governance might fail to deliver the same transformational outcomes in a
network with: (i) larger number of shareholders; (ii) more diverse member profile, (iii)
more democratic structure i.e. a cooperative instead of cooperative enterprise; and (iv)
commanders unable to respond effectively to trust shocks/conflicts. Besides, the existing
governance structure is sufficient to circulate only production knowledge and general
market information, but not to generate "tacit" knowledge regarding marketing and
managerial skills.
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There are several possible explanations for this contradictory finding to the expectations
(the quite effective governance despite the weak transactional outcomes). It may be
argued that when the Kefalas shareholders were the suppliers of Blauel, they had not
experienced the way in which Blauel built trustful, long-term bilateral relationships with
his downstream actors. Also, they did not appreciate Blauel's reliance on European
networks of information/knowledge exchange. Therefore, since Kefalas Ltd relies only
on the defensive domestic downstream actors to acquire market/marketing intelligence,
the problem is the limited amount of information collected, rather than the effectiveness
of governance mechanisms in diffusing this information. In other words, analysis reveals
that Kefalas suboptimum outcomes may be caused more by the shortage in marketing
skills of Kefalas commanders, their inability to comprehend and admit this shortage, and
the defensive attitude of domestic downstream actors, rather than the governance
structure itself. In contrast, it can be argued that the Kefalas network governance has an
unexploited potential to generate favourable outcomes. Findings from this case study
support that the network governance structure cannot be more sophisticated than the
awareness level, the marketing/entrepreneurial skills, and collective-managerial
competences of its commanders/leaders who construct it.
6.7. Summary
This Chapter has presented the findings derived from (lie analysis of the Kefalas
network. Particularly, the network historical evolution, and how it was shaped by
contextual factors has been discussed. In addition, the current Kefalas network structure,
performance and key features have been analysed.
The overall conclusion is that the Kefalas network is a short-standing network,
performing unsatisfactorily mainly in terms of transactional outcomes. Contrary to
expectations, the network was found to enjoy strong inter-firm relations at the farmer
level resulting from strong pre-existing social cohesiveness and prior involvement in the
Blauel bio-program. The unanticipated findings were not limited here, since
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considerable collective-managerial skills and production competences, as well as quite
effective governance mechanisms were discovered. Some findings able to explain the
weak transactional outcomes were the weaknesses in network members' marketing skills
(e.g. difficulty to build bilateral relationships with the downstream actors; reliance only
on domestic defensive networks exchanging information/knowledge) and their inability
to comprehend and admit this shortage. The defensive attitude of domestic agrifood
actors and the lack of institutional support did not help Kefalas Ltd to tackle market
challenges. So, Kefalas Ltd still struggles to establish marketing channels for its own
standardised product, selling 90% of output in bulk. This prevents the Kefalas enterprise
from increasing profit by adding value. The overall impression left by the analysis of the
Kefalas network is that there is an unexploited potential, hampered by the inability of
network members to communicate it effectively to the downstream actors. Having now
presented the results of the two "processed product" cases, the thesis now turns to
presenting results of the "unprocessed product" cases. The next Chapter focuses on the
case study of the Zagora apple cooperative.
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Chapter 7: Zagorin Apples: Case Description and
Analysis
7.1 Introduction
Having presented the results of the two olive oil case studies, this Chapter presents and
analyses the results with respect to the case study of the Zagora apple cooperative
(ZAC).
The ZAC produces and standardises apples. It is a fanner cooperative, established in
1916 at a remote mountainous village in Magnisia prefecture. Within its long history, it
established the well-known premium brand 'Zagorin', leading the market. This case was
selected based on two criteria: unprocessed product and apparently good market
performance in terms of good competitive positioning and strong customer reputation
(Fotopoulos and Krystallis, 2003). So, relatively strong network relations and possibly
benign contextual conditions were tentatively anticipated. .
The Chapter begins with an account of the ZAC's historical evolution, described in 5
phases. An analytical section then explains how some contextual factors influenced this
evolution. A description of the current Zagora network structure follows. Then, some
observations on the current performance of the ZAC are presented. The relation between
the performance and ZAC's features are further analysed. The Chapter closes by
summarising the results of the case.
7.2 Historical Evolution
7.2.1 'Establishment of the Zagora cooperative-from potatoes to
apples' (1916-1964)
In 1915, the first national law for farmer cooperatives was voted. In 1916, 199 farmers
mainly from the poorest Zagora quarter, Perachora, established the farmer cooperative to
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counteract the exploitation from wholesalers. At that time Zagora farmers were
cultivating primarily potatoes and smaller quantities of hazel-nuts, grapes, chestnuts and
apples. Between the World Wars, the cooperative had an economic boom. Moreover, in
1945, it issued a cash receipt voucher for its members. Despite the 5-year Greek civil
war (1945-1949), the cooperative attracted new members, reaching 358 in 1949.
However, the economic and political crisis, following the civil war, resulted in many
Zagora inhabitants moving out to cities or abroad. In 1955, the Potato Blight disease
forced Zagora fanners to switch to apple production60. Both crises rendered the
cooperative almost defunct. In 1963, the government forgave some debts. The
cooperative started almost exclusively to produce apples, so it was informally called
Zagora apple cooperative (ZAC).
7.2.2 'Revitalising the cooperative-the Greek dictatorship' (1964-
1980)
To counteract the wholesalers' exploitation, a communist leader and critical mass, from
Perachora quarter, revitalised the cooperative in 1964. The fanner leading as the ZAC
president, invested in wholesaling activities. Particularly, in 1965, the ZAC bought its
first sale outlet in the Athens wholesaler market, and transport facilities and hired
clerical staff.
From 1967 to 1974, the Greek dictatorship replaced the cooperative board of directors
with farmers having a compatible political ideology; and forced the deregistration of
many communist members. This deteriorated the ZAC, in spite of the new board's
respecting the goals set by its communist predecessor, and successfully attracting funds
to expand infrastructure (i.e. first cooling plant, first sale outlet in Thessalonica
wholesaler market). In 1967, the dictatorship also forgave some debts. But by 1974, the
wholesalers re-exerted power over the Zagora fanners who did not belong to the ZAC,
60 The Zagora farmers cultivated their steep sloping land by hand and converted it to apple groves using
this new red variety, Stalking Delicious, introduced from California, since 1935.
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by making enticing offers in order to make it doubtful, whether being a ZAC member
was more beneficial or not. This rendered the cooperative almost defunct.
7.2.3 'Quality improvement using government funding' (1980s)
In 1981, Greece joined the EC and the socialist party was elected. In 1982, a new law
(1257/1982) for farmer cooperatives boosted funding, but abrogated certain inspection
mechanisms, both internal and external, and permitted political intervention.
A communist leader from Perachora quarter, experienced in wholesaling, was elected
ZAC president (1980-1987). He believed that the ZAC should motivate not only Zagora
farmer groups of left- or right- wing political beliefs, but also apple farmers of the
adjacent villages to join the ZAC in order to achieve scale economies and quality
improvement. So, he made judicious use of funding opportunities for increasing
infrastructure and expanding to standardisation and export activities. Skilful personnel
were hired. The ZAC established a multiple retail store and services of agricultural
insurance and inputs (e.g. fertilises, pesticides and animal feed stuffs) and tourism
facilities. In this way, it controlled prices and advances the service level. In 1991, the
brand 'Zagorin' was officially registered. However, by the end of 1980's, bad weather
conditions gave poor crops. Since a ceiling for apples' price existed in the domestic
market, the ZAC had neither the production volume nor the premium price. So, it
accumulated large debts, because it could not pay off the high instalment for all those
investments made within the 6-7 previous years. Despite debts, the ZAC was an
exceptional case of democracy, transparency and equity, compared to most domestic
farmer cooperatives related to scandals.
7.2.4 'Dramatic market changes-internal network tensions' (1990s)
In 1992, the Greek government pursued free-market policies -imports and retailer
concentration (as described in Chapter 2) - which increased the ZAC's market
challenges. In 1993, right-wing farmers' groups joined the ZAC, reaching 750 members,
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98% of Zagora farmers. However, sub-groups primarily based on political and personal
differences, cliques, gradually emerged and prevailed.
To keep informed on the best novel practices in apple production, standardisation and
marketing, the ZAC general manager participated in EUROFRU, a European network
for promoting the apple consumption, from 1992 to 1996. As part of this participation,
the ZAC collected statistical data of quantities and qualities produced in Greece and
exchanged with relative data from Europe. It successfully organised annual apple
festivals at Zagora village (1992-1996), and the first European conference for apple
production in Greece (22o PROGNOSFRUIT Conference) in 1997.
All information exchanged through EUROFRU, constituted a fundamental step in the
design of the ZAC's marketing and sale strategy. Particularly, the ZAC manager
inspired and first applied in the domestic market: a) the P.D.O. certification (EEC
2081/92) and b) the affixing of the 'Zagorin' label on each apple. The latter constituted a
revolution, since 'Zagorin' apples were more effectively advertised on TV, using
EUROFRU's funding.
Consequently, the 'Zagorin' brand became the first differentiated and well-recognised
brand of fresh fruits by domestic end consumers, who expressed willingness to pay a
premium price for its advanced quality. This obliged even the powerful multiple retailers
to have the ZAC's product on their shelves. By controlling the largest quantity of the
domestic apple production (5%), the ZAC has become the market leader.
Despite its considerable market success, the ZAC faced internal problems. In 1996, an
expensive storage facility collapsed due to poor quality. Moreover, many ZAC members
were dissatisfied with high costs of the apple festivals. Since in both cases relatives of
the ZAC manager and president were involved, they were accused of nepotism. This
triggered a series of leadership battles among cliques and intra-cooperative tensions. In
1997, a new board of directors stopped the apple festivals, exports and participation in
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EUROFRU, also proposed the ZAC to exclusively collaborate with only one wholesaler
in Athens. The rest of the Athenian wholesalers reacted causing controversy among the
ZAC members. Finally, the general meeting discarded the proposal. This was the biggest
intra-cooperative tension, which motivated less than 10 members to deregister and
establish a private apple standardisation unit at Zagora.
7.2.5 'External pressures and internal difficulties' (2000-present)
Since 2000, the ZAC cooperative has faced two serious external problems: the pigmy-
fruit disease and 'misselling' of Zagorin branded apples by wholesalers or small
retailers. The former combined with bad weather conditions during 2000-2004 gave a
very poor crop in terms of quality and quantity. So, the ZAC was forced to break long
term collaboration with some customers, due to inability to cover the demand, which in
turn, stimulated the increase of Italian apple brands. The 'misselling' refers to the
phenomenon where some wholesalers or small retailers sell multiple quantities produced
in other places as 'Zagorin apples' under fake labels. Since 2001 when Pouri and
Macrirachi, the two adjacent villages of Zagora, officially were incorporated into the
Zagora municipality, this kind of illicit market competition has sharpened. Particularly,
the offenders mislead the trade inspectors by using invoices for buying smaller
quant ities from farmers of Pouri or Macrirachi, so typically they have the right to use the
'Zagora' name of origin. The stimulus is that end consumers cannot distinguish the
Zagora origin from the 'Zagorin' brand.
Both the aforementioned problems made the ZAC's leading market position vulnerable,
so some deficiencies in production and governance have been revealed. First, in order
for the ZAC to reach competitive production costs and increase further quality, its
production system needs re-structuring. Second, some intra-cooperative inflexibility in
decision making and application came into sight, which makes the need for changes in
governance vital.
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The ZAC's leadership has spearheaded production and marketing initiatives to deal with
these. Since 2004, the ZAC has participated in a pilot program of integrated low input
agriculture, organised by the Greek General Secretariat for Research and Technology.
This program is a system of agricultural techniques promoting sustainable development
based on European practices. Initially, a minority of ZAC members responded
positively. Since December 2005, an agreement between the ZAC and the leading
multiple retailer offers a better price to farmers following integrated farming and
promotes more effectively these products to final consumers. This resulted in 70% of
members' conversion to integrated farming in 2006. Regarding production re¬
structuring, the ZAC's leadership, in collaboration with the Magnesia Prefecture,
organised an educational trip to Bolzano, Italy. There, despite the steep slopes and heavy
winters, modern cultivating and irrigating systems are applied successfully, giving
Italian brands a cost advantage over 'Zagorin' apples. A video presentation from this trip
worked as a 'catalyst' for the ZAC leadership to communicate more effectively the
feasibility and significance of structural changes in cultivating and irrigating systems.
This resulted in a few ZAC members' participation in a pilot production re-structuring
program under the guidance of Thessaly University.
However, the governance deficiencies remain unresolved. A bulk of the ZAC
membership (450-500 of 750 members) remains alienated following the internal crises
of 1990s. The intense abstention, especially of the youngest farmers, manifests their
decreasing interest, commitment, trust and confidence in their own decision-making
capacity. Besides, the ZAC's internal communication mechanisms i.e. general meetings
and personal discussions with the commanders are poor. Despite commercial success,
both these governance deficiencies risk the ZAC's future development.
Since 2004, the ZAC general manager has shifted his networking interest from the
European to the domestic apple scene, aiming to strengthen further the ZAC's position
in the domestic sector and market. Particularly, in 2004, he became involved in an
initiative of the Management Agency of the Thessalia periphery, promoting the
214
horizontal collaboration between the ZAC and two other Greek apple cooperatives, one
at Agia area, in Thessalia and one in northern Greece. This initiative failed due to
differences in market-orientation attitudes and governance of the cooperatives. In 2005,
the ZAC general manager together with private actors, established the 'Association of
Greek Packers of Fresh Fruits and Vegetables' (SSEFF), which successfully exerts
influence to the state and promotes the sector. Also, since 2004, the ZAC has
participated in the biggest European trade fair, FRUIT LOGISTICA in Berlin, based on
support of the Hellenic Foreign Trade Board.
7.3 Analysis of Factors Influencing Historical Evolution
7.3.1 Introduction
This section considers the key factors influencing the Zagora network evolution over
time, drawing from the factors identified from literature in Chapter 3, namely: market
conditions, social cohesiveness and external institutional support. For Zagora, analysis
indicates many of these seem to play a role. Figure 7.1 summarises the impact of all
factors on the Zagora network evolution diagrammatically; most important impacts are
depicted with black bars, less important with white bars6'. As Figure 7.1 indicates, three
factors were found to be particularly important to the Zagora network evolution: (i) the
unfair treatment of fanners by the downstream actors, (ii) the pressure of substitutes and
(iii) social cohesiveness. The next sections describe and explain the impacts of these
factors.
7.3.2 Unfair Treatment of Farmers by Downstream Actors
According to the literature, if downstream actors in a supply chain are relatively
concentrated and treat fragmented suppliers unfairly, then the development of
61 For an analysis of the less important contextual factors for the Zagorin case study, see the comment for
the footnote 61 from Chapter 7 in the Appendix I
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Figure 7.1: Contextual factors Reinforcing and Encumbering the Collective Action
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'countervailing power' networks from the suppliers is stimulated (Grandori and Soda,
1995). Additionally, the existence of imitations, which misuse the origin or brand name,
may constitute a strong incentive for local SMEs to join resources in order to 'take
ownership' of the brand (Barjolle et al., 1999). For Zagora findings are consistent with
both theoretical propositions. The first proposition is evaluated from evidence collected
before 1992. Then, the most powerful link in the supply chain of fresh fruits and
vegetables was the wholesalers, frequently exploiting farmers and small retailers. The
Zagora farmers could not tolerate it, so they established the cooperative in 1916 and later
they re-vitalised it in 1964 and 1980 for the same reason. Moreover, the wholesalers
reacted offensively by offering enticing prices, in periods when the ZAC malfunctioned
in order to sabotage ZAC membership, as happened in 1974. The second proposition is
evaluated from evidence collected after 1992. Then, the wholesalers were skipped by the
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powerful multiples. Also, open-merchants and local small-retail shops dramatically lost
market share. As a result, some wholesalers or small retailers reacted by misusing the
Zagora origin and the 'Zagorin' brand. The ZAC has considerable difficulties in facing
this economic crime, especially after 2001 when Pouri and Macrirachi, the two adjusted
villages were officially incorporated into the Zagora municipality, as described in
section 7.2.5.
A proposed solution currently, is to change the ZAC's memorandum in order to permit
the membership of fanners of the aforementioned adjusted villages. The second leader
proposed it in early 1980s without success, aiming to increase the scale economies.
However, recently the ZAC members are forced to reconsider this possibility, and put
aside any prejudices against other villages derived from lack of existing social bonds. In
other words, findings support the second proposition, since a strong incentive is created
for the ZAC members to join resources with apple farmers of Pouri and Macrirachi
villages in order to 'preserve the ownership' of 'Zagorin' brand. In conclusion, the
unfair treatment of Zagora fanners by downstream actors substantially influenced the
historical evolution of the ZAC.
7.3.3 Pressure of Brand Substitutes
Following the literature, the pressure of well-differentiated brand substitutes might
increase the sustainability of existing collective action of SMEs, because they realise the
'strength of unity' (Barjolle and Sylvander, 1999; Sylvander et al., 2000). In the Zagora
case, supportive evidence was found. Since 1992, free-market policies resulted in
changes in market structure. First, the multiple retailers became the most powerful link.
Second, both the wholesalers and multiple retailers found a cheap substitute of 'Zagorin'
apples, the Italian brands. Gradually, the domestic market has surplus in apples since
both imports and domestic production increased. Consequently, the 'Zagorin' brand
seems to reach the ceiling of the affordable price for domestic consumers, since the
Italians brands have equivalent quality but lower price than 'Zagorin' brand. Such
market pressure, first, strengthened ZAC members' existing social bonds, by convincing
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them 'in order to survive, we must stay united'. Second, it made the ZAC commanders
realise that production re-structuring is vital for cost reduction. Furthermore, the
research added a further refinement, specifically identifying the importance of the
pressure of imitations misusing the Zagora origin and Zagorin brand name. It was found
to force the ZAC members to reconsider their decision of denying the adjacent villages
farmers the right to be cooperative members, and overcome their prejudices due to the
lack of existing social bonds. The scope for this expansion was to 'secure the brand
ownership' by restricting access of the domestic imitators to supplies of Zagorin apples
from the adjacent villages' fanners.
The Zagora case illustrates how the pressure of well-differentiated substitutes can
reinforce any existing network bonds, while the pressure of imitations can expand these
bonds by forcing actors to overcome prejudices towards other potential members due to
the lack of existing social bonds.
7.3.4 Social Cohesiveness amongst Producers
If socio-cultural bonds between network members pre-exist and are expressed through
communality in interests and perceptions, then the likelihood of strong, durable network
ties is high (Scott, 1988; Baker, 1995). For Zagora, strong social cohesiveness has
always been evident among different farmer sub-groups. Before the Greek civil war
(1945-1949), the distinction of these sub-groups was based on wealth (wealthy vs. poor
farmers), while afterwards, it was on political beliefs.
Regarding the impact of social cohesiveness on network evolution, before the civil war,
the poor farmers recognised the cooperative and generally collective action as the only
means to face difficulties e.g. unfair treatment of wholesalers, economic crises of World
Wars.
"1 told you Zagora was the only village which captured early the meaning of the
cooperative idea...Zagora farmers had and still have a vision for their village.
They see that through the collaboration they could cope the difficult situations.
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There were leaders capable of motivating the mass. The people obeyed, saw
what was the right, followed, believed in the collective action. " [Farmer- ZAC
member]
However, after the political disunion of the Greek civil war, social cohesiveness
narrowed to smaller fanner groups and became expressed through communality in
political beliefs. Collective action was considered as a typical communist behaviour.
Therefore, the disposition to collective action was found in descending order of strength
in communists, socialists and right-wing farmers. This is reflected in the order these
groups decided to join the ZAC: first communists (1964-1980), then socialists (1982-
1989) and last right-wing Zagora fanners (1992-1993). However, the incorporation of
each additional group weakened the intra-coop social cohesiveness, since cliques
emerged. The cliques have preserved the link between political beliefs and stronger
social bonds. So, the ZAC became vulnerable to crises.
This contrasts markedly with the fact the ZAC avoided the market failure in spite of the
political intervention in farmer cooperatives through cliques, as was the case for the
overwhelming majority of Greek farmer cooperatives. The interviewees explained this
paradox by relating it to the social cohesiveness. Particularly, after the numerous
incidences that Zagora farmers survived thanks to the cooperative, it is now recorded in
the collective memory of ZAC members that their personal economic interest is tightly
linked to the ZAC's profitability. Therefore, they realised what serves the ZAC's
profitability best is more important than their political differences. Consequently,
although cliques' cohesiveness is based on political beliefs, they will not remain in
power unless they justify their contribution to the ZAC's economic growth. This is
illustrated in the following quotation:
"Within the ZAC, political parties have less influence, because our "pocket" is
common...all together wefight for the "pocket" ... (what happens) mainly at the
Zagora, although I belong in the far-left wingers, both the right and centre
wingers votedfor me... a person is what (Zagora farmers) are lookingfor here, a
person who chases the problems, they follow their "pocket", nothing else ....
Even if they had voted for you or you belong in the same party, ifyou do not
make a proper job, they will keenly criticise you in the general meeting, they
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forgive nothing, they themselves will "eat" you." [Zagora Administrator -the
second leader (1980)]
The Zagora case illustrates that social cohesiveness is an indispensable feature of the
evolution of the network.
7.4 Structure of the Current Zagora Network
Having discussed how the contextual factors stimulated the development of collective
action and networking activity in the Zagora case, the Chapter continues by describing
the present day network, in terms of structure and performance. Then, features of the
network are analysed, drawing from literature presented in Chapter 3. Finally, the impact
of these features on performance is discussed. As the Zagora case was selected on the
basis of apparently strong performance, it is expected to validate good performance and
find strong horizontal cooperation.
7.4.1 Zagora Network Structure
The Zagora network structure is presented in Figures 7.2 and 7.3. Figure 7.2 illustrates
the five-stage supply chain of internal actors, where the ZAC is the focal point. Figure
7.3 depicts the network relationships with actors external to the supply chian.
As Figure 7.2 shows, the first stage of the network consists of input suppliers to farmers
(i.e. suppliers of fertilisers and pest control equipment) or standardisation/packaging
units (i.e. suppliers of standardising machinery or packaging materials). The next stage
includes 750 Zagora apple fanners supplying the ZAC, divided into 650 farmers
following conventional apple farming and 100 following integrated farming. 70% of
output is certified as integrated low input product. Among the ZAC members, cliques
exist. Approximately 10 Zagora farmers used to be ZAC members of the cooperative,
but deregistered and established a private apple standardisation unit at Zagora village. At
the third stage, standardisation units are found. The ZAC grades and stores apples in its
own facilities: the standardisation, packaging and storage plant. 100% of its apple output
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is labelled with 'Zagorin' brand. The final two stages present the apple distribution to
retail outlets. 55% of output is distributed by domestic wholesalers and 10% by the 4
outlets of the ZAC's in the wholesaler markets of fresh fruits/vegetables to small local
retailers and open-market merchants. 35% of output distributed directly to multiple
retailer chains. In the past, the ZAC occasionally exported to Portugal, Israel, Holland
and Albania via import agents.
As Figure 7.3 shows, the main external actors to the Zagorin supply chain are: other
cooperatives in Greece/Europe; domestic private or public agricultural/developmental
agencies; the 'Fruit News' magazine; the Association of Greek packers for fresh
fruits/vegetables; as well as actors of European apple trade and production networks.
Overall, the ZAC compared to other domestic farmer cooperatives is a unique and
remarkable case, since it has a large number of members and strong links with external
actors. Especially, the ZAC is focused on European networks, from whom it picked up
cutting edge techniques and methods and employ them in its own networks.
7.5 Performance of Zagora Network
7.5.1 Introduction
The Zagora case was selected on the basis of apparently strong performance. However,
this judgment was based only on an external evaluation. So, this section aims to
undertake a more detailed internal assessment, seeking to validate whether the external
appraisal is true or not.
Human and Provan (1997) proved empirically that SME networks have both
transactional and transformational outcomes. The former refers to the improvement in
financial performance, organisation credibility and access to resources. Transformational
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Figure 7.2: Internal Actors of the Supply Chain of Zagorin Apples
STAGE 1: RAW MATERIAL INPUT
Suppliers to farmers Suppliers to standardisation and packaging units
STAGE 2: APPLES PRODUCTION
ZAGORA APPLE
COOPERATIVE MEMBERS
* 650 Apple Farmers/members of
ihe cooperative following
conventional production method
(within the wider area of Zagora
municipality)
* 100 Apple Farmers'members of
ilk' cooperative follow in« integrated
production management method
(within the wider area of Zagora
municipality)
NOT MEMBERS OF THIS
COOPERATIVE
* Same Apple Farmers following
conventional production nvthud (Come
from Pouri and Macrirachi, the two adjacent
villages of Zagora. officially incorporated to
Zagora municipality since 2001)
* A small group of Apple Farmers
following conventional production method
(within the Zagora village: they used to be
members of the ZAC. but deregistered and
established a private apple standardisation
unit at Zagorai
STAGE 3: APPLES STANDARDISATION AND PACKAGING
1 COOPERATIVE: Zagora Apple Cooperative (ZAC)
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facilities: apple standardisation, packaging and storage; wholesaling outlets:
transportation means: a multiple retailer outlet and a bar/restaurant at Zagora
STAGE 4: TRADE INTERMEDIATES' INVOLVEMENT
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Wholesalers from remote places e.g islands
STAGE5: RETAILERS' INVOLVEMENT
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7 Domestic Multiple Retailer Chains:
Direct contact without intermediates
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Figure 7.3: Networks of the ZAC with External Actors of the Supply Chain of
Zagorin Apples
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outcomes refer to a change of members' attitude towards a more cooperative behaviour,
because they appreciate the network benefits and have a greater input. In the ZAC, both
types of outcomes were expected to be found, since the ZAC was selected as a classic
'successful performance story'. Figure 7.4 summarises the performance outcomes found
in practice and the following sections give the details.
7.5.2 Transactional Outcomes of the Zagora Network
All ZAC members enjoy secure access to standardisation and marketing facilities and
secure premium payment. Reliable information and agricultural guidance is offered on
demand. Since the ZAC has achieved stable scale economies, its viability and credibility
towards large suppliers and customers, as well as public agencies e.g. universities,
public agricultural or administrative agencies, have been considerably increased.
"if the ZAC did not exist, quality ofapples in Greece would not he so high... The
ZAC is the most organised cooperative in Greece today, that's why it manages to
control the quality... the cooperative has the same behaviour to multiple retailers
and wholesalers, it collaborates in the proper way... because Zagorin apples is a
premium brand and expensive, not everyone "touches" these apples. Besides,
since the ZAC has long-term relationships with its customers, it knows them very
well ...indeed it has the best customers in the whole Greece. The ZAC leads the
market, is the only one who has a fixed price, according to which all others set
lower prices. So, if the ZAC starts with a relatively low price, the others have
problems, because more customers turn to Zagorin " [Wholesaler]
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Besides, the contribution of the ZAC to the prosperity of Zagora village is fundamental.
It keeps young people in the village and farming, advances the quality of local services
e.g. multiple retailer store or tourism facilities. It controls the local prices for inputs,
products or services that the ZAC offers. As indicated in Figure 7.3, it occasionally
sponsors local associations women agri-tourism cooperative; farmer association; sport-
cultural club. It made the name of Zagora well-known.
Overall, transactional outcomes of the ZAC are optimum, reflecting its good economic
performance as was expected.
7.5.3 Transformational Outcomes of the Zagora Apple Cooperative
The ZAC members jointly produce and market their product; bid large projects; discover
funding opportunities and obtain infrastructure. They jointly own a premium brand
'Zagorin', which is highly recognised and differentiated by both the downstream actors
and final consumers in the domestic market, in terms of quality, brand, origin and
marketing promotions. However, since only 250 of the 750 members are involved in the
decision-making process, especially the elder ones, very few members increase their
tacit knowledge of the actual market conditions and the cooperative management and
improve their MO attitude. This phenomenon jeopardises the sustainability of the ZAC,
since it decreases the number of members who are satisfactorily qualified for managing
the cooperative. Overall, the transformational outcomes, in terms of the way the ZAC
members perceive and actively participate in the ZAC decision-making process, are
significantly less than the optimum.
"The external environment to the ZAC, the suppliers, the customers, I would say
we control it enough well. The internal one is difficult, more complex and
complicated. We have a large number ofmembers, 750, with conflicting interests
sometimes. The ZAC is the economic pillar of region, because it circulates the
money, offers jobs. But sometimes this causes conflicts, and political or personal
interests may be involved. " [ The ZAC general manager]
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In conclusion, since the ZAC was selected as a classic 'successful performance story',
both transactional and transformational outcomes were expected to be optimum. It was
surprising that only the former met these expectations. The next section attempts to
explain how certain features of the ZAC were conducive to favourable transactional or
transformational favourable outcomes of observed performance.
7.6 Features of the Zagora Network
7.6.1 Introduction
This section considers the key features of the Zagora network that impact on its
performance, drawing from Chapter 3. Briefly, these are: (i) the profile and (ii) the
competencies of the ZAC's members, as well as (iii) the network governance. Figure 7.5
shows the effect of these network features has been to reinforce or strengthen the
network performance. The next sections explain the three features of the ZAC.
Figure 7.5: Effects of Zagora network Features on Performance
Encumbering Nsutml Reinforcing
A ►
NETWORK RELATIONS (The ZAC)
Diversity inthe ZAC members' profile
and employees
Governance of tlie ZAC
7.6.2 Zagora Network Member Profile
The first feature of the network that impacts on performance is the profile of the
network's members. According to Milliken and Martins (1996), two types of network
members' profile exist: physical and attitudinal. The fonner refers to some 'observed'
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attributes such as age, land size, having a.second job, whereas the latter denotes 'less
visible or underlying' attributes, for example perspective, goals, reluctance to change.
The theoretical proposition states that diversity in either physical or attitudina! profile
impedes performance outcomes of a network (Milliken and Martins, 1996). Since in the
Zagora network performance only transactional outcomes were found optimum, some
heterogeneity in members profile was expected.
In fact, Zagora case exhibited a basic level of homogeneity in the attitudinal members'
profile, since all members believed the ZAC as an entity is beneficial and expressed a
willingness to remain members obeying its rules. This basic level of homogeneity
explains why the ZAC reaches satisfactory scale economies and high product/services
quality, which results in good transactional outcomes.
However, the Zagora case exhibited a notable heterogeneity not only in the physical
profile of farmers (i.e. age, land size and having a second job), but also the attitudinal
profile, beyond the basic attitudinal features described above. Particularly, the ZAC
members appeared to differ in professionalism, political beliefs and time-perspective of
goals. So, overall the Zagora member profile was considered as a case of high
heterogeneity, which resulted in strong diversity in members' commitment and
determination to enhance ZAC's sustainability. This diversity was reflected in the low
number of participants in the decision-making process and in the questionable motives
of conflicting cliques.
Moreover, the heterogeneity in ZAC members' profile decreased intra-cooperative
social-integration and increased coordination costs. This impact is intensified due to the
large number of ZAC members. So, this heterogeneity helps to explain why the
perception and behaviour transformation of members is not optimum.
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7.6.2 Zagora Network Competencies
The second feature of a network that impacts on performance is the members'
competencies. The theoretical preposition is that network members should have a range
of skills at a sufficient level according to their responsibilities, in order for a SME
network to perform well (Provan and Kenis, 2008). Three types of skills are mainly
required: production expertise, marketing/entrepreneurial skills and collective-
management capabilities. So, since in the ZAC's performance, only transactional
outcomes were found optimum, some of the aforementioned skills were expected to
exist at an insufficient level.
First, regarding the production skills, it was found that both ZAC farmers and
agriculturists have good knowledge of traditional cultivating systems. Besides, the
cooperative has satisfactory standardisation competencies. However, ZAC fanners
ignore modern cultivating and irritating systems, by which they could reduce the cost.
Moreover, their attitude to overestimate their expertise and ignoring agriculturists'
instructions hampers production re-structuring.
Second, regarding the marketing/entrepreneurial skills, the current general manager and
the second leader were found to have considerable empirical competencies. For instance,
thanks to his natural marketing/entrepreneurial instinct, the general manager has
detected successfully the European market tendencies before these become observed in
the domestic market62. However, these skills are only based on experience and
concentrated within the aforementioned two individuals. For example, the second leader
had a wide network horizon, since he had interacted with the downstream actors and
travelled in Bolzano area, whereas the great majority of ZAC members cannot fully
capture the intangible benefits of 'weak ties'.
62 The ZAC manager proposed affixing the Zagorin label on each apple; advertisement on TV; P.D.O.
certification and integrated farming. Besides, during the 90 years of its presence, the ZAC also first
adopted and applied, compared to its competitors: wholesaling; standardisation; emphasis on quality of the
product and relationship with downstream actors.
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Third, regarding the collective-managerial capabilities, the interviewees indicated that
only the two leaders (presidents in 1964 and 1980) had considerable skills, such as
detecting possible pitfalls; thinking critically and in abstract terms; communicating and
persuading; synthesising; coordinating and tackling indiscipline. These two leaders
convinced the critical mass for their honest intentions, by committing themselves to
carry the collective goal into effect and by promoting intra-cooperative transparency,
dialogue and synergy.
"(The president and another person leading in 1963) were more active persons,
had progressive ideas about Zagora village. They had a bigger co-operative idea
than us, the youngest, so they guided us ... they were unschooled like us...but
they convinced us that this exploitation cannot be tolerated any more...we ought
to revitalise the cooperative..." [Zagora Administrator -the second leader
(1980)]
"All elected in the board of directors should offer unsalaried sendees because
the position ofcouncillor is honorary, all ought to understand this! Now they say
me that those times when one worked for free had passed. For me this is an error
... For example, when I was first elected president, I gathered the cooperative
employees and said: "1 will work for free, as hard I will work, I want you who get
paid to work, in order the cooperative to succeed". And we achieved this, we
believe in it. " [Zagora Administrator -the second leader (1980)]
"As a president, Ifound very helpful discussions with small groups, 20-30 people
here at the office, before going to the general meeting where the decisions are
taken. The cooperative council informed them about the situation, the proposals
and discussed, so it was aware of their reaction. From everyone you can gain
something, to add it in your mind. Because the general meetings are too
crowded, so it is better to inform previously the members. Besides, they say to
you some useful opinions, so you can correct possible mistakes in your proposal
before announcing it in the general meeting. Many opinion leads to the right
decision. " [Zagora Administrator-the second leader (1980)]
However, except for the two leaders, the rest of presidents and the general manager
appeared to "have insufficient collective-managerial skills. In particular, they found it
hard to understand how some cooperative principles (e.g. transparency; equity;
justifiability; democracy) can be preserved and effectively communicated by
establishing the appropriate governance mechanisms. So, presidents with low leadership
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abilities were related with phenomena of lack of meritocracy, impartiality and
transparency or simply of inability to act/have a strategy.
The existing competencies of production; marketing/entrepreneurship and collective
management were found sufficient to optimise the ZAC's transactional outcomes. By
participating in EUROFRU, the ZAC manager captured most European market
tendencies, before observed in the domestic market. This antecedence gave him time to
convince ZAC members about the pioneering ideas. So, by the time of their
implementation, the ZAC remained ahead from the rest Greek agrifood businesses,
which did not benefit from the knowledge diffusion in European networks. This
antecedence was combined with the professionalism and scale economies achieved
thanks to the existing competencies of production and collective management. As a
result, the ZAC has the leading market position, with considerable price difference from
the second competitor.
Inversely, the fact that the great majority of ZAC members have a shortage of
competencies of modern production; marketing/entrepreneurship and collective
management explains why transformational outcomes are not optimum. The lack of
modern production competencies has recently threatened the ZAC's leading position, by
creating a production cost disadvantage and barriers to further product quality
improvement. The shortage of marketing/entrepreneurial competencies and collective
management skills of ZAC members caused two problems. On one hand, the general
manager faces great difficulties to impact his knowledge to each board elected every
four years. On the other hand, having a 'plasmatic' picture about ZAC's competencies
and challenges, the members exert pressure to maximise short-term and tangible benefits
(e.g. price, less risk), although such a policy could be detrimental from a long-term
perspective. After a period of adjustment, each board becomes less receptive to novel
ideas, since they overestimate their expertise to assess accurately these ideas' utility and
ignore the continual change in markets. In brief, the ZAC suffers from decision-making
inflexibility, especially regarding structural changes, attitude inertia and conflicting
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perspectives of cliques. As the market competition pressure becomes sharper, the
shortage of ZAC members' competencies appears more obvious.
"The prosperity and the rise of the ZAC, the reputation ofZagorin label and the
recognition of value of product have also created a plasmatic picture to the
members and in turn requirements from the enterprise that certain times exceed
its possibilities. Considering as datum that they produce a very good andfamous
product, even the careless producers require from the organisation to give them
a price which certain times can except the market price range. Ok, as good as
you are a price ceiling exists, you cannot ask whatever you want from the
market... Besides the Cooperative tends to become an establishment, something
conquered for its members, therefore we can potentially strike more easily and
often " [The ZAC general manager]
"for the integrated farming...the members reaction was: "What we need these
things now, you make us quill-drivers". The discipline of producer is very
difficult when he does not understand the directness of result, "How much I am
going to gain from this? Will you give me 20 cents more?" But you cannot
guarantee this to him. " [The ZAC general manager]
"No complains from the ZAC, but the problem is the change of the board of
directors every four years, you start-each time from the beginning, until we know
each other and they calm down...because you deal with farmers lacking trade
knowledge. It is a waste of time until they understand how markets work, you
ought to explain obvious things...if they had not the specific general manager
who are the link between the members and customers and knows well the job, the
ZAC would have serious problems. " [Wholesaler]
Overall, the Zagora network exhibited sufficient competencies to achieve only
transactional outcomes, not transformational ones. Furthermore, the evidence highlights
the need to distinguish between formal qualifications and competencies based only on
experience. In fact, the solely empirical skills of marketing and collective management
appeared to lead to suboptimum transformational outcomes. Besides, the concentration
of competencies within few individuals can play a negative role in the marketing
performance.
7.6.3 Zagora Network Governance
The third feature of a network that impacts on performance is the governance.
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This is comprised of five aspects: (i) power distribution; (ii)
accountability/formality;(iii) mechanisms for knowledge/information diffusion; (iv)
mechanisms for resolving conflicts; and (v) mechanisms for
monitoring/evaluating/planning.
According to Grandori and Soda (1995), Provan and Kenis (2008), if the power is highly
distributed within a network; and if there is sufficient accountability/formality and
mechanisms for diffusing the information/knowledge; resolving conflicts and
monitoring/evaluating/planning, then the likelihood for good network performance
increases. Given the ZAC's performance, where only transactional outcomes were found
optimum, some of the aforementioned aspects of governance were expected to exist at
an insufficient level.
Regarding power distribution, all members officially have equal votes. Besides,
impartiality in discipline penalty for members offending against their obligations exists
(i.e. 10-year membership and delivering the whole quantity produced). In terms of
accountability, the ZAC has established a quality-rewarding payment system for farmers
to stimulate quality improvement. Regarding formality, the ZAC has its memorandum of
association, which determines the relationships with its members, decision making
processes and its mission statement. Regarding the- mechanism of transferring
information and building trust, the second leader (1980-1987) organised very effective
mini meetings with sub-groups before each general meeting. In this way, he transferred
valid information and collected feedback or new ideas, so in the general meeting he
could submit an adapted proposal integrating the preferences of the most ZAC members.
Besides, he was aware of conflicting interests and addressed them in advance through
mutual explanation and understanding. Finally, regarding
monitoring/evaluating/planning mechanisms, the ZAC monitors and evaluates all the
standardisation processes and outcomes, thanks to ISO and IIACCP certifications. As a
result, the ZAC has a clear identity recognised by both members and external actors; it
achieves scale economies; it secures high product/services quality and maintains its
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functions even under hostile or unexpected circumstances. The aforementioned
governance features explain the ZAC's optimum transactional outcomes.
Notwithstanding, there are some findings regarding network power that are inconsistent
to the ZAC's optimum transactional performance. First, the power appears very
concentrated within cliques, which limit members' access to accurate information and
opportunities to gain expertise in order to secure their exclusive privilege in power
sharing. Such access is permitted only to members adopting an existing clique's
perspective; otherwise their voice is weakened or sometimes even derided. For example,
some elder members discourage the younger to express independently their 'fresh' ideas,
by keeping an attitude 'leave us to decide because we have the experience'. An
interviewee described it as 'the compliant voters today become the board of directors
tomorrow'. Clearly, these findings indicate a non democratic leadership, which limits
the active participation of the great majority of ZAC members, and results in non-
optimum transformational outcomes.
Second, there is no independent and objective mechanism to diffuse accurate and
intimate information to ZAC members, especially those not belonging in a clique.
Officially, the general meeting is the only existing mechanism for transferring valid
information for decision making, as well as for resolving conflicts and assessing the
commander's contribution. However, in the general meetings the commanders or
cliques' leaders explain very ineffectively: what decisions were taken, under what
speculation and criteria; within what context (i.e. market situation; regulations or
trends), what the pros and cons of alternative options were. This happens because those
providing the information needed for assessing a decision option, coincide with those
being assessed or those fighting for gaining the impressions. There is no newsletter or
official broker for transferring valid information/ knowledge. In consequence, there is
disinformation, which cliques seem to manipulate for leading the remaining members to
certain conclusions. Some interviewees expressed it as 'they need us to simply ratify the
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decisions they made'. In brief, the disinformation hampers the optimum transformation
in ZAC members' perceptions/ behaviours.
"There is not an enacted mechanism to transfer official information to all
members, especially those not coming to the general meetings...official briefing,
that could not be twisted in the cafe. This has still not been conquered, we have a
weakness here which creates horrible problems at certain times...a grotesque
distortion ofthe facts " [The ZAC General Manager]
"There is great mistrust among members ...corruption suspicions. " [Wholesaler]
Third, the disinformation hampers accountability and trust building, since the
contribution of each member or commander is partially recognised according to their
clique's power. In fact, the clique leaders (around 30 people) seem to fight for
improving their own human capital rather than promoting objectivity and flexibility in
the ZAC's decision making process. So, they hold firmly to their opinion, and tend to
disclaim responsibility for wrong decisions or observed omissions. For these, the ZAC
general manager is usually blamed, while his contribution is not openly recognised,
since most ZAC members believe 'he is just an employee, the president does the
difference'. As a result, accountability is highly diffused for what happens, what is
achieved and by whom. Besides, this attitude of clique's leaders triggers intra-
cooperative conflicts, which polarise the audience in the general meetings instead of
unifying it. Therefore, trust shocks for ZAC members are unavoidable. Since there is no
constructive resolution of conflicts as a paradigmatic example, they reiterate. In turn,
this endless influence control game encourages the intense abstention and
disengagement of two thirds of ZAC members, especially the youngest ones. Clearly,
these findings indicate how disinformation hampers accountability and trust building, so
non-optimum transformational outcomes occur.
Finally, the ZAC has not established mechanisms for identifying changes in members'
interests and perceptions; and for evaluating its governance efficiency and
members/employees' sufficient level of competencies according to their responsibility.
Consequently, the ZAC fails to learn from everyone's experience, and incorporate best
practices. Due to the lack of mechanisms for monitoring, evaluating and planning, the
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ZAC commanders delayed to identify the existing deficiencies in governance and
members' competencies. Moreover, this delay aggravated the alienation of two thirds of
ZAC members, so now the ZAC commanders struggle to regain their confidence and
stimulate structural changes. Hence, it is apparent why transformational outcomes do not
reach the optimum level.
Overall, the existing ZAC's governance structure was found effective in securing scale
economies and quality improvement, mainly because of the quality-rewarding payment
system and obligations for 10-year membership and delivering the whole quantity
produced. So, compared to other domestic farmer cooperatives lacking such obligations
and a rewarding payment system, the ZAC's governance structure is proved successful
to deliver optimum transactional outcomes. In contrast, this structure was proved
inefficient to optimise and distribute the intangible benefits of perception/behavioural
transformation of active participation to the great majority of ZAC members. In fact,
these benefits (e.g. gaining expertise) are concentrated and sometimes even violated
within cliques of elder farmer-members. This impact of governance structure in terms of
transformational outcomes has further consequences. The existing diversity in members
profile and shortage in members' competencies is deteriorating rapidly, since there is
dramatic decrease in interest, trust, commitment, and confidence on their own decision¬
making capacity of two thirds of ZAC members. Furthermore, issues of sustainability
and flexibility of ZAC arise. In other words, even the optimum transactional outcomes
are threatened, as market competition increases.
7.7 Summary
This Chapter has reported the findings regarding the historical evolution of the Zagora
network and the factors influencing it, as well as the current network structure,
performance and analysis of the ZAC's features.
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Having set out the main question to be investigated, namely, the description and analysis
of the evolution of the Zagora network, the Chapter demonstrated that it is a long¬
standing and high performance network, where the ZAC has worked effectively to
counteract downstream actors' power. Social cohesiveness, combined with
marketing/entrepreneurial skills of leaders led to this result. However, internal tensions
indicate weaknesses in the ZAC's governance structure and commanders' management
skills. Consequently, ZAC members' involvement appears low, jeopardising the
cooperative's future development. This explains the optimum transactional outcomes
and suboptimal transformational outcomes exhibited by the Zagora network.
The next Chapter goes on to present the results of the fourth and final case study: that of
Agia apples. This case was selected on ■the basis of representing an "unprocessed
product" and apparently weak market performance.
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Chapter 8: Agia Apples -Case Description and Analysis
8.11ntroduction
Having discussed the findings of the Zagora case study, attention now turns towards the
last case, Agia apples. This case study refers to an SME cluster having its production
base in the region of Agia, in the Larissa prefecture in central Greece. Apples represent
the most significant crop in this area with more than ten private standardising/packing
enterprises in operation. The annual output of apples in the Agia region is estimated
around 50-60,000kg.
The inter-firm relations for this case revolve around the three largest private packing
enterprises (Poulis Ltd, Xatzisalatas Ltd, Xatzidakis Ltd), and one cooperative (the Agia
Apple Cooperative; AAC). The cluster is characterised by continuous entry and exit of
packing enterprises. Upstream, the network consists of around 450 apple farmers, who
frequently switch between the four standardising/packing enterprises. Overall, evidence
of the existence of'typical' domestic, problematic relationships not only among farmers,
but also between the farmers and downstream actors, was found within the interviewees'
accounts and perceptions.
The three private firms distribute almost the total of their annual apple output as branded
apples, each brand corresponding to the name of the packing firm. The cooperative
enterprise only distributes unbranded apples.
Following the two criteria for case-study selection, this case was selected on the basis of
representing, an unprocessed product and apparently weak market performance.
Therefore, relatively weak network relations would be found and also possibly quite
hostile contextual conditions. The results of analysis of the Agia case are reported as
follows. First, the network historical evolution is described in four phases, followed by
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analysis of influencing contextual factors. Next, description of the current Agia network
is given, involving descriptions of its structure and performance. The Chapter then
analyses the key network features impacting on performance. The Chapter finishes by
summarising the findings.
8.2 Historical Evolution
8.2.1 'Agia apple cooperative suffers from internal problems -
Wholesalers exploit farmers' (1965-1980)
A long history of farmers' exploitation by wholesalers exists in this case. In particular,
wholesalers had no constant presence in the Agia region, but continually entered and
exited, usually without paying farmers off fairly. The farmers could not bring a suit
against them, since the transactions were based on verbal agreements, and no proof
element was available. In 1965, the Agia apple cooperative (AAC) was established to
provide Agia fanners direct access to small retailers through its own sale outlet in the
Athenian wholesaler fresh market, skipping the wholesalers. However, the AAC's
governance was proved tricky, since the elected fanners established only informal
customer relationships with the cooperative members. The disappointed members
reacted by abandoning the AAC or supplying only the worst part of their apple
production, while they delivered the best to wholesalers for a better price. No obligation
for exclusive supply was imposed by the AAC on its members.
8.2.2 'The AAC was trapped by government funding-
Standardisation/packaging plants exploit farmers' (1981-1991)
In the 1980's, the socialist party passed a Law boosting government funding. However,
this misguided cooperatives to heavily invest in expensive constructions e.g.
standardisation/ packaging units, without having previously secured production input
and high quality, through an obligation for exclusive supply and encouraging quality -
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orientation respectively. The AAC obtained the first standardisation/ packaging unit in
Agia region. However, due to inefficiency and its leaders' nepotism, the AAC has
suffered from high production costs, huge accumulated debts and low capital equity. As
a negative example, the AAC's situation discouraged any movement of local apple
farmers towards stronger farmer horizontal relations.
8.2.3 'Dramatic market changes-Wholesalers invest in
standardisation/packaging units in Agia' (1992-2004)
In 1992, the Greek government pursued free-market policies, e.g. imports and retail
concentration. Since then, the wholesalers were not any longer the most powerful supply
chain link, because the domestic multiple retailers prevailed over them. Higher quality
standards were set, such as standardisation, packaging and more recently, quality
certification, which forced some wholesalers of fresh fruits and vegetables to invest
upstream and become packers located within the main production regions. For apples,
the Agia region, representing the highest domestic crop, was a meaningful choice for the
wholesalers.
Even as packers, the wholesalers were found to maintain their hard attitude towards the
farmers. In fact, it was reported that they exploited the fact that agreements between
farmers and packers were verbal instead of written contracts, in two ways. First, this
allowed packers to enter and exit the market without legal consequences. Frequently,
some of them after a short period in business operation, -declared bankruptcy, and left
local farmers unpaid. Then another wholesaler would buy the factory, and the process
would start again. Second, there was also the way of unfair discounts and delays in the
final payment, justified by the packers' claims that during the processing, they
discovered lower quality or quantity than that expected/agreed. This was possible, since
there was no established process or quality standards for secure measurement of quality
and quantity of farmers' delivered production to the packers, prior to the processing
stage.
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In the mid. 90's, both Athenian wholesalers with local origins, Xatzisalatas Ltd,
merchandising mainly apples and Xatzidakhs Ltd, merchandising mainly apples and
pears, used the European/government funding to invest in standardisation/packaging
units in Agia region. Since 2003, Xatzisalatas Ltd, Xatzidakhs Ltd, and later Poulis Ltd,
distribute almost the total of their annual apple output as branded apples, each brand
corresponding to the name of the packing firm.
During the same period, some efforts of a few farmer groups failed to counteract the
wholesalers' exploitation. These groups used the European/government funding specific
to the 'fanner groups' to establish their own cooperative enterprise, but lacked
cooperative education and successful experience. Combined with the AAC's
problematic situation, these failures have made most Agia farmers hesitate to act
collectively.
Since 2001, _some positive changes have happened in the AAC. Its manager retired and
the AAC's agriculturist was charged with management responsibilities. Also, a new
board of directors was elected. Having learnt by past mistakes, they applied a reforming
governance policy. However, the accumulated debts and discontent, stemming from the
nepotism of the previous AAC's board of directors, combined with the lack of exclusive
production delivery to the AAC, made few local farmers trust the reformed AAC.
In 2004, the AAC current manager got involved in a networking initiative of the
Thessaly Periphery management agency among the AAC, the ZAC and an apple
cooperative in north Greece. This top-down networking initiative failed, due to the huge
differences in cooperative governance and market position.
Since the mid 90's a few big Agia farmers have frequently visited Bolzano in Italy to be
informed about modern cultivating and irrigation systems. Given the low-lying nature of
the Agia region, these modern systems could be easily applied, so the Agia farmers
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extensively re-structured their farms using the European/government funding.
Consequently, the Agia farmers improved their position in relation to the Zagora
fanners, since they reduced costs and improved macroscopic apple features thanks to
modern cultivating systems, which cannot be applied easily in the Zagora mountainous
region. However, it remains questionable whether the gap between Zagora and Agia
apples in taste, attractiveness and perishability is reduced. Despite the added value of
standardisation and packaging, the price of Agia apples remains low, since the final
consumers little recognise the Agia origin or existing brands. This is explained by the
short history of launching Agia apples as a branded product rather than as a commodity
one. The existing Agia brands compete mainly on the basis of the attractive price
compared to the expensive Zagorin or Italian branded apples.
8.2.4 'Investments of a powerful wholesaler in Agia region - the
integrated apple production introduced' (2004-present)
In 2004, using the European/government funding, Poiilis Ltd, one of the biggest
domestic wholesalers invested upstream, as a packer in major fruit production Greek
regions, i.e. apples in Agia, citrus fruits in Sparta, and peaches in Veria. Its presence had
a dramatic influence on the balance among the existing Agia packers. The first year,
Poulis Ltd allured other packers to offer Agia farmers high prices, however the market
could not absorb the whole quantity of Agia apples on a premium price. So, big profit
losses led to the dramatic fall in prices offered to Agia apple farmers in the next
production year. This evolution exasperated fanners, resulting in bad feeling and
unsuccessful hunting for collective solutions. For example, the current AAC leaders
have been keen on finding an applicable manner to start from scratch a new AAC to
counteract wholesalers/packers' exploitation.
In 2004, Carrefour-Marinopoulos Ltd, the biggest domestic multiple retailer, encouraged
Xatzisalatas Ltd to introduce integrated apple production management. Xatzisalatas Ltd
persuaded a fanner group to convert to this new production system. As a result, a closer
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packer-fanner relationship flourished, including regular agriculturist's guidance;
guaranteed purchase of the whole quantity at a satisfactory price; and support with
certification bureaucracy.
In 2005, the AAC and a private agriculturist followed the example of Xatzisalatas and
organised two farmer groups converted to integrated apple production management,
establishing a similar close relationship with the farmers.
8.3 Analysis of Factors Influencing Historical Evolution
8.3.1 Introduction
Having outlined the key events in the historical evolution of the Agia network evolution,
attention now turns towards the crucial contextual factors that can explain the network
evolution. It may be recalled from Chapter 3 that these factors are market conditions,
social cohesiveness and external institutional support. Figure 8.1 summarises the impact
of all factors on the Agia network evolution diagrammatically63; most important impacts
are depicted with black bars, less important with white bars. As it is shown in Figure 8.1,
four factors were found to be particularly important to the Agia network evolution: (i)
the physical and technological constraints; (ii) the unfair treatment of farmers by the
downstream actors; (iii) social cohesiveness and (iv) external institutional support. The
next sections describe and explain the impacts of these factors.
8.3.2 Physical and Technological Constraints
It may be recalled from Chapter 3 that physical and technological constraints can
weaken both real (e.g. cooperative organisation) or "virtual" vertical integrated forms
(e.g. contract agriculture), if there are not sufficient mechanisms to obstruct the repeated
63 For an analysis of the less important contextual factors for the Agia case study, see the comment for the
footnote 63 from Chapter 8 in the Appendix I
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Figure 8.1: Contextual factors Reinforcing and Encumbering the Collective Action




JUcoinbcn »s 11:: initiation i
ofprotest ty mi mtemm
i
9r»Murte: KsHioutts irsiiatbns i_ J
Cansftaasi dcwnrtmsii aete»
«id'cr taiia* ttsatmatf
?*ti«ipaien in * asata-mc*
uttiicatian qnt«n as aprtccnditicrt
:cr muk* ashy
J
it) Pre-existent social coheshwms and
commumliry in interestsperceptions
Hi) External Institutional Support
("Existmm am' mturg
eft)£# pslk-m)
opportunistic behaviour of some network members, due to both information asymmetry
and quality uncertainty (De Roest, 1999; Chappuis and Sans, 1999; Barjolle and
Chappuis, 2000).
In Agia case, evidence was found to support this theoretical proposition. Agia apples are
characterised by higher physical constraints: much more perishability and scant
resistance to transportation, standardisation and preservation, than that of Zagorin
apples. Combined with the technological constraint of lack of sophisticated techniques
for assessing apple quality, these have two results. First, the increased inability to
distinguish whether the deviation from the prior agreement on quantity and quality
243
standards was caused by environmental factors e.g. bad weather conditions or by human
mistake, intentional or not. Particularly, the impact is that these constraints leave plenty
of leeway to the actors to dishonour their word/ agreement and embrace opportunistic
behaviours. (Nevertheless, it is the actors' choice to act in a reliable or opportunistic
way.) Second, it creates higher pressure to sell apples quickly to the market. The packers
often react by cheating the farmers. In fact, they plead the inability to assess whether a
mistake was made intentionally or not by the fanner as the pretext of paying off in very
unfavourable conditions. On their behalf, the packers conveyed their action in a manner
suggesting it was an unwilling, but unavoidable step to share the increased transactional
costs due to information asymmetry and quality uncertainty, as well as to punish those
farmers with opportunistic attitude.
However, a vicious circle is created in this way, since the packers fail to communicate
effectively the need of minimising quality heterogeneity during the harvest to the
farmers. This is translated to higher costs of mechanical sort-out for the standardisation
units. Overall, the physical and technological constraints give the opportunity to both
Agia farmers and packers to behave opportunistically, increasing mistrust and
weakening inter-firm relationships. This happens because both sides focus on lower
quality standards and on short-term relationships.
8.3.3 Unfair Treatment of Farmers by Downstream Actors
As highlighted in Chapter 3, if the downstream actors in a supply chain are relatively
concentrated and treat fragmented suppliers unfairly, then the development of
'countervailing power' networks from the suppliers is stimulated (Grandori and Soda,
1995).
The analysis of Agia case illuminated the phenomenon of bad feeling, caused by the
unfair treatment of fragmented fanners by the concentrated wholesalers/packers. By
244
chance, the data collection took place in a period of great agitation, when the dramatic
fall in prices had exasperated Agia fanners. Within such bad feeling, voices encouraging
a 'countervailing power' network were heard louder among worried farmers. Most Agia
farmers gathered and agreed on keeping a common "harder" attitude towards the
packers, refusing to accept lower prices than a minimum standard. This verbal
agreement represented the 'seed' for collective action against the downstream actors'
power. On their behalf, the packers reacted offensively by approaching the few Agia big
farmers and offering exceptionally attractive prices. In this way, the packers sought both
to secure the minimum input needed to operate and weaken even more the bargain
power of the smaller farmers, to whom the packers offered lower prices than the
minimum standard. This represented a challenge for Agia farmers' networking initiative,
leaving two options: either give in or resist. The fact that some Agia farmers gave in
reflected their little commitment to collective action, their individualism; lack of
discipline and belief /confidence of "being capable of making a collective scheme
work". This was demonstrated in the pessimist views of interviewees, who often referred
to failed past networking initiatives by local farmer groups, the disappointing situation
of the AAC and the times such bad feeling failed to inspire a 'solid resistance'. The lack
of social cohesiveness, the absence of people able to persuade the critical mass that they
can lead the agitation against the downstream actors, and the loose intra-connection of
the critical mass were reported by the interviewees to explain why attempts for
collective action were unsuccessful.
Clearly, although unfair treatment of fragmented suppliers by concentrated downstream
actors brings under serious consideration the establishment of a 'countervailing power'
network, other factors were found to determine whether this remained a 'wish' or be
materialised.
"The Agia apple cooperative has approximately 100 cooperative members. Their
number is decreasing. Most members used to supply their production of better
quality to the traders, and give the part of inferior quality to the cooperative,
whose tradability was doubtful. The last 3-4 years the prices achieved by the
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cooperative are better than those offered by the traders. In the past, the opposite
happened because first the cost ofcooperative's employees is high, second some
of them do not do their job correctly. Here we have the problem called 'kanonia'
("cannons") where after a few years of good collaboration with the local
farmers some traders suddenly say "I am bankrupted, I cannot pay offyou... "
[Agia Farmer]
"The price the traders-packers actually paid the farmer is lower (e.g. 0.45
Euros) than that originally they had promised when the apple produce was
delivered (e.g. 0.5 Euros). We call this problem 'psalidia' ("scissors"), for
example the packers paid for 50 tonnes while you have delivered 55 tonnes, the
total payment is 10,500 Euros, but you get paid 10,000 Euros. They scissor both
the quantity and price. " [Agia Fanner]
"It is interesting to see what happened this year. The traders-packers knew that
the great majority ofAgia farmers had no access to market and storage facilities,
that they also have bank loans to pay off and need immediately cash. The 3-4
biggest traders seem that they discussed together and decided to book all the
storage facilities and harvestings equipment available in the area, before buying
any produce. They were waiting, starting approximately a month later the
discussion with the Agia farmers for buying their apples. It was aforethought.
They aimed to create panic to local farmers and force them first to contact the
traders-packers rather the opposite as used to happen. They started negotiating
very low prices, when apples started become mature and could not stay longer¬
on the trees. They offered 0.30-0.35 Euros compared to 0.45 -0.75 or 0.80 per
kilo the previous year. The Agia farmers did not know what to do, because the
cost per kilo ofapples is 0.30-0.35Euros. " [Agia Farmer]
"Faming for us is soul-destroying. There is uncertainty and insecurity. We have
made large farm investments, but we do not know what is going to happen at the
end, who will buy our produce, what will be the price, whether we are paid
off..." [Agia Farmer]
8.3.4 Pre-existent Social Cohesiveness and Communality in
Interests/Perceptions
In Chapter 3, Hu and Korneliussen (1997) proposed that the pre-existing social-cultural
bonds between network members, which are expressed through communality in
interests/perceptions, enhance the likelihood of strong and durable network relations. In
the Agia case, the lack of social cohesiveness and communality in interests/perceptions
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admitted by the interviewees was striking, and provided evidence that both cohesiveness
and communality are fundamental ingredients for a collective action to flourish.
The pre-existing socio-cultural bonds appeared to be loose, as can be inferred by the
views of interviewees. A strong spirit of competition, jealousy for the prosperity of their
fellow-villagers, willingness to increase personal benefits in expense of a collective
effort, and the notion that 'the less local farmers survive, the better it seems to be' were
behavioural features, drawn from the interviews. Regarding communality in interests
and perceptions, high variability was observed across interviewees, with some directly
opposing views expressed: short versus long-term focus; collective versus individual
benefits; inclination to deceive versus to honour the agreement; improve quality versus
profit.
Such differences in Agia farmers' behaviour and attitude may be partially explained by
the variation in farm size and economic prosperity. However, it is noticeable how deep
the mistrust is rooted between farmers, even of those having similar farm size. The faith
in other farmers' words, actions and commitment was found severely shaken by repeated
cases of disloyalty in common agreements. Despite their initial promise for a minimum
price, the Agia farmers often broke their word by compromising for less, in order to sell
their whole production or persuade the packer to choose them instead of other fanners.
Then they pretended to each other that they had sold at a better price than the actual one
(i.e. they hesitated to share their problems). In this way, trust among the fanners has
been lost and replaced by suspicion, aversion and recrimination.
"10% of the Agia farmers are big and enjoy a better treatment from the traders-
packers. They have some responsibility in what happened this year. They offered
their produce under satisfactoiy prices, which were kept secret, so the packers
had a good quantityfor their factory to operate and couldforce the 50% ofother
farmers to accept veiy low prices. The remaining 40'% market their own
produce, as open farmer market merchants to Athens and Larissa city. " [Agia
Fanner]
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"All the disappointment and complaints of the Agio farmers are only expressed
among friends in the local cafe shops, they do not have the courage to express
openly their experiences of unfair treatment in the general gatherings, as that
taken place after what happened this year. ...There is a paradox, even in
personal discussions, most of the farmers pretend that they were offered a better
price (i.e. 0.33 Euros per kilo) than the actual one (i.e. 0.20 Euros). " [Agia
Apple Cooperative Administrator]
Another example of such behaviour is found in the AAC. The board of directors used to
treat the members unfairly by making discriminations in the priority with which the
farmers' production was sold in the wholesaler outlet in Athens. As a reaction, most of
the farmers-members exited the cooperative or delivered only the inferior quality of their
production, which was rejected by the private packers. Having learnt by past mistakes,
the AAC's new commanders have applied a reforming governance policy since 2001.
However, very few Agia farmers believe that this reforming policy can reverse the
sombre picture of the AAC's future. Even the current AAC leaders try to find an
applicable manner to start from scratch a new AAC to counteract wholesalers/packers'
exploitation, without success so far.
As an accumulative result, it has been deeply recorded in the collective memory of the
great majority of Agia farmers that a collective scheme is almost impossible to sustain,
since both its leaders and critical mass initiate or join the scheme, hoping to reap its
benefits but at the expense of others involved. They believed that is a matter of time
before the commanders' nepotism or members' cheating will be exposed. Interestingly,
it is noticeable how the wholesalers/packers, who also show a similar individualistic and
defensive attitude towards other packers, take advantage of weak social cohesiveness
among Agia fanners, aiming to 'stifle' any initiative of'countervailing power' network.
Overall, the Agia case provided strong evidence that the lack of faith of network
members in their own capabilities and other actors' intentions constitute a very fragile
basis for any collective scheme to build on. It results in a vicious circle of lack of faith,
commitment and success, leading almost inexorably to deterioration in the Agia farmers'
situation.
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8.3.5 External Institutional Support
It may be recalled from Chapter 3 that the external institutional support can enhance the
emergence and sustainability of SME networks, provided that the networks' autonomy
and self-management are respected, and that flexibility and efficiency are promoted
(Amin and Thrift, 1995). The Agia case offered evidence for how the existing external
institutional support proved harmful in the case of the AAC.
The Cooperative Law 1982 boosted the European/government funding for farmer
cooperatives, but also misguided them to heavily invest in expensive constructions such
as the first standardisation/ packaging unit in Agia region, without a focus on efficiency
and sustainability. So, the AAC established expensive standardisation equipment
without having previously secured input and high quality. Particularly, its members were
not required either to exclusively deliver the whole apple production for a continuous
number of years, or to improve the quality, because there was no quality-rewarding
payment system. Simultaneously, the same law abrogated the external (e.g. from state
agencies) or internal inspection mechanisms. This resulted in promoting political
intervention, which in turn led to the phenomenon of cooperative commanders'
nepotism. Consequently, the AAC's disappointed members reacted by abandoning the
cooperative or supplying only the worst part of their apple production, while they were
delivering the best to wholesalers for a better price. Because of that, the AAC has
suffered from high production costs, huge accumulated debt and low capital equity.
"The governments made social policy through farmer cooperatives. The AAC
now has an excessive number ofpermanent employees, whom we were forced to
hire, although their salaries could not be covered. As explained, their selection
was not based on their qualifications. The AAC also was led to invest in a
standardisation unit, but the public funding was never paid off resulting into a
huge debt now. This clept has prohibited our access to any current public
funds. " [Agia Apple Cooperative Administrator]
"Our cooperative has a big debt, resulted from the government past policies.
Since 1981, the government required all the standardisation and packaging of
the whole production supplied to the market. However, the government did not
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enforce all those involved in marketing offresh fruit and vegetables to apply the
policy. This has started to happen only now. Through funding in 1981, the AAC
built the first standardisation unit in the region, but because the policy was not
applied, the cooperative run into dept, as it could not cover the fixed costs of the
construction. ... Due to the AAC's huge debt, now we cannot take a loan for the
Agricultural bank and improve our cash flow. Additionally, the last years, the
market exchanges mainly are done though cheque; this creates more problems in
the cash flow. On the contrary, the traders-packers have a good cash flow, so
they usually have paid off the farmers till Christmas and also give forepayments,
so the farmers can cover their expenses during the harvest time. " [Agia Farmer]
Besides, the eligibility criteria and inspection mechanisms for the public funding of
private SMEs, particularly for packers in Agia case, proved inefficient to prevent
wholesalers/packers from deliberately leading themselves to bankruptcy after few years
of business operation, leaving local farmers unpaid. Then another wholesaler was buying
the factory in a bargain price, and the process was usually repeated. This was proved
very destructive for the market balance in Agia area, with the farmers being the direct
victims. Moreover, in long-term it clearly encumbered bilateral, trustful inter-firm
relationships from flourishing.
Overall, the Agia case illustrates that when public funding regulations do not prioritise
SMEs' efficiency and sustainability or respect collective schemes' autonomy/self-
management, negative chain reactions are created. Funding appeared to have a mixture
of consequences, affecting dramatically the market balance, both in the short and long -
term and the evolution of inter-firm relationships. Therefore, it seems crucial that public
funding needs to be used as a tool in order to distinguish the beneficial from harmful
practices, rewarding only efficient and sustainable agrifood enteqirises, either collective
or private.
Flaving explained the impact of certain contextual factors on the historical evolution of
the Agia network, the Chapter continues by describing the present day network
structure.
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8.4 Structure of the Current Agia Network
The Agia network structure is presented in Figures 8.2 and 8.3. The five-stage supply
chain is shown in Figure 8.2, where the three private and one cooperative
standardisation/packaging units constitute the focal point.
As Figure 8.2 shows, the first stage consists of input suppliers to farmers (i.e. suppliers
of fertilisers and pest control equipment) or standardisation/packaging units (i.e.
suppliers of standardising machinery or packaging materials). The second stage
comprises around 450 apple farmers, supplying the four standardising/packing
enterprises, of which less than 50 farmers have converted to integrated farming. The
latter have joined one of the three existing fanner groups who produce and certify apples
as products of integrated apple production management: the group of Xatzisalatas Ltd,
the group of the AAC and another group initiated by a local private agricultural agency.
They show some loyalty to their chosen group, in noticeable contrast to the remaining
farmers following conventional apple farming, who frequently switch between the
packers. At the third stage, for the purpose of this research, the three largest private
packing enterprises, (Poulis Ltd, Xatzisalatas Ltd and Xatzidakis Ltd), and one
cooperative (the Agia Apple Cooperative -AAC) represent the focal point of the chain.
All four enterprises grade and store apples in their own facilities: the standardisation,
packaging and storage plant. The three private firms recently distribute almost the total
of their annual apple output as branded apples, each brand corresponding to the name of
the packing firm. The cooperative enteiprise only distributes unbranded apples. The final
two stages present the apple distribution to retail outlets (stage 4 and 5 in Figure 8.2).
The four enteiprises operate downstream, also as wholesalers, supplying other
wholesalers and hundreds of small food retailers at the central fresh product market in
Athens via their own sales outlets. Each private firm has occasionally supplied one
domestic multiple retailer, with the most regular relationship being between Xatzisalatas
Ltd and Carrefour-Marinopoulos Ltd, which encouraged Xatzisalatas Ltd to introduce
the integrated apple production management.
251
Figure 8.3 depicts actors in the Agia network who are external to the supply chain and
namely are: other cooperatives in Greece; domestic private or public
agricultural/developmental agencies; the 'Fruit News' magazine.
Poulis Ltd belongs to the foundation team of the 'Association of Greek Packers for
Fresh Fruits and Vegetables' and is linked with a small number of actors of European
apple production networks. The current AAC manager has links with the Thessalia
Periphery Agency.
Overall, the Agia network presents some 'typical' features of unilateral relationships
between domestic agrifood actors, and exhibits links only with domestic
knowledge/information exchange networks, external to the supply chain.
8.5 Performance of the Agia Network
8.5.1 Introduction
The selection of the Agia case was based on two criteria: unprocessed product and
apparently weak market performance. However, the judgment for performance was
based only on an external evaluation. So, this section offers a more detailed internal
assessment to validate whether the Agia case does indeed exhibit weak market
performance.
As with the other three cases, the assessment employs the work of Human and Provan
(1997), who identified two kinds of SME networks' performance outcomes:
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Figure 8.2: Internal Actors of the Supply Chain of Agia Apples
STAGE 1: RAW MATERIAL INPUT
Suppliers to farmers Suppliers to standardisation and packaging units
STAGE 2: APPLES PRODUCTION
350 Apple Farmers following
conventional production method
Within the wider area of Agia
municipality
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method
Within the wider area of Agia
municipality (supported by
Xatzisalatas Ltd and Agia Apple
Cooperative)
STAGE 3: APPLES STANDARDISATION AND PACKAGING
Around IE PRIVATE FIRMS






STAGE 4: TRADE ENTERMEDLATES' INVOLVEMENT
Their Own Sale points in Athens
wholesaler market of fresh
products
Wholesalers from remote places e g
islands
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Poulis Ltd
Wholesalers ofAthens and countv
STAGE 5: RETAILERS' INVOLVEMENT
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Figure 8.3: Networks of the Agia Apple Packers with external actors of the Supply
Chain of Agia Apples
PROVIDERS OF EXPERTISE &
KNOWELEDGE
(e.g. developing agencies; universities;
research institutes)
EUROPEAN APPLE SCENE
* BOLZANO Apple Scene (ITALY)
% mutual communication and cooperation
I more unilateral communication
Very weak network linkages ofAgia Packers with European Apple Scene
) The actors in circle are located within the wider area of Thessaly periphery,
" "
whereas the actors in square are located outside the Thessaly periphery.
The actors in pink circle are located at Agia area.
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transactional and transformational. The former includes the improvement in financial
performance, organisation credibility and access to resources, while the latter considers a
change of members' attitude towards a more cooperative behaviour after experiencing
the networking benefits. Given what lias been revealed about the Agia network
evolution, both weak transactional and transformational outcomes may be expected.
8.5.2 Transactional Outcomes of the Agia Network
The Agia farmers conveyed clearly in their interviews that they suffer from: (i) unfair
treatment in terms of very low prices offered; (ii) inability to ascertain whether they
have being cheated or not; (iii) unsecured payment and uncertain purchase of their whole
production due to lack of a single-transaction contract; and (iv) lack of secure storage,
reliable market information and agriculturist advice. Besides, as fragmented suppliers,
they have little credibility to customers and public agencies. Overall, Agia farmers have
not access to the profits of the added value to apples thanks to standardisation,
packaging and branding from the packers. The uncertain market position of Agia
fanners was confmned by their limited bargain power. The only exception found was
the case of farmers following integrated apple production management and joining the
relative farmer group of Xatzisalatas Ltd. This packer has a contract with Carrefour-
Marinopoulos Ltd and can offer the farmers producing product of certified quality an
assured purchase of their whole production at a better price than that of conventional
product. Reliable agriculturist advice and administrative support for preparing all the
documentation for quality certification was also offered.
From their viewpoint, the packers reported that they suffer from the way that their
relationships with local fanners have evolved over time. They cannot enjoy a stable
production base, in other words stable scale economies, owing to Agia farmers' frequent
switching between packers. They run their business on a high risk to be cheated by the
fanners, who deliberately deliver a mixture of product qualities, which results in
increasing the sorting out costs during standardisation. The packers mentioned that they
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struggle to build trustful long-term relationships with Agia farmers due to the farmers'
deep suspicion derived from past negative experiences. So each year, the packers need to
be involved in a price war with other local packers to secure the minimum needed input
for their factory to operate. Downstream, despite the existence of brands successfully
capitalising on the domestic consumers' willingness to pay for a premium product such
as 'Zagorin' apples and Italian brands, the brands of the Agia private packers have not
yet reached that level of success in product differentiation. Still in the minds of both the
retailers and end-customers, the Agia apples seem to constitute more a commodity rather
a branded product. Some evidence suggests that the domestic final consumers have
started to differentiate the Agia origin more in terms of its lower price rather than
premium quality. In conclusion, the potential of adding value through standardisation,
packaging and labelling was found to be little exploited in Agia case so far. The AAC
has even bigger losses of profits from adding value, by only distributing unbranded
apples. Interestingly, despite their strong power in the Athenian wholesaler market for
fresh fruits and vegetables, the three private packers were found to struggle to establish
regular collaboration with the domestic multiple retailers, so they were forced to
distribute the great majority of their output to small retailers (e.g. small neighbourhood
fresh food retailers or open market merchants) whose market share has presented a
dramatic drop over the last 15 years. Even Xatzisalatas Ltd was found to have a more
regular but a clearly unilateral relationship with Carrefour-Marinopoulos Ltd.
Overall, transactional outcomes of the Agia network were found to be weak, reflecting
its weak economic performance as was expected.
8.5.3 Transformational Outcomes of the Agia Network
i
The Agia network is a case characterised by loose and informal network linkages
between actors, who seem to deeply believe in temporarily joining a network strictly
only for serving their individualistic interests. Therefore, any formal or 'serious'
commitment to network requirements is deemed unnecessary, even harmful, given the
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numerous past experiences that faith in collective principles was manipulated. Agia
fanners and packers consider that it is 'wiser' to keep a defensive attitude when joining a
network for "collecting up to date information of efficient practices and applying them
outside the collective scheme/initiative". The other network members are perceived and
treated as 'competitors' with suspicious intentions, who threaten to take advantage of the
inter-firm relationship exchange of knowledge/information. The Agia infonnal network
was found to be recognised as an entity, but narrowly perceived as a forum where the
actors diplomatically seek to assess the relative power of the other actors, discover their
weaknesses and hidden strengths in order to exploit or imitate them respectively.
Therefore, the network actors join the network as if walking into a 'field of battle',
keeping their weaknesses and strengths well hidden and seeking to eliminate all their
opponents. Networking was conveyed in a manner suggesting it was a necessary, but a
hard and dangerous power game, where those losing might not survive. As a result,
beliefs in common action, trustful sharing, and devotion in collective goals are almost
absent in the mindset of the great majority of Agia network actors. Reversely, it seems
that they have adjusted to this manner of networking, therefore they usually have a
short-term and strictly individualistic perspective; establish informal, loose network
linkages, by frequently switching between partners; give little or false information about
themselves; seek effortless gain and show indiscipline.
Only two exceptions in inter firm cooperation were found, one in the farmer group
following integrated apple production management, initiated by Xatzisalatas Ltd, and
another in the current leaders of the AAC. Xatzisalatas Ltd treated the farmer group in
an exceptionally supportive and fair manner, compared to the usual Agia farmer-packer
relationship. As a result, they started to show more faith and disposition to build a
trustful relationship with the packer. Moreover, they showed discipline and commitment
to improve .product quality to the level needed to certify the quality. Besides, they
respected their agreement to exclusively supply Xatzisalatas Ltd, since the packer
responded by offering a better price. These positive transformational outcomes suggest
that when the intentions for a fair agreement become clear, are supported by a secure
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payment thanks to the contract with a powerful retailer, and combined with practical
support offered to the fanners (e.g. agriculturist's advice, administration, farming
training), there is still room for a bilateral fanner-packer relationship to flourish. The
second exception concerns the AAC's current leaders who seem to constitute a group of
almost 'romantic' believers in collective principles. In their interviews, they expressed
their admiration for the ZAC's success and disappointment for the opportunities lost in
the case of the AAC. However, the crucial finding was that by remaining members of
the AAC and reflecting heavily on its evolution over time, they managed to understand
which preconditions were not satisfied and the AAC failed as a collective scheme. This
suggests that positive transformational outcomes can occur, even within unfavourable
conditions, when the network actors resist in refuting their collective principles and use
their experiences to identify the preconditions for building a sustainable collective
scheme. However, it is questionable whether these few visionaries can constitute the
critical mass for changing the deeply rooted defensive attitude of the great majority of
Agia farmers, especially when they lack the attractive element of securing absorption of
the whole product quantity at a satisfactory price.
Overall, the Agia case not only illustrated a different approach of Agia actors to
networking, justified by certain perceptions about their own position within a network
and the utility of this network as a means for serving their individual goals, but also it
gave good insight into how these perceptions have been arrived at. Participating in the
Agia network had mainly negative transformational outcomes for Agia actors, since they
have been gradually convinced that they need to be careful with networking to avoid
exposing themselves and being manipulated by other network actors.
8.6 Features of the Agia Network
8.6.1 Introduction
This section contains details regarding the key features of the Agia network and their
impact on the performance of the network.
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As explained in preceding result chapters and drawn from literature, there are three key
features: (i) the profile of network members, (ii) the competencies of the Agia network
actors, and (iii) the network governance.
Figure 8.4: Effects of Agia Network (A) Features on Performance Outconmes
Encumbering Neutral Reinforcing
NETWORK RELA TIONS






Figure 8.5: Transactional and Transformational Performance Outcomes of the
Agia Network (A)
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Figure 8.4 illustrates whether these features reinforced or encumbered the network
performance of the Agia network. What follows in the next three sections is the
discussion of the outcomes of the analysis regarding these network features' impact. As
Figure 8.4 shows, the overwhelming picture is negative.
8.6.2 The Agia Network: Member Profile
The first network feature influencing performance is the profile of the network's
members. Milliken and Martins (1996) identified two types of network members'
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profile: physical and attitudinal. The former refers to some 'observed' attributes such as
age, land size, and having a second job, whereas the latter denotes 'less visible or
underlying' attributes, for example perspective, goals, reluctance to change. It is
expected that high diversity in either physical or attitudinal profile impedes network
performance outcomes (Milliken and Martins, 1996). Given the weak transactional and
transformational performance of the Agia network, some heterogeneity in members'
profile was expected.
The Agia network indeed exhibits a notable level of heterogeneity in both physical and
attitudinal members' profile. In the course of scrutinising the interviewees' perceptions
and relating them to their profile characteristics, it emerged that the high diversity in
physical profile directly relates to the high diversity in Agia farmers' attitude and
behaviour. The interviewees expressed openly how difficult it is for their opinions,
perceptions and behaviours to be comprehended by other Agia farmers with different
features, such as farm size, and having a second job or access to open markets. For
instance, the big farmers who own storage, can afford to travel in Bolzano area and
introduce first fanning innovation in a large scale. They were found to enjoy increased
bargaining power, and be preferred as suppliers by the packers than small farmers.
Furthermore, Agia farmers appeared to differ in professionalism, time-perspective of
goals, commitment to quality improvement and collective action. Most interviewees
expressed openly an individualistic approach, justified as 'the only way to survive',
given the numerous examples of failed collective initiatives. Overall, the member profile
of the Agia network members was considered as a case of high heterogeneity, reflected
by the strong beliefs that 'the less other network actors know about yon, the less
vulnerable you are' and 'how can our perceptions/goals be combined, since we are so
different?\
Such high profile heterogeneity could explain some of the very low social-integration,
increased transactional costs, unstable scale economies, unsatisfactory improvement in
quality, and little transformation in Agia network members' perceptions and behaviours.
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8.6.2 The Agia Network: Competencies
The second network feature influencing performance is the members' competencies. If
network members have a range of skills at a sufficient level according to their
responsibilities, then the SME network is expected to perform well (Provan and Kenis
(2008,). Three types of skills are mainly required: production expertise,
marketing/entrepreneurial skills and collective-management capabilities. Given the weak
transactional and transformational outcomes of the Agia network, the aforementioned
skills were expected to exist at an insufficient level.
First, regarding the production skills, Agia farmers apply modern cost-effective
cultivating and irrigating systems, although many appeared to have little knowledge and
commitment to improve apple quality, which increases the costs of the sorting out
process for the packers. The latter have satisfactory standardisation competencies.
However, they complain that most Agia farmers overestimate their expertise and
deliberately ignore the packers' instructions for selecting Only the best product quality to
deliver to the standardisation units.
Second, regarding the marketing/entrepreneurial skills, the packers were found to have
slightly better empirical competencies than Agia farmers, however even the former
appeared to face difficulties in detecting market tendencies before domestic competitors
such as the ZAC. This, in combination with the fact that Agia actors concentrate only on
the defensive domestic knowledge/information exchange networks, partially explains
why Agia packers do not lead the domestic market. The little reliance on European
networks and that Agia packers deliberately avoid sharing marketing intelligence with
other network actors were noticeable. Particularly, most Agia packers are Athenian
wholesalers," therefore their personal network includes mainly other wholesalers and
small retailers, while their links with the multiple retailers appeared to have been
dramatically weakened during the last 15 years. Agia packers were found to keep the
Athenian wholesalers' 'typical' attitude of establishing unilateral relationships with both
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fragmented suppliers and retailers. Only with the multiple retailers, Agia packers are
forced to change style in their inter-firm relationships, since there, the competition is so
sharp that only those packers showing high professionalism and interest in building
trustful relationships can survive in the long term. However, the three private packers
appeared to struggle to establish regular collaboration with the domestic multiple
retailers, and even Xatzisalatas Ltd, who was more successful, was compelled to adapt
to the requirements of Carrefour-Marinopoulos Ltd for radical changes in farming
system (i.e. introduction of integrated apple management production). Finally, the
discussion about market-orientation and professionalism with all three owners/managers
of private packaging units and the AAC's leaders revealed the shortage in marketing
skills, since they referred to quality improvement in terms only of elements appertaining
to the core product, not the augmented product or the relationship with the downstream
actors. This might explain some of their difficulty to build bilateral relationships with
the downstream actors and differentiate their product.
Third, regarding the collective-management skills, the analysis revealed that this where
the Agia network suffers its biggest shortage of competencies. Agia farmers have
frequently concluded that a collective scheme could stop their unfair treatment by the
packers/wholesalers, but no one with sufficient leadership qualities to materialise a
sustainable and beneficial collective initiative was found. The interviewees indicated
that people, who tried to play a leading role, were proved to lack a series of critical
skills, such as: understanding of and ability to communicate effectively crucial
cooperative principles (e.g. transparency; equity; justifiability; democracy; discipline) to
the critical mass; capability of detecting possible pitfalls; ability to inspire and convince
the critical mass for their honest intentions; and capability of coordinating and tackling
crises and indiscipline. Hence, incidents of lack of meritocracy, impartiality and
transparency unavoidably appeared sooner or later, indicating usually the dissolution of
farmer partnerships. The interviewees used the failed examples of farmer groups and the
AAC to confirm the lack of collective-management skills of those leaders. However, in
the course of scrutinising the interviewees' perceptions and relating them to their
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actions, it emerged that the deeply rooted suspicion embedded in Agia farmers'
perception creates such hostile conditions for a collective scheme to flourish that only
someone with exceptionally strong leadership qualities and long-gained trust on his/her
face could dilute this suspicion. In other words, even the critical masses in Agia case
tend to be relatively less receptive to directions or rales given by a leader. Evidence is
provided by the case of the current AAC leaders, who appeared to have the
aforementioned list of collective-management skills, but they straggle to convince Agia
farmers to support the reformed AAC. However, the accumulated debts and discontent
stemming from past nepotism experiences of farmers as AAC members, combined with
the fact that still no rule for exclusive delivery to the AAC exists, made few local
farmers accredit the reformed AAC.
Agia packers/wholesalers appeared to lack both the interest to support a collective
initiative and the collective-management qualities to inspire bilateral relationships with a
stable production base of local farmers. Only Xatzisalatas Ltd recently organised
successfully a farmer group following integrated apple production management,
however both the pioneer idea and model for packer-farmer relationship appeared to be
designed and strictly required by the multiple retailer rather than the packer.
Overall, a weak quality-orientation of farmers' production skills combined with a
considerable shortage in marketing/entrepreneurial and collective-management
competencies of Agia network actors were identified, which are intensified by the
deeply rooted defensive attitude towards other actors. These deficiencies explain why
both transactional and transformational performance outcomes of the Agia network are
weak.
8.6.3 The Agia Network: Governance
The third network feature that impacts on performance is network governance. The
higher the power distribution within network members and the accountability/formality,
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the better performance is expected (Thorelli, 1986; Johnsen et al, 2008). Additionally,
the existence of sufficient mechanisms for a) information/knowledge diffusion; b)
conflict-resolution/trust-building' and c) monitoring/evaluating/planning, enhances the
network's good performance (Grandori and Soda, 1995; Provan and Kenis, 2008). Since
in Agia case, weak market performance was identified, such features of Agia network
governance were not expected.
Regarding power distribution, for the three private enterprises the power is totally
concentrated on the entrepreneur/manager, who neglects farmers' needs and interests.
Fanners complain for an extortionate penalty for indiscipline in quality restrictions and
discriminatory treatment on behalf of the packers. Even in the AAC where the
cooperative members vote for the board of directors, the leaders used to exhibit a
nepotistic behaviour, which abrogated the cooperative's democratic and fair principles.
The AAC members lack opportunities to gain management and marketing expertise, so
they have formed political cliques fighting to gain access to the power. Overall, the
striking imbalance of power distribution in the Agia network, combined with the
individualistic attitude of those on power, helps to explain why some network members
feel neglected and show little discipline and loyalty.
As regards accountability/formality, the Agia network is- characterised by loose inter-
firm relationships based on verbal agreements, frequently violated by both sides, the
packers and fanners. The lack of a contract, an obligation for exclusive supply, stable
and clear specifications regarding the quality-rewarding system leaves room for
opportunistic behaviour from both the packers and farmers. However, the latter are in
the most disadvantageous position when they are paid for the delivered production either
in unfavourable conditions or not at all, but they cannot take legal action against the
packers, due to the lack of evidence. It also eternalises the problems of unsecured scale
economies, huge quality variability and frequent farmers' switching among the packers.
Due to the information asymmetry and quality uncertainty, the transaction costs are
considerably increased and little value is added to the product. With the existing Agia
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governance, it is almost impossible to identity who accounts for the weak transactional
and transformational outcomes. Overall, the lack of accountability and formality of the
Agia network creates confusion to its members regarding others' intentions, the proper
product quality and attitude towards other network actors. This confusion is also
reflected in the lack of a clear strategy to distinguish Agia apples.
For the three private enterprises, the only mechanism for information/knowledge
diffusion and conflict-resolution/trust-building is the informal personal discussion
between the packer and the farmer. However, having little faith in others' words,
actions and commitment, both sides keep a defensive attitude by sharing little
information in order to protect themselves and increase their bargain power. By being
less open, they feel less vulnerable. Also, due to past experiences with the particular
actor or others, each side doubts whether what is discussed or agreed will coincide with
the actions following. For instance, the packers deem useful to avoid transferring
information/knowledge to the farmers regarding the market conditions, because this
information can reach their competitors or increase the farmers' bargain power. Because
all these informal personal discussions are not recorded, each side can later alter their
initial positions and report a different, more favourable version of the past discussion.
Therefore, there is no evidence to justify the arguments of each side in case of a
disagreement. Trust shocks occur, because Agia network actors vaguely blame each
other. For the AAC, it was also found that the formal general meetings proved very
insufficient, since those assessed (i.e. president, general manager) coincide with those
used to fall into nepotistic behaviour and those provide the information needed for
assessment. In conclusion, the Agia network suffers from disinformation and lack of
trust, owing to insufficient mechanisms for information/knowledge diffusion and
conflict-resolution/trust-building. This also explains the weak transactional and
transformational outcomes.
Regarding monitor/evaluating/planning, there is no established mechanism, since the
network is characterised by frequent fanners' switching among the packers. Therefore,
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even if the packers are satisfied with the collaboration of the previous year with the
fanners, they cannot plan to continue it next year, since they do not know which farmers
will finally select them to deliver their production. As a result, the Agia network actors
struggle to discover, effectively communicate, and deal with deficiencies in governance
and competencies, so weak transactional and transformational outcomes occur.
The two farmer groups following integrated apple production, one initiated by
Xatzisalatas Ltd and another by the current commanders of the AAC, differ in
governance from the typical packer-farmer relation described above. The power
distribution remains the same, however, the packers' individualistic attitude has been
replaced by a deliberate effort to support a bilateral relationship. It is via regular
informative meetings that the fanners become familiar with the higher production
restrictions of the integrated apple production and the market challenges that the packer
and the farmer are called to face in collaboration. To produce the certified product
quality, the farmers need to cover extra costs and participate in the on-going
training/administrative support offered by the packer. Therefore, both sides are
encouraged to show commitment, communicate effectively their needs and build trust.
These regular informative meetings give the packer the opportunity to resolve early any
conflict and also monitor the group's progress. The packer-farmer relationship gradually
was found to gain some formality and accountability, since the farmers obtained the
"feeling of belonging" in a specific group and the packer felt stronger the commitment
to treat fairly these fanners, rewarding their cooperative attitude. Overall, the integrated
apple production created extra costs and needs, which neither the packers nor the
farmers could face alone, so a close collaboration was needed to flourish. Such a
bilateral relationship could not emerge from the existing governance, therefore the
network actors were forced to introduce a novel governance. This introduction was
justified by two reasons: (i) that the integrated apple production was an unknown
production system and (ii) that for Xatzisalatas Ltd, a powerful customer, Carrefour-
Marinopoulos Ltd, demanded product of certified quality.
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Overall, the existing governance of the Agia network was proved insufficient to deliver
stable scale economies and optimum product quality, mainly because of the lack of a
contract, fair and clear specifications of the quality-rewarding payment system and the
absence of obligations for exclusive supply. These deficiencies create confusion, which
dramatically affects the inter-firm relationships. The observed loose network linkages
partially result from the existing governance structure, however they reflect the deeply
rooted perception of the Agia network actors that "less commitment and input to the
network protects and benefits better the network member". Due to past negative
experience and lack of competencies, the Agia network actors struggle to imagine
anything different than their individualistic approach towards the network, since they do
not believe that long-term bilateral inter-firm relations can flourish. Therefore, the whole
network governance is structured in a way that serves short-term unilateral relationships.
However, a vicious cycle is created, because the existing governance structure increases
the existing notable diversity in members' profile and the shortage in their competencies.
The case of the integrated apple production was exceptional, since the network actors
perceived it as a completely different production method. A change in their attitude,
perceptions and network governance was more accepted by Agia network actors, given
the novel needs occurred.
8.7 Summary
This Chapter has reported the findings regarding the historical evolution of the Agia
network and the factors influencing it, as well as the network's current structure,
performance and analysis of its key features.
Overall, the analysis identified the Agia case as exhibiting the weakest, most fragmented
network relations, manifest in frequent switching between partners in the supply chain
and a continuous entry and exit of packing enterprises. As a result, the network exhibited
weak transactional and transformational outcomes. The physical and technological
constraints appeared to leave leeway to actors to embrace opportunistic behaviour,
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which the existing governance could not prevent, due to the lack of a contract, a quality-
rewarding payment system and obligations for exclusive supply. Despite the unfair
treatment o'f fragmented Agia fanners by the packers, efforts to establish a
"countervailing power" network often failed, owing to the lack of pre-existing social
cohesiveness. Evidence of how public funding upset the market balance and in the long-
term encumbered inter-firm relationships has been provided. Weaknesses were also
identified in terms of high profile heterogeneity and a considerable shortage in
marketing/entrepreneurial and collective-management competencies of Agia network
actors. The case showed that the lack of faith in their own capabilities and other actors'
intentions constitutes a fragile basis for collective action. Furthermore, the knowledge
networks that the Agia actors used tended to be domestic rather than European in
orientation, and were characterised by inferior flows of information. The Agia case
illustrates how and why a vicious circle of lack of faith, commitment and success was
created. Furthermore, it also vividly depicts the defensive attitude of actors to
networking, how this attitude has been formed and its negative implications in long-term
inter-firm relationships.
All the four case studies comprising the empirical research have now been presented in-
depth individually. The Thesis now turns to presentation of a cross-case analysis, in
which cross-cutting themes, issues and explanatory factors in SME network evolution
and performance can be combined. The intention is to add further value to the empirical
research results, and develop further a theoretical model of the phenomena under
investigation. The cross-case comparison is the subject of the next Chapter.
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Chapter 9: Cross-Analysis of the Case Studies
9.1 Introduction
After the systematic analysis of each case separately, this Chapter presents a cross-case
comparison. The aim is to recapitulate core findings from each case, to identify
important factors for SME network evolution and performance and to further develop a
theoretical model conceptualising how network context, and features influence
performance.
The Chapter begins by summarising the key results of each case. Then, the impact of
contextual factors on network evolution, and network features on performance is
described across the cases. The Chapter continues with a presentation of a revised
theoretical model, which constitutes a key original contribution of the Thesis and
concludes with a summary.
9.2 Overview of the Case Studies
In order to promote the undertaking of a cross-case comparison in the empirical
research, four 'instrumental' case studies were selected, following methodological
protocols described in Chapter 4 (Table 9.1). These cases possessed rival features
regarding two selection criteria: (i) the level of processing involved in the end product
(processed or not), and (ii) the apparent network market performance.
This case selection reflected two initial expectations. Regarding the first selection
criterion, cases one (Blauel) and three (Zagorin) having apparently good market
performance were expected to be characterised by strong inter-firm relations,
particularly amongst farmers, in contrast to cases two (Kefalas) and four (Agia), which
demonstrated apparently weak market performance. Regarding the second criterion,
supply chain actors of both apple cases were expected to coordinate their activities more
easily than the olive oil cases and be more market-oriented, because unprocessed
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products require less transformation to turn raw materials into finished products, so
fewer types of supply chain actors are involved.
Table 9.1: Case Study Selection
Apparent Market Performance
Strong Weak
Level of Processed CASE 1: CASE 2:
Processing Product 'BLAUEL 'KEFALAS
(olive oil) ORGANIC ORGANIC
OLIVE OIL' OLIVE OIL"
Fresh CASE 3: CASE 4: 'AGIA
Product * ZAGORIN APPLES'
(apples) APPLES'
The analysis revealed that both expectations were not always borne out. The Blauel case
had exhibited strong market performance, despite rather weak inter-firm relations
appeared for farmers outside Saidona village. Furthermore, despite the longer supply
chain for organic olive oil, strong vertical cooperation and market orientation were
exhibited in the Blauel case, but not in the Kefalas case. The latter exhibited, in practice,
weak performance, although it showed the strongest horizontal relationships among
fanners compared to the other cases. For the Zagorin case, both expectations were borne
out, while for the Agia case, despite the short length of apple supply chain, weak vertical
cooperation and market orientation appeared.
Despite the fact that the Kefalas case revealed that horizontal cooperation alone does not
secure strong market performance, all cases in the current research highlighted the
salutary impact of socially cohesive horizontal relations amongst farmers on
achievement of scale of economies, diffusing pioneer ideas and changing farmers'
attitudes.
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Following one of the research objectives, this Chapter cross-analyses the cases to
identify contextual factors influencing network evolution, with emphasis on which
factors overall encumber or reinforce inter-firm relations over time (Section 9.3).
However, the preliminary results suggest that network features are factors influencing
not only network evolution, but also its performance. Therefore, these network features
are identified in Section 9.4. Finally, the chapter seeks to explain differences in
performance of the four case studies by cross-analysing both their contextual factors and
network features. In this way, a revision of the theoretical model of interplay between
context and features of a SME network proposed in Chapter 3 (the NCFO model) is
performed (Section 9.5). To conclude, two further factors influencing SME network
performance, not previously identified in the literature, were discovered from the cross-
case analysis and are discussed in Section 9.6.
9.3 Which Factors are Important to SME Network Evolution?
9.3.1 Theoretical Propositions from the Literature Review
As may be remembered from Chapter 3, three categories of contextual factors
influencing SME network evolution were derived from the literature: market conditions,
social cohesiveness, and external institutional support. Market conditions are divided
into five sub-categories: (i) recognition and differentiation of product by end customers;
(ii) unfair treatment of downstream actors; (iii) pressure of substitutes; (iv) quality
certification scheme as a pre-requisite to market entry; and (v) physical and
technological constraints.
Each factor was proposed to have an impact on the tendency of network actors towards
tighter or looser cooperation over time. Table 9.2 summarises the original proposals.
271
Table 9.2: Description of Contextual Conditions Influencing SME Network
Evolution and their Theoretical Propositions
I) MARKETCONDITIONS
* If a significant segment of end-users recognises and differentiates the product, this may enhance
tighter cooperation to develop quality products and brands. So, this factor has a positive effect on
SME network evolution.
* The pressure of well-differentiated substitutes and imitations is assumed to reinforce an existing
collective action, by making its members to realise "the strength of unity". So. this factor has a
positive effect on SME network evolution.
•The existence of very concentrated downstream channels or monopolies is assented to inhibit the
collective action of fragmented suppliers. This factor ears have a negative effect on SME network
evolution.
* //«»««', when the fragmented suppliers are in a disadvantageous position, due to unfair
treatment from the concentrated downstream actors, this is expected to have the opposite effect,
because fragmented suppliers join to a "countervailing power" network. It can also have a positive
affect on SMS network evolution.
* U is assumed that the physical and technological constraints increase production and marketing
costs, and by this way affect iMcrfirm relationships, due » both information asymmetry and quality
uncertainty, from the suppliers' side, quality brand-oriented processors are likely to adopt a vertical
integrated form, "virtual" (e.g. contract agriculture) or real (e.g. cooperatives}, rather than spot
markets. From the distributors' side, these processors usually establish long-term bilateral
relationships. This factor can have a positive effect on SME network evolution.
*Honever, these physical and technological constraints are expected to weaken cither real or
"virtual" vertical integrated forms, if mechanisms to obstruct repeated opportunistic behaviour of
some members arc absent or inefficient in the collective schemes, it can also have a negative effect
on SME network evolution,
•The participation in a quality certification system, as a precondition for market entry, is likely to
encourage fragmented SME suppliers to adopt a vertical integrated form, cither "virtual" (e.g..
contract agriculture) or real (e.g. cooperatives). So, this factor has a positive effect on SME network
evolution.
2) PXEXiSTMG SOClAL-COiiBSmxeSS & COMMUNALAT IN iNTERESJS/RERSEFflONS
•These two factors enhance the emergence and sttstainabilny of SME collective initiative*.
providing that a capable leader exists. So, this factor has a positive effect on SME network
evolution.
J/ EXTERNAlINSTITL'TiONAL SVPPOffi
* The externa) institutional support is likely to enhance the emergence and sustainabiiity of SME
collective initiatives, nrovidine trot it respects SME network's autonomy and self-management, and
promotes their flexibility and efficiency. So, thif factor can have a positive or negative effect on
SME network evolution.
272
9.3.2 Results from Cross-Case Analysis
Across the case studies, evidence generally supported the five proposals regarding the
impact of market conditions on network evolution. However, whether strong inter-firm
relations actually emerged and how sustainable this was, seem to depend on the
interplay of these market-condition factors, explained in Section 9.3.3. Pre-existing
social cohesiveness and communality in interests/perceptions was the only factor that
played a decisive role in all the four cases. Moreover, it seemed to moderate the impact
of the remaining contextual factors on network evolution. This finding makes sense,
since high social cohesiveness indicates a pre-existing fertile ground for tighter
cooperation. Figure 9.1 summarises the results on the impact of contextual factors on
network evolution across the four cases and constitutes the basis for the analysis below.
The black colour of the bars indicates whether the contextual factor was decisive for the
network evolution of each particular case study, compared to the remaining contextual
factors. Longer bars also reflect higher impact on the network evolution. However, only
if the bars are black, do they indicate that the respective factors' impact was decisive for
the particular case study.
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Figure 9.1: Contextual Factors Encumbering or Reinforcing the Network
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(i) Effect ofMarket Conditions on SME Network Evolution
Amongst the five market conditions, only the factor "Concentrated downstream actors
and/or unfair treatment" was decisive for more than one case study, reflecting the
strong impact of unfair treatment by downstream actors on the fragmented suppliers of
the case networks. Having fumed over this unfair behaviour, the fragmented suppliers
(i.e. fanners) considered seriously the option of establishing a 'countervailing power
network', as evidence derived from the Blauel (Saidona), Zagorin and Agia cases shows.
The analysis showed that whether this thought of a countervailing power remained a
'wish' or was materialised, seemed to depend on past experiences of collective
initiatives, existence of a leader and a critical mass and degree of pre-existent social
cohesiveness.
In turn, downstream actors in the case studies usually reacted offensively to any
'countervailing power network' of farmers by making exceptionally attractive offers to
entice fanners to violate their verbal agreements. This represented a challenge for the
network. Findings from across all cases studies support these arguments.
The critical mass of farmers' collective schemes had two options: either give in or resist.
When the first offenders of the critical mass' verbal agreements appeared, the remaining
members of the critical mass faced the challenge whether or not to punish them in order
to prove cohesiveness, commitment to the initiative, discipline and belief/confidence of
'being capable of making this collective scheme work'. The Zagorin and Kefalas critical
masses isolated and punished any offenders, while Agia farmers did not. When all Agia
farmers'gathered and agreed on a common 'harder' attitude towards packers to ensure a
fair price for all, some big fanners finally dishonoured that commitment to collective
action and made personal agreements with the packers, who offered them enticing
prices. This decreased the bargain power of the smaller fanners. Offenders avoided
repercussions because their agreements were kept secret and the rest of the farmers had
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no mechanisms to impose any penalty. Overall, the research confirmed the literature's
argument that the unfair treatment of downstream actors encourages the establishment of
'countervailing networks' from the fragmented suppliers (Galbraith, 1980; Grandori and
Soda, 1995; Masurel and Janszen, 1998). However, it added a further refinement,
specifically revealing that this unfair treatment can also challenge the critical mass'
dedication to their new-formed collective scheme at the early stages of its development.
Blauel Ltd is a special case, because it was a standardising/packaging firm, not a farmer,
so farmers considered it as one more downstream actor. Therefore initially Blauel faced
a defensive attitude amongst fanners, who could not conceive of a relationship different
than being cheated. So, Blauel worked hard to convince farmers to let a fair relationship
fiourish. In contrast, Agia packers still struggle to build up mutual and loyal
relationships with farmers.
For the impact of the second market condition factor "Recognition and differentiation of
product by end customers", evidence from all cases supported the proposal that the
existence of such recognition encourages the establishment of quality brand-oriented
SME networks. However, only for the Blauel case this condition was decisive. Blauel
came to a country where organic farming and exports of standardised product were
unknown, but his links with Austria convinced him that there was a significant segment
of end-users recognising and paying a premium for organic food, quality, label and
origin. That the domestic consumers preferred conventional olive oil sold in bulk,
inhibited Blauel from focusing on the domestic market. Blauel's success revealed the
exporting potential of Greek olive oil, contingent on the introduction of organic practice,
standardisation and quality focus. Similarly, the Kefalas farmers were motivated to
collectively reap benefits from the significant segment of end-users abroad rather than
domestically.
The Agia case confirmed that since end-consumers hardly recognised the Agia origin,
low incentive existed for SMEs to form networks to improve product quality/brand. In
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the Zagora case, there were more decisive factors than consumer recognition for
triggering collective action, in particular, the unfair treatment by downstream actors,
however the strong recognition of the Zagorin brand does now convince ZAC members
of the unique benefits of collective action over working individually.
The third factor 'Pressure ofSubstitutes and Imitations' played a significant role only in
the Zagora case. Since 1992, Zagorin apples, as the product leading the market, faced
increased pressure of both substitutes (i.e. Italian brands) and imitations. The pressure of
substitutes strengthened the ZAC members' existing social bonds, conveying the
message 'in order to survive, we must stay united'. Furthermore, the research added a
further refinement, specifically identifying the importance of the pressure of imitations
misusing the origin/brand name. It forced the ZAC members to reconsider their decision
of denying farmers in the adjacent villages the right to be cooperative members, and
overcame their prejudices due to the lack of existing social bonds. The scope for this
expansion was to 'secure the brand ownership' by restricting access of domestic
imitators to supplies of Zagorin apples from the adjacent villages' farmers.
The Agia case exhibited no serious problem of imitations. Neither did Blauel refer to
any imitation issues. In contrast, Kefalas Ltd faced a few problems of imitations in the
domestic market. This, coupled with negative implications of the factor "Physical &
technological constraints", led Kefalas Ltd and other domestic SMEs to establish 'the
Association for Greek Agrifood Products of Certified Quality' to limit the illicit trade.
Moreover, the pressure of strong substitutes in a period of market slowdown resulted in
a "disillusion" for Kefalas stakeholders regarding their enterprise's competencies. This
strengthened their existing social bonds and commitment 'in order to siwvive, we must
stay united and adapt our competences to the market environment requirements'.
From the suppliers' side (i.e. farmers), the results confirmed that the fourth market
condition factor "Physical & technological constraints" increased considerably product
quality uncertainty and transaction costs, and .made the quality-oriented
standardising/packaging firms prefer to adopt a vertical integration form governed by
written rules and an interactive negotiation process, rather than spot markets. The
vertical integration form could be 'virtual' (i.e. contract agriculture) such as the Blauel
bio-program, or 'real' (i.e. cooperative organisation) such as Kefalas Ltd and the ZAC.
In the Blauel, Zagora and Kefalas cases, the effectiveness of these forms was
safeguarded by written contracts for exclusive supply, quality-rewarding payment
systems, and isolation or paradigmatic punishment of members with opportunistic
behaviour. In contrast, these safeguards were missing in the case of less quality-oriented
Agia actors. Hence, the Agia case confirmed that SME networks without the appropriate
governance structure leave room for the factor "Physical & technological constraints"
to weaken not only the horizontal network linkages, but also the vertical collaboration
between fanners and packers, by permitting repeated opportunistic behaviour, due to
information asymmetry and quality uncertainty.
From the distributors' side (i.e. wholesalers and retailers), the results confinned that
Gaia Ltd, a quality/market-oriented downstream actor, made its relationship with
Kefalas Ltd more bilateral, when it realised that Kefalas Ltd, being a well-organised
supplying network, could absorb more of its transaction costs than small fragmented
suppliers. The more that distributors recognised such an advantage offered by the
network of suppliers, the greater their commitment became to create bilateral
relationships. Indeed, both Blauel Ltd and the ZAC, enjoyed greater loyalty from their
customers than Kefalas Ltd, because they had communicated a much clearer advantage
of "scandal free reputation", market-orientation attitude and strong brand name to their
distributors.
In addition, evidence from the Blauel, Kefalas, and Zagora cases corroborated the fact
that standardisation units are keen to establish a long trustful relationship with
distributors in order to reduce the risk of remaining with a large stock of unsold product
or being paid on disadvantageous terms.
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The fifth market condition factor "Participation in a quality assurance/certification
system as a precondition for market entiy" was decisive for the Blauel case. Organic
farming was a less loose code of production practice, which required ability to monitor
and certify quality. This forced Blauel to adapt the governance structure. Particularly, in
order to establish the production base with the needed scale and efficiency, Blauel was
compelled to understand and 'eliminate' the deficiencies of local farmers. His response
was the Blauel bio-program, a contract offering strong support but imposing stringent
application of regulations. To achieve the same level of professionalism, scale
economies and internal coordination, the Kefalas enterprise was impelled to imitate the
principles of Blauel's 'virtual' vertical integration. A similar forced adaptation of the
1 ♦
governance structure was observed when integrated apple production management was
introduced in both the Agia (i.e. Xatzisalatas Ltd) and Zagorin cases, when stronger
support and stringency in regulation application was introduced in the packer-farmer
relationship.
Overall, the market conditions discussed above indeed influence Greek agrifood SMEs'
network activity and the evolution of the emerging collective schemes, tending to either
reinforce or dilute them. In fact, each of these market conditions seems to work as a
'pull or push' force to which the actors' responses vary, depending on the existence and
impact of other factors.
(ii) Effect ofPre-existing Social Cohesiveness on SME Network Evolution
The factor "Pre-existing social cohesiveness and communality in interests/pel'ceptions,,
was decisive for all four case studies. From the Kefalas case, it was evident that the
critical mass selection by the leader relied mainly on communality in
interests/perceptions, and that social cohesiveness seemed to be more a precondition
rather than a guarantee for effective collective action. Practically, the leader needed to
assess the compatibility between individuals' personality/behaviour and the philosophy
of the particular network initiative.
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All case studies bore testimony to the necessity of social cohesiveness for network (i)
creation, (ii) expansion and (iii) maintenance. In terms of network creation, the evidence
of Kefalas was presented in the previous paragraph. For network expansion, the Blauel
case exposes the evidence from farmers of Saidona, Valinisti and Kefalas villages,
where diffusion/application of innovative ideas accelerated due to high social
cohesiveness, helping Blauel to reach scale economies and economic success easier. In
terms of network maintenance, the Zagora case vividly depicts that despite the
significant social-political changes in Greece within the last 45 years, it was the social
cohesiveness that maintained the network, notwithstanding three initial disharmonious
observations. First, social cohesiveness was narrowed to smaller groups (i.e. cliques) and
expressed through communality in political beliefs, after the political disunion of the
Greek civil war. Second, for a long time, there was prejudice against collective action,
since it was considered as typical communist behaviour. Third, there were accidents of
governments' political intervention in farmer cooperatives through political cliques. The
Blauel and Agia cases also confirmed this discouraging political-social background for
each SME networking initiative. Despite these three aforementioned findings, the ZAC
was maintained. This happened because cliques were spots of higher 'within' social
cohesiveness, but social cohesiveness was also strong 'between' different spots. In fact,
social cohesiveness seems to reflect what has been recorded in the collective memory of
network members from past collective action experiences. Particularly, the ZAC
members had recorded that their personal economic interest and survival in past difficult
periods had been tightly linked to the ZAC's existence and profitability. The
interviewees expressed it as the notion of a "common pocketTherefore, while later the
ZAC members suffered from political intervention and cliques, they still showed strong
commitment to the ZAC. In other words, strong cohesiveness between spots (cliques)
prevented them from becoming independent from the ZAC.
In contrast, Agia farmers had recorded in their collective memory that the AAC and
every other collective scheme were not possible to sustain due to the commanders'
nepotism. Moreover, even before incidents of political intervention and cliques occurred,
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Agia farmers had no past positive experience of collective action. So, now a deep
suspicion on any collective initiative exists, reflecting the weak social cohesiveness both
'within' and 'between' different spots/social groups.
The Blauel case is a special one. Since Blauel Ltd is a private enterprise, the farmers see
it as nothing more than an exceptionally supportive and fair downstream actor, a fact
which explains why their vision does not always coincide with Blauel's objectives. This
revealed a lack of 'between' spots social cohesiveness. Since there were only spots of
strong 'within' social cohesiveness (i.e. farmer groups of Saidona, Valinisti and Kefalas
village), farmers tended to want to become independent from Blauel's collaboration. In
fact, the Blauel bio-program, a 'virtual' vertical integration form, increased the
confidence/interest of farmers of Saidona, Valinisti and Kefalas villages to establish
their own collective scheme, a real vertical integration form. Only Saidona farmers
wished but not dared the independence, since they admitted being too old for such a
demanding initiative. Therefore, for splintering network initiatives two preconditions
were discovered: young age and existence of a person with leadership qualities. The
Blauel bio-program both transferred 'tacit' knowledge ('school') of how practically to
build up a sustainable collective scheme, and changed the collective memory in terms of
farmers' capability to build a sustainable collective scheme. In contrast, fragmented
famiers, i.e. those lacking 'within' social cohesiveness tend to decrease their interest in
establishing their own collective scheme, i.e. 'countervailing power networks', when a
downstream actor such as Blauel Ltd offers a fair, supportive and secure contract.
Overall, evidence derived from all case studies supports the argument that pre-exiting
social cohesiveness dramatically affects the evolution of SME networks. However, the
research added a further refinement, specifically identifying the importance of
distinguishing between 'between group' and 'within group' social cohesiveness, and the
need to avoid of assuming that the vision, goals and priorities of these groups always
coincide.
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(Hi) Effect ofExternal Institutional Support on SME Network Evolution
Across the four case studies, three situations were observed concerning the factor
'External institutional support" sometimes there was: (i) complete lack of support,
sometimes (ii) existent but harmful support and sometimes (iii) existent and beneficial
one. Each of these is now discussed in turn.
The complete lack of "External institutional support" made each studied network
initiative vulnerable at its first stages. Particularly, the case study networks suffered
from shortage of valid information/knowledge on production, standardisation, marketing
4
and networking offered by public sources. They also suffered from gaps in legislation
regarding fair funding eligibility and trade. This is illustrated by the following
testimonies:
"The logic of maximising the absorption of the EU funding for the agrifood
sector, predominated, which proved detrimental. To avoid it, first we had to have
strict eligibility criteria, which would reward only those firms demonstrating
selected features, that the government wanted to promote, e.g. efficiency. Second
we ought to respect these criteria. For instance, when a subsidyfor standardised
olive oil was introduced by the EU, a series of standardising/packaging units
were built, which closed the day after this subsidy stopped, due to inefficiency. At
the same time, there was the State's weakness to control the illicit trade in the
domestic market. The combination ofthese two forces had a detrimental effect on
the development of the healthy, efficient agrifood companies which had to face
increased competition. On the contrary ifonly these healthy and efficient parts of
the industry were funded, this would work as a real stimulus for the rest to
develop. " [Magazine Editor]
"Greek olive oil companies learn about changes in the European regulations
only afterwards, although there is a sufficient discussion period of 1-2 years
before they are launched. The State does not inform agrifoodfirms in advance to
give them the opportunity to prepare. " [Magazine Editor]
"There are not the mechanisms that could make the existing public structures
work effectively. Greek agrifood SMEs need stable and effective public structures
and mechanisms to rely on. For example, with regard to the Hellenic Foreign
Trade Board (HEPO), agrifood firms need to know what the general strategy
direction is, how national campaigis are organised, what the eligibility criteria
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are, who has priority etc. These mechanisms need to have entity and duration,
not constantly changing and confusing the agrifood SMEs. " [Magazine Editor]
These deficiencies illustrated that the domestic agrifood business environment was
neither resource supportive, nor fairly regulated. In contrast, it set challenges for the
interviewed leaders both of the downstream side, i.e. the market, and of the upstream
side, i.e. the suppliers. From the downstream side, the case study leaders had to find an
alternative source of valid information/knowledge or protect themselves against
domestic illicit trade. Both Blauel and the ZAC general manager reacted by establishing
links with European knowledge/information exchange networks. In contrast, Agia and
Kefalas leaders struggled with defensive domestic networks, whose actors seemed to
I
abide by an unwritten game rule of "holding back information or giving out wrong
information as a market entry barrierThe four case studies provided strong evidence
for the existence of this rule-entry barrier.
Moreover, the lack of public support adjusted to the real needs of agrifood SMEs,
combined with increased market pressure, worked as a push factor for SMEs to establish
national collective schemes in order first to exert pressure on the government's policy
and second offer some of the needed institutional support. Actors of the four cases had a
leading part in the establishment of two associations, one for fresh fruits and vegetables
and one for certified quality products. Both associations were good examples of bottom-
up networking.
On the upstream side, the domestic agrifood business environment set a challenge for
the quality-oriented actors, because the lack of "External institutional support" resulted
in fanners' weak orientation to quality and customers' needs. Blauel Ltd, seeking to
differentiate itself through quality and market-orientation, was forced to educate local
farmers by itself, which "cost money, time and strength". In fact, the introduction of the
Blauel bio-program was imperative, not a luxury. The other three cases confirmed a
similar forced change to governance structure when quality certification was required, in
order to improve local farmers' quality and market-orientation.
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Regarding the existent and harmful "External institutional support", the ZAC and AAC
cases confirmed that past state policies harmed SME network development, such as
farmer cooperatives, when they did not respect/enhance networks' autonomy and self-
management, but aimed to promote political intervention. This, in turn, encumbered
collective schemes' efficiency, flexibility and sustainability. Moreover, the eligibility
criteria for funding that did not promote efficiency and sustainability proved destructive
for the domestic market balance. Consequently, efficient but not funded SMEs faced
vast market pressure exceeding sometimes their ability to cope. Interviewees from the
Blauel and Kefalas cases vividly depicted this phenomenon.
Regarding the existent and beneficial "External institutional support", the Kefalas case
revealed that SMEs benefit by being engaged in 'soft actions' guided by a network
facilitator such as the Peloponnesus Management Agency. For Kefalas Ltd, participating
in international fairs or organising local ones as a member of the SME cluster of the
Parnonas Quality Agreement, was recognised as the most efficient way for obtaining
'tacit' knowledge in entrepreneurial networking and marketing.
9.3.3 Effect of Interplay of Contextual Factors on SME Network
Evolution
Having discussed the impact of contextual factors on network evolution separately, this
section focuses on investigating their interplay. Drawing from results relating to market
conditions and social cohesiveness, it is identified that past collective experiences,
existence of a leader and a critical mass appear to be major influences on network
evolution by determining whether the notion to establish a 'countervailing power
network' remains a 'wish' or is materialised. For example, the Agia farmers lacked all
these preconditions, therefore their notion remained a 'wish'. In contrast, the existence
of leaders, critical mass and successful positive past experiences in the Zagora case
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permitted the 'wish' to be materialised. The Kefalas farmers believed that collective
action was a feasible solution, only after experiencing the Blauel bio-program, in other
words when they had experienced a successful incidence of collective initiative.
Evidence from all the case studies supports the argument that the stronger the social
cohesiveness, the higher its countervailing effect over certain contextual disincentives
for collective action e.g. offensive reaction of other market actors, and lack of vital
information/knowledge. In brief, the strong "Social cohesiveness & communality in
interests " encourages across tendencies to readily consent to and underpin a collective
action as well as to deal with difficulties as a group. Network actors who easily give up
are likely to be characterised by loose social cohesiveness. The positive impact of social
cohesiveness is fundamental in the early stages of network establishment, where
members' commitment relies more on beliefs/expectations of future benefits, rather than
on facts and successful experiences of the particular network. In fact, the critical mass
usually needs to believe first and then hopefully reap the promised benefits.
Despite the fact that social cohesiveness is an essential ingredient for SME network
development, progress can be made also in cases of weak social cohesiveness under
certain preconditions. The Blauel case revealed that a well-adjusted program to the
farmers' real needs (e.g. satisfactory income, security, respect, education in both farming
practices and market/cooperation oriented attitude) such as the Blauel bio-program, can
indeed address the problem of lack of social cohesiveness up to a degree. However then,
the program provider (e.g. Blauel Ltd) suffers from higher uncertainty and costs in
money, time, strength than in cases where social cohesiveness exists. In other words, the
research found that the existence of pre-existing social cohesiveness dramatically
increases the speed, spread and effectiveness of farmers' attitude transformation. In
Saidona village, thanks to pre-existing social cohesiveness, Blauel found the solid mass
of fanners needed to introduce his pioneer ideas of organic farming and standardisation
at such a scale to achieve economic success.
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Strong social cohesiveness is an indication of a potentially powerful critical mass of
members in a network. However, the research revealed that the extent to which an
external actor can control such a group remains questionable. The Blauel case revealed
that a solid mass should not be assumed to always serve an external actor's
goals/interests e.g. Blauel Ltd. When Saidona farmers collectively decided not to adopt
more of Blauel's innovative ideas or young Kefalas/Valinisti farmers decided to
continue independently, then Blauel could not dissuade them from serving their own
interests.
The cross-case comparison also demonstrates that the actors' orientation determines
*
whether the influence of certain market conditions on the network evolution will be
decisive or not. Actors more oriented to quality and the market, are keen on establishing
quality-orientation networks, therefore contextual factors such as "Recognition and
differentiation ofproduct by customers", "Physical & technological constraints" and
"Participation in a quality assurance systemhave a decisive impact on network
evolution. In contrast, for the Agia case, where quality and market orientation seem a
less vital issue compared to the other three cases, the three aforementioned contextual
factors did not played a pivotal role in stimulating tighter network interrelationships.
Moreover, quality-orientation networks appeared to coincide in practice with vertical
integrated forms, either 'real' i.e. cooperative or 'virtual' i.e. contract agriculture.
Overall, the cross-case comparison concludes first that all "Market conditions " working
as push or pull factors, set challenges for both individual SMEs and SME collective
schemes. Second, "Social cohesiveness & communality in interests " reflects the existing
perception/record in the collective memory regarding two fundamental questions: (i)
'Does a collective scheme serve better our personal short and long-term interests than
acting individually?' (ii) 'Are we capable of building a sustainable collective scheme?'
This thesis, through the example of Kefalas, showed how favourable changes in
collective memory could happen. Third, strong evidence supports that this collective
memory is dynamically constructed. Finally, "External institutional support" can be
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either an encumbering factor, adding more challenges for SME networks to challenges
set by the market conditions or an encouraging factor, under certain preconditions, by
providing opportunities to gain 'tacit' knowledge on how a sustainable SME network
can be built up. In fact, this thesis aims to describe a favourable direction for the change
of collective memory regarding the two aforementioned fundamental questions and to
explain the factors leading there. The next section analyses network features influencing
the network performance.
9.4 Which Factors are Important to SME Network Performance?
9.4.1 Theoretical Propositions from the Literature Review
Having discussed the contextual factors influencing network evolution, this section
addresses the question of what impact network evolution has on the performance
outcomes of individual SMEs and the whole network, in line with the third research
objective. According to Human and Provan (1997), the performance of SME networks is
assessed through transactional and transformational outcomes. There are three sub¬
categories of transactional outcomes: organisational credibility, access to resources, and
financial performance. The transformational outcomes are defined as how the network
participation changed the actor's approach to work with others instead of alone.
According to the theoretical propositions described in Chapter 3, three key features'of
SME networks are suggested to have an impact on performance: (i) members' profile,
both physical and attitudinal; (ii) members' competencies, of three types: production
expertise, marketing/entrepreneurial skills and collective-management capabilities; and
(iii) network governance in terms of five aspects: power distribution,
accountability/formality, mechanisms for knowledge/information diffusion, mechanisms
for resolving conflicts, mechanisms for monitoring/evaluating/planning. Table 9.3 below
summarises the original theoretical propositions regarding the impact of these network
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features on performance. The next sections draw together what the case study analysis
actually found out about network features and performance in practice.
Table 9.3: Description of Network Features Influencing SME Network
Performance and their Theoretical Propositions
1) DIVERSITY INMEMBERS' PROFILE
Low diversity and incompatibility in network members' profile, both physical and
attitudinal, is expected to be a weak stimulus for innovation, but to reinforce network
performance. (-)
2) SUFFICIENCYINMEMBERS' COMPETENCIES
Production related capabilities, marketing and entrepreneurial skills together with
collective-management capabilities affect network performance. If network members
have a sufficient range of these competencies, according to their responsibilities, the
network performance is enhanced. (+)
2) NETWORK GOVERNANCE STRUCTURE
A SME network is expected to perform well, if sufficient governance mechanisms exist
to regulate the following five main aspects of collective action: (i) power distribution
(ii) accountability and formality, (lii) diffusion of information and knowledge, (iv)
resolution of conflict and trust building and (v) monitoring, evaluation and planning. (+)
9.4.2 Results from Cross-Case Analysis
Across the case studies, the evidence yielded generally supported all the propositions
regarding the impact of network features on performance. However, it was found that
the impact on performance varied across sub-categories for each of the three key
network features. Furthermore, the extent to which transformational and transactional
outcomes were optimum, seemed to depend on the interplay of these factors (Section
9.4.3). Figure 9.2 provides a reminder of the performance outcomes of the four cases,
whilst Figure 9.3 summarises how the features of the networks contributed to those
performance outcomes.
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(i) Effect ofMember Profile Diversity on SME Network Performance
Regarding the feature "Diversity in members' profile", the Kefalas case had the most
homogenous member profile, both physical and attitudinal, except for a few isolated
offenders. This had a positive impact on both transactional and mainly transformational
outcomes. The homogeneity stemmed from the careful initial selection of the critical
mass of farmers by the leader, and the shareholders' small number.
The Blauel case had some unavoidable heterogeneity in the physical profile of farmers,
due to innate differences between those from Mani and Laconia, but a dramatic increase
in the attitudinal profile homogeneity was observed (over time. This homogeneity
influenced positively both transactional and mainly transformational outcomes. Despite
the large number of farmers supplying Blauel Ltd, the attitudinal homogeneity resulted
from the careful initial selection of participants into the Blauel bio-program.
Furthermore, BlaueTs intensive effort had a positive effect by transferring knowledge to
farmers and transforming their attitude, in terms of quality and market orientation,
professionalism, discipline, and reciprocal relationship between the farmers and Blauel
Ltd.
Figure 9.2: Transactional and Transformational Performance Outcomes of Blauel
(B); Kefalas (K); Zagorin (Z) and Agia (A) Case Studies
Problematic Semi-satisfactory Optimum
« ►
Transactional Outcomes a ♦ K ♦ B ♦ Z ♦
Transformational a ♦ z ♦ B ♦ K ♦
Outcomes
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Figure 9.3: Impact of Network Features Encumbering or Reinforcing the
Achievement of Transactional and Transformational Performance Outcomes of the
















For the Zagora case, heterogeneity in both physical and attitudinal member profile was
observed, intensified by the big number of ZAC members. This heterogeneity was
directly linked to less than optimum transformational outcomes. However, homogeneity
amongst farmers in terms of accepting the ZAC as the most beneficial option, being
willing to remain cooperative members and obeying the cooperative rules, secured the
ZAC's scale economies and high product quality. Therefore, this had a positive impact
on transactional outcomes.
The Agia case was characterised by high heterogeneity in both physical and attitudinal
profile of members, intensified by the big size pool of the Agia farmers. This high
heterogeneity was directly linked to problematic outcomes, both transactional and
transformational. However, high homogeneity was noticeable in the farmers' attitudes
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towards distrustful packers and collective initiatives of other fanners. As shown in the
Agia case analysis, farmers were switching between packers because they did not trust
them, and for the same reason collective initiatives failed.
(ii) Effect ofMembers' Competencies on SME Network Performance
All three types of network member competencies (i.e. production;
marketing/entrepreneurial skills; and collective-management) existed at a sufficient level
for good performance in the Blauel case. This was in contrast to the Agia case, where
the shortage of competencies was directly linked with weak performance, in terms of
both transactional and transformational outcomes.
The Kefalas commanders had strong production and collective-management
competencies, but insufficient marketing/entrepreneurial skills, which directly impeded
transactional outcomes. The exact opposite was observed in the Zagorin case. Despite its
traditional production skills and insufficient collective-management competencies, the
ZAC had optimum transactional outcomes thanks to its general manager's considerable
marketing/entrepreneurial abilities. The paradox with traditional production practices
used by Zagora farmers was that they secured high quality, but with high costs.
Overall, the conclusion regarding the impact of competencies on network performance is
that provided that production skills can secure high quality, it is only
marketing/entrepreneurial competencies that are necessary for optimum transactional
outcomes, as demonstrated by the Zagorin case. In contrast, both the Blauel and Kefalas
case studies show that it is collective-management skills that are more crucial for
transformational outcomes, as well as sustainability and high coordination within the
collective scheme.
(Hi) Effect ofNetwork Governance on SME Network Performance
Regarding the impact of "Network governance'" on network performance, the four cases
demonstrated that the sufficiency of this governance directly depends on the leader's
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collective-management competencies. Besides, this sufficiency appears to influence the
diversity of network members' profiles, especially the attitudinal one, and the
competencies of the network members/employees. On the one hand, evidence from the
Blauel case reveals how network governance can reduce the negative implications of
both high diversity in members' profile and deficiencies in their competencies.
Practically, the network governance structure needs to be consciously adjusted to
overcome these two weaknesses in profile and competencies, in turn resulting in a
positive impact on both transactional and transformational performance. On the other
hand, the Zagorin case illustrates how network governance, which ignores the issues of
diverse profile and low competencies, results in a rapid deterioration of both members'
profile diversity and lack of competencies, which consequently worsen the
transformational outcomes. The ZAC's governance structure primarily aimed to secure
scale economies and high quality, through sufficient accountability/formality (i.e.
quality-rewarding payment system; obligation for 10-year membership and exclusive
supply to the ZAC; and the cooperative's memorandum). Optimum transactional
outcomes ensued from this governance structure. However, the ZAC's problematic
power distribution, and insufficient mechanisms for information/knowledge diffusion,
for conflict resolution/trust building, and for evaluating/planning, were directly linked
with less than satisfactory transformational outcomes. The large number of ZAC
members intensified these weaknesses of the ZAC's governance structure.
The Agia case further illustrates how problematic network governance can rapidly
exacerbate both member heterogeneity and weak of competencies, and in turn
deteriorate sharply the transformational outcomes. The Agia case underlines the
importance of the existence of sufficient accountability/formality in network
governance. To illustrate, due to the lack of a quality-rewarding payment system, and a
obligation for minimum year cooperative membership and exclusive supply, the Agia
case could not secure scale economies and high quality-orientation. Consequently,
negative transactional outcomes occurred.
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9.4.3 Effect of Interplay of Network Features on SME Network
Performance
Overall, the case study analysis reveals that all three key network features are necessary
to describe a SME network and explain its performance. Interestingly, these features are
dynamic. However, in terms of relative importance to SME performance, results from
this research suggest that collective-management and marketing/entrepreneurial
competencies of the leader/s, or in other words, the constructor/s of the governance
structure are the most important factors influencing performance. This happens, because
the network governance structure as a tool cannot be more sophisticated than its
constructor's (i) collective-management competencies, (ii) marketing/entrepreneurial
skills and (iii) awareness level. Awareness here refers to actors' capability of assessing
correctly their own competencies, and the weaknesses and strengths of the whole
network governance structure, against the market challenges. It is noticeable that
negative implications of the network members' diverse profile and lack of competencies
can be alleviated by a network governance structure suitable to address these
deficiencies. However, the precondition is that these constructors are capable of (i)
identifying the network's problematic areas, including their personal deficiencies, (ii)
designing a suitable network structure or (iii) at least discovering the right training for
designing a sustainable structure. The Blauel, Kefalas and Zagorin case studies provide
strong evidence for this argument. Especially, the Blauel case reveals the importance of
the problem awareness' level of the leader/constructor. Particularly, the Blauel couple
initially faced serious difficulties with the existing governance structure, then realised
and admitted their deficiencies in collective-management and marketing/entrepreneurial
competencies, so they had formal training. As a result, a pioneering governance structure
was designed to enable flat hierarchy, flexibility and adaptability, through coordination
and internal flow of information/knowledge. Practically, Blauel's employees were
strongly motivated to improve self-expertise, and effectively communicate both their
needs and expertise. In contrast, the lack of the Kefalas and ZAC commanders'
awareness regarding deficiencies in both the network governance structure and own
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competencies, led the whole network to suffer, having a detrimental impact on both
transactional and transformational outcomes.
The minimum acceptable level of key features to ensure optimum transactional
outcomes are the quality and market orientation combined with scale economies. To
satisfy these preconditions, it is required: (i) considerable marketing/entrepreneurial
competencies, (ii) production skills securing at least high quality, if not also low costs;
(iii) accountability/formality64, and (iv) a minimum level of attitudinal profile
homogeneity, where actors accept the particular collaboration as the most beneficial
option and respect its rules. The Zagorin case provided the evidence for this conclusion.
i
For optimal transformational outcomes, collective-management competencies combined
with a sufficient network governance structure, especially designed to tackle problems
of heterogeneous member attitudes and lack of competencies, are required. Furthrmore,
it is noteworthy that the larger the network members' number, the larger the challenge
for the governance structure is, so the more sophisticated it needs to be (a fact
acknowledged by the interviewees themselves).
Finally, a clear finding from research was that the governance structure of a cooperative
enterprise or cooperative needs to be more sophisticated than that of a network
coordinated by a private enterprise, because it should transfer 'tacit' knowledge of the
three types of competencies to all those shareholders elected as cooperative commanders
in the future. In other words, the network ought to be an 'internal school for leadership'.
9.5 Explaining SME Network Performance: Context and Network
Features
Having analysed separately the results of the case study research on the impacts and
64
Practically, efficient accountability/formality usually entails a quality-rewarding payment system,
restrict obligation for certain-year collaboration and exclusive supply.
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consequences of contextual factors and network features, the purpose of this section is to
synthesise these insights to propose a theory of network evolution and performance. This
section proposes a novel model, which constitutes a key original contribution of this
Thesis.
9.5.1 Theoretical Propositions from the Literature Review
It may be recalled that in Chapter 3 numerous theoretical propositions relating to
network contexts, features and performance were derived from the literature and
combined in a tentative model ('NCFO' model). This model offered a summary of the
propositions and was employed as a starting point for the empirical study. Figure 9.4
illustrates the revised version of the 'NCFO' model, following empirical research and
suggested the interplay between the three components: network context, features and
outcomes. The revised model, based on empirical analysis, adds an important
refinement, specifically elucidating how the interaction of context and features of a SME
network influence performance. Briefly, the principles of this figure are as follows: The
context of a network appears to be a major influence on network's evolution over time
both in terms of its features and performance. However, the current research expands
this syllogism further by providing evidence that the features of an SME network are
key to explaining variability in performance displayed by SME networks operating in a
very similar context. Although overall network leaders and members are exposed to
quite similar contextual push or pull factors, they perceive and respond differently to
context, due to differences in their profile, competencies and existing network
governance structure. The same contextual stimulus can work differently for different
network actors. Some can perceive it narrowly as a threat, so they become defensive and
isolated, preferring individual over collective action. Others can be inspired or forced to
expand their networking/collective activity both in width and depth in order to
reach/create new resources. Interestingly, the way in which the actors perceive the
context, their position and power within it, are dynamically interlinked with their faith
and own capability in networking. Therefore, in the current research there were cases
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where the network actors responded to the challenges set by the context, through a
network setting. Certain network features, such as the diversity in physical and
attitudinal profile of members, their competencies and the governance structure, were
found to alter the effect of the contextual factors on network performance. In other
words, these features moderate the consequences of external forces on the network
function and outcomes. Overall, compared to its initial version, the revised 'NCFO'
model confirms the interplay of the three components, but further highlights the
explanatory power of network features' moderating influence on the context's impact on
performance (indicated with the blue arrow in Figure 9.4). Having presented the revised
version of the 'NCFO' model derived from the literature, this model will be applied to
i 4
each of the four case studies to explain, overall, the interplay of factors (i.e. network
context and features) and their effect on performance both for individual SMEs and the
networks as a whole.
9.5.2 Explaining the Performance of the Blauel Organic Olive Oil
Network
Before Fritz Blauel's initiative, the existing situation for this network was characterised
by unfair treatment offarmers by downstream actors, a lack of external institutional
support, and an absence of a domestic customer segment, recognising organic and
standardised product. The existing network governance structure was very loose, since
olive oil suppliers were fragmented, and lacked competencies (i.e. no organic
production/standardisation skills, no market knowledge, and no collective-management
skills). Both the physical and attitudinal profile of network members were
heterogeneous, particularly the fragmented suppliers lacked professionalism, quality
orientation, and had a defensive attitude towards downstream actors. Consequently,
weak transactional outcomes (i.e. sold in bulk, low product quality and recognition, low
bargain power) and no transformational outcomes were observed.
This situation changed when Blauel, a leader with strong collective-management and
marketing/entrepreneurial competencies, was attracted by the existence ofpotential
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Figure 9.4: Revised Model of Effects of Context and Network Features on SME
Network Performance (The 'NCFO' Model)
SME NETWORK
CONTEXT



















(FOP. DETAILS SEE TABLE*9.3)




Economic outcomes, resulting from SMEs* engagement in business networks are: (i)
financial performance, (ii) access to resources, and (Hi) organisational credibility. A
transaction makes recourses available at different network places.
2) TRANSFORMATIONAL OUTCOMES
Hon- outcomes, resulting from SMEs* engagement in business networks constitute the
changes in the way SME managers think and act. thanks to network participation. A
transformation creates "novel" resource from the combination of the existing ones.
consumers seeking organic products of high quality. Having understood the implications
of the participation in a quality assurance scheme, and of the physical/technological
constraints, Blauel realised the need of a system with a governance structure designed
t *
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to reduce diversity in network members' profile and lack of competencies (the Blauel
bio-program). The aim was to provide both transactional outcomes (i.e. secure price,
scale and supply coordination) and transformational outcomes such as transforming the
farmers' attitudes. Blauel tackled the hostile domestic business environment,
characterised by the lack of fair trade/funding legislation and marketing/networking
resources, through his own strong marketing/entrepreneurial skills. He sought
information/knowledge/training to the European exchange networks. Both the
innovation introduced by Blauel and performance outcomes were accelerated, when
Blauel met solid critical masses of farmers at Saidona, Kefalas, Valinisti villages, where
strong social cohesiveness pre-existed. However, the opposite happened when these
* (
critical masses abandoned collaboration or refused to adapt to all his innovative
propositions. Figure 9.5 visualises how the NCFO model is applied for the Blauel
present day network.
9.5.3 Explaining the Performance of the Kefalas Organic Olive Oil
Network
Before the establishment of Kefalas Ltd, the Kefalas farmers participated by 'chance' in
the Blauel bio-program (i.e. existence of external institutional support). Consequently,
they recognised the consumer segment appreciating the organic, standardised product of
high quality. In addition, they understood the implications of the participation in a
quality assurance scheme and physical/technological constraints. Hence, the Kefalas
fanners realised the need to imitate the principles of the Blauel bio-program, in order to
establish their own sustainable collective scheme. As participants in the Blauel bio-
program, the Kefalas fanners enjoyed both transformational and transactional
outcomes. Particularly, their attitude was transformed towards market orientation,
certified-quality and standardisation. They realised benefits of establishing reciprocal,
bilateral relationships with the downstream actors and got used to the recipient role of
knowledge/information transferred by the downstream actors. In terms of transactional
Figure 9.5: Application of the NCFO Model on the Blauel Case Study
BLAUEL ORGANIC OLIVE OIL CASE STUDY
• Old Contextual Factors:
\ Unfair treatment of farmers by downstream actors
x Absence of a domestic customer segment differentiating the product
x Lack of external institutional support (i.e. lack of fair trade funding legislation and
marketing networking resources)
x Pre-existing social cohesiveness only in one village (i.e. Saidona)
• Old Network Features:
x Loose and problematic governance structure (fragmented suppliers)
x Lack of competencies in quality production, market knowledge, and collective-
management skills
x Heterogeneous profile of farmers
• Old Network Performance:
=> Weak transactional outcomes (Le. sold in bulk, low product quality and
recognition, and low bargaining power)
=> No transformational outcomes
When Blauel came...
• New Contextual Factors:
"V Existence ofpotential consumers seeking organic product in Austria
"V Implications ofparticipation in a quality assurance scheme
\ Implications ofphysical/technological constraints
x Lack of external institutional support (i.e. lack of fair trade funding legislation and
marketing networking resources)
• New Network Features:
"V A leader with strong collective-management + marketing'entrepreneurial
competencies
Blauel sought information/knowledge and trainingfrom European exchange
networks, not only domestic ones
V A supportive governance structure (i.e. the Blauel bio-program) introduced in
Saidona village
V Farmers with homogenous profile selected
• New Network Performance:
=> Strong transactional outcomes (e.g. secure price, scale and supply coordination)
=> Strong transformational outcomes (olive farmers increased their professionalism,
quality orientation and stopped having a defensive attitude towards downstream
actors)
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outcomes, the Kefalas farmers added value to their product, served successfully a new
market segment, enjoyed a premium price and security in payment.
The change in performance was thanks to the village president, a leader with strong
collective-management competencies and entrepreneurial skills, for instance his
personal network of domestic public/administrative actors. Having absorbed the
principles of the Blauel program, he felt confident enough to establish a collective
enterprise, Kefalas Ltd. Supported by the strong pre-existent cohesiveness, the leader
found easily a solid critical mass of farmers (i.e. the 23 shareholders), having
homogenous physical and attitudinal profiles. A fake market opportunity was decisive in
bringing into effect the idea of establishing Kefalas Ltd. The offensive reaction of trade
brokers (downstream actors), offering shareholders enticing prices to break the unwritten
rule of exclusive supply to Kefalas Ltd (i.e. the factor of unfair treatment by downstream
actors) set a challenge in the earliest stages of the Kefalas enterprise. Very few offenders
arose and even these were isolated and punished. Thanks to the collective-management
capabilities of the leader, Kefalas Ltd turned successfully the challenge into an
opportunity to communicate the need for discipline and prove the effectiveness of the
existing network governance structure. However, the leader struggled to tackle the
hostile domestic business environment, due to the lack of external institutional support,
due to the lack of fair trade/funding legislation and marketing/networking resources.
This struggle also resulted from the leader's own weak marketing skills, because he
joined only the domestic information/knowledge exchange networks, and lacked a
personal network with trade actors. Later thanks to strong pre-existent cohesiveness,
Kefalas Ltd managed to overcome cash flow problems and self-fmance the enterprise,
avoiding bank loans. Recently, Gaia Ltd, a market-oriented downstream actor stalled to
prefer to cooperate with the well-organised Kefalas network, rather than a lot of
fragmented farmers, to reduce its transactional costs (effect ofphysical & technological
constraints). Also, the current Kefalas manager gained 'tacit' marketing and networking
knowledge by participating in the "soft actions", part of the Periphery's network
initiative "Pamonas Quality Agreement" (i.e. beneficial external institutional support).
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To address the serious implications of the lack of external institutional support and the
physical & technological constraints, as well as the pressure of imitations, Kefalas Ltd
became involved in the bottom-up networking initiative of establishing the "Association
of SMEs for quality-certified products". Despite the progress, Kefalas Ltd presents less
than satisfactory transactional outcomes, since 90% of total production is still sold in
bulk. Its transformational outcomes were almost optimum, because of the farmers'
transformation to shareholders of a collective enterprise. Particularly, the Kefalas
shareholders gradually obtained a long-term perspective, appreciating both tangible and
intangible benefits from collective action, prioritised collective benefits over personal
ones, accepted discipline, meritocracy and lack of special treatment, and became aware
of deficiencies in capabilities. Figure 9.6 visualises how the NCFO model is applied for
the Kefalas present day network.
9.5.4 Explaining the Performance of the Zagorin Apples Network
The unfair treatment by downstream actors, the social cohesiveness and the existence of
a leader with strong collective-management led to the establishment of the Zagora
farmer cooperative. It had an homogenous physical and attitudinal-members' profile and
therefore, enjoyed transfonnational and transactional outcomes such as surviving in
difficult times and increasing bargain power. The political intervention in farmer
cooperatives during the dictatorship and later the decade of 80's, caused dramatic
changes in the ZAC members' profile and challenged the existing governance structure,
since accidents of prodigal administration and internal political conflicts occurred. Also,
the political intervention narrowed down the social cohesiveness to groups with similar
political beliefs. In the meantime, the offensive reaction of some downstream actors,
offering enticing prices to violate the agreement for exclusive supply among the ZAC
members, challenged once again the ZAC's governance structure. Thanks to the
existence of leaders with considerable collective-management competencies, the ZAC
was revitalised after periods of defunction after dictatorship and the end of the 70's. The
current ZAC manager tackled the hostile domestic business environment through his
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Figure 9.6: Application of the NCFO Model on the Kefalas Case Study
"KEFALAS ORGANIC OUYE OIL CASE STUDY
Before the establishment of Kefalas Ltd:
• Old Contextual Factors:
\ Existence ofpotential consumers seeking organic product aboard
x Absence of a domestic customer segment differentiating the product
\ Strong external institutional support (Le. the Blauel bio-program)
Implications ofparticipation in a quality assurance scheme
\ Implications ofphysical'technological constraints
\ Pre-existing social cohesiveness in Kefalas village
• Old Network Features:
v A supportive governance structure (the Blauel bio-program) introduced in Kefalas village
v A leader with strong collective-management - marketing entrepreneurial competencies (i.e.
Blauel)
V Relative homogeneous profile of farmers
• Old Network Performance (as members of the Blauel bio-program):
=> Strong transactional outcomes (e.g. secure price, scale and supply coordination)
=> Strong transformational outcomes
After the establishment of Kefalas Ltd:
• New Contextual Factors:
\ Implications ofparticipation in a quality assurance scheme
v Unfair treatment of farmers by downstream actors (except for Blauel Ltd)
x Wholesalers offering farmers enticing prices to violate exclusive supply agreements to
Kefalas Ltd, when those agreements were verbal
x Lack of external institutional support (i.e. lack of fair trade funding legislation and
marketing networking resources), later increased support from Parnonas Quality Agreement
Initiative'
% Implications of physical'technological constraints, made market-oriented Gaia Ltd prefer
Kefalas Ltd over other fragmented suppliers
• New Network Features:
X A leader with strong collective-management and entrepreneurial skills, but * insufficient
marketing competencies (i.e. the village president), was later replaced by another leader with
similar skills
Both leader sought information knowledge and training onlyfrom domestic exchange
networks, not European ones
Veryfew offenders were isolated andpunished
Week vertical relationships: only Gaia Ltd ctnd only unilateral relationships
\ A supportive governance structure introduced, following the principles of Blauel bio-
program
V Farmers with even more homogenous profile selected
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Figure 9.7: Application of the NCFO Model on the Zagora Case Study
ZAGORIN APPLE CASE STUDY
1916-1964:
A Unfair treatment by downstream actors
A Strong social cohesiveness
a Existence of a leader with strong collective-management
=> Establishment of Zagora Apple Cooperative (ZAC) in 1916
a Homogenous members' profile
a Sufficient accountability formality
=> Strong transformational and transactional outcomes
1965-Early 1980s:
a Investments in processing, packaging & logistics especially after 1981, but * strong
political intervention in farmer cooperatives through legislation and funding (i.e. externa}
institutional support)
=> Challenged the existing governance structure which had * insufficient mechanisms for
conflict resolution and * for diffusion of information1 knowledge
=> Narrowing down the social cohesiveness to groups with similar political beliefs
> Wholesalers offering farmers enticing prices to violate exclusive supply agreements to
the ZAC
a 2 leaders with considerable collective-management competencies, punished offenders
and improved temporally a the mechanisms for conflict resolution and a for diffusion of
information knowledge
=> ZAC overcome challenges
Late 1980s:
x Increased physical and attitudinal heterogeneity in members' profile when later all political
groups joined the ZAC
x Commanders with insufficient collective-management competencies
x Insufficient mechanisms for conflict resolution and * for diffusion of information knowledge
=> A series of internal trust shocks
1990s: Brand development and market expansion
V The current manager has marketing entrepreneurial competencies
He sought information hiowledge and training from European exchange
networks, not only domestic ones
a Pressure of substitutes and imitations misusing the name (+)
Current Network performance:
=>Strong transactional outcomes, but
=>Suboptimal transformational outcomes, denoted by members' rigidity of views,
resistance to structural changes, and lack of transference of tacit knowledge.
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own strong marketing/entrepreneurial skills, by seeking information and knowledge to
the European exchange networks. However, except for the leaders, the other
commanders lacked collective-management skills, therefore designed weak governance
structures to tackle the increased physical and attitudinal heterogeneity of members in
the 80's. That period, all political groups joined the ZAC and high public funding was
offered (i.e. external institutional support), which however abrogated certain inspection
mechanisms and permitted political interventions. Given the large numbers of members,
the existing governance structure manages to secure only scale economies and quality
improvement, but the diversity in the ZAC members' profile and the deficiencies in
capabilities deteriorate over time. This evolution threatens the ZAC's sustainability and
..." 4
flexibility in decision-making process. The pressure of substitutes and imitations
strengthened the belief that surviving through the ZAC is the only option, but uncovered
the lack of modern production capabilities, so the urgent need for structural changes for
reducing production cost was revealed. The Zagora network presents optimal
transactional outcomes, but suboptimal transformational ones, denoted by the members'
rigidity of views, the difficulty to proceed with structural changes, the little transferred
'tacit' knowledge and the suspicion of prodigal administration. Figure 9.7 illustrates how
the NFCO model is applied for the Zagorin apples present day network.
9.5.5 Explaining the Performance of the Agia Apples Network
The unfair treatment of the downstream actors made the Agia farmers wish to establish
"countervailing power" networks, but because of the absence of a capable leader and
social cohesiveness, there has not been a solid critical mass to resist the downstream
actors' enticing offers, aiming to violate the farmers' unwritten agreements on exclusive
supply or a minimum acceptable price. Due to their lack of marketing/entrepreneurial
skills, both the farmers and packers struggle to tackle the hostile domestic business
environment, characterised by lack of fair trade/funding legislation and of enabling
marketing/networking resources. They rely only on the domestic defensive
knowledge/information exchange networks.
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The Agia Apple Cooperative (AAC) had a loose governance structure, permitting its
commanders' nepotism to flourish and lacking an obligation for exclusive supply, long-
term membership and quality-orientation. Besides, it is characterised by a heterogeneous
member profile and serious deficiencies in members' capabilities. In the late 80's, high
public funding (i.e. external institutional support) abrogated certain inspection
mechanisms and permitted political interventions. This deteriorated the implications of
the existing weaknesses in the ACC's governance structure, as a result, huge debts
accumulated. Now, the ACC is a prime example of a failed collective action.
Both the vertical collaboration between the fanners and packers and the horizontal
collective action such as the ACC, have been weakened dramatically by the implications
ofphysical & technological constraints. Practically, these constraints leave room for the
repeated opportunistic behaviour of some members, due to both the information
asymmetry and quality uncertainty. However, the absence of a suitable governance
structure to address effectively such a problem was observed. Particularly, the weak
accountability/formality of the existing governance structure was noticed, since a written
obligation for exclusive supply and long-term membership/collaboration as well as a
quality-rewarding payment system were absCnt.
Consequently, problematic performance outcomes were observed. Regarding the
transformational outcomes, the Agia fanners have a sneaky suspicion that the packers
cheat them, do not show loyalty to any vertical collaboration or horizontal collective
action, and seem to lack a market and quality orientation. So, they frequently switch
among the packers. The unilateral relationships with the downstream actors were found
to compromise the transactional perfonnance outcomes, since the Agia farmers suffer
from unsecured and unfair payment; low bargaining power; and little potential for
adding value due to the low product quality. Figure 9.8 illustrates how the 'NCFO'
model is applied for the Agia apples present day network.
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9.6 Further Factors Influencing SME Network Performance
Inductively Derived from the Empirical Study
To date, much of the literature on SME networks has concentrated principally on the
effects of horizontal cooperation on network performance, that is between members at
one level of supply chain. In the case of agrifood SMEs, classically this is taken to be
farmers. However, the cross-case comparison of the empirical research offers some key
insights into the configuration of SME network relations beyond horizontal cooperation
and their link to performance outcomes. Specifically, the analysis highlights the need to
distinguish between horizontal and vertical dimensions of network relations, and points
out in particular the importance of the strength of vertical relationships within a
network to good performance.
Figure 9.8: Application of the NCFO Model on the Agia Case Study
AGIA APPLE CASE STUDY
* Network Contextual Factors:
\ unfair treatment of farmers by downstream actors
* absence of a domestic customer segment differentiating the product
* lack, ofpre-existing social cohesiveness
* Lack of externa] institutional support (i.e. Sack of fair tradef'funding legislation
and marketingf'networkitig resources, political intervention on farmer co-ops)
* Implications ofphysical/technological constraints
« Network Features:
* laass. and problematic governance structure (fragmented suppliers)
x ACC: lack of accountability (no obligation for exclusive supply), mechanisms
for conflict resolution and information/knowledge diffusion, low power distribution
=>its commanders' nepotism & a series of internal trust shocks
x lack ofproduction, marketing/entrepreneurial, and collective-management skills
Actors sought information/knowledge only from domestic exchange
networks, not European ones
Weak vertical relationships
x absence of a capable leader
* N>twoik Pnfovw.ince
—> transactional outcomes (i e sold in bulk, low product quality and recognition,
low bargaining power, unsecure and unfair payment of farmers)
=> no transformational outcomes (repeated opportunistic behaviour, no loyalty,
suspicion, lack of market and quality orientation, defensive attitude towards
downstream actors, frequent switching between partners)
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A second finding from the cross-case analysis is the importance of openness of SME
networks to external sources of knowledge about the market to good performance.
This could be described in Granovetter's (1973) terms as the use of 'weak ties' to build
network performance. Particularly, the analysis emphasised how crucial is the nature of
relations that network leader(s) have with actors and institutions external to the network.
Both these additional factors influencing performance have been inductively derived
from analysis of the data, and therefore are novel and not pre-defined in the literature. In
fact, both these factors are manifestations of actors' strong entrepreneurial/marketing
skills that allow them to have a broad network horizon/picture. In other words, actors
with a high ability to recognise the strength of 'weak ties', and to build and exploit them,
are more likely to create value by establishing respectively either vertical relationships
within a supply chain or relationships with actors and institutions external to this chain.
Figure 9.9 shows a diagrammatic overview of the nature of these two types of relations
in each of the four cases.
9.6.1 The Role of Vertical Relations in Network Performance
Figure 9.9 clearly demonstrates the strong vertical relationships-of the Blauel and Zagora
cases, in contrast with the unilateral relationships of both Kefalas Ltd and the Agia
farmers with their downstream actors. The strength of vertical relationships helps to
explain the network performance. For example, in Kefalas, market performance was
weak in spite of strong horizontal relations between farmers, whereas in both of the
market-success cases - Zagorin and Blauel - tight vertical connections prevailed, even if
there were some weaknesses at the horizontal level.
As a conclusion, not only can the strength of vertical relationships vary across the two
dimensions within the same network, it may be that one dimension is more critical for
performance outcomes, especially transactional ones. For the cases in the current
research, it was the strength of the vertical, rather than the horizontal relations that
seemed most important. It is also observed that strong horizontal relations at the farmer
f
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Figure 9.9: Vertical and External Network Relations in the Four Case Studies
Apparent strength of relations between actors
High levels of vertical cooperation
High reliance on knowledge networks
Low levels of vertical cooperation
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level help to reach quickly the needed scale of production, but it was strong vertical
relationships that address the more sophisticated needs created by a market orientation
such as coordination, and the need for elaborating the needs/ideas of other supply chain
actors.
9.6.2 The Role of External Relations in Network Performance
Figure 9.9 clearly demonstrates that both market-success cases - Zagorin and Blauel-
have established frequent international relationships with external actors encountered at
international fairs and competitions, or through meetings of European associations such
as EUROFRU. Despite the loose character of such relationship, such international
assemblies take place against a backdrop of information/knowledge exchange activity.
Both Blauel and the ZAC general manager are keen on being involved in this exchange.
The Blauel case illustrates this, since here the bottling plant management showed
willingness to share knowledge with other actors both within and outwith the chain,
including end users and experts in the global organic product scene. This contrasts
markedly with the packers in the Agia case, who were found to adopt a highly defensive
attitude towards other actors involved in the Greek apple scene. This had a detrimental
effect on the novelty and diversity of information flowing through the relationships in
this case, placing the network in the position of market follower rather than leader. The
results of this research add a further refinement to these observations, specifically
identifying the importance of the geographic scale of external contacts and information
gathering to market orientation in the case firms. Whilst in Kefalas and Agia, managers
used domestic contacts and information sources, Blauel and Zagorin focused on
European networks. The latter benefited hugely from this more international perspective
because of the more advanced nature of markets for olive oil and apples in countries
outside Greece. Managers would pick up the cutting edge techniques and methods - e.g.
on integrated production management, quality assurance, relationship development -
and employ them in their own networks. In contrast, the domestic information gathering
in Kefalas and Agia, when it was performed, did not tap into this novel knowledge.
309
The aforementioned effects of external relations on SME network performance can be
explained with reference to Granovettor's theory of network relations. As Granovetter
(1973) indicated in his seminal article, it is often the 'weak' ties developed with key
actors external to a network that strengthen the position and performance of the network
itself. To create and secure their competitive advantage, Blauel and Zagorin managers
relied heavily on the cutting-edge knowledge/information derived from the "backdrop"
interaction with experts on a variety of issues. In this way, they scan the circumstances
and tendencies in the global business environment of the particular sector of interest;
anticipate future challenges and interactively elaborate sophisticated ways to respond.
4 *
Consequently, they adapted earlier and more effectively than competitors to emerging
market requirements. It is clarified that listening closely to those shaping opinions and
tendencies such as quality gurus, European committee representatives etc., is
fundamental for entrepreneurial SMEs to anticipate where the global scene turns its
attention; what the future challenges the supply chain will be called to meet; and
understand better the demands of the rest of supply chain actors. Besides, the power of
these "weak" ties to reduce the entrepreneur's anxiety in dealing with risks was
acknowledged.
"It is very important to work with the right degree ofrisk. Ifyou do not risk, you
go nowhere, but ifyou take too much risk, it is dangerous, and you also risk the
jobs positions you have created. The right balance is one of my main concerns.
When you start and your firm is too small then you have little to lose so you risk
more, but the more your company grows, the more careful you become.
However, then you have much more information derived from your network
linkages, which support you, so you still take risk but you have your network to
protect you. Now, I do things that seem more risky but there are not because I
have all the information I need. When I started I made decisions then I could not
fully understand their risk, due to lack of information." [The Entrepreneur-
Leader -The Blauel Case]
Therefore, it is reasonable why Blauel and Zagorin managers prioritised gaining of novel




To summarise, this Chapter has cross-analysed the cases and discussed: (i) overall,
which contextual factors influence evolution of SME networks, (ii) overall, which
features of a network are influential to its performance, (iii) how context and network
features, in combination, explain the performance of SME networks.
In terms of contextual factors, the countervailing effect of social cohesiveness over
contextual disincentives for collective action such as unfavourable market conditions or
lack of external institutional support, has been demonstrated. Social cohesiveness
reflects the existing record in the collective memory regarding the faith in collectivism
and network members' capability to build a sustainable collective scheme. It is
noticeable this memory is not static but dynamically constructed.
In terms of network features, the key findings state that negative implications of
diversity in members' profile, and lack of competencies on network performance can be
compensated by a network governance structure suitable to address these deficiencies.
The most decisive factor for the success of this countervailing effort constitutes the
collective-management skills, marketing/entrepreneurial competencies, and awareness
level of the constructor(s) of the network governance structure. This is reasonable
because the governance structure as a tool cannot be more sophisticated than its
constructor. Additionally, for optimum transformational outcomes, a more sophisticated
governance structure is required than that securing optimum transactional outcomes.
In terms of explaining how context and features, in combination, explain the SME
network performance, the research revealed that the context influences the network
evolution over time both in terms of its features and performance. However, the features
of a SME network are central to any explanation of variety in performance displayed by
SME networks operating in a very similar context. In fact, these features are found to
moderate the consequences of external forces on the network function and performance
outcomes. Evidence suggests a dynamic interplay between network context and features.
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Finally, cross-case analysis identified two novel factors influencing SME network
performance: the strength of vertical relationships and the reliance on relations with
external actors and institutions, preferably from an international product scene.





This thesis has comprised an investigation of how SME networks evolve, the reasons for
this evolution, and the implications for performance, both in terms of individual SMEs
and the entire network from the supply side as a whole. Throughout, the investigation
has placed the phenomena within a social-economic context.
This thesis has introduced the topic and research objectives, reviewed the relevant
literature, reported the empirical study, apd described and analysed in detail the results.
This Chapter aims to draw together the main findings. Furthermore, it contemplates the
practical implications and the theoretical insights, which have been gleaned. Finally,
limitations and avenues for future research are also discussed.
The structure of this Chapter consists of a first part putting the study into context and
recapitulating the research objectives. The second part reports the main findings for each
topic, including the network features, context, and performance. A third part describes
the practical implications of the research for SME and network managers as well as
policy makers. Finally, reflections are expressed on theoretical implications and
limitations.
10.2 The Study In Context: a Recapitulation
The starting point for this investigation was the observation of increased popularity of
networks amongst researchers and policy makers as efficient structures for stimulating
the competitiveness, productivity and innovation of SMEs. This shift results from the
perception that SME networks have positive outcomes that could not be normally
achieved by individual organisations acting independently (Provan and Kenis, 1997).
Yet these premises about unique capabilities of networks in creating economic
opportunities for SMEs required further investigation. Empirical evidence suggested that
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a highly diverse range of networks exist and their evolution and performance cannot
always be anticipated. Consequently, the following key research objectives were raised
for this PhD:
1. To describe the key features and trace the evolution of a sample of SME
networks, as whole entities, within the Greek agrifood sector
In the light of absence of a uniform set of theory-based terms assessing different
properties of SME network configurations (Grandori, 1997), this research sought key
descriptive network features. The term of network configuration referred to both
structure and governance. Furthermore, this research sought to trace the historical
evolution of these network features and performance outcomes. Both a static and a
dynamic description of SME network configurations are needed to capture the dynamic
character of interfirm relationships, suggested by the literature.
2. To identify the key factors influencing the evolution of these networks, both in
terms ofcontextualfactors and networkfeatures
This involved an investigation of contextual factors influencing the network evolution
and examination of the interplay between these contextual factors and network features.
At the network level, emphasis was placed on (i) linking certain features of network
configurations with certain outcomes, and (ii) explaining how network configurations
shift or change over time in response to contextual or environmental circumstances, (or
indeed, how they do not shift or change).
3. To build a theoiy ofhow the context and features of these SME networks impact
on the performance outcomes of individual SME members, and the networks as
whole entities
In view of the knowledge gap relating to SME network performance, in terms of how it
can be explained, and what really influences it, the third objective of this research is to
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build a theory of how the context and features of the SME networks impact over time on
the performance outcomes of individual SME members, and the networks as whole
entities. This objective is valuable academically because first the existing literature
suffers from mainly discussing network impacts on individual SMEs, rather than the
whole network. Second, although it stresses that a network can be ineffective and fail, as
evidence for Greek agrifood SME networks shows, performance has not been linked
with network evolution, which appears hard to anticipate. By considering the interplay
over time between a network's features, context and outcomes, a theory linking these
three components goes beyond the limited traditional focus of research on each
component separately. Instead, it captures the dynamic interactions of particular
I I
endogenous (e.g. features) and exogenous (e.g. context) factors on network performance,
and in turn enables practitioners to understand the tradeoffs and management challenges
they have to face, their role and power, if any, in network evolution. The ultimate goal
of this research is to identify key critical conditions for the existence/feasibility and
effectiveness of agrifood SME networks.
Having set out these questions, the literature review provided a list of theoretical
propositions regafding contextual factors influencing network evolution and network
features affecting performance. These propositions were used as a starting point in
systematically analysing the four case studies. The methods and results were presented.
The cross-case comparison Chapter examined each of the aforementioned propositions,
with a view to exploring the interplay of variables discussed, providing a summary of
the overall conclusions from this study with respect to the above questions. The
following sections elaborate further the conclusions derived from Chapter 9.
10.3 Conclusions Relating to the Description of SME Network
Evolution
This research proposes that a network configuration can be satisfactorily described by
three key theory-based properties: (i) the profile of network members, (ii) their
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competencies, and (iii) the network governance structure. Each of these network features
is explained under distinctive aspects derived from literature. Particularly, the diversity
in profile of network members was analysed in terms of both their physical and
attitudinal aspects. The sufficiency of competencies of network members was discussed
regarding their production expertises, their entrepreneurial and marketing skills as well
as the management capabilities of a collective scheme. Finally, the discussion about
network governance structure comprised aspects of balanced power distribution and
increased accountability/formality of the inter-firm relationships. Moreover, the
effectiveness of existing mechanisms were discussed regarding the diffusion of
information and resolution of conflicts among network members as well as
# *
monitoring/planning of the network activity.
Furthermore, the counterbalancing effect of the network governance structure over the
negative implications of either members' diverse profile or/and lack of competencies on
network performance, is a significant finding of this research. A network governance
structure intentionally constructed to address such deficiencies appears capable of
alleviating them. However, the competences of the constructor(s) is found the most
decisive factor for its succ'ess, since the network governance structure cannot be morfe
sophisticated than its constructor. Particularly, collective-management skills,
marketing/entrepreneurial competencies, and awareness level of its constructor(s)
directly influences the efficiency and effectiveness of the network governance structure.
The governance structure of a cooperative enterprise or cooperative needs to be more
sophisticated than that of a network coordinated by a private enterprise, because it
should transfer 'tacit' knowledge of the aforementioned three types of competencies to
all those shareholders elected as cooperative commanders in the future. In other words,
these networks ought to work as an "internal school for leadership".
By tracing the historical evolution of inter-firm relationships of particular SME
networks, this research confirmed their dynamic character, the path-dependency of
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strategic choices of actors involved and the necessity of investigating network linkages
against time and space (Crouch and Farrell, 2004; Provan et al., 2007).
The findings corroborate the thesis of Halinen et al. (1999) that behind the network
evolution, there is an on-going perception evolution process, taking place. This research
provides evidence about how changes in perceptions are reflected in attitudes and
behaviours regarding collaboration and networking. These changes constitute
transformational outcomes. Specifically, strong barriers to networking are found to
originate in prejudices held by the actors that there is no room for cooperation between
'them ' and 'others', either competitors or actors from other stages in the supply chain or
sectors. To overcome such barriers/prejudices in networking, an external actor is needed
to get involved and introduce a different mentality in the traditional inter-firm
relationships. This external actor could be an entrepreneur (such as was found in the
Blauel case), or a network facilitator organising a "top-down" initiative (such as the
Parnonas SME cluster in the Kefalas case). Facilitators can try to eliminate the 'the
others' prejudice and accelerate the maturation of conditions for collaboration among
actors typically categorised/thought as separate segments. Breaking the prejudices and
discovering areas/ways for collaboration and exchange of'tacit' knowledge between the
actors, encourages the synthesis of novel ideas. This research empirically confirms the
capability of SME networks to create new resources that are difficult to replicate via
markets and hierarchies (Uzzi, 1997).
10.4 Conclusions Relating to Factors Influencing the Network
Evolution
This research confirms the necessity to include network context in an investigation of
network evolution (Provan et al., 2007). The influence of context was proposed to be
bestowed through the impact of three key contextual factors, derived from the literature:
market conditions, social cohesiveness and communality in interests amongst members
as well as external institutional support. "Market conditions" were explained under
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distinctive aspects. Particularly, what was examined included: (i) the impact of product
recognition and differentiation by end consumers, (ii) the pressure of imitations and
well-differentiated substitutes, (iii) the existence of concentrated downstream actors who
may also treat upstream actors unfairly, (iv) the role of physical and technological
constraints, and (v) the impact of participating in quality certification systems as a
precondition for market entry.
The findings of the cross-case comparison suggest first that all "Market conditions " set
challenges for both individual SMEs and collective schemes, either as push or pull
factors. Second, "Social cohesiveness & communality in interests" reflected the existing
*
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so far perception/record in network members' collective memory regarding their faith in
collectivism and their own capabilities to build a sustainable collective scheme. Third,
even more complex impacts of "External Institutional Support" were identified: on the
one hand, it was found to be a destructive force when it entailed political intervention on
collective schemes, but on the other hand, also capable of reinforcing collective action
under certain preconditions. Particularly, if "External Institutional Support" transfers
'tacit' knowledge on how a sustainable SME network can be built up, prevents illicit
trade and respects networks' autonomy and self-management, it can promote strong
SME network relations. Otherwise it adds challenges to those set by "Market
conditions
This research also reveals the countervailing effect of social cohesiveness amongst
network members over contextual disincentives for collective action, such as
unfavourable market conditions or lack of external institutional support. Moreover, the
stronger the social cohesiveness between members, the higher its countervailing effect.
In brief, strong "Social cohesiveness & communality in interests" implies people's
tendency to readily consent to and support the network initiative as well as to deal with
difficulties as a group. That is why it is fundamental in the early stages of network
establishment, where members' commitment relies more on beliefs/expectations of
future benefits, rather than facts and successful experiences from the particular network.
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Specifically, the critical mass usually needs first to believe and later hopefully reap the
promised benefits.
Evidence from the research also finds that both the network actors1 belief about 'what is
feasible' and commitment to particular network linkages/initiatives are dramatically
influenced by expectations and past experiences. What was discovered is that there is a
preconception about 'how far it can go' that accompanies each inter-firm relationship or
network initiative, which, in turn, has a multiplicative effect on attitudes and behaviours,
either positive or negative depending on the original preconception. For example, actors
with negative experiences of inter-firm relationships (such as Agia actors), tend to
become more defensive and reluctant to share information with others. In contrast,
actors with positive experiences (such as Fritz Blauel and the ZAC manager, who
benefited from European information/knowledge exchange networks), tend to be more
open, believe and invest in network linkages.
Many actors having similar experiences and sharing their beliefs about 'what is feasible'
and 'what is worth doing' creates the collective memory reflected in social_cohesiveness.
This appears not static but dynamically constructed thfough an on-going trial and error
process. Spots of strong "within" social cohesiveness such as the farmer groups of
Saidona, Valinisti and Kefalas villages, believed the benefits of collective action, but
lacked the confidence of establishing it after past effort with little success. The Blauel
bio-program both transferred 'tacit' knowledge ('school1) of how practically to build up
a sustainable collective scheme, and changed the fanner's collective memory in terms of
'what is feasible'. Consequently, in Valinisti and Kefalas villages, where farmers of
young age and a person with leadership qualities existed, established their own
collective schemes, independently from Blauel Ltd.
Overall, the main conclusion from the research is that to understand the nature of
network evolution, the interplay between contextual factors and network features needs
to be taken under consideration. This also explains why it was difficult to anticipate how
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a network evolves and perforin. The primary research here suggests that the context sets
challenges to which SME networks can respond differently, given their own unique
structure, governance and atmosphere among their members. Each contextual change
uncovers existing inefficiencies in the network configurations, not previously realised
since the demands were different, and sets a challenge for network members and
managers to adapt. If they are capable of identifying the weaknesses and shifting from
the existing network configuration that becomes increasingly ineffective, to a different
one, then the network evolves and strengthens its performance, otherwise they struggle
with the current network configuration. Therefore, it is difficult to guarantee the
sustainability of networks under unfamiliar contextual conditions.
By taking on board the perspective of the interplay between context and network
features, this research reveals the counterbalancing effect of factors influencing the
network evolution and performance. It does not suffice to investigate only the influence
of individual contextual factors and network features, because it seems not to determine
what form the network actually takes and its performance. In contrast, it is the
combinative effect of these factors - their 'resultantthat determines the success or
failure of a network. In reality, what happens is that certain positive factors (i.e.
contextual or network features) counteract the negative influence of other existing (or
lacking) contextual or network factors.
Furthermore, this research suggests that in practice, contextual factors work as stimuli
for change in a network, by giving incentive or barriers to inter-firm relations, however,
their effect cannot be fully predicted until the features of the particular network
configuration of interest are known. Therefore, it is the network through its unique
members' profile, competencies and its governance structure that determines
whether the contextual factors would have a salutary or detrimental effect on its
performance. For example, the lack of "External institutional support" worked
differently for both Fritz Blauel and the ZAC manager in contrast to the Agia actors.
Thanks to their entrepreneurial and marketing skills, the actors in the former two cases
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responded by establishing links with European knowledge/information exchange
networks, which in turn helped them to build a strong competitive advantage. Agia
actors lacking such skills, could not fmd alternative sources of knowledge and
information, so the particular contextual factor had a detrimental effect for their
performance. What can be concluded therefore is that the network features
moderate the consequences of contextual factors on SME network function and
outcomes. Consequently, these features are key to explaining the variability in
performance displayed by SME networks operating in a very similar context.
Another intriguing finding was that for a dynamic, competitive and sustainable SME
network, all the three network features are required to satisfy a minimum level, i.e. of
low diversity in members' profile, of sufficiency in their competencies and the network
governance structure. This syllogism can be illustrated through the metaphor of a barrel
formed by wooden planks of different lengths. The water will only collect up to the level
of the shortest plank. The shortage of a network feature (like the shorter plank), weakens
the performance of the whole network (like the low level of water within the barrel).
Following this conclusion, this research links certain features of network'configurations
with certain outcomes. Particularly, a different combination of key features was
identified to be required to a minimum acceptable level for ensuring optimum
transactional, compared to optimum transformational outcomes as explained in Section
9.4.3. This explains why some networks achieve only transactional or transformational
outcomes.
10.5 Conclusions Relating to Impact of Evolution of Network
Context and Features on Performance of Individual SMEs and
the Network as a Whole Entity
The framework for network outcomes proposed by Ehirnan and Provan (1997) was
proved valid and useful in analysing the network performance as conveyed through the
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interviewees' perceptions. Indeed, SMEs through network involvement could enjoy
transformational and transactional outcomes, such as improved financial performance,
access to resources and organisational credibility. However, since these outcomes were
originated from collective efforts aimed at achieving economies of scale and scope,
dysfunctions at the network level, such as inefficient collective management capabilities,
entrepreneurial/ marketing skills and governance mechanisms, could influence
dramatically the performance of the network as a whole entity and in turn the
performance of individual SMEs. The existence of this two-way association between the
two levels, individual and network, in practice, was confirmed by the vulnerability of
collective brands such as Zagorin apples and Kefalas olive oil, to farmers not respecting
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high quality standards. Moreover, the case of Agia apples demonstrated the difficulty of
individual firms to differentiate their product, when serious dysfunctions observed at the
network level. Due to these dysfunctions, the Agia apples seem to still constitute a
commodity, in the minds of both the retailers and end-customers.
On the question of how the message of "we need to be innovative, market-orientated
and cost-effective simultaneously" is created and passed along the supply chain, this
research suggests that' such a message is more likely to emerge within vertical network
linkages, rather horizontal ones, and to be conveyed backward in the supply chain. This
can be explained with reference to the notion of the "strength of weak ties" proposed by
Granovetter (1973). The horizontal network linkages were found mainly to determine
how quickly this message of "cost effective and market-oriented innovation" is diffused
and accepted among the actors within the same supply chain stage. For best performance
results, such a message is assumed to require to be effectively diffused both "within"
and "between" the different supply chain stages. For instance, what was observed from
the Blauel case was that strong horizontal relations at the fanner level helped the
network to reach quickly the needed scale, while strong vertical relationships covered
those more sophisticated needs linked with a market orientation such as coordination,
and the need for elaborating the needs/ideas of other supply chain actors. The conclusion
deduced from this observation is that not only can the strength of relationships vary
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across the two dimensions within the same network, it may be that one dimension, the
vertical, is more critical for performance outcomes, especially transactional ones.
Another issue emerges from the findings of this research with respect to the novelty and
diversity of information flowing through the relationships. This is the establishment of
international, frequent relationships with external actors to the supply chain, met at
international fairs, meetings and competitions, as happened in the Zagora and Blauel
case. This proved to have a salutary effect on performance, placing the network in the
position of market leader rather than follower. Granovetter's (1973) notion of the
"strength of weak ties" can be also applied here. However, this research added a further
9
refinement, specifically identifying the importance of the geographic scale of external
contacts and information gathering to market orientation in the case firms, because of
the more advanced nature of markets in some European countries.
The aforementioned argument of the existence of an ongoing perception evolution
reflected in the network actors' attitude and behaviour65, suggests that the current
performance outcomes could be understood not only at their 'essential' level, their
current market value, but also at another level, their 'projected' value. The latter refers to
the expectations that the current outcomes create for the future of the particular or
similar network linkages. The present-day outcomes became part of the experience of
actors investigated, were used as a reference in future, and therefore, explained the path-
dependency of the actors' strategic choices in the network. The current performance
outcomes appeared to generate a preconception about 'how far it can go ' the particular
or similar future network linkages, which was found to have a multiplicative effect on
the attitude and behaviour, either positive or negative depending on the original
preconception66. When experiences of the current network performance outcomes were
discussed among actors, they tended to share similar beliefs on 'what is feasible' and
66
Explained in Section 10.3
66
Explained in Section 10.4
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'what is worth doingThese beliefs constituted a new record in their collective memory,
which was reflected as social cohesiveness.
If the current performance outcomes of a SME network can indeed be considered as
'essential' and 'projected' aspects, this suggests that the network through its outcomes
can influence the context. The impact on social cohesiveness was already explained.
Regarding the impact on market conditions, Zagorin Apples as the market leader
constituted a well-differentiated substitute for Agia apples, and revealed the existence of
a segment of domestic consumers of high quality apples. In other words, the strong
market performance of the network of Zagorin apples altered some of the contextual
conditions for the Agia case. Similar observations were made in the Kefalas case, which
had a developmental trajectory linked to that of the Blauel case. Particularly, the market
success of Blauel Ltd revealed the existence of a consumer segment willing to pay a
premium for standardised organic olive oil of high quality. This recognition and demand
for the differentiated product was among the contextual factors encouraging the
establishment of Kefalas Ltd. Besides, the Blauel bio-program through its good
performance worked as a contextual force, an example of beneficial "External
institutional support". In contrast, the detrimental effect of the political intervention in
agricultural cooperatives, such as the AAC in the Agia case, constituted an example of
harmful "External institutional support" that produced weak market performance for
the majority of Greek agricultural cooperatives. This led to passing a new rationalised
cooperative Law 1982/90 for agricultural cooperatives, that eliminated the harmful past
practices. Overall, the network through its performance outcomes seems to shape to
some degree the broad contextual factors, at least in a long term.
By observing the evolution of the four networks under investigation, negative outcomes
of SMEs' networking involvement also were identified, for example the exploitation of
information shared through inter-firm relationships and the problem of 'free riders'.
However, one can raise the question whether these negative outcomes should only be
considered as general negative externalities generated by networks (end outcomes) or
also as intermediate, temporal ones providing evidence that the current network
configuration has become increasingly ineffective. Under this scenario, these negative
outcomes signal network managers and members to shift to a different form more
consistent with particular demands. If they are capable of identifying the weaknesses and
making the proper changes in the network features, then the negative outcomes are
temporal, otherwise they struggle with the current network configuration, which is likely
to lead to the network failure. This syllogism proposes that temporal inefficiencies as
network performance outcomes might be an unavoidable step in some cases for reaching
an advanced network configuration. Hence, the emphasis is placed on the transformation
process rather than on the intermediated outcomes.
4
10.6 Implications of the Research for SMEs, Managers of
Networks and Policy Makers
10.6.1 General Implications
The Network Context, Features and Outcomes (NCFO) framework proposed links the
network context with its features and performance. In what way is this framework a
useful tool for network members and managers or policy makers? First, the NCFO
framework offers a means of describing and assessing SME networks in terms of a
uniform set of theory-based properties, easily applied on diverse modes of networks,
such as industrial districts, supply chain networks, or collective brands for cross-sectoral
products and sendees. In particular, the first property proposed by the NCFO
framework, the profile of network members, assesses/predicts how opinions and goals
may diverge, increasing the potential for conflict and limited commitment to common
agreements. The second property, the network members' competencies,
assesses/predicts whether they have the capability of identifying and amending the
weaknesses and inefficiencies. Finally, the last property proposed by the NCFO
framework, the network governance structure, analyses how in practice, power,
distribution of benefits and costs, information/knowledge, monitoring/planning and
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conflict have been arranged between autonomous but interdependent network actors.
Therefore, it is evaluated whether the existing governance structure delivers the
results/outcomes that meet the needs of SMEs involved in the network, given the current
demands set by the context.
Second, the NCFO framework argues that the network members and managers play an
active role by moderating via their choices the impact of context on network
performance outcomes. So practically, they can influence whether the contextual factors
would have eventually a salutary or detrimental effect on the network performance by
eliminating their shortage of competencies and altering the governance structure, In
other words, their response could even transform a disadvantageous context into a
pioneer and beneficial activity. This transformational power on the hands of network
managers appeared not to be always fully realised.
Third, the NCFO framework is also useful because it may be argued that the aspects of
each of network features can be translated into an equal number of inherent
challenges/tensions for network managers, which are related to the existing network
configuration. These contradictory logics may apply to all' network configurations, but
the unique network features appear to determine to which side of each tension the
network is most likely to stand. Thus, network managers could benefit from knowing in
advance what challenges are going to be faced and which network features these
originate from. The NCFO framework proposes that the role of contextual factors is to
intensify or reduce these tensions inherent into the network configurations.
Finally, by employing this framework to their own SME network constituencies, policy
makers could make more precise and appropriate choices regarding the "External
institutional support" they offer. For instance, they could offer training to SMEs
facilitating or managing a network on how to assess its weaknesses and construct the
governance structure in such a way that could alleviate problems. Frthermore, they could
place emphasis on making sure that the agrifood business environment is both resource
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supportive and fairly regulated. In particular, public agencies could ensure that SME
networks do not suffer either from a shortage of valid information/knowledge on
production, standardisation, marketing and networking, or from gaps in legislation about
fair funding eligibility and trade. Especially, funding eligibility criteria seem to
crystallise a set ofjudgements on which performance attributes and strategic orientations
are important. Regulators' choices on which organisations to fund appear to signal to
SMEs and their networks which attributes are crucial for their success. Therefore, setting
efficiency, flexibility and sustainability as prominent funding eligibility criteria could
encourage applicants to prioritise these goals. It is important to highlight here, that both
regulations and funding eligibility criteria seem to signal and stimulate a shift in
behaviours and attitudes of SMEs and their networks, only provided that the State forces
their restrict and fair application for all stakeholders. Otherwise, the unjustified
exceptions and non-punishment of offenders signal that the violation of the regulation
principles is acceptable. Finally, policy makers could realise the negative implications
and address the problem of farmers' weak orientation to quality and customers' needs,
saving downstream actors from the costs of educating farmers by their own resources.
As a result, the whole supply chain is expected to be more commercially sustainable,
entrepreneurial and less depended upon public funding.
10.6.2 Implications for Policy Support of Agrifood SMEs in Greece
The research conducted for this study was focused on the Greek Agrifood Sector. First,
it was identified that this sector is an intriguing for investigation because although
Greece has one of the largest numbers of registered farmer co-operatives in Europe, very
few examples of strong networks exist. In examining case studies of SME networks in
the Greek agrifood sector, two strong and two weak performing, the research has
generated some important, practical implications for policy support of Greek agrifood
SMEs. First, the Greek Government needs to continue keeping a 'neutral' attitude
towards farmer cooperatives, which was adopted with the last cooperative Law
2810/2000. The rejection of some farmers' demand for the continuation of old
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protectionism is fully justified, since this resulted in low competitiveness, efficiency and
sustainability of most collective schemes (e.g. the Agia case) and the GAS in general. In
fact, the State now avoids political intervention on collective schemes, respecting their
networks' autonomy and self-management, and forces them to abandon their passive
administrative-intermediary activities. Despite the less interventionist stance of
government, the research confirms that crucial barriers to the development of farmer
cooperatives exist, including little guidance and training for cooperatives and agrifood
SMEs on how to apply new organisational solutions, resolve common market problems
and fill their gap in skills and competencies. Given the sharp increase in market
challenges, domestically and abroad, Greek cooperatives and agrifood SMEs appear to
need the Greek State's "(External) Institutional Support
The research findings indicate several roles that the Greek government can perform.
First, the State is asked to play effectively its regulating and signalling roles, preventing
illicit trade and setting funding eligibility criteria that only reward efficiency,
sustainability and market-orientation. Especially, the latter implies that regulations and
their strict application, signals to SMEs and their collective schemes what behaviours are
acceptable, and What strategic choices make a difference. Therefore, rewarding only
those firms justifying the criteria of efficiency, sustainability and market-orientation is
expected to encourage a shift of goals/strategic choices of domestic agrifood SMEs and
collective schemes towards this direction. Additionally, the research also indicates a
coadjutant role for the State towards SME networks' efforts to build a competitive
advantage, in which it also underperforms. Specifically, the State can either complement
the SMEs' marketing efforts through promotional campaigns for commodities at
national level, or offer consultancy services to SMEs and their networks (e.g. valid
information through public research institutes). Finally, the educating role of the State in
changing the wide-spread negative perceptions of Greek fanners and agrifood SMEs for
the feasibility and effectiveness of the collection action is also discovered. Interviewees
from all four case studies strongly supported the view that Greek SMEs and (at least) the
commanders/leaders of collective schemes could improve their networking skills
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through training in collective principles. The training aims to clarify that the past failures
resulted from the violation of these principles, and under certain preconditions collective
action can flourish in Greece as happens in agrifood sectors of other countries (e.g.
France, Italy, Denmark). Therefore, taking on board the proposed NCFO framework,
trained SMEs can go beyond the well-justified explanation in literature of the State's
harmful political intervention, and recognise other equally crucial reasons for the
collective schemes' failure, such as lack of competencies and problematic governance
structure. This recognition will enable trained SMEs to take more responsibility and
control over the evolution of network linkages. Apart from the transfer of explicit
knowledge through training, research indicates that the State can also facilitate 'tacit'
knowledge exchange on how a sustainable SME network can be built up, through the
engagement of SMEs in regional and cross-sectoral network initiatives. Specifically, the
research shows that despite their top-down nature, initiatives, such as the Parnonas
Quality Agreement cluster, accelerate the maturation of the conditions for SMEs'
cooperation across different sectors and the whole supply chains, with a view to
advancing quality of services and products provided within a region. Ideally, as network
facilitators, the public agents increase SMEs' awareness of both benefits of emerging
synergies and challenges in interfirm coordination, provide solutions, but leave freedom
to SMEs to decide their engagement. In this way, SMEs make informed decisions, act
based on their motivation, overcome limiting perceptions, and Team by doing'
networking and marketing within a controlled environment.
10.7 Implications for Theory Development in SME Networks
In undertaking a qualitative case study investigation of SME network evolution and
performance, a key aim of the current research was to contribute to theory building and
development, relating the findings to existing work. The most important theoretical
contribution of this thesis is its focus on the dynamic interplay of three components
simultaneously (network context, features and outcomes), as well as developing a novel
theoretical framework (the NCFO framework). This is an original synthesis of factors
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derived from careful scrutiny of the literature, which has then been subsequently refined
through empirical research.
Additionally, the findings of the current research corroborate the existence and impact
of social-embeddedness, suggested in the economic sociology literature, specifically that
boundaries between a network and its context are blurred (Birkinshaw and Hagstrom,
2000) and that reality is socially-constructed (Berger and Luckmann, 1967).
Consequently, in the current research the impact on network performance outcomes was
found to be the result of contrasting forces, rather than the dominance of one of them
and exclusion of all others. It was also problematic to distinguish these forces between
pure contextual factors and network features, because those having a protagonist role in
network evolution, were found to construct the meanings of both context and network
features according to their past experiences and future expectations. This finding is
valuable because it suggests that profound changes in protagonists' current networking
experiences and expectations (e.g. an exceptionally good relationship with downstream
actors) can dramatically influence the meanings attached upon their network linkages
and context, opening new opportunities. In other words, it is implied that protagonists
thanks to exceptional experiences cotild start interpret, and in turn, respond differently to
contextual stimulus and alert their network's properties according to their new
interpretations. Indeed, 'network', 'evolution', 'change', 'context of a network', 'impact
of network evolution' were found to have multiple interpretations, therefore this thesis
placed the emphasis on understanding them through the eyes of research subjects.
Furthermore, these socially constructed meanings appeared to be constantly changing
and overlapping, making the objective of discovering the objective 'truth' and the
ultimate definition of concepts and phenomena under investigation unrealistic. However,
trying to understand the multiple meanings given, how these were constructed and how
these influence the choices and behaviours of network actors is the way suggested by
this thesis for the investigation of network evolution phenomenon. Additionally, the
current research shed light on vertical relationships within a network and also linked
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them to performance, in contrast with the previously tendency of researchers to
concentrate on horizontal network linkages.
10.8 Limitations of the Current Research
This thesis derives its value from the combined examination of the context, features and
performance of a SME network, taking also a historical perspective. This practice led to
some intriguing findings, however, the investigation is subject to a number of
limitations, described below.
The first limitation identified is the lack of generalisations of conclusions due to the
small number of case studies. Indeed, following the qualitative research approach, fewer
observations compared to those included in a quantitative research were expected to
occur. It is the nature of qualitative approach, which cannot produce results
representative of all agrifood SME networks in Greece and Europe today. Following
good practice in qualitative research, the researcher made a significant effort to enhance
the transferability of findings, by providing a considerable amount of information during
the presentation of each case study. Specifically, their historical evolution and context
were elaborated, to enable the reader to judge the relevance of findings with other
instances. For example, one needs to scrutinise the history and social-economic context,
point out crucial differences between the cases presented here and those other instances,
and assess the importance of these differences, before the relevance and applicability of
this research's findings can be assessed. Also, "thick" descriptions of the phenomenon
(multi-layered detailed descriptions) were given to facilitate the comparison between
cases for assessing the transferability of findings. These "thick descriptions" included
the examination of individual firms from all stages of the supply chain and from outside
the chain, and the analysis of the entire network from the supply side under three
dimensions, its structure, governance, and performance. Nevertheless, generalisations of
findings are not possible, so future research could be contacted on evaluating the NCFO
framework on larger samples with quantitative methods (e.g. surveys).
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Drawing from the aforementioned criticism, the second limitation identified relates to
the sample selection, due to the lack of probability representative samples. Indeed,
following the principles of the grounded theory and theoretical sampling, that constitutes
non-probability sampling, this thesis did not sampled persons or case studies, but
concepts. Following good practise in qualitative research, the researcher was purposely
looking for indicators of how concepts vary under different conditions. Particularly, the
four selected case studies varied on a number of dimensions such as: the type of product,
length of the supply chain, level of vertical and horizontal cooperation, level of reliance
on external knowledge/information network linkages, location, legal form of the
enterprise used as the focal point of research (i.e. private firm, cooperatives or
cooperative enterprises), size of network, and the way the network was governed. Given
the huge variety of parameters and dynamics of SME networks as social settings
discovered by this research, the expectation of designing a research focused equally on
depth and breadth of investigation seems very ambitious and almost unrealistic. As
explained in the methodology Chapter, this thesis has an exploratory character, with
emphasis on depth rather breadth, because it accepts the notion that it is better to address
depth before addressing the breadth for understanding clearly a phenomenon so complex
and socially- embedded that network evolution is. So further research could involve
alternative sampling methods, such as probability sampling (e.g. stratified sampling), in
addressing the 'breadth' of application of the NCFO framework.
The further discussion of this second methodological limitation addresses the selection
of the particular case studies, particularly the basis on which these were chosen: the
product type and the apparent networks' market performance. First, the selection was
based on assessing the contribution of different agricultural sectors on the Greek
economy, and on the empirical knowledge of an expert from the Agricultural University
of Athens, (identifying "success stories" of the Baluel and Zagora cases). Therefore, the
assessment especially of the apparent networks' market performance can be deemed to
some extent subjective. Besides, quite different conclusions may have been drawn if
332
SME networks from other sectors, or even multi-sector network initiatives, also from
other countries had been selected. Besides, all networks studied here had emerged from
'bottom-up' and voluntary networking processes, excluding 'top-down' and mandatory
cases of SME networks. Following good practice of qualitative research, the researcher
tried to eliminate this impact, by selecting a 'typical' case of the Greek agrifood sector
(i.e. the Agia case study), having weak apparent market performance, and contrasting it
with 'extreme' cases such as the rest three cases studies. These 'outliers' were expected
to reveal crucial factors making this difference. Furthermore, the validity of the
judgement on apparent market performance based on external evaluations during the
case study selection phase, was later tested, by using more detailed internal assessments.
Nevertheless, it can be argued that the used sampling frame impacted on findings, so
caution in interpretation and generalisability of conclusions is again required. Also,
further research could involve alternative sectors to the agricultural sector, or even
multi-sector network initiatives, and include 'top-down' and mandatory cases of SME
networks.
The third limitation of this investigation results from the particular macro-environment
forces shaping the historical social-economic-political context o'f the Greek agrifood
sector. The Greek government's extensive intervention with its well-documented
negative implications on farmer cooperatives, from the literature constitutes a strong
reason for expecting agrifood SME networks to follow different developmental
trajectories in counties where the government's intervention was almost absent (e.g. the
UK) or had a positive impact (e.g. France and Italy). Therefore, extrapolations from this
research's conclusions, regarding the prediction of how a particular SME network would
actually evolve, ought to be made with caution. Further research on the NCFO
framework could be contacted in other European countries regulated by the CAP
legislation.
The forth limitation of this investigation results from the very limited number of
interviews conducted with retailers, especially for the two olive oil cases (i.e. none for
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the Blauel case and only one domestic multiple retailer interviewed for the Kefalas case
study), and the lack of interviews with end consumers. Blauel's customer base is located
abroad, as happens also with the biggest part of the Kefalas customer base, so resource
limitations and difficulties in gaining access for interviews with foreign multiple
retailers resulted in this limitation. With regards to the lack of interviews with end
consumers, the reasons were the large scale and geographical spread of population as
well as its unknown composition, therefore all different assumed attributes of consumers
in the domestic or foreign market were consider very difficult to be indentified,
anticipated and included in a small sample used by this research due to resource
limitations (e.g. time, money). Additionally, it was deemed that interviews with multiple
I
. *
retailers, who do regularly their own marketing research, could give a good indication of
end consumers' perceptions on the products under investigation. The behaviour of
multiple retailers to the upstream actors in each of the four case studies was expected to
reflect to some extent the preferences and needs of end consumers (e.g. demand for
certified quality or value for money), given the retailers' high market orientation.
Nevertheless, it can be argued that the used sampling frame impacted on findings, so
caution in interpretation and generalisability of conclusions is again required. Further
research could itivolve end consumers and a greater number of retailers.
However, a general comment for the contribution of this research against the criticisms
described above, is that the purpose was to develop a uniform framework for describing
a SME network and its evolution, through some key and abstract elements, particularly
the network context, features and performance, which are always present and seem
necessary for the analysis, irrespectively the particularities of the case studied, e.g.
country, policy, network actors. It is argued that the NCFO framework proposed is a
powerful analytical tool for practitioners and policy makers exactly because of its ability
to deal with and analyse variations in nature and status of the network context, features
and perfonnance. Such variations were anticipated to occur due to differences in
countries, policies, profile of network members, levels of social cohesiveness, market
conditions, network governance structures, goals of networks, network members'
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perceptions, attitudes and behaviours. Therefore, the development of NCFO framework
placed emphasis on identifying the minimum number of necessary attributes/variables to
describe a SME network and its evolution, rather than on determining casual
relationships between these variables. Moreover, each of these variables was a theory-
based attribute derived from the literature. The reason for this placement of emphasis
was frequently stressed in the thesis. Particularly, each SME network appears to have
unique characteristics and its evolution is better explained from the 'resultant' of
contrasting forces, such as individual contextual factors and network features, rather
than from examining casual relationships for each of these forces. Besides, the meanings
attached to the nature and impact of these forces were found multiple, socially
1 *
constructed and constantly changing, an observation which made the extrapolation of
absolute assertions about causal relationships require caution.
10.9 Avenues for Future Research
The discussion of key limitations of this investigation leads to suggestions for extensions
of the current research, whose benefits described below in further detail:
First, future research could involve conducting similar studies in different agricultural
sectors and countries. This could allow for more detailed analysis of the differences
originated from the nature of product and variations in applied policy (i.e. level and
impact of "External institutional support"), levels of social cohesiveness, and market
conditions. The impact of those different contextual forces on the way SME networks
are structured, governed and evolved could be assessed. The network features and
outcomes displayed across a different range of contextual conditions would be observed,
providing support to the notion that the NCFO framework constitutes a uniform
explanatory tool, easily applied across sectors and counties.
Second, the current research could be expanded into the investigation of multi-sectoral
SME networks, such as agri-tourism schemes or the case of a regional collective brand,
imposing quality standards. This allows for discovering the difficulties in network
•lir
establishment and management originated from the diverse background and orientation
of networks actors belonging in different sectors. It is common that these multi-sectoral
SME networks to be the result of 'top-down' network initiatives organised by private or
public developmental agencies. The lack of 'bottom-up' network initiatives in these
cases usually indicates the absence of inclination of network actors to consider the multi-
sectoral collaboration as a feasible, sustainable and profitable solution. This extension
of the current study will give us a fuller understanding of the difficulty, which an
external actor faces trying to accelerate the maturation of conditions for collaboration
among network actors traditionally acting individually. This difficulty can also result
from the suspicion of network actors against the intentions of this external actor,
especially if it is a private firm (i.e. how it will benefit?). However, the investigation of
'top-down' network initiative is expected to give us a clearer picture of how certain
factors practically influence the network evolution, because these external actors
consciously observe, plan and exert influence on the acceleration of maturation of inter-
frim relationships towards a pre-decided direction. In other words, they are practitioners
who consciously try to manage the network evolution. Moreover, the usefulness and
applicability of the NCFO framework could be assessed by these external actors
facilitating 'top-down' network initiatives.
Third, a final avenue for further research after examining the validity of the NCFO
framework in other sectors, countries and types of networks, could be the
complementary use of the quantitative research methods. In practice, quantitative
research would place emphasis on measuring the concepts, verifying their causal
relationships proposed through the qualitative theoretical propositions and increase the
generalisability of findings.
10.10 Closing Statement
The objective of this thesis was to investigate the dynamics and interplay between
contextual factors and network features and their role in SME network evolution, with a
view to building a theory of how context and features affect SME network performance
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outcomes. The case study evidence suggested that contextual factors work as stimulus
for change, but it is the network through its unique members' profile, competencies and
its governance structure that determine whether the contextual factors would have a
salutary or detrimental effect on its performance. Consequently, these features are
critical to explaining the variability in performance displayed by SME networks
operating in a very similar context. In practice, this suggests that network members and
managers play an active role, as through their choices, they can moderate the
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APPENDIX I - Comments on Footnotes & Quotes
Chapter 2
Comment for footnote 18:
The Changes introduced by the 'For the Restoration of the Democratic Order in the
Cooperative Organisations' Laws 1982, '83 and '85 were: (i) introduction of the
principle 'one person-one vote', irrespectively of the cooperative shares and of an
electoral system of proportional representation and party list instead of a single ballot;
(ii) uniform organisational structure in fanners' unions, to which were allocated
financial resources and public authority to issue official proof of farmer's professional
identity, one of the preconditions for agricultural subsidies, called 'decentralised
corporation'; (iii) compulsory consolidation of second grade, county level, cooperatives,
so only one Union of Agricultural cooperatives per county, and (iv) the replacement of
audits provided by the ATE bank with auditors provided by the Ministry of Agriculture.
(Patronis, 2002)
Comment for footnote 19:
Some examples constitute the collection of and payment for agricultural products
beyond subsidised from the EU quota, the payment of prices to the farmers higher than
the economic conditions of the cooperatives, the handling of the 'clearing' (agricultural
machinery in exchange with Greek tobacco) with Eastern European countries. '/«
general, the cooperatives were urged to undertake activities and exchanges which were
irrelevant to their own activities and that, finally — either due to the non competitiveness
of the Greek agricultural exports or due to the differences in the exchange rates — the
cooperatives were invited to pay for the costs instead of the state to which belonged the
political decision ofthose choice, (Patronis, 2002, p. 10)
Comment for footnote 20:
"Significant funding was channelled through the Unions of Cooperatives (second level)
by means of subsidies for different investments, loans and tax exemption. Most of the
funding either for the support — through the prices — of the agricultural income, or for
exports and investments (of uncertain economic utility and effectiveness), were
implemented by the administration of the ATE usually with procedures of disputed
transparency, control and only verbal guarantees from the state which especially after
1985 was unable to cover its obligations. ...To the cooperatives' indebtedness, ... the
monopolistic position of ATE (that shouldered the responsibility of financing the
agricultural sector of behalf of the State), and its high interest rates played a crucial
role. " (Patronis, 2002, pp. 10-19)
Comment for footnote 23:
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"This 'coincidence' ofdeep actions in the cooperative legislation in every alteration of
the political situation in Greece, leads to the conclusion that under the pretence ofsocial
change or liberal reform is hidden a wish to manipulate the farmers mainly through
their professional-economic organizations -which are the cooperatives - the guidance
of their leadership or guaranteeing its tolerance towards the party choices and politics,
and the construction of impressions concerning the 20 per cent of the Greek population
— which are the farmers who belong to the cooperatives — but also for the rest of the
population " (Lambropoulou-Dimitriadou, 1995, p. 98).
Comment for footnote 24:
"The social character of this [agricultural] debt has to be underlined. The farmer is
impelled to borrow in order to carry out his operation, for which is destined by the
system, and from which only the impersonal urban capitalism benefits. Thus, the
indebtedness of the farmer constitutes a significant medium for the dominance of the
State upon the agricultural production. For this, the State is obliged periodically,
recognizing indirectly the social character of the agricultural debts, to write offpart or
the whole of these debts. In reality, these state interventions constitute an indication of a
silent admittance of the de facto socialization of family agricultural economy"
(Vergopoulos, 1975, p. 231).
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Contracts as Market-like features: Multiple Partners
hierarchical documents profit centers, transfer
(Stinchcombe, 1985) pricing (Eccles, 1985) Formal rules
Source: Powell (1990)
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Management. ofNetworks Management illNetworks
Managanait of Accountability
Mimagaitait of Legitimacy
• Determining who is
responsible for which
outcomes.
• Rewarding and reinforcing
compliance with network
goals.
• Monitoring and responding
to network "free riders."
♦ Building and maintaining





* Ensuring that dedicated
resources are actually used for
netwoik activities.
• Ensuring that your
organization gets credit for
network contributions.
* Resisting efforts to "free
ride."








* Legitimizing the role of the
organization among other
netwoik members.
Managanait of Conflict • Setting up mechanisms for
conflict arid dispute
resolution.
* Working at the dyad level to
avoid and resolve problems
with individual network
members.
• Acting as a "good faith"
broker.
• Working mside your
organization to act as a
"linking pin" to balance
organization versus network
demands and needs.
• Making decisions that
reflect network-level goals
and not the specific interests
of members.
(table continues to next page)
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Table 3.4: Essential Management Tasks for Network Managers (column 2) and












other network participants and
with network-level
management, based on the
governance structure in place.
• Implementing and
managing tire structure.
• Accepting some loss of
control over network-1 evel
decisions.
• Recognizing when structure
should change based on
network and participant
needs.
Managanait of Commitment • Getting the "buy-in" of
p articip ants.
• Working with participants
to ensure the)' understand
hownetwork success can
contribute to flie
o rganization's e ffectivenes s.
♦ Building commitment within
the organization to network-
level goals.
* Institutionalizing network
involvement so that support of
network goals and
participation goes beyond a
single person in the
organization.
♦ Ensuring that network
resources are distributed
equitably to network
p articip ants based on network
needs.
• Ensuring that participants
are well informed about
network activities.
Source: Milward and Provan (2006)
Table 3.5: Alternative Forms of Netw ork Governance—the Management of Design
Desigft Se!f-Go*vrttance Lead Organization AVtowfc
(luiracterhlia Adnittistratfre
Organization
Structure No administrative Administrative Distinct
entity, participation entity ( and network administrative
in network manager) is a entity set up to
management by all major network manage die




Optimal number Few Many Many
of members
Decision making Decentralized Centralized Mixed
Advantages Participation, Efficiency, clear- Efficiency of day-
commitment by network direction to-day





Problems Inefficient-— Domination by Perception of
frequent meetings, lead organization, hierarchy, cost of
diffi culty reacliing lack of operation, complex
consensus, no commitment by administration
network "face'' members
Source: (Milward and Provan, 2006)
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Chapter 5
Comment for footnote 56:
Given the lack of external institutional support, it was acknowledged that a "game rule"
has been formed: "holding back information or giving out wrong information works as
an entry barrier".
"The biggest constraint was the mentality in the Greek public agencies and private
banks, when I started in 1980. Now things have improved. The game rule was that those
M'ho had the access to the information they had the power, that's why nobody shared
information. They pretended that they did not know which form I needed to fill, to which
office 1 had to take the form etc...The bureaucracy was a nightmare. So, holding back
information and giving out wrong information was the rule of the power game " [The
Entrepreneur-Leader]
- »
This rule imposed serious obstacles in the early stages of the Blauel enterprise
formation. Blauel's reaction was characterised by patience, persistence and creativity.
He sought information/knowledge sources in European networks. Additionally, Blauel
was left without any other option than to educate farmers about organic farming and
market orientation, which constituted the state's duty and "cost money, time and strength
to us ". Due to "physical and technological constraints", the farming in Mani, is labour
intensive and requires high costs. Therefore, the need of a "virtually" integrated scheme
like the Blauel bio-program was necessary to minimise transactional costs. Finally, the
unfair treatment of wholesalers and trade brokers made fanners cautious towards the
downstream actors and less interested in developing the product quality. Blauel ought to
transform all these,established beliefs.
EXTRA BLAUEL QUOTATIONS
"We have an excellent product and we live from the enthusiasm ofpeople who get know
us. ...Even our biggest customers, such as (name of a multiple retailer chain) in
Germany, who are a huge company, came alone to us... Ofcourse we do our efforts, but
we do not go outside their office to 'beg' them as other sellers do. Because ifyou do this
you belong to another categoiy, the buyer of this huge company says: "what do you
want? I have 200 olive oils to evaluate per day". So, ifyou wait to be the number 201,
you could expect limited results. " [The Entrepreneur-Leader]
"In general, we build a good reputation through the quality of our communication,
through internet, telephone, networking, meeting people, personal contact as much as
possible, and second the quality of the product we never compromise in quality. And in
that way you get a name, we do not say that we have only the quality of the olive oil, we
have quality in terms of deliveiy time, ofproduction. We have quality in terms of the
generic problems that might arise with the food stuff like these various scandals that
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have happened in the olive oil world. We are of the few companies that never had a
scandal in the 25 years that we have existed. " [The Entrepreneur-Leader]
"When me and my wife started, organic farming was unknown. JITatever we did we did
it alone. We went to a village and said to farmers about the advantages of organic
farmers. Next Sunday, a local agriculturist selling conventional fertilisers and pest
control products went and said to those farmers that by following organic farming, they
lose all their production in five years. ...We were like missioners, for all issues, we
searched alone what standardisation equipment we needed, who produces the organic
fertiliser... we were beginners" [The Entrepreneur-Leader]
"With all the main collaborators (e.g. farmers, customers) we built a very close and
friendly relationship. This has a cost, not in money, but in time and in terms of important
life values. This depends on our personal philosophy, me and my wife, the way we want
to live ...Or we have a relationship ofheart or nothing. " [The Entrepreneur-Leader]
"Shared-learning experiences are something new for us. I am happy that this is
happening and it is not something that I can create or demandfrom anybody, so we try
to work with people and motivate them to be become independent and communicative to
others, to the outside. You will see some little reminders on the wall in the kitchen and
the factory that "communication makes us stronger" ....Over the years this works. When
we saw we were stuck in a group ofpeople from farming environment who were not
used to communicate, we worked with the people through seminars." [The
Entrepreneur-Leader]
"These weekend seminars were very revolutionary, they were meant to optimise the
company, but later we realised that we are working with people who did not actually
communicate, who used to surpass the difficulties... this gave us this family feeling and
this close collaboration. " [The Entrepreneur-Leader]
"I think it is really based on personal qualities. This is the foundation.
...Professionalism, I mean that you are good in what you are doing and that you do it in
a reliable way and the best way you can is also essential. I am not saying is only the
personal side, but the personal side, e.g. attitude, love, openness and lack offear,
constitute the foundation, on which you can build on all the special technical skills.
These skills are of secondary importance, the foundation needs to be O.K. " [The
Entrepreneur-Leader]
"As the olive oil is a natural product, problems can occur. Our attitude towards
complaints is immediate satisfaction of the customer, clearly. The economic issue is of
secondary importance, whether we lose or not, the cost can never be transferred to the
customer, especially in the case when the mistake is ours, we aim to provide immediate
satisfaction without discussion. In the cases when there is a disagreement with the
customer, then the situation is explained to the customer with love, respect and gratitude
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in order to find a common solution, ifwe cannot find it, many times we cover the extra
cost. " [The General Manager]
"The success of our company is based on just-in-time delivery, at all levels of
collaboration with the customer. This means that what is promised is systematically
delivered to the customer. There is an automatic procedure here. We are fully motivated
here and all work consistently for a common goal. We call the management style
'management by love'. Everything happens within a tender spirit." [The General
Manager]
"The real cost would be a claim of a customer ...to be heard in the market that our
product quality is not premium. This danger is more likely now because we have a wider
production base to control and we need to be consistent with what we promise. Besides,
the more famous we become, the more attention ofour competitors we attract. They tiy
to approach to approach our customers. " [The General Manager]
"When some farmer groups abandoned the Blauel bio-program agreement, we let them
be free to leave, without economic or other penalties, based on the contract they had
signed. Our philosophy is respect the freedom ofpeople to act according their will, and
avoid conflicts. If something occurs, we tiy through communication, explanations and
discussion to solve the issue. " [The General Manager]
Chapter 6
Comment for footnote 58:
However, some of the sub-categories were deemed as less decisive for this case study,
compared to the rest cases, marketed by the white colour of bars in Figure 6.1 and
briefly described below. Regarding the customers' product recognition, Kefalas farmers
had very little incentive for standardising olive oil and increasing its quality (i.e.
organic), because the prevailing practice was to sell in bulk either in the domestic final
consumers via personal networks or to Italian standardisation units via wholesalers.
"The combination of subsidies and high prices thaiiks to some special features of the
Greek olive oil which Italian standardisation units want to mix it with their produce, led
to the Greek suppliers' lack of motivation for adding value on their product, building
their own brands and give the Greek olive oil the position it desen>es in the world
market. When you can easily load a 30 tons shipment of olive oil in bulk to send it to
Italy with a good profit, why to get bothered to differentiate the product, put it in nice
bottles, participate in fairs and wait at least six months to get paid off... " [Magazine
Editor]
Blauel's success made well-known the wider area and Greek origin abroad, opening a
new market, and introducing Kefalas fanners to organic farming. Blaud's success
convinced them to collectively add value and sell their product. Concerning the factor
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'Quality certification scheme as a pre-requisite to market entry', through the Blauel bio-
program, the Kefalas shareholders understood that in order to enter the market of
certified quality products, they had to maintain higher levels of professionalism,
economies of scale and effective internal communication. So, they closely imitated the
principles of the Blauel bio-program (Section 6.3.7). Regarding the pressure of
substitutes, domestically, heavy TV advertising campaigns pressured multiple retailers
to have a small number of well-established domestic brands on their selves. This made
impossible for Kefalas Ltd and other SMEs the access to multiple retailers. So, Kefalas
Ltd was compelled to use only the marketing channel of domestic delicatessen shops.
Besides, it faces sharp competition from other SMEs, even some incidents of unfair
treatment occurred. Abroad, Kefalas shareholders had oversimplified the challenges,
thinking that imitating the Blauel bio-program was enough to secure their success.
Consequently, a period of 'disillusion' came where the Kefalas shareholders realised
their limited market knowledge and marketing experience. This convinced them that in
order to survive they need to stay united and to advance their marketing competencies
was a priority. Owing to the negative implications of physical and technological
constraints, Gaia Ltd a quality-oriented downstream actor started to prefer to cooperate
with the well-organised Kefalas network, instead of a lot of fragmented farmers, to
reduce its transactional costs. Also, due to the incomplete list of forbidden substances
and not error-free detection procedures of organic certification inspection, it is hard to
distinguish the case of accident from that of deceit. This difficulty is reflected by
deficiencies in the EU legal framework. Consequently, the latter fails to limit the illicit
trade. Kefalas Ltd and a group of other domestic SMEs reacted by establishing 'the
Association for Greek Agrifood Products of Certified Quality' to help limiting the illicit
trade, put pressure on the government, and tackle the existing deficiencies in the external
institutional support.
EXTRA KEFALAS QUOTATIONS
"Except for the leader, Kefalas Ltd happened because it relied on a critical mass of
young people, who wanted to stay at the village and work hard... loved innovation, and
sought to produce olive oil in an environmentally friendly way. Each ofus has made big
farm investments. It happened at the right moment when enough young people stayed at
the village, seeking solutions and having common ideas, and language. " [The Kefalas
General Manager]
"The whole effort for organic farming started in 1995 here at Kefalas. Blauel was the
initiator. He found the fertile ground here, for instance he could easily introduce new
ideas; we are of the same young age... The village president was an active person,
(name). Everything happened thanks to him: he made the contact with Blauel, completed
all the paper work, his idea was Kefalas Ltd later. " [The Kefalas General Manager]
"Blauel preferred working with farmer groups rather than isolated farmers. As a
respond to this demand, our group was established. Later, we become active
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independently. We decided to be a cooperative enterprise rather than a cooperative,
because this gives us moreflexibility" [The Kefalas General Manager]
"By observing the Greek olive oil supply chain and market for the last 25 years, I
reached the conclusion that there are two different levels and speeds of firms'
development in the Greek agrifiood sector in general. There is a massive stream offirms
producing conventional agricultural products, and another stream of dynamic, healthy
and innovative companies that are usually small and spread around Greece. These have
differentiated their product e.g. organic farming, but because of their small size and
being isolated, needs more support than the former. At the same time, these companies
are usually excluded by the national agrifood associations, in which mainly
conventional producers are represented. Although they offer other products (e.g. olive
oil and wine), these small differentiatedfirms have similarproblems. They cannot afford
the cost of promoting their differentiated products. Their direct competition is not
considered due to their small size. On the contrary, synergies can occur, for instance of
promoting a basket ofcertifiedproducts abroad. " [Magazine Editor]
"As farmers, the 18 members of Kefalas Ltd, we may have "hidden" complaints,
because this is the mentality of the Greek farmer, he wants a special treatment, e.g. the
quality of "my"produce...but we operate with strict quality criteria that all we respect
because we know these arefor our benefit. " [The Kefalas general manager]
"I believe Kefalas Ltd offers a convenient service to Gaia Ltd, because it deals with a
group of suppliers, offering the quantity demanded, rather a large number of isolated
farmers. " [The Kefalas general manager]
"There was a critical moment at the beginning, when, some trade brokers disliked the
idea of the Kefalas establishment, because they were losing their job. So, they offered
enticing prices to some members of the Kefalas critical mass to break their verbal
promise for exclusive supply to the Kefalas Ltd. No contracts existed, then, but most ofus
respect our agreement, moral commitment.
"When we as farmers started the trading part, we were too enthusiastic, having
unrealistic expectations, because we did not know the existing difficult market
competitions. There is not the demandfor organic olive oil that we thought, and if there
is, the market is so divided that it is impossible for us to collaborate with everyone.
Many competitors exist. We were enthusiastic, discussing continually our dreams, but
since there was not progress, we started complaining... the board of directors changed.
Now there is some maturity. " [The Kefalas general manager]
For the first five years, there was not any contract, only our moral commitment. Almost
all of us we kept our word for the verbal agreement we initially had. It seems in the
Kefalas case, the moral commitment is strong. This can be considered as social
cohesiveness, which intensively enforced our discipline to issues ofquality and these are
paying off.
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"The number ofmembers is a double-edged sward. Flexibility trades off the availability
ofcapital. " [The Kefalas General Manager]
"In Greece, there is a common misunderstanding. This is the false expectation that a
good promotional campaign is enough to solve all our problems... but promotion
without havingfirst established an efficient production base and supply chain is a waste
of money. Some of this money could be spent on doing what the Union of Sitia
Cooperatives in Crete did. When a few entrepreneurial minds were elected in the board
of the directors, they hired a chemist that has spent years visiting each cooperative,
informing its members about how to improve the product quality, and collect samples of
its olive oil produce. According to these samples, the price offered by the Union ofSitia
Cooperatives was determined. This resulted in the Sitia olive oil gaining world quality
completion awards for two years in the row, making the product well known abroad and
dramatically increasing its export. This was a result with 10 years ofpreparation behind
it. We need to fully understand the need for the total improvement of the product,
startingform its roots at the research level, and the long-term commitment to the quality
improvement, the cost reduction, ...the association ofthe product with the local territory
and the creation ofa product identity " [Magazine Editor]
"In summary, there is needed a combined effort ofdevelopments in the structure of the
domestic olive oil supply chain and market, combined with political will that is
expressed through an effective legislation framework and supportive mechanisms. The
increased market pressure enforces bottom-up networking initiatives of agrffood SMEs
to cover some of these deficiencies and push the State to offer the support they needed.
Given the frequent changes in the ministries' administrators and their strategies, I
believe the stakeholders related to the Greek olive oil scene with a common interest
would manage at some point to establish a model ofoperation that is less dependent on
these coincidences " [Magazine Editor]
"I am satisfied by the collaboration with Kefalas Ltd. I trust them, I leave my produce,
without caring even to check its weight. I trust the receipt that they give me. They are
hard working. They offer better prices than other buyers. I was not satisfied with others,
I was begging them to buy my produce, and their prices were low. With Kefalas Ltd I
feel secure, and their prices are very competitive.... They also prepare all my paper
work to get the subsidy and the organic certificate" [Independent Farmer]
"I do not believe that any problems will occur in the future in our collaboration,
because people in Kefalas Ltd are fair, and people cannot change so easily. If they
cannot pay me, there is going be a reason, I show patience and try to support them as
much as possible, I will not neglect them. Difficult times can come but I am sure that I
have asfair a treatment as eveiyone else. " [Independent Fanner]
"I strongly believe that discipline is necessary, because if anyone decided whether or
not to deliver its produce, then we, the other members of Kefalas Ltd, would fail to
respect the agreements that we have made with customers. We would have to search for
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buying the produce of others, for which we have little knowledge on its quality, the
conditions ofolive production and processing ..." [Kefalas Shareholder]
"I believe we are still at the beginning, only 30-40% of our goals have been
materialised. " [Kefalas Shareholder]
"There is a problem in the cash flow of Kefalas Ltd. We are the suppliers and
shareholders of the Kefalas enterprise at the same time, so we get paid when the
company has the money from the customers. Those remaining in the company have
accepted this way of operating, because as I mentioned, some could not afford it."
[Kefalas Shareholder]
"In organic products, traces ofpest control solutions can be found which are not the
responsibility of the farmer or standardising unit, for instance because the neighbour
farmer uses them, or those broughtfrom the wind. There are unknown substances, which
we do not look for or are not included in the regulation. However, a specialised
research lab in America or Germany can find traces of them, and you do not know
where those came from. So it is hard to guarantee the product quality and distinguish
between those intending to cheat and those that do not" [Magazine Editor]
"We started originally as 23, but today we are 18, because 5 people were not consistent
with our conditions and principles ...they yield to some trade brokers' pressure of
enticing prices and dishonoured their word to the rest of us for exclusive supply to
Kefalas Ltd. With respect to the cohesion and right function of the company, initially it
was only our word of honour, not contracts. ...There was also the issue that then the
enterprise lacked its own storage space, so the members stored their produce in their
own houses' courtyards, so Kefalas Ltd could not really have the control, relying only
on our word ofhonour. We had agreed on sending any potential buyer ofourproduce to
the Kefalas general manager. We banish those members found to act independently... "
[Kefalas Shareholder]
"Some difficulties and delays in the process of obtaining our own infrastructure as
Kefalas Ltd, e.g. buildings, land, and standardisation equipment brought us (the
members) closer. The difficulties in finding buyers for our product were a test for us,
whether each of us could keep his word. However, fortunately things went well. These
difficulties forged our bonds as team. It proved our commitment. Our response to the
five members breaking our verbal agreement proved that we could decide as a group,
because the board ofdirectors made a proposition, and all the rest supported it. It was
clarified that the Kefalas enterprise is not disposed to tolerate such behaviour. "
[Kefalas Shareholder]
"We live in a small place, news get around quickly. Ifone farmer is paid a good price,
for instance 2 Euros per litre, this is taken from the restfor granted. But we, as Kefalas
Ltd, we negotiate hundreds of tonnes, we are anxious to sell out quickly, it is risky to
keep such a large quantity for long, due to dramatic changes in the market. We also try
387
to be competitive in price. Some of our shareholders complain: "why we do not sell at
2.10 or 2.50 Euros per litre?". This is what I mean about cooperation, we need to be
open-mined, to think that that one independent farmer might have a better quality, or it
might be that the buyer is in a great need for a few tonnes ofolive oil to cover an order,
so for such a small quantity he can afford paying a higher price than normal. However,
having hundreds of tonnes to sell, we need to ask for a lower price" [Kefalas
Shareholder]
"We started by having an advantage. The man who started the Kefalas initiative was the
village president for 16 years. Through his work, he had proved he knew what he is
doing, but most importantly he had gained the respect ofhis fellow-villagers. As a result,
all his movements were acceptable, without any criticism. Because he inspired respect,
nobody had a disposition to criticism, all wanted to discuss what options we have. He is
like a magiiet to others because they believe that something worth while had begun.
Secondly, when the board of directors changed, some members like myself and the
general manger remained. We had the previous good character as a proof, this made the
rest accept us and follow our decisions. " [Kefalas Shareholder]
Chapter 7
Comment for footnote 61:
For Zagora, analysis indicates many of these seem to play a role, however some of the
sub-categories were deemed as less decisive for this case study, compared to the rest
cases, marketed by the white colour of bars in Figure 7.1 and briefly described below. In
terms of institutional support, the funding made available in the 1980s permitted the
ZAC to increase in size, and acquire the needed infrastructure. In contrast, the
problematic legislation framework (i.e. for cooperatives and trade) and efficiency of
public agencies, resulted in the ZAC's dependence almost exclusively on its leadership's
entrepreneurial/marketing and management skills in order to face market challenges or
internal crises. In terms of market factors, physical constraints have been important,
witnessed by consequences of diseases and the need for austere quality control to avoid
opportunistic behaviour on behalf of farmers.
Chapter 8
Comment for footnote 63:
With respect to product recognition and differentiation by the customers, since the end-
consumers hardly recognise the Agia origin, low incentive exists for local packers and
farmers to form quality-oriented networks and collectively reap the benefits. Besides,
Agia network actors have not faced any serious problem with imitations; in contrast
some of them have caused a problem of illicit trade against the ZAC have been reported.
The pressure of well-established substitutes, especially the 'Zagorin' brand, makes more
obvious the inefficiencies in Agia apples' standardisation and inter-firm coordination to
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the downstream actors, especially the multiple retailers. Therefore, the Agia fanners
need to try harder to refute the impression of the downstream actors of 'inferiority-not a
premium brand' of Agia apples compared to Zagorin apples. However, for some Agia
standardisation units, the pressure of the 'Zagorin' brand is occasionally turned into an
advantage through tactics of misusing the Zagora origin reputation. Regarding
participation in a quality certification scheme as a precondition for market entry,
Xatzisalatas Ltd had no other option than introducing the integrated apple production
management to Agia farmers in order to secure a big supply contract with Carrefour-
Marinopoulos Ltd, the biggest domestic multiple retailer. This caused radical changes in
the governance of the packer-fanner relationship, introducing a long-term perspective
and an unprecedented supportive character. Those Agia farmers converted, enjoyed for
first time regular agriculturist's guidance, guaranteed purchase of the whole quantity at a
satisfactory price, and support with certification bureaucracy, offered by the packer.
However, the scale of this change was small to reverse the gloomy picture of the
occasional, unilateral relationships formed between Agia packers-farmers.
Briefly, three main categories of factors were identified: market conditions, social
cohesiveness, and external institutional support. For Blauel analysis indicates, all three
factors played a role, however some of the sub-categories were deemed as less decisive
for Blauel, compared to the other cases. Figure 5.2 summarises the impact of all factors
on Baluel's evolution diagrammatically; most important impacts are depicted with black
bars, less important with white bars. The length of the bars reflects the impact of the
respective factor to network evolution.
As Figure 5.2 shows, the three factors identified as particular critical to the Blauel
network evolution were: (i) recognition and differentiation of product by end customers,
(ii) quality certification scheme as a pre-requisite to market entry and (iii) pre-existent
social cohesiveness and communality in interests/perceptions. The next sections explain
the impact of these factors.
EXTRA AGIA QUOTATIONS
"In my opinion, the collective action is the only way for farmers to enjoy the maximum
benefits of farming. The cooperative is a safety valve, ...provided that it has a strong
base. I mean its members have to have common perceptions, vision and interests. It does
not help if a group of cooperative members are retired or if another relies on a
permanent public job and has a farm as a complementary income.... It is better all
cooperative members are full time farmers with strong interest in the farming' future
prospects. Today in the AAC, from 100 members, only 15-20farmers have such common
perceptions and interests. For development a cooperative needs a large basis ofpeople
with homogenous interests. When from 100 members, 70 have no main interest; they
accept whatever price is given, because they do not live exclusively from farming. Given
this, a cooperative board ofdirectors is needed to control more things. " [Agia Farmer]
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"In our cooperative, the responsibilities have been loosened too much: the exclusive
delivery of production, the use of agricultural input outlet, taking advice from the
cooperative agriculturist. A penalty exists for those not exclusively offering their
production to the cooperative. This was not applied, because the prices offered by the
traders were much higher than those offered by the cooperative, especially the last 3-4
years when the apple prices in the market were high. " [Agia Farmer]
"Our cooperative has a big debt, resulting from the government's past policies. Since
1981, the government required all the standardisation and packaging of the whole
production supplied to the market. However, the government did not enforce all those
involved in marketing offresh fruit and vegetables to apply the policy. This has started
to happen only now. Through funding in 1981, the AAC built the first standardisation
unit in the region, but because the policy was not applied, the cooperative ran into dept,
as it could not cover the fixed costs of the construction. Later, private traders also got
funding and built other standardisation units in the area. These traders used to come to
Agia as wholesalers, but built their own standardisation units the last in 6-7years. So,
from 1981 to 7 years ago, the AAC had a huge unexploited opportunity to add value to
the product. Specifically, the ACC started by collecting 1500 to 2500 tonnes of apples,
and now has ended up marketing approximately 600 tonnes. Due to the AAC's huge
debt, now we cannot take a loan for the Agricultural bank and improve our cash flow.
Additionally, in recent years, the market exchanges mainly are done though cheques,
which creates more problems in the cash flow. On the contrary, the traders-packers
have a good cash flow, so they usually have paid off the farmers by Christmas and also
give forepayments, so the farmers can cover their expenses during the han>est time. "
[Agia Fanner]
"The only advantage over collaborating with the traders that we have as cooperative
members now is that paymentfrom the cooperative is guaranteed. " [Agia Farmer]
"Given the exploitation of the localfarmers by the traders-packers, the only solution for
the Agia farmers is a cooperative that is strong, healthy, that could play a significant
role in the market, not as the AAC with its small market share of only 600tonnes, for
example a cooperative that could market at least 40% of the Agia apple production,
compared to the current 2-5% ofthe AAC. The Agia farmers have been convinced of this
need ...ifyou could hear the farmers' discussion after what happened this year, all said
"we need to get organised, have stronger collective action by establishing farmer
groups or a cooperative" It might be alternative forms to the AAC, for example a group
of 10-20 big farmers to supply enough quantity to support a sale point in the
wholesalers' market in Athens, an order for a multiple retailer... The local farmers have
been convinced that collective action is needed, the issue is who can lead, organise
them. ...I do not know who has such capabilities... only the need can force them to get
organised... one more year with the unfair treatment from the traders-packers like the
last one is needed, when the farmers could not cover the costs and provide for their
family... " [Agia Fanner]
390
"To describe the profile ofa good cooperative member, a person needs to be a full-time
farmer, to monitor the whole process that their produce follows after being delivered to
the cooperative, and know how the market operates. I mean it is important the
cooperative member show an interest in the function and challenges the cooperative
faces, and does not deliver his produce and avoid any further involvement. In the AAC's
general meeting less than a 20% of members comes, compared to 50% in the past."
[Agia Farmer]
"As a board ofdirectors we achieved first to sell other products than apples offered by
non-cooperative members through the AAC's sale outlet in the Athenian wholesale
marketfor the period when apple sales " [Agia Farmer]
"Most cooperative members have the AAC as their last option, in years of lower quality
production, they delivery it to the cooperative and accept whatever price is offered. They
have not the cooperative consciousness. This attitude negatively affects the AAC,
because it deprives the AAC of the opportunity to have enough quantity to cover the
whole demand period in the market and therefore achieve higher average prices. " [Agia
Farmer]
"The trader-packers do not make a social policy, they have the option to choose. They
come to the farm, check the quality and buy only if they like it, regardless if they had a
good collaboration with the particular farmer last year. On the contrary, the
cooperative has to market its members' produce, whatever quality they have." [Agia
Farmer]
"First, the State does not protect the farmer from those traders, who easily give rubber
cheques, and can be declared bankrupt without any punishment. Secondly, no general
directions are given to us for instance, what to produce, what innovative production
system exist, do they want us to be farmers or entrepreneurs... We take all our decisions
alone, without any information. The only contribution of the State so far is the funding,
but without any guidance or other support. " [Agia Farmer]
"There is adulteration of apples in the domestic market. For instance, Turkish apples
were sold as Greek by some wholesalers to reduce the prices, or one merchant can mix
Agia or Kastoria apples with Zagorin apples, which have a higher price. The product
identity is negatively affected. " [Agia Farmer]
"We (the Agia farmers) have common problems, but each one has different interests,
mentality, attitude and economic prosperity. So, although in the difficult years we make
gatherings and discussions, agreeing on the need for collective action, after a while we
have forgotten it. There is not a person to lead. Besides, everybody suivives with one or
another way, only if we found ourselves in a severe need, we would be forced to act
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collectively. However, I think the packers suspect this and keep always a few satisfied in
order to control the situation. " [Agia Farmer]
"An apple farm ofsmall size is less than 3 hectares. 95-6% of the Agia farmers are of
small size. The remaining 4-5% have more than 7 hectares. However, 20% of small
farmers have farming as a secondary income, so they accepted lower prices offered by
the packers more easily. The bigfarmers (5%) have more stable collaborations with the
packers and enjoy betterprices. " [Agia Apple Cooperative Administrator]
"As the AAC, we sell apples 0.40-0.50 Euros for kilo at the wholesaler market and the
consumer at the open farmer market buys it 1.10-1.20 Euros. The trade ministry is not
efficient to control overpricing and illicit trade. As farmers, we want to sell 0.50 Euros
per kilo, cover costs, for instance 0.30 Euros, and have 0.20 Euros profit. Then, I want
the retailer to have other 0.20 Euros per kilo profit, and the consumer buys apples for
0.70 Euros per kilo. So, the consumer buys more quantity in a competitive price rather
than less in a higher price. ...There are regulations requiring all quantities offresh
fruits and vegetables to be standardised, packaged and labelled, so the farmer can be
identified. However, these regulations are nugatory for years. This could help to not
only control the illicit trade, but also to motivate the farmers to increase their quality. "
[Agia Apple Cooperative Administrator]
"The employees of the local public agricultural agency show willingness to help, but
their number is small and their time is devoted to bureaucratic processes related to
agricultural subsidies. " [Agia Apple Cooperative Administrator]
"Ideally, a collective scheme needs to startfrom us, thefarmers, not the State. When you
find yourself in a strong need then it is too late. Therefore it needs to start from people
who have some knowledge and future prospects. The remaining farmers have to follow
and support those people without a sly attitude, for example to deliver only the inferior
quality of apples. They have to believe in the collective scheme. Regarding the
commanders and employees of the new scheme, the oldpractices must stop. They elected
persons in the AAC based on political identities rather than on qualifications and
knowledge. A high school degree is not enough to govern a cooperative, or the bonds of
relatives are not the reason to employ someone without the necessaiy qualifications.
Meritocracy is crucial. The localfarmers have objectively insufficient skills to manage a
cooperative. Therefore, we need to hire people with the proper expertise, and give them
incentives to work for the new collective scheme, to search for new markets. Some of
them will be responsible for marketing, others for agricultural support to the
farmers...These need to be done from people who want to work hard...The most
important is the cooperative or farmer group to not be as farmer cooperatives operate
today, but to show the professionalism of a private firm. I mean we cannot be a
charitable foundation. The market rules are strict and hard. We ought to be first in
quality, competitive in all aspects, ... and determined on the battles we have to give
within the collective scheme, for instance with the farmers supplying inferior quality,
with the employees who do not fulfil their duties, and with the commanders, managers
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who seems inactive to explain why ...Otherwise with the tolerance and lack ofdiscipline
of the ACC, we cannot have any progress. " [Agia Apple Cooperative Administrator]
"The AAC's image is bad. However, the Agia farmers' doubts against the AAC are not
expressed openly, so as a new board ofdirectors, we have not the opportunity to explain
to them that things have dramatically changed now." [Agia Apple Cooperative
Administrator]
"The Agia farmers think that they solved the problem, if today they manage to be given
0.10 Euros by the trader, when they bend and kiss his hand. They do not reckon that next
year, they will lose these gains and be treated unfairly. Moreover, they tend to pretend




APPENDIX II - Questionnaires & Matrices for Chapter 4
A. QUESTIONNAIRE TO THE GENERAL MANAGER
A) INTRODUCTION
-Describe briefly please the enterprise
(present organisation structure; its current capabilities which give sustainable
advantage; firm's objectives and future plans)
- How it happened to get involved to this enterprise?
B) DESCRIPTION OF NETWORK (1st objective to identify the key-interviewees of
my research)
- Some enterprises of agrifood sector maintain relationships with other private
enterprises, public consulting agencies, cooperatives or people, in order to collect
information/ advice/know-how about: (included in other Figure B)
- market (e.g. demand trends, consumers' preferences, prices, competitors)
- processes such as quality certification, distribution, processing
- technology (e.g. production methods, IT)
- food safety legislation and legislation of environmental protection
- CAP
- public/EU initiatives (e.g. EU projects)
- innovative solution in production, marketing, etc.
Staff availability and capabilities
- potential business partners
- capital sources
- training, education
Do you behave in the same way? If yes, please give me some details with w hom and
w hat kind of relationship you maintain?
- Are there specific etc. producer of raw materials or exporters w ho you prefer to
have relationships instead of others? Why?
- Are there any friends or relatives who participate/influence in any w ay your
business activity?
For each of these relationships referred could you describe the questions below:
- How it happened to know about the other firm/agency... and start a
relationship with?
- Did you use specific criteria to select those w ith whom you establish a
relationship? What result do vou expect to have this relationship for you
and the other (s)?
- What have vou offered/invested to establish and maintain this relationship?
How much easy it is? How much important are you deem each relationship
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separately for your firm's growth? How you would characterise the nature
of each relationship? Any special ties (e.g. friends, family-ties,...)?
-Are there any rules, procedures or norms (written or not) established in
your inter-firm relationships? Please give us more details (what, who and
why establishes them, how do you characterise them)
-Until now, how would you characterise the outcome of each relationship?
Cost/benefits? Does it meet vour expectations? How you react when this
match does not satisfy vou? Are you thinking/planning to make any change
in existing inter-firm relationships? How much easy to expect this to be?
-Do you any shared-learning experience with other firm or agencies? Please
describe it.
C) DESCRIPTION OF EVOLUTION OF NETWORK OVER THE TIME
- Over the time, some firms have noticed changes in the relationships with other
forms/agencies/ people compared to the past, particularly in (it will be included in
Figure C):
- identity of firms/agencies
- number of firms/agencies
- resources exchanged
- your expectations of the relationship
- your motivation to establish a new relationship
- actual benefit gained
- actual costs occurred
- easiness/difficulty to establish/maintain/break a relationship
- degree of impact on your firm
Do you have noticed something similar? If yes, please give us more details.
- Are you satisfied or not by these changes?
- Can you predict if any more changes will happen in the future? What feeling it
creates to you this prediction?
D) ANALYSE FACTORS INFLUENCING THIS EVOLUTION
-According to your opinion w hat might cause these changes in firm relationships
with others? (any change in your firm's needs/objectives/ strategies over time, or any
change in your firm's environment, which you think is related to these changes)
-To w hat extent is your firm tried to stimulate or avoid them? Why?
- What determine your attitude tow ai ds the relationships of your firm with others?
How?
- Is there any external stimulus (e.g. incentives, obligation, initiative) for increase
consciously (by intention) relationships w ith others, offered by any public or
private agency? Please give us more details about it. (What, when, how did you come
in conduct, did you participate in a training or project, what did you learn by this
experience)
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- Have you found any particular obstacle/problem in establishing/ maintain/ break
any kind of firm relationship with others? Please give us more details about it.
(What, how it influences negatively your (networking) activity, how did you try to
overcome it, was it successful this effort)
- How you manage conflicts with other firms? Is there any mediator? Please give us
more details about it. (what type of conflict, how is it resolved, what the role of
mediator, how does conflict influence inter-firm relationships)
- What did you suggest that it could enhance your (networking) activity? Are there
any issues/problems that you are not enough confident how to tackle them? What
kind of help, you suggest, can be efficient?
- Identify those features of your firm relationships that you think are good, so it is
important to be maintained? How, you suggest, this can be done? Who should take
care of it?
- Identify those features of your firm relationships that you think that they
constitute their 'dark side', so it is important to be identified and minimised?
Please think when you felt 'that something does not go well' in a business
relationship or 'this relationship is unhealthy'? How did you try to defend against
these aspects of a relationship?
E) COOPERATION, COLLECTIVE ACTION, LEADERSHIP (Actually, it is sub¬
category of D. but I think it is important to have them separetly)
- Could you please describe us w hat cooperation means for you? Please give us
more details and examples about it (definition, are there any principles, how much
easy is to establish cooperation; are there any critical points in this procedure)
- What can lead to collective action in business world? And how?
- What capabilities/features of Mr. Blauel do you think help him in his effort as a
leader?
(How close (level of conduct) are you feel to him)
F) ASSESS THE CONSEQUENCES OF NETWORK AND COLLECTIVE
ACTION ON FIRM PERFORMANCE AND LOCAL COMMUNITY
- Some firms consider that relationships w ith others (enterprises/ agencies/ people)
and the way that these relationships evolve over time
influence up to an extent your firm's: (It will be included in Figure D)
- financial performance
- sustainability within a changeable environment
- management style, attitudes
- structure
- way of operation (e.g. the used production or information technology is selected
in a way to increase compatibility with suppliers/customers and further efficiency
and flexibility)
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- innovation, quality improvement
- decision making process
- strategy design and implementation
- way of servicing consumers.
So, these firms take decisions about design and application of business
activity having in mind these relationships, how they have evolved and how firms
w ant these relationships to evolve in future. Some other firm consider that
relationships with others do not influence the firm performance, so they ignore
them in design and application of business activity. What is your opinion about all
these? And how do you behave in practice?
- How much easy is to assess the impact of the firm's relationships with others?
- Are there relationships whose the wav that thev have been evolve over time, do
you think that, is beneficial or damaging for the firm? Give examples.
- Do you think that the business initiative have influence the local social and
economic prosperity? If yes, how ? Give us some examples.
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